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1. Introduction
This book provides an assessment of Latin America’s1 twentieth-century economic 
performance and policy from a comparative and historical perspective. The theory 
and empirics of economic growth have come to be the focus of attention once 
again. Surveying the literature, one sees many new interesting ideas and the 
rediscovery of older, somewhat forgotten ones. The empirical work -  and this 
book is in that tradition -  concentrates on determining trends and main sources of 
growth in a cross-section of countries. Economic growth in Latin America is 
explained on two levels: (a) proximate and measurable influences which are 
captured in the growth accounts; (b) causes of a more ultimate character, that is, 
qualitative and institutional influences which are more difficult to measure.
The analysis of economic performance concentrates on the quantification of 
economic growth, long-run estimates of GDP growth and the measurement of 
factor inputs and total factor productivity. Another important element of this study 
is an international comparison with countries outside the region, both developed 
and developing. Maddison (1991a) defines proximate causes o f growth as:
those areas of causality where measures and models have been developed by 
economists and statisticians. Here the relative importance of different influences can be 
more readily assessed. At this level one can derive significant insights from comparative 
macroeconomic growth accounts, (p. 11)
Through growth accounting it is possible to identify and quantify the proximate 
causes o f growth but no light is shed on the ultimate causes o f growth.
This study is for the most part eminently empirical in nature, and presents long­
term series not available until now for several variables which can serve to analyse 
Latin American growth, levels o f performance, and phases when growth 
accelerated or decelerated. For the 1950-94 period, a growth accounting analytical 
framework is presented using a total factor productivity analysis in which step-by- 
step explanatory factors are listed, and given their weight in ‘explaining’ economic 
growth in the sample of countries. Growth accounting shows the contribution of 
factor inputs (capital, labour and land) and total factor productivity to output 
growth. For these quantitative growth accounts long-term GDP and capital 
formation series were required which permit analysis o f GDP (per capita) and 
labour productivity developments since 1900.
1
2 The Economic Development of Latin America
This kind of growth accounting exercise may serve different purposes such as 
explaining differences in growth rates between countries, illuminating the process 
of convergence and divergence, assessing the role of technical progress and 
calculating potential output losses. Growth accounting cannot provide a full causal 
explanation. It deals with ‘proximate’ rather than ‘ultimate’ causality and records 
the facts about growth components: it does not explain the underlying elements of 
policy or circumstance, national or international, but it does identify which facts 
need further explanation.
Ultimate causes are those factors related to economic growth which are 
difficult to quantify in economic or statistical models. They include the role of 
institutions, ideologies, pressures of socioeconomic interest groups, historical 
accidents, and economic policy at the national level (Maddison, 1991a). They also 
involve consideration of the international economic order, foreign ideologies or 
shocks originating in friendly or unfriendly neighbours. The ultimate sources of 
Latin American performance are less clearly established than its proximate causes 
and constitute an extremely interesting area for further research. The contribution 
of this book to the understanding of the role of these ultimate sources in economic 
growth is only modest. Chapter 2 analyses some of the topics to be included in the 
realm of ultimate sources, such as the institutional set-up, social capabilities and 
path dependency. In Chapter 7 policy and international context are analysed.
It should be stressed that the proximate causes are not independent o f the 
ultimate causes of growth. To a rather significant degree proximate causes are 
dimensions through which ultimate causes can be seen to operate. However, the 
importance of interaction and interdependency between the different sources of 
growth is emphasised. On the proximate level the interaction between capital 
accumulation and technological progress is an example of this interdependence. 
On the ultimate level there exists interaction between the institutional framework 
of a society and the implementation of economic policy. An example of 
interdependence between the ultimate and proximate levels is the relationship 
between technological progress and the institutional context.
In this book Latin American performance is compared with three other groups 
of countries: (a) two rapidly growing Asian countries (Korea and Taiwan) whose 
economic growth in the past couple of decades has been remarkably fast; (b) 
Portugal and Spain, whose institutional heritage had a good deal in common with 
Latin America; and (c) six advanced capitalist countries (France, Germany, Japan, 
the Netherlands, UK and USA), whose levels o f income and productivity are 
among the highest in the world.
Judging from the performance of several countries in the early 1990s, it would 
seem that Latin America is now climbing out of the depths of one of the most 
profound crises of the twentieth century. The ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s was 
characterised by low or negative real economic growth, huge external 
indebtedness, great macroeconomic instability represented by two to three digit
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inflation, fiscal crisis, and great distortions in resource allocation. Some lessons 
can be learned from studying Latin America in a comparative perspective.
-  There are lessons from the lost decade, which was a period of stagnation rather 
than growth. The situation in Latin America in the 1980s was highly unusual, 
with slow or negative growth. Although other regions also experienced lower 
growth, this did not lead to negative total factor productivity. The implication 
is that policy at that time was less efficient in Latin America than in many other 
areas.
-  In the period 1950-80 Latin America was not an outlier. Total factor 
productivity was then positive as it was in other regions. Total factor 
productivity growth was fastest in Europe, followed by the Asian developing 
countries and the Latin American countries. Growth accounting, o f course, 
accounts only for the so-called proximate causes. An evaluation of policy, 
institutions and shocks of an internal or external character is important, in order 
to be able to get a frilly rounded view of growth performance and of the 
efficacy of countries.
Previous work on economic growth accounting in Latin America has 
concentrated mainly on detailed studies of specific country experience. This book, 
by contrast, takes a comparative view of a substantial array of countries, within and 
outside Latin America. Unlike some recent econometric analysis it does not use a 
maximalist approach, where available data are used without regard to their quality. 
In this study great attention is given to the construction of comparable series, 
which data are reasonably reliable. A very important element of this study is the 
transparency of the methodology used. The complete description of the sources 
gives the reader the opportunity to judge the quality of the available information. 
This is the reason for the inclusion of appendices in which the basic series are 
given together with a description of methodology and sources.
In Chapter 2 some of Latin America’s most salient characteristics, such as 
unequal income distribution, persistent macroeconomic instability and the 
institutional context, are analysed in a historical perspective. This historical 
perspective is important because some of the roots of these characteristics might be 
found, for example, in pre-Columbian society, the colonial period or in the 
relatively early independence of Latin America compared to other developing 
regions. This study provides a short, not exhaustive, description of some of the 
most important characteristics of Latin America in comparison especially with the 
United States. In this context it is interesting to compare Latin America with the 
United States because both belong to the same hemisphere, were ‘discovered’ at 
the same time by European countries, and had very substantial natural resources 
endowment by world standards. Now, however, income levels in Latin America 
and the United States are quite different and the latter leads the world in
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productivity. The first element to be analysed is the physical endowment of Latin 
America followed by the institutional framework, inequality, human capital, debt, 
foreign trade and inflation to finish with policy and ideology.
A long-run perspective of growth acceleration and slowdown in Latin America 
compared with the other groups of countries is presented in Chapter 3. Labour 
productivity for the 1913-94 period shows some additional evidence concerning 
the cycles of acceleration and deceleration of growth in the twentieth century. Per 
capita GDP showed recovery in the 1989-94 period after the negative growth in 
the lost decade of the 1980s. The analysis of the business cycle and comparison of 
similarities and differences in the periods commonly used are also studied in this 
chapter. The main causes of cyclical instability, either of an internal or external 
nature, are identified.
In Chapter 4, which deals with the human capital dimension, I analyse the 
results with respect to employment, unemployment and annual days worked. This 
section also takes into consideration the quality aspects of the population as 
reflected in educational levels. The results with respect to physical capital are the 
subject of Appendix G and Chapter 5. Appendix G gives a systematic comparison 
of previous capital stock estimates in Latin America. The lack of comparable 
estimates of fixed capital stocks for Latin American countries has long hindered 
analysis of economic development within the region as well as comparison with 
other developing and developed countries. Chapter 5 attempts to fill this gap by 
providing estimates of gross and net fixed capital stock for the six Latin American 
countries selected. The estimates have been generated by employing the ‘perpetual 
inventory method’ currently used by most OECD countries to estimate their capital 
stocks, and hence the most appropriate in an international comparison.
Chapter 6 presents a causal analysis of Latin American post-war development 
using the methodology of the growth accounts, providing for labour and capital a 
detailed breakdown of their components and indicating the weighting procedure of 
all inputs (including land) into a measure of augmented total factor input. 
Performance and policy of Latin America in the post-war period is analysed in 
Chapter 7. An overall description of policy and performance in the Latin American 
region is given. The chapter concludes with a description of the major policy 
issues on which consensus has been reached and the ones which are still subject to 
debate.
In eight appendices, the complete series, sources and measurement procedures 
are presented. Appendix A contains long-term population series from 1820-1995. 
Appendix B provides time series for GDP, levels of GDP and GDP per capita both 
in national currencies and international dollars. Some basic quantification with 
respect to the labour market is given in Appendix C, which presents activity rates, 
employment, educational level of the population and labour productivity series 
from 1950 onwards, as well as estimates of hours worked. Estimates for total and 
disaggregated capital formation for the 1900-1994 period, which are the essential
Introduction 5
building blocks for the construction of capital stock estimates using the ‘Perpetual 
Inventory Method’, are presented in Appendix D. Appendix E presents the 
standardised estimates with respect to the fixed capital stock, both in national 
currencies and international dollars. Appendix F presents import and export series 
in current dollars as well as indices representing volume movement. Appendix G 
gives the evolution of consumer prices on a year-to-year basis. Appendix H 
consists of previous non-standardised capital stock estimates and examines in 
some detail the history of capital stock and national wealth estimation in Latin 
America in the twentieth century.
NOTE
1. Latin America refers, if not indicated otherwise, to: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela, which cover around 80 per cent of Latin America’s population, territory and 
GDP, see also Chapter 3 for a description of our sample. The origin of the term Latin America 
is not totally clear. Bushnell and Macauly (1988) attribute it to the Colombian José Maria 
Torres Caicedo in 1856 while Annino (1995) gives Fiance as the origin, citing one of Napoleon 
ffl’s advisors on imperial projects as having used the term.

2. Some Distinctive Characteristics of Latin 
America over the Long Run
There is a consensus among analysts that the origin of some of the most pressing 
problems of Latin America, for example unequal income distribution and 
macroeconomic instability, can be found in its history. It is for this reason that I do 
not keep as strictly to the twentieth century in this chapter as I do elsewhere. The 
colonial period and the achievement of independence, which came rather early in 
Latin America compared to other developing regions, are important in 
understanding the Latin American reality. A short description is presented o f some 
of the most important characteristics of Latin America especially in comparison 
with the United States, another ex-colony in the same hemisphere. The initial 
situation as regards natural resources endowment was not better in the United 
States than in Latin America, but the United States became the world productivity 
leader.
NATURAL RESOURCE ENDOWMENT
The relationship between the natural resource endowment of a country and its 
economic development is not straightforward. Long-run empirical evidence shows 
that the availability of natural resources is not a decisive factor in economic 
development. There are examples of resource-rich countries that have grown 
rapidly over the long term while others have had only a modest economic 
performance. On the other hand there are examples of countries, despite being very 
poor in natural resources, that have grown at a spectacular pace.
In economic theory, the classical economists assigned a very important role to 
the impact of natural resources on the growth potential of an economy. Adam 
Smith stressed the availability of land as a factor in economic growth.1 Ricardo and 
Malthus were quite pessimistic about the availability of natural resources for 
growth. More recent studies, like those prepared by the Club of Rome, stress the 
same point. However, it has become clear that technological advances have 
increased the productivity of agriculture enormously and that technology and 
geological prospecting have also increased proven reserves and the yield of 
mineral resources.
7
8 The Economic Development of Latin America
A great variety of arguments are presented in the literature about the effects, 
both positive and negative, o f natural resources on development. On the positive 
side the availability of minerals, fertile soil, climate or geographic location present 
the opportunity to capture economic rents to be used for accelerated economic 
growth. Negative elements regularly mentioned are the effect o f deterioration due 
to the structural transformation process, affecting a country’s pattern of 
international trade, hindering efficient resource allocation, inducing rent-seeking 
behaviour, formation of dual economies and Dutch disease effects.
In a comparative perspective the Latin American advantage in natural 
resources is overwhelming. Total land area per head in 1950 in Latin America was 
two or three times the level in the United States (which is the best endowed 
developed country among those considered), and more than 20 times that of South 
East Asia (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Total Land Area per Head o f Population, 1900-1994 (hectares per 
capita)
1900 1950 1994
Argentina 58.3 16.0 8.0
Brazil 47.3 15.9 5.3
Chile 25.2 12.3 5.4
Colombia 26.0 8.7 3.0
Mexico 14.0 6.9 2.1
Venezuela 34.7 17.3 4.1
Korea 1.1 0.5 0.2
Taiwan 1.3 0.5 0.2
Portugal 1.7 1.1 0.9
Spain 2.7 1.8 1.3
Ranee 1.4 1.3 0.9
Germany 1.1 0.7 0.5
Japan 0.9 0.5 0.3
Netherlands 0.7 0.3 0.2
UK 0.6 0.5 0.4
USA 12.5 6.3 3.7
Source: Appendix A, FAO, Production Yearbook, various issues and Maddison (1995).
The Western Hemisphere together with Australia is often referred to as 
‘empty’.2 They are ‘countries of recent settlement’. Land was obviously the most 
abundantly available natural resource in these ‘empty’ countries and offered a great 
opportunity for economic development. Mineral resources have also had a great 
impact on economic development in Latin America since the colonial period.
Adam Smith (1776) was one of the first writers to emphasise differences in the 
use of the land between the English and the Spanish colonies, and the relationship 
between land use and economic development. Among the factors limiting 
productive use of land he mentioned engrossment, rights of primogeniture, taxes
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and levies and a restrictive trade system. The land system introduced by the 
Spanish, the ‘encomienda’, granted large properties to ‘conquistadores’ as well as 
the right to exploit indigenous labour more or less like serfs. The ‘encomienda’ 
was gradually replaced by the ‘hacienda’ which was the form of landownership 
that prevailed at the end of the colonial period.
However, it is important to note that during the colonial period Spain was not 
at all interested in agriculture and most part o f its energies went into obtaining gold 
and silver. The first source was, of course, the gold already found by native 
Americans from alluvial sources. The second step was to expand alluvial gold 
mining. The third step was the introduction of the mercury amalgamation 
technique which improved the efficiency of extraction and made the mining of 
lower grade silver ore possible. Mining developments generally created mineral 
rents that helped to maintain external equilibrium. But it produced a pattern of 
resource use that made the distribution of income worse, the economy less 
diversified, export earnings more concentrated on primary products. Mineral 
development may well have caused a lower growth rate in the non-mining sectors 
of the economy than otherwise would have occurred (Lewis, 1984).
In the colonial period, the Southern Cone countries, Argentina and Chile, 
established a system of great landed estates, haciendas or latifundios. Argentina 
(Río de la Plata in colonial times) was an impoverished colony. It was only during 
the second half o f the eighteenth century that exports o f hides provided an 
indication of the enormous potential of this rich and fertile country (Diaz- 
Alejandro, 1983 and Cortés Conde, 1985). Chile, which had some mining but 
nothing on the scale of the silver mines of Peru and Bolivia, experienced a great 
expansion of livestock herds in the seventeenth century to meet the strong demand 
for leather and for fats for making candles and soap. The eighteenth century saw 
the transformation of Chile’s pastoral economy when it captured the Peruvian 
market for wheat (Carióla and Sunkel, 1985).
Brazil was somewhat different as it was colonised by Portugal and mining was, 
initially, relatively unimportant. Portugal did not exercise as strong an authority as 
Spain did on its colonies. The plantation economy introduced in the sixteenth 
century, when Brazil became the world’s most important producer and exporter of 
sugar, also had distinct characteristics compared to the rest o f Latin America, 
particularly the use of slave labour on a great scale. Like the Southern Cone 
countries, Brazil was only sparsely populated at the time of conquest. Two 
centuries after Columbus’ discovery of the Americas, gold was found in Minas 
Gerais and the subsequent discovery of diamonds in 1729 generated an era of 
spectacular opulence that lasted into the second half o f the eighteenth century 
(Cardoso and Helwege, 1992).
Agriculture in Mexico towards the end of the colonial period was a hacienda 
system with great church estates. Production on these haciendas was mainly self- 
sufficient and only partly directed to the market. Most agricultural production was
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for domestic consumption. There were also a few export crops such as dyes for the 
booming European textiles industry, cacao, vanilla and henequen. These haciendas 
were not ‘feudal’ as was originally claimed, especially by the Berkeley school 
(Borah, 1951), as they were connected to domestic markets, especially in 
supplying workers for the mining industry and urban settlements. Although some 
plantations were developed in Mexico, for example for sugar cane, these were 
never as important as in Brazil. Mexico’s agriculture was basically oriented to the 
domestic market.
Independence was seen by many as a great opportunity for Latin America to 
accelerate its economic development.3 The new opportunities for trade, now that 
the region was no longer hindered by Spanish regulations, and access to 
international capital are regularly mentioned as potentially the most important 
factors for inducing faster development. Most scholars point to the beginning of 
the nineteenth century as the starting point of accelerated capitalist development, 
with much faster growth than in the ‘protocapitalist’ period from 1500-1820 
(Maddison, 1991a). However, Latin America did not enjoy the same acceleration 
as achieved in Europe and the United States, because the first half of the nineteenth 
century was devoted to political consolidation of independence and the formation 
of more stable political and economic regimes. Brazil and Chile were the first to 
form stable regimes and suffered less from political instability than other countries, 
especially Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.
During the first half century after independence, Argentina’s considerable land- 
based natural resources remained undeveloped, as the country was immersed, most 
of the time, in political turmoil. Diaz-Alejandro (1983) claimed that a political and 
social framework compatible with export-oriented growth was established in 
Argentina only shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century. By 1880 the best 
land on the Pampas had been appropriated in a manner leading to concentrated 
ownership. All exports were based upon natural resource wealth, especially land, 
and the first exports were wool, hides and salted meat, to which wheat, com and 
linseed were added. Later on frozen beef exports became important. Brazil 
experienced an agricultural revival at the end of the eighteenth century based on its 
plantation economy. First sugar, later cotton and, at the end of the colonial period, 
coffee were to become extremely important in Brazil.
Mining, which had not been particularly important in Chile during the colonial 
period became prominent after independence. Chile then experienced an 
expansion based on exports of gold, silver and copper, followed in the 1850s and 
1860s by substantial trade in grain. The grain exports originating from the area 
around the capital, Santiago, and the south, were very important during parts of the 
nineteenth century. This expansion was ended by the War of the Pacific in 1879. 
After the war, with the incorporation of the provinces of Tarapaca and 
Antofagasta, a second major cycle of expansion began. This cycle reached its 
height about 1920 and ended with the Great Depression of the 1930s. The boom in
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nitrate production in the provinces of the Norte Grande relegated grain and flour 
exports to a secondary role (Cariola and Sunkel, 1985).
The export-oriented development strategy of Latin America continued at least 
until 1913. It was after the Great Depression of 1929-33 that the debate: on 
industrialisation as a development strategy assumed importance in many countries. 
Industrial development was promoted after the Great Depression and during 
World War II as imports became scarce. This policy was at the expense of 
agricultural exports though mining exports remained important. Many authors 
have indicated that the process of industrialisation had already started long before 
the Great Depression4 but the import substitution strategy was intensified after the 
World War II and was maintained longer than many commentators, often in 
retrospect, thought necessary.
In the economic development of Latin America in the twentieth century, 
natural resources remained a very important element. Currently in all countries the 
single most important export product is a primary product.5 Several countries have 
added manufactures to their exports, but only in Mexico and Brazil do these 
represent more than 50 per cent of total exports. Recently, since the debt crisis of 
the 1980s, there has been some indication of change in Latin America’s 
development strategy. Chile is the prime example of a country which, after a 
process of macroeconomic stabilisation and economic restructuring, adopted a 
strategy based upon its abundant natural resources. The growth of the natural- 
resource based export sector has given new momentum, through forward and 
backward linkages, to the entire economy which has been growing at a rate of over 
6 per cent for more than 10 years.
INSTITUTIONS
The institutional set-up and its relation to economic growth, a subject normally 
located in the sphere of the so-called ultimate causality, is extremely important 
and, in the case of Latin America, further study of the relationship between growth 
and institutions can be very useful. Institutions provide the incentive structure of a 
society and they comprise the formal rules, constitutions, laws and regulations; and 
informal constraints, conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of 
conduct, and their enforcement characteristics (North, 1993). In a historical 
context the comparison between Latin America and the United States in terms of 
the institutional set-up might explain part of the difference in performance. North 
refers to the idea of path dependence, originated by David (1985) and Arthur 
(1988), and applied it to institutional evolution, indicating that once on a particular 
path economies find it very hard to fundamentally change direction because of the 
built-in characteristics of institutions. His striking comparison between the 
institutional evolution of Spain and England and the consequences for the
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subsequent course of events in Latin and North America provides a striking 
illustration of the role of path dependency (see also North, 1990).
In this respect the ‘social capability’,6 that enhanced growth in the successful 
Asian countries, is deficient in Latin America. ‘Social capability’ refers to different 
elements such as the adequacy of the institutional framework, the role of 
government in designing and implementing economic policy and the skill level of 
the population.
During the conquest and the colonial period, Spain was to a large degree 
isolated from the forces important to modernisation in the rest o f Europe, 
especially in Northern Italy. The Renaissance and Enlightenment made possible 
recognition of man’s ability to transform the forces of nature through rational 
investigation and experiment. But Spain retained, to a great extent, medieval 
thinking and medieval ways. The wars of Reconquest against the Moors had 
allowed the Castilian Crown to obtain great wealth. Agriculture, crafts and 
commerce took second place to armed conquest as sources of wealth in the eyes of 
both hidalgos (noblemen) and peasants. It was this way of thinking which induced 
the followers of Hernán Cortés and Francisco Pizarra to seek fame and fortune in 
the new world. This behaviour and its modem, rent-seeking variant, is still, in 
many Latin American countries, an important component of the behaviour of 
economic agents.
In a comparison of institutional development in Latin America and the United 
States during their respective colonial periods, several features become clear.7 The 
level o f interference by the colonial power was much lower in the case of the 
English than in the case of the Spanish. As Smith (1776) noted:
Hie Spanish colonies, therefore, from the moment of their first establishment, attracted
very much the attention of their mother country; while those of the other European
nations were for a long time in a great measure neglected, (p. 612)
Spain deliberately followed a policy of total conquest, modelling the colonies 
on the institutional structure of Spain and destroying the indigenous political and 
cultural institutions, together with indigenous religion and architecture. The other 
colonial powers had a much stronger tendency to a system o f coexistence with 
indigenous institutions.
The Spanish Crown established a centralised, hierarchical system with several 
viceroys,8 who also had responsibility for appointing bishops and therefore 
exercised control over the church. The authority of these viceroys was hardly 
challenged during the whole colonial period.9 Underneath this centralised structure 
there was a complicated method for dispensing favours, land mineral concessions 
and so on, which made it important to be close to power and which partially 
explains the absentee character of landownership.
The indigenous population was considered and treated as inferior. They were 
subjected to military oppression and faced unknown diseases like measles and
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smallpox that caused epidemics with extremely high death rates (Maddison, 1995). 
Later they were subject to cruelty, racism, injustice and indifference, elements 
characteristic o f colonial Latin America which continued to be a feature o f the 
independent Latin American countries.
The labour relations established under Spanish colonial rule were of an 
extremely dependent, debt peonage, and oppressive character. This impeded 
practically all forms of labour mobility and stands in marked contrast to the 
conditions experienced by settlers in the English colonies, who were basically 
independent, working their own land.
An important distinction between the English and Spanish colonies concerns 
the fiscal burden imposed upon them by the colonial power. There are very clear 
indications that taxes in the Spanish colonies were much higher than in the English 
ones. The Crown taxed the production of agricultural estates and mines by levying 
a ‘fifth’. Remittances of profits to Spain were quite high. In the case of the English 
colonies taxes were much lower and basically trade related. There was a big 
difference in the style of government between the English and the Spanish colonies 
in the Americas. The English colonies of North America were split up into 13 
virtually autonomous colonies, while the Spanish featured a highly centralised 
power structure, and their top officials had a sumptuous lifestyle.
The mercantilist restrictions imposed on Latin America by the Spanish were 
much tougher than those on English colonies. They confined all their trade by their 
colonies to a particular port in the mother country; ships were obliged to sail from 
that port, in convoy at a particular season, or, if on their own, only once a special 
licence had been granted, which in most cases was very expensive. Trade was 
limited to a few ports in Latin America and Cadiz and Seville in Spain. The 
monopolistic character of this trade had very detrimental effects on prices, 
production and trade.10 The mercantile policy of Spain and Portugal practically 
prohibited the development of manufacturing industries in Latin America.
One of the institutional arrangements that changed as a result o f independence 
was the new ability to raise capital on the international financial market, which had 
been impossible during the colonial period. It is interesting to note, however, that 
all Latin American governments were in default by the end of the 1820s for a 
myriad of reasons. The colonial period did not prepare them for financial 
independence.
The origins of fiscal irresponsibility can be traced to Spain’s own practices. It 
is an irony of history that when Spain conquered Latin America, its relative power 
was already on the decline in Europe. One reason for this was the establishment of 
more efficient institutional arrangements in several European countries, such as the 
Netherlands and the UK, which were the world productivity leaders until the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The institutional systems of Portugal and Spain 
were very different from those in the more advanced northern European countries
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in terms of religious practice, centralisation of power, the role of science and 
technology and the degree of fiscal responsibility.
Argentina was created as a nation, in the sense of definitively bringing the 
national territory under a single regime, in the third quarter o f the nineteenth 
century. Formal political unity was achieved between 1859-62, with the accession 
of Buenos Aires province to the Argentine Federation. But the issue of governance 
was only resolved in the following two decades, with the closing of the Indian 
frontier in Patagonia, the suppression o f the last regional revolt and the creation of 
a federal district separating the city of Buenos Aires from the province of the same 
name in 1880. Diaz-Alejandro (1970) states:
From 1860 to 1930 Argentina grew at a rate that has few parallels in economic history, 
perhaps comparable only to the performance during the same period of other countries 
of recent settlement, (p. 18)
Differences in the role of central government in the economies o f Latin 
America can be explained partly by political considerations, as well as by differing 
relations with the world economy. The state in Brazil was internally strong and 
internationally respected, while in Mexico the state was internally fragmented and 
internationally dependent. The republicans who took power in Brazil in 1889 
inherited a state with fairly strong institutions that had the support of the elite, since 
Brazil’s path to independence had been smooth. A weak church and the social 
cement of slavery tended to convince the country’s ruling class of the necessity to 
maintain a united front. Arguably, a nation was built and a state formed earlier in 
Brazil than anywhere else in Latin America.
Brazil experienced a peaceful transition to independence. It was much more 
dependent on the world economy than Mexico, its ratio of exports to GDP was 
twice that of Mexico, and exports were concentrated in two commodities, coffee 
and rubber. The Brazilian state relied upon taxes on international trade to a much 
greater degree than Mexico. Foreign exchange was a more pressing concern, since 
Brazil’s foreign debt was twice the size of Mexico’s.
The transformation and the strengthening of the economies of Latin American 
countries occurred at different moments in their national histories, depending on 
the export commodities involved and their relative success in state-building. 
Chile’s economy was affected by overseas demand as early as the 1850s (copper 
exports to Europe and wheat to California), and Argentina and Brazil followed in 
the 1860s. These countries, along with Mexico, then felt the full impact of the 
combined effects o f the European economic expansion, which, as far as Argentina 
and Brazil were concerned, triggered an unprecedented level o f European 
immigration. Chile established a constitutional regime in 1833 and was widely 
admired in Spanish America for its stability. Mexico and Argentina were not to 
have stable regimes until the late 1860s.
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In Colombia the doctrine of economic liberalism went unchallenged from the 
late 1840s until the 1880s. The basic tenet of economic thinking in Colombia until 
the 1940s was economic liberalism. Independence brought a more general 
commitment to economic liberalism in the 1820s by the Colombian government. It 
adopted free trade and attempted both to reform some taxes and to privatise Indian 
communal holdings in accordance with liberal prescriptions. The state that Porfirio 
Díaz seized in 1876 was less secure; Mexico before Diaz had been plagued by 
civil wars, regional rivalries, and foreign invasions. The treasury was plundered, 
foreign credit scant, power splintered and sovereignty mocked. Internal peace and 
external pressures were constant concerns of Diaz.
INEQUALITY OF INCOME AND WEALTH
The distribution of income and wealth in Latin America is extremely unequal in 
comparison with most of the rest of the world, and these levels o f inequality have 
been persistent over time. The roots of this situation can be found in the 
distribution of land, mineral rights and education during the colonial period.
Labour relations inherited from the system of landownership, which tied the 
workers and their families to the land, also caused very uneven initial conditions 
and proved to be a major obstacle to a more equal distribution of income. 
Education of the masses was completely neglected during the colonial period; 
Spain even tried to prevent the population from becoming literate because this was 
deemed dangerous for religious and political reasons. Two particular facets o f the 
colonial period provide a partial explanation of the uneven income distribution in 
Latin America. Unequal income distribution was a legacy from the old colonial 
system of labour exploitation, with slavery in Brazil and peonage elsewhere. 
Restricted access to education was another cause of inequality, and was more 
important than in many Asian countries (Maddison, 1989).
Cardoso and Helwege (1992) describe the roots of inequality as follows:
The colonial division of property had implications not only for the usage of land but for 
the political structure of die region as well. The encomienda system established a landed 
aristocracy that dominated political life for centuries and then shared power as industry 
displaced agriculture as the central economic activity. It established a sharp division 
between the haves and the have-nots, creating a class structure that is extremely 
bifurcated by comparison to other cultures. Problems of unequal income distribution 
and widespread rural poverty that face the region today are rooted in events of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, (p. 37)
The problem of inequality in income and wealth was inherited from the 
colonial period, in which the distribution of assets (principally land) favoured a 
concentration of income, and for most of the post-independence period the
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dynamics of the dominant model of economic development have either preserved 
the existing level o f inequality or have exacerbated it (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).
A long-term view of Latin American income distribution is very difficult to 
obtain because o f huge methodological difficulties.11 In Table 2.2 Gini 
coefficients12 are presented for the 1950-90 period based upon a methodology of 
linking appropriate pairs of Gini coefficients.
Altimir (1987) describes these pairs which were selected on the ground that 
they are comparable with regard to the concept of income, the procedure used for 
measuring income and the geographical coverage of the surveys used to collect the 
data, as well as the units and criteria used by the respective authors in processing or 
adjusting the survey data (see also Altimir, 1992).
A first step in the preparation of Table 2.2 was the selection of a base period 
Gini for which there were reliable estimates of income distribution in the specific 
country. This base period Gini estimate was linked over time to the other available 
estimates. The results indicate that income distribution in Latin America in the 
post-war period either remained the same or worsened. The worsening of the 
income distribution was especially marked after 1980.13
Table 2.2 Latin America: Inequality in Pre-tax14 Income Distribution, 1950-90 
(Gini coefficients around benchmark years)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 0.400 0.419 0.412 0.472 0.423
Brazil - 0.570 0.630 0.619 0.631
Chile - 0.459 0.473 0.522 0.520
Colombia 0.513 0.542 0.516 0.566 0.494
Mexico 0.516 0.606 0.586 0.478 0.523
Venezuela 0.613 0.462 0.494 0.390 0.442
Average Gini 0.510 0.509 0.518 0.507 0.506
Source: Oscar Altimir kindly provided access to his extensive database on income distribution (see also 
Altimir 1997 and 1998). The 1950 estimate for Venezuela is a direct interpolation based upon estimates 
fra-1944 and 1962 from Baptista (1991).15
In Table 2.3 the Latin American countries are compared with the other 
countries of our sample, and the results show markedly higher inequality in Latin 
America than in all the other country groups. There are also reasons to presume 
that these differences have persisted over time. Inequality may have risen 
somewhat in recent decades in the advanced countries.
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Table 2.3 Inequality o f Pre-tax Income o f Households around 1970
Year Gini coefficient
Top decile per capita 








Arithmetic average 0.528 20.8
Korea 1970 0.351 7.6
Taiwan 1959 0.396 7.0
Arithmetic average 0.374 7.3
Spain 1965 0.393
France 1970 0.416 14.4
Germany 1973 0.396 10.5
Japan 1969 0.335 7.5
Netherlands 1967 0.385 10.5
UK 1973 0.344 9.1
USA 1972 0.404 13.5
Arithmetic average 0.382 10.9
Source: If not otherwise mentioned, from sources given in Maddison (1989) and (1995). See Table 2.2 
for Latin American Gini coefficients. Gini coefficients for Spain from Jain (1975).
HUMAN CAPITAL
The renewed interest expressed by the ‘new growth’ theorists in human capital 
highlights once again the importance of this factor in improving productivity and 
growth. A higher level of education permits faster incorporation of technical 
progress and most growth analysts, since Schultz (1961) and Denison (1962), 
attribute an important weight to this factor. Education had an extremely low  
priority during the colonial period in Latin America. Far fewer universities were 
established than in the United States even though the population was much larger. 
To a great degree, the indigenous population went uneducated during the entire 
colonial period. Argentina had moved toward mass primary education as early as 
1860 (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994), and was the first country in Latin America in the 
twentieth century to provide compulsory primary education, paid for by the State, 
for all o f the population (Cortés Conde, 1985).
Brazil’s educational system lagged behind those of most Latin American 
countries. Women were almost totally left out until well into the twentieth century. 
At the end of the colonial period the whole rural and urban population was 
illiterate. The situation had improved somewhat by the end of the nineteenth
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century, especially with respect to the urban population, whose literacy rates 
reached a figure of just below 50 per cent. Education in Chile became a priority 
during the government of José Manuel Balmaceda (1886-91) and major progress 
was made at the primary level (Blakemore, 1992). However, primary education 
became compulsory only in 1920 (Mamalakis, 1976).
The rural indigenous population of Colombia received almost no formal 
education during the colonial period. From the middle of the nineteenth century 
some increase in elementary education took place and the proportion of the 
population able to read reached about 30 per cent at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The National University was founded in 1867 but most professionals 
received their education abroad (see Orlando Melo, 1987 and Safford, 1976).
In Mexico the indigenous population was almost completely denied education 
during the colonial period. The education of the middle and upper classes was 
entirely dominated by the Catholic Church. After independence there was little 
change in education policy. An educational reform was initiated in 1833 but could 
not be fully implemented. During the second half of the nineteenth century 
education was reformed and removed from clerical control, and there was some 
state intervention in favour of popular education. After the Mexican Revolution, 
free compulsory education was introduced but initially coverage was extremely 
low. Table 2.4 shows the evolution, during the second half o f the twentieth 
century, of the situation in Latin America as regards years of primary, secondary 
and higher education.











Argentina 3.9 0.8 0.1 4.7 1.5 0.2 5.0 2.0 0.4 5.1 2.7 0.7
Brazil 1.5 0.2 0.1 2.2 0.6 0.1 3.2 0.9 0.1 3.9 1.3 0.2
Chile 3.6 0.7 0.1 4.4 1.4 0.3 4.9 2.1 0.3 5.3 3.0 0.4
Colombia 2.0 0.3 0.1 3.0 0.9 0.1 3.4 1.4 0.2 4.4 2.4 0.4
Mexico 1.9 0.2 0.0 2.9 0.5 0.1 4.2 1.3 0.2 4.6 1.9 0.4
Venezuela 1.7 0.2 0.0 2.8 0.6 0.1 4.1 1.2 0.2 5.4 2.3 0.4
Note: I refers to primary, II to secondary and III to higher education. 
Source: Appendix C.
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INFLATION
The issue of inflation has generated intense debate in Latin America, especially 
between the so-called monetarists and structuralists. The former see inflation as 
detrimental, and contend that a stable price level is a necessary condition for 
economic growth, whilst the structuralist school regards inflation as an inevitable 
byproduct of economic growth. Simonsen (1964) differentiates the monetarist and 
the structuralist school by the sign of the correlation between growth and inflation. 
For the structuralists this is positive while the monetarists expect it to be negative.
Table 2.5 Experience o f Inflation, 1900-1994 (annual average compound growth 
rates)
1900-13 1913-29 1929-38 1938-50 1950-73 1973-80 1980-94
Argentina n.a 2.2 -0.7 30.6 30.5 189.1 629.1
Brazil -1.6 6.4 -0.2 12.3 31.6 47.0 748.6
Chile 7.3 5.1 6.5 16.4 48.6 236.2 22.3
Colombia 4.6 7.7 3.1 11.7 10.8 27.2 26.4
Mexico 5.3 2.9 2.2 10.0 5.7 22.5 58.9
Venezuela 3.0 1.7 -4.4 6.0 1.8 11.3 28.9
Arithmetic
average 3.7 4.3 1.1 14.5 21.5 88.9 252.4
Korea 30.1 20.0 8.7
Taiwan 7.2 13.0 3.2
Arithmetic
average 18.6 16.5 6.0
Portugal 3.4 23.9 16.7
Spain 6.7 19.6 9.7
Arithmetic
average 5.0 21.7 13.2
France 0.9 12.1 1.4 28.1 5.0 11.1 5.5
Germany 1.3 2.5 -2.2 3.8 2.7 4.8 2.8
Japan 2.8 4.8 1.2 82.4 5.2 9.7 2.1
Netherlands 1.1 2.0 -2.1 7.4 4.1 7.1 2.6
UK 0.9 3.3 -0.7 5.3 4.6 15.8 6.4
USA 1.3 3.1 -2.1 4.5 2.7 8.9 4.5
Arithmetic
average 1.4 4.7 -0.7 21.9 4.1 9.6 4.0
Note: For the Asian and the Iberian countries, no information for the pre-war period was available.
Source: Maddison (1989), IMF (various issues) and Appendix G.
In comparative terms Latin American inflation has been higher than in OECD 
countries, particularly since World War H. One of the most interesting findings is 
the fact that the acceleration of inflation had started well before the 1950s, as a
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matter of fact the starting point is similar to that documented in Table 3.4, which 
shows the growth acceleration in GDP per capita and labour productivity.
Table 2.5 presents the inflationary experience in the twentieth century of a 
sample of 17 countries, and shows that Latin America had the highest inflation of 
all regions in most periods. It also makes clear that the Latin American inflationary 
experience was, surprisingly, not very different from that of the advanced countries 
during the first half of the twentieth century. The advanced countries witnessed 
more or less the same levels of inflation before the Great Depression, and the 
acceleration of inflation during the 1938-50 period was greater than in the case of 
the Latin American countries. However, with the exception of Japan (the country 
that had by far the highest inflation in this period), inflation in the advanced 
countries was somewhat less than in Latin America.
Table 2.5 shows that the big difference occurred after World War II when all 
areas, except Latin America, experienced a reduction in inflationary momentum. In 
the period 1973-80 inflation accelerated in all countries, with Latin America again 
recording the highest rates. While inflation abated in the rest o f the world after 
1980, Latin American inflation accelerated further. In the early 1990s, in the 
context of economic stabilisation and restructuring, most Latin American countries 
were able to drastically reduce their rates of inflation. In particular, Argentina and 
later Brazil which had recorded extremely high rates succeeded in stabilising their 
economies; Chile and Colombia reduced inflation even further, while in Mexico 
and Venezuela inflation increased somewhat.
DEBT PROBLEMS
The recent debt crises of the 1980s and the 1990s are not unprecedented events, 
but part of a chain of recurrent crises throughout the history of Latin America. 
During more than a century and a half the Latin American nations have repeatedly 
experienced international financial storms that greatly damaged their economies 
and strapped them into an apparendy irrevocable succession of boom and bust 
cycles that reinforce underdevelopment (Marichal, 1989).
Foreign capital can foster economic development in various ways, for example 
through increases in the rate of growth of the capital stock, mitigating payment 
problems and helping technology transfer. However, Latin America’s experience 
has been one of booms and crises. Productive use of foreign investment very often 
did not have priority; indeed the first inflow of capital into Latin America shortly 
after independence was used principally for military expenses. Defaults were 
usually followed by a 20- to 30-year drought in access to private credit.
One of the first significant financial waves came in 1822 as newly independent 
Latin American countries attracted European capital for the consolidation of 
independence and trade promotion.16 The financial boom was short-lived,
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however, as debtors and investors overestimated the region’s export earnings 
potential and were also adversely affected by the European financial crisis of 
1825-26; servicing problems and financial panic occurred shortly thereafter in 
1827. The severe losses experienced by creditors helped keep foreign investors 
away from the region for more than two decades. Nevertheless, foreign capital 
returned with some enthusiasm in the 1850s due to expansive forces in some 
European capital markets and the fading memories of the past losses. The second 
wave of credit was also followed by severe payment problems: 58 per cent of Latin 
American public debt to Great Britain was in default by the end of 1880 (ECLAC, 
1965a).
Notwithstanding these earlier problems foreign capital flowed into Latin 
America during the rest o f the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth 
century, although there were other payments crises in the 1870s, triggered by the 
world crisis of 1873, and in 1890, as a result o f the Anglo-Argentine financial 
panic of that year (Marichal, 1989). During this period Latin America managed to 
attract a steadily increasing number of foreign investors, and by the eve of World 
War I the region had become the target of keen competition among the great 
international financial centres.
During World War I capital flows to Latin America slumped, but serious 
payments problems did not develop, in part because exports and payments 
capacities were boosted in wartime. In the 1920s another investment boom ensued, 
followed by the famous crash of the 1930s, which was brought on by the Great 
Depression and the dramatic fall in the region’s export prices. Private capital flows 
dried up almost completely in the fifteen years following the 1929 depression due 
to defaults. It was only after World War II that Latin America’s access to private 
international capital began to be gradually restored.
Immediately following World War II, the region’s foreign finance was heavily 
dependent on direct foreign investment flows and bilateral lending. This was 
complemented by World Bank funding at the end of the 1950s, as that institution 
turned its attention from the reconstruction of Europe to development finance. 
Additional multilateral finance became available in the early 1960s with the 
establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank. Private commercial 
banks had a very low profile in the region’s external finance situation, generally 
limiting themselves to export credits guaranteed by their own government and 
relatively risk-free short-term trade credit. Meanwhile, bond issues were for only 
limited amounts due to investors’ lingering memories of the 1929 crash, and the 
institutional restrictions that limited access to these markets.
The picture changed radically in the 1970s. Capital flows boomed, partly as a 
result o f increased liquidity due to the first oil crisis and partly because of 
increasing Latin American demand. These new inflows were largely provided by 
private commercial banks. A good deal of the flow was in the form of bank credits 
at floating rates of interest, most of them denominated in dollars. The situation
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turned around abruptly in 1981 as world trade prices in dollars fell and interest 
rates increased dramatically (see Table 2.6). From one year to another, net 
transfers to Latin America became negative. The debt crisis of the 1980s caused 
Latin America to change its development strategy. Most countries became 
involved in efforts to achieve stability and made structural changes in their 
economies.
At the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, several Latin 
American countries which had seemingly mastered the crisis o f the 1980s, 
stabilised their economies and introduced or deepened structural reforms, once 
again became attractive to foreign investment. The big inflow o f foreign capital in 
the early 1990s took a variety of forms, for example short-term bonds (Mexico), 
investment in assets in the stock markets (most countries) and also some foreign 
direct investment (Chile).
Table 2.6 Average Real Annual Percentage Interest Rate on Developing Country 
Floating-Rate Debt
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
-11.8 -7.4 -9.7 -6.0 14.6 16.7 15.9
Source: Reisen (1985).
In December 1994 and early 1995 it seemed that Latin America was again 
headed for crisis, triggered once more by Mexico.17 On 20 December, the newly 
elected Mexican government devalued the peso and, having accumulated large 
external liabilities, provoked a tremendous fall in confidence in Mexico and in the 
rest of Latin America. This caused a ‘tequila’ effect, entailing the reversal of 
capital flows in some countries and a massive sell-off of assets in the stock markets 
which fell steeply in almost all countries.
Some countries are in better shape than others, for example Chile, because it 
had already introduced profound economic reforms and had a positive, copper 
influenced, trade balance; and Brazil, still on the path o f reforming the economy, 
but having rather high reserves, as well as a positive trade balance and a relatively 
low current account deficit compared to Argentina and especially Mexico. The 
renewed reversal of capital flows to Latin America and the increase in interest rates 
caused negative effects in several countries, particularly in Mexico and Argentina, 
which both went into recession, and Venezuela and Colombia, both immersed, for 
different reasons, in severe political crises.
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THE MOVE FROM OPEN TO CLOSED ECONOMIES -  
1929-1980s
Latin America’s role in the world economy is a story of ups and downs. During the 
colonial period trade was officially limited only to Spain and Portugal, although 
smuggling became increasingly important. After independence there was freer 
trade and although initial political instability did not help the export sector, exports 
increased in some countries, for example Chile, and Latin America’s terms o f trade 
probably improved as prices of imports fell after the termination o f the colonial 
monopoly.
Table 2.7 Variations in Volume o f Merchandise Exports, 1870—1994 (average 
annual compound growth rates)
1870-1913 1913-50 1950-73 1973-94
Argentina 5.2 1.6 3.1 5.8
Brazil 1.8 1.7 4.7 8.9
Chile 3.4 1.4 2.4 8.8
Colombia 2.0 3.9 3.8 5.7
Mexico 5.9 -0.5 4.3 9.7
Venezuela 4.1 5.4 4.1 -1.9
Arithmetic average 3.7 2.3 3.7 6.2
Korea 0.0 -1.3 20.3 12.6
Taiwan 4.8 2.6 16.3 10.8
Arithmetic average 2.4 0.7 18.3 11.7
Portugal n.a. n.a. 5.7 8.5
Spain n.a. n.a. 9.4 8.2
Arithmetic average n.a. n.a. 7.5 8.4
France 2.8 1.1 8.2 4.4
Germany 4.1 -2.8 12.4 4.0
Japan 8.5 2.0 15.4 6.2
Netherlands 2.3 1.5 10.3 4.3
UK 2.8 0.0 3.9 3.9
USA 4.9 2.2 6.4 5.1
Arithmetic average 4.2 0.7 9.4 4.7
Source: Maddison (1995).
At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, Latin 
America was relatively open to world trade, exporting primary products and 
importing capital goods and consumer durables. The Great Depression marked a 
change in trade history as, first, the de facto exclusion from the world market, and 
second, import substitution policies caused Latin America to turn away from 
international trade. More recently, as a result o f the debt crisis but also due to 
severe problems with the import substitution strategy, there has been a renewed
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trend to use trade as an engine o f growth.
Latin America has always been an exporter of primary commodity exports: in 
the colonial period, first minerals like silver and gold, and later on agricultural 
products like sugar and coffee. Surprisingly, for all the countries of our sample the 
first export product, by value, is actually still a primary commodity: coffee in the 
case of Brazil and Colombia, oil in Mexico and Venezuela, maize in Argentina 
and copper in Chile. In the section dealing with natural resources, it was pointed 
out that some Latin American countries had been quite successful in entering the 
world market on the basis o f agricultural and mining products.
In Table 2.7 the export performance o f Latin America, in terms o f volume 
growth rates, is compared with other regions. At the beginning of the century Latin 
America’s performance was similar to the rest of the world. The 1913-50 period 
was much better for Latin America, among other reasons because it was not that 
directly affected by the World Wars.
In 1950-73 the export performance of Latin America in comparison with the 
rest o f the world was extremely poor. Latin America did not profit from the rapid 
expansion of trade opportunities, indeed Latin American trade barriers and 
protection were increased. The data presented for the 1973-94 period were 
disaggregated in the case of Latin America to show somewhat higher overall 
growth rates in the 1980-94 period. Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela had 
higher growth rates in 1980-94 than in 1973-80. Brazil had similar growth rates 
in both periods and Chile and especially Mexico had lower growth rates in the 
1980-94 period.
POLITICAL AND POLICY INSTABILITY
One of the points stressed by many authors is the importance of ideology in Latin 
America’s macroeconomic management as opposed to the more pragmatic 
approach followed, for example, by some Asian newly industrialising countries.
As has been indicated above, in the discussion on institutions, economic policy 
in Latin America during the colonial period was guided principally by the 
mercantilist doctrine imposed by Spain. After independence a shift can be 
observed towards a more laissez-faire orientation. At the end o f the nineteenth 
century free trade and liberal commercial policies had favourable effects on 
economic growth. However, Latin America already had quite high levels of 
protection compared to other regions in the world.
The 1930s are widely regarded as a major turning point in Latin America’s 
development. The decade marks the acceleration of import-substituting 
industrialisation and the start of public policy more concerned with growth and 
social objectives. An important element was the emergence o f strong protectionism 
and nationalism in most of the advanced countries. By the end of 1931 most Latin
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American countries were experimenting with balance of payments measures 
previously regarded as heterodox.
As a result of the unfavourable shocks of the Great Depression, the Latin 
American policy mix changed more by force of circumstance than deliberate 
strategy. The countries of the region abandoned the gold standard, imposed 
exchange controls and discriminatory trade restrictions (such as quotas, tariffs, and 
multiple exchange rate systems) on imports of consumer goods, and adopted 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. This set of policies has been called 
the model of domestically-oriented growth. Import-competing manufacturing 
activities were given an advantage not only through protective trade policies, but 
also through tax and credit incentives. Specifically, the dynamic growth 
component, instead of being the export sector as it was before the Great 
Depression, was private and public investment in import-substituting industries 
and public investment in infrastructure geared to these industries’ needs (Corbo, 
1988).
Latin America abandoned economic orthodoxy in the beginning of the 1930s 
with remarkable success. Most Latin American countries had by 1932 erected 
exchange control barriers, raised tariffs, devalued very substantially and begun to 
default on foreign debt. In thus breaking away from the liberal international 
economic order and gold standard rules they felt able to follow expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies to promote recovery (Maddison, 1985). The drastic 
experience of recession in the independent countries of Latin America had induced 
a change in attitudes towards the liberal international economic order, and an 
inward-looking approach to development which had its first successes in the 1930s 
(Maddison, 1985).
After World War n , when the advanced countries embarked on a period of 
growth characterised by dismantling of barriers to international trade and capital 
and so on, Latin America’s policies did not change much and came to be 
characterised as ‘structuralism’ (Corbo, 1988). The main characteristic was 
promotion of industrialisation for the domestic market. Import substitution was 
implemented by a set of policies designed to shift the domestic terms of trade 
between agriculture and industry in favour of the latter. The major tool was the 
trade regime. Moreover, in these years of increasing intervention, the state itself 
often became directly involved in import-substitution industrialisation by setting up 
public enterprises in highly protected sectors, such as steel, petroleum, and 
chemicals. One of the major results of this policy was discrimination against 
exports (Corbo, 1988).
In the late 1940s and the 1950s the Santiago-based Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) worked on the theoretical foundations 
of what was to be called the structuralist position in economic development. Raul 
Prebisch, one of the most controversial and influential intellectual leaders in Latin 
America, formed a team in the late 1940s and onwards at ECLAC and produced a
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series of studies of which the one by Prebisch (1991) is the best known.18 Here the 
influential concept of the ‘centre-periphery system’ in economic relations was 
revealed for the first time.
Prebisch’s best known academic contribution is the so-called Singer-Prebisch 
thesis (see also Singer, 1950) on the secular deterioration of terms of trade which 
led him to advocate industrialisation in Latin America and for a long time made 
ECLAC and import substitution inseparable. Many of these ideas were initially 
developed as a result o f analysis o f problems of inflation. Structuralist analysis 
attempted to identify specific rigidities, lags, shortages and surpluses, low  
elasticities of supply and demand, and other characteristics of the structure of 
developing countries that affect economic adjustments and the choice of 
development policy (Chenery, 1965). Structuralist analysts emphasised, among 
many other factors, the role of the state in economic development, the structural 
shift from agriculture to industry, and the lack of economic surplus for 
accumulation; they became influential in many countries in Latin America, 
particularly in Brazil and Chile.
A more critical analysis, also with respect to import substitution 
industrialisation, was provided by the Marxist structuralist interpretations, o f which 
André Gunder Frank (1969) and Paul Baran probably offered the best known. The 
relationship between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ is not one of mutual benefits 
but of exploitation. The surplus in the periphery will be caught by foreign capital 
or by the local elite. The basic theory is that import substitution increases 
dependency on imports and increases the power of the industrialists and 
multinational corporations at the expense of the poor and the rural peasants.
In the mid 1960s, both at ECLAC and elsewhere, another more sociological 
and political line of interpretation was developed to be known as ‘dependency 
theory’, which tried to explain why some of the presumed consequences of 
industrialisation for the periphery were not being produced. One of the basic 
economic arguments was that the industrialisation that took place in Latin America 
was largely limited to the production of consumer goods. The fruits o f the dynamic 
capital goods sector where technical progress was concentrated went once again to 
the centre nations (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969).
Another set o f ideas was developed at ECLAC to counter the foreign exchange 
constraint through economic planning and economic integration of the Latin 
American market, in order to be able to move to a second, more difficult stage of 
import substitution which could not be enacted at the national level alone. This 
analysis, together with the structuralists’ view on inflation, was very influential in 
the 1960s and has been labelled Structuralism II (Corbo, 1988).
From early on several critics, within and outside Latin America, criticised the 
import substitution strategy. As early as 1950, Viner (1950), had rejected most of 
the arguments for protecting import-competing industry and recommended 
elimination of discrimination against exports. Another influential critic was
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Roberto Campos (1967), who questioned the emphasis in favour o f industry at the 
expense o f agriculture, and the confidence in the theory that, by substituting public 
for private initiative, new resources would be created, and the assumption that 
inflation could be used to increase capital formation in a sustainable way.
Around the middle of the 1970s, a group of Southern Cone countries started to 
experiment with new policies which abandoned import-substitution policies and 
government intervention. These so-called neoconservative experiments were 
inspired as much by political and ideological as by economic factors and were 
implemented under the reign of military governments. Although many observers 
acknowledged serious problems in Latin America’s development strategy in the 
mid 1970s, including the inefficient role of the state, the application of a radical 
anti-interventionist model paid very little attention to the limits o f the market and 
the private sector (Ramos, 1986).
The debt crisis o f the 1980s caused many Latin American countries to rethink 
their development strategy due to the economic necessity of debt servicing and 
external constraints; many countries started to implement neo-liberal policies 
consisting of economic adjustment, stabilisation and outward orientation, and also 
including policies to reduce state intervention, promotion of private enterprise, 
fiscal discipline, getting the prices right and improving allocation in the product, 
factor, and financial markets. Most of these policy elements were included in the 
‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 1990); additional themes like income 
distribution and social issues have been added to the agenda in the 1990s.
NOTES
1. Smith (1776, p. 617): ‘Plenty of good land, and the liberty to manage their own affairs their own 
way, seem to be the two great causes of the prosperity of all new colonies’.
2. H ie term ‘empty’ countries, used for the American hemisphere and Australia, was of course not 
appropriate as both areas had significant indigenous populations. North America, the Southern 
Cone and Australia were sparsely populated. The more densely populated parts o f the Americas 
experienced very drastic reductions in their population in the first decades after the conquest
3. Most Latin American countries became independent during the first half o f the nineteenth century. 
All countries, except Brazil, declared their independence in 1810 and won it soon after 1816 in 
Argentina, 1818 in Chile and Colombia and 1821 in Mexico and Venezuela. Brazil became 
independent from Portugal in 1822.
4. See in the case of Argentina (Diaz-Alejandto, 1970 and 1983), in Brazil (Suzigan, 1976), in Chile 
(Palma, 1979 and 1984), and in Colombia (Ocampo, 1987).
5. In the case o f Argentina, maize (8.0 per cent) and beef (6.7 per cent) are the first and second export 
products and 68 per cent o f all expats are of primary origin. The respective figures f a  other 
countries are: Brazil, coffee (8.5 per cent) and iron ore (5.2 per cent) and 40 per cent; Chile, copper 
(42.9) and grapes (4.6 per cent) and 81 per cent; Colombia, coffee (49 per cart), oil (12.6 p a  cent) 
and 69 per cent; Mexico, oil (43.6 per cent), coffee (3.5 per cent) and 47 per cent; and Venezuela, 
oil (79.1 per cent), aluminium (4.2 per cent) and 86 per cent (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994 and W a ld  
Bank, 1995).
6. A term introduced by Okhawa and Rosovski (1973) but recently emphasised especially by 
Abramovitz (1986,1990).
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7. The comparison by Adam Smith (1776) of colonies in the Western Hemisphere was not the fust 
but he concentrated on economics while other comparisons, for example Buffon (1761), de Pauw 
(1768) and Hegel (1820) were more of a theological-philosophical nature (Annino, 1995).
8. Around 1800 Latin America was divided in die Viceroyalties o f New Spain, New Granada, Peru 
and Rio de la Plata (Lynch, 1991).
9. Between 1535 and 1816 there was a steady succession of 60 viceroys in New Spain (Maddison, 
1995).
10. However, these detrimental effects of mercantilism on Latin American production, trade and 
development should not be overestimated; see the careful summary in Cardoso and Helwege 
(1992), emphasizing that mercantilism may not have been as important in slowing industrial and 
agricultural growth as the distorting nature o f the mineral boom itself. They also stress that most 
European countries were extremely protectionist until the late nineteenth century. This makes it 
difficult to assess how much trade would have occurred in the absence o f mercantilism.
11. Among those most mentioned are: underestimation o f  income that affects differently both income 
level and their concentration, the technique for measuring income and the geographical coverage of 
the surveys, see Altimir (1987) for a  review and discussion of the income measurements from 
different types of surveys in Latin America and their comparability problems.
12. The Gini coefficient is a  measure o f  income concentration that ranges from 0  to 1, the larger the 
coefficient, the greater the inequality. Thus 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect 
inequality.
13. It cannot be stressed enough that these estimates give only an indication of a  tendency as the linking 
procedure involved linking series o f  different coverage, definition and quality.
14. In the strict sense it is difficult, especially in die case of the Latin American countries, to 
differentiate between pre- and post-tax income distribution, again; see Altimir (1987).
15. I did not use the 1957 estimate (0.802) o f Baptista (1991) because it seemed unreasonably high, 
especially compared with his 1962 estimate (0.462).
16. The following description of Latin America’s history of capital flow and debt is based largely upon 
Devlin (1989), ECLAC (1965a) and Marichal (1989).
17. By the middle o f 1995 things had settled again; the major countries affected by the crisis were 
Mexico and (to a lesser extent) Argentina, both entering into recession. The repercussions in the rest 
o f Latin America were relatively minor and most countries recovered part o f the losses, especially 
those on the stock markets. However, on a  negative note, several observers have commented that 
the crisis o f the 1980s started the same way, through a number of mine»' crises in several countries. 
On the other band, more optimistic observers suggest that the situation in Latin America is now 
structurally different from the 1980s as many countries have restructured their economies. In fact, 
only a  few countries have advanced far in structural reforms, notably Chile, but several others are in 
the process of restructuring and it is to be hoped that economic growth will resume (or continue) in 
Latin America as restructuring is always much easier in times of economic growth but is extremely 
painful in times of crisis. It should also be stressed that structural reforms do not prevent crisis per  
se, as Chile found out so painfiilly in the early 1980s.
18. Many studies could be mentioned; o f special importance were a series of country studies titled, 
“The Economic Development o f  ...” , which used what for that period were quite advanced 
techniques; capital stock estimation, econometric analysis and extensive data collection, and which 
are up-to-date valuable statistical sources for historical research due to their excellent empirical 
base. Other important ECLAC studies dealt with external financing, inflation and industrialization.
3. Economic Performance in Latin America 
-  A Comparative Quantitative Perspective
A primary purpose of this book is to provide a new quantitative assessment of 
Latin American economic growth performance in the twentieth century. For the 
period after 1950 a growth accounting framework is presented in Chapter 6. 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide the necessary basic series for capital stock and labour 
input.
In this chapter the growth performance of Latin America throughout the 
twentieth century is treated from a comparative perspective using indicators of 
demographic development, growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita and labour 
productivity. Our sample covers only six of the 44 countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean -  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela -  but 
these had in 1994 a combined population of 359 million, equivalent to 75 per cent 
of the total for Latin America. They cover about 80 per cent of Latin American 
territory, and about 85 per cent of Latin America’s GDP. Two major biases of the 
sample should be emphasised. First, it excludes the smaller countries of the Latin 
American continent which generally have a (much) lower per capita GDP. Second, 
it also excludes all 23 islands of the Caribbean which make up for around 5 per 
cent of GDP in the area, and of which 15 have higher than average per capita 
GDP.
Latin America’s performance is compared with three other groups of countries:
(a) two Asian countries (Korea and Taiwan) whose economic growth in the past 
couple of decades has been remarkably fast; (b) Portugal and Spain, whose 
institutional heritage had a good deal in common with Latin America; and (c) six 
advanced capitalist countries (France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States), whose levels o f income and productivity 
are amongst the highest in the world.
AGGREGATE GROW TH PERFORM ANCE
The GDP growth rates presented in Table 3.1 show a quite respectable 
performance by Latin America for the whole of the twentieth century. The slowest 
growth was in Chile and Argentina, with Brazil and Venezuela having the best
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overall performance. A comparison o f these results with the other countries o f the 
sample shows that the average growth of 4.2 per annum was faster than the 
advanced and Iberian countries, which both grew at an average o f 2.8 per cent a 
year. Growth in Latin America was slower than in the Asian group, which grew at
4.8 per cent in the twentieth century.
Table 3.1 Latin America: Total GDP, 1900-1994 (average annual compound 
growth rates)
1900--13 1913-29 1929-50 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1900-94
Argentina 6.4 3.5 2.5 4.0 3.0 -1.0 6.1 3.5
Brazil 4.5 4.7 5.0 6.9 7.2 2.3 0.9 5.0
Chile 3.7 2.9 2.2 3.6 2.8 2.9 6.4 3.2
Colombia 4.2 4.7 3.6 5.1 5.0 3.3 4.3 4.4
Mexico 2.6 0.8 4.0 6.5 6.4 1.4 3.0 3.7
Venezuela
Arithmetic
3.3 8.2 5.9 6.4 4.1 -0.1 3.6 5.2
average 4.1 4.1 3.9 5.4 4.8 1.5 4.0 4.2
Korea 2.0 3.0 0.7 7.5 7.1 8.7 7.6 4.5
Taiwan
Arithmetic
1.8 3.8 1.8 9.3 8.3 7.4 6.3 5.2
average 1.9 3.4 1.3 8.4 7.7 8.0 6.9 4.8
Portugal 1.7 0.6 2.6 5.5 3.2 2.5 1.5 2.8
Spain
Arithmetic
2.3 2.4 0.1 6.1 2.1 2.8 1.5 2.7
average 2.0 1.5 1.4 5.8 2.7 2.7 1.5 2.8
France 1.7 1.9 0.6 5.1 2.8 2.2 1.1 2.4
Germany 3.0 1.2 1.4 5.9 2.2 1.9 2.7 2.8
Japan 2.5 3.7 1.1 9.6 2.9 4.0 2.2 4.2
Netherlands 2.3 3.6 1.5 4.7 2.4 1.8 2.1 2.9
UK
Arithmetic
1.5 0.7 1.7 3.0 0.9 2.9 0.6 1.8
average 2.2 2.2 1.3 5.7 2.3 2.6 1.8 2.8
USA 4.0 3.1 2.6 3.7 2.1 3.0 1.7 3.1
Sources: Latin America from Appendix B and other countries from Maddison (1995). Korea updated 
to 1994 with growth rates from IMF (various issues) and Taiwan from Council far Economic 
Development (1994), 1994 updated using growth rate fra-1992-93.
In Chapter 7 policy regimes in Latin America in the post-war period will be 
analysed together with their role in the performance of the region. In this section I 
give only a condensed description of the performance of the different countries 
during the twentieth century. The périodisation and the appropriateness of my 
benchmarks are discussed in the section o f this chapter on fluctuations in growth.
In the twentieth century most of our countries performed best in the 1950-73 
period. Of the 16 countries in our sample, 10 experienced the highest growth o f the
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century in this period. These include all the advanced countries, with the exception 
of the United States and three Latin American countries. Three countries o f the 
sample group are currently experiencing their best growth period of the twentieth 
century, with two of them, Korea and Taiwan, coming, not very surprisingly, from 
Asia. The other one is, quite significantly, Chile, which managed this performance 
amid one of the worst crises for Latin America in the twentieth century. However, 
one must take into consideration that Chile’s performance in the past has been 
extremely weak; its overall performance in the twentieth century is the worst for 
the Latin American sample. For two countries, Argentina and the United States, the 
first part of the century, 1900-1913, was their best period in terms of total GDP 
growth. Finally, there is a clear distinction between developing and advanced 
countries in 1973-80. Growth performance deteriorated abrupdy in all advanced 
countries after the OPEC crisis, while the pace of growth remained high in Latin 
America and Asia.
The inter-war period was by far the worst in terms of total GDP growth for 
most countries in the twentieth century. Six countries (France, Japan, the 
Netherlands and Spain of the advanced countries, and Korea and Chile) 
experienced their lowest point in the 1929-50 period, while the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Portugal and Mexico had their low period from 1913-29. Latin 
America, with the exception of Chile and Mexico, experienced its major crisis 
during the lost decade of the 1980s.1 For the Asian countries 1900-1913 and 
1929-50 were the worst periods.
PER  CAPITA GROW TH
Table 3.2 shows the long-term per capita growth record since 1900. The final years 
of the liberal world order were years of prosperity for most countries in our 
sample. On a comparative basis it was the best period of the twentieth century for 
Latin America, but per capita growth was very slight in the Asian developing 
countries, which grew at a rate of 0.6 per cent before World War I. The Iberian 
countries grew at 1.3 per cent, about the same rate as the more advanced European 
countries. The United States did even better with a growth rate of 2.0 per cent.
The period 1913-50 can usefully be divided into three different sub-periods 
with benchmark years in 1929, the year the Great Depression began, and 1938, the 
dividing point between the Great Depression and World War II.
From 1913-29, when the liberal world trading order broke down, the 
expansion of per capita real income in different regions was quite similar, with 
Asia as the laggard. Latin America experienced fast growth during the first years of 
the twentieth century. In the period 1929-50 when growth was interrupted by the 
collapse of international trade and World War II, most areas suffered major 
setbacks and their growth performance was generally very poor, or, in the case of
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Asia,2 negative. Several primary exporters in Latin America had already 
experienced difficulties in the late 1920s; Brazil lost control over the coffee market 
and Chile lost ground as a result of the introduction of synthetic nitrates.
Table 3.2 GDP per Capita, 1900—1994 (average annual compound growth rates)
1900-13 1913-29 1929-50 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1900-94
Argentina 2.5 0.9 0.6 2.3 1.4 -2.5 4.8 1.3
Brazil 2.3 2.5 2.6 3.9 4.7 0.2 -0.8 2.6
Chile 2.4 1.6 0.6 1.4 1.2 1.3 4.6 1.5
Colombia 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.2 2.7 1.3 2.5 2.0
Mexico 1.9 0.1 1.6 3.3 3.5 -0.8 1.1 1.7
Venezuela
Arithmetic
2.3 7.3 3.8 2.6 0.5 -2.5 1.2 2.9
average 2.2 2.4 1.8 2.6 2.3 -0.5 2.2 2.0
Korea 0.8 1.3 -1.3 5.2 5.3 7.4 6.6 2.7
Taiwan
Arithmetic
0.4 2.1 -0.9 6.2 6.2 5.9 5.2 3.0
average 0.6 1.7 -1.1 5.7 5.7 6.6 5.9 2.8
Portugal 0.9 -0.1 1.5 5.4 1.3 2.6 1.4 2.2
Spain
Arithmetic
1.6 1.5 -0.7 5.1 1.0 2.3 1.4 1.9
average 1.3 0.7 0.4 5.3 1.2 2.5 1.4 2.0
France 1.5 1.9 0.5 4.1 2.3 1.7 0.8 2.0
Germany 1.6 0.8 0.4 4.9 2.3 1.8 1.8 2.1
Japan 1.3 2.4 -0.2 8.3 1.8 3.4 2.0 3.1




0.7 0.3 1.3 2.5 0.9 2.7 0.4 1.4
average 1.2 1.5 0.4 4.6 1.8 2.2 1.3 2.1
USA 2.0 1.7 1.5 2.2 1.0 2.0 1.2 1.8
Source: See Table 3.1.
In contrast with most of the rest of the world, 1929-50 were remarkably good 
years in Latin America. Unlike other areas, GDP per capita accelerated. The 
general trend towards import substitution and expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies produced impressive results by world standards. If there was an engine of 
growth in Latin America during the 1930s, that engine was import-substituting 
industrialisation.
There is truth in the assertion that the Latin American countries that performed 
reasonably well during the 1930s were those which had large domestic markets 
and some industrial base prior to 1929, as was the case in Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico. One may conclude that a substantial domestic market and a 
degree of autonomy with regard to exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policy were 
conditions required for industrialisation in Latin America in the 1930s.
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Table 3.2 shows GDP per capita growth rates. Latin America averaged 1.8 per 
cent per capita growth a year, compared with a mere 0.4 per cent in Europe, and - 
1.1 per cent in Asia. The USA grew by an average of 1.5 per cent for 1929-50 as a 
whole, but the average includes the depressed 1930s and the wartime boom. 
Analysis o f Table 3.3, on comparative levels of performance, clearly reveals that 
the whole period 1900-1950 was, comparatively, a very prosperous one for Latin 
America. Its per capita GDP increased somewhat compared to the United States 
whilst all other countries show a relative decline. The figure for the Asian group 
fell from an average of 17 per cent in 1900 to 8 per cent in 1950. The Iberian level 
had fallen to 21 per cent by 1950. Also, the advanced countries’ level had fallen 
drastically. The detrimental effects of World War n  on most countries, and the 
relatively sheltered position of Latin America, explain this performance to a great 
extent.
Table 3.3 Levels o f per Capita GDP, 1900-1994 (international 1980 dollars, USA 
= 100)
1900 1913 1929 1950 1973 1980 1989 1994
Argentina 52 55 49 41 42 43 29 34
Brazil 10 11 12 15 22 29 24 22
Chile 38 40 39 33 27 28 26 31
Colombia 18 18 19 19 19 22 21 22
Mexico 35 35 27 27 35 42 33 33
Venezuela
Arithmetic
10 10 24 38 41 40 26 26
average 27 28 28 29 31 34 26 28
Korea 19 16 15 8 16 22 35 45
Taiwan
Arithmetic
15 12 13 8 19 27 38 46
average 17 14 14 8 17 24 36 45
Portugal 25 22 16 16 33 34 36 36
Spain
Arithmetic
43 41 40 25 48 48 50 50
average 34 31 28 21 41 41 43 43
France 55 52 54 44 68 74 73 71
Germany 58 55 47 37 69 75 74 76
Japan 23 21 24 17 64 67 77 80
Netherlands 74 64 69 53 71 74 69 71
UK
Arithmetic
96 81 65 62 68 67 72 69
average 61 55 52 43 68 71 73 73
USA 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Table 3.1.
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Since 1950, Latin America’s performance has been systematically much worse 
than that of almost all the other areas. The period 1950-73 witnessed great 
expansion in Latin America, with growth per capita averaging 2.6 per cent a year 
(faster than the 1.8 average for 1929-50). However, most other areas had a golden 
age with a much greater acceleration of growth. Asian growth averaged 5.7 per 
cent a year from 1950-73, Iberia 5.3 per cent, and the advanced European 
countries 4.7 per cent. US performance was much more modest at 2.2 per cent a 
year.
In the post-war period Latin America did not enjoy positive growth to the same 
extent as other countries which were enjoying reconstruction and catch-up, rapid 
expansion of international trade and the commercial exploitation of a backlog of 
technological advances made during the war. An additional important factor in 
explaining Latin America’s lacklustre performance was the fact that Latin America 
had grown faster than any other region during the first half o f the twentieth century 
and was thus much closer to its potential, while many other countries had much 
larger scope for recovery.
In 1973 the period of post-war expansion abruptly came to an end. The 
advanced and the Iberian countries settled into a much lower pace of growth. The 
Asian countries continued growing at extremely high average per capita rates of 
above 5 per cent. Latin America experienced a modest slow-down between 
1973-80 but a complete collapse in the 1980s.
The crisis o f the 1980s was triggered off by the rapid increase of interest rates 
in the international market and affected Latin America profoundly as many of its 
countries had rapidly increased their foreign debt in the 1970s when international 
liquidity was very high. The debt crisis forced them to reevaluate their 
development strategy and in many cases a more outward looking, private sector 
oriented strategy was adopted. Table 3.4 presents labour productivity in Latin 
America for the 1913-94 period (1913 being the earliest year for which data were 
available).
One of the most important findings is that the process of acceleration of GDP 
growth and labour productivity had already started in Latin America around 1938, 
when per capita GDP and productivity growth accelerated with growth rates about 
three times as high as the previous 1929-38 period. It should be noted that growth 
was more homogeneous compared to the 1913-29 period when average per capita 
growth was also relatively high in Latin America. Growth accelerated from 1938 
onwards, especially in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. It was during this 
period that the combined effect o f expansionary fiscal and monetary policy and 
import substitution resulted in high growth of productivity per man hour and per 
capita GDP, some countries also benefiting from the positive effect of World 
War II.
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Table 3.4 Latin America: Labour Productivity Growth and Levels, 1900-1994 
(average annual compound growth rates and USA = 100)
1913-29 1929-38 1938-50 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1900-94
Labour Productivity (GDP per Man Hour) 
Argentina 1.6 -0.2 2.7 2.6 2.2 -2.1 4.6 1.7“
Brazil 5.2 3.0 3.9 3.9 4.0 0.1 -0.6 3.4*
Chile 2.3 -0.7 2.0 3.0 1.0 -0.2 3.2 1.8“
Colombia 4.2 0.6 2.3 3.0 1.9 1.3 2.1 2.5*
Mexico 2.4 1.0 3.4 4.2 2.7 -1.1 0.4 2.2“
Venezuela 11.1 1.4 4.9 3.5 -0.9 -1.8 0.2 2.7“
Arithmetic
average 4.5 0.9 3.2 3.4 1.8 -0.6 1.6 2.4“
Levels of Labour Productivity (USA = 
1913 1929
100)
1938 1950 1973 1980 1989 1994
Argentina 53 51 44 41 40 45 32 38
Brazil 9 15 17 18 24 30 26 24
Chile 42 46 38 32 35 35 30 33
Colombia 18 26 24 21 23 24 24 25
Mexico 37 34 32 33 45 52 41 39
Venezuela 24 37 37 45 53 48 35 33
Arithmetic
average 31 35 32 32 37 39 31 32
USA 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: a refers to the 1913-94 period.
Sources: Appendix A and B for population and GDP. Appendix C for employment and hours worked 
for 1950 onwards. Annual hours worked were estimated at 2588 in 1913 based upon Maddison (1991a, 
p. 255) and interpolated to 1950. Employment 1925-50: from ECLAC (1965b) except for Argentina 
1913-50 from IEERAL (1986). Employment before 1925: Chile from Ballesteros and Davis (1965), 
Mexico from INEGI (1985) and Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela retrapolated.
FLUCTUATIONS IN GROW TH
In order to be able to compare Latin America with countries outside the region, the 
benchmarks which are almost universally accepted by the scholars in this field 
have been analysed. For the twentieth century these benchmarks consist o f the 
years 1913, 1950 and 1973. With these benchmarks four different phases of 
growth can be distinguished in the twentieth century, that is a first phase until
1913,3 a second phase from 1913-50, a third from 1950-73 and the fourth and last 
phase covering the period since then. However, it is necessary to ascertain whether 
this chronology, specifically developed for the advanced countries, also fits the 
Latin American case and, if not, which countries are the main exceptions, in what 
period, and what is the effect on the analysis. Table 3.5 and Figure 3.1 give an
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indication of the shifting weights, in terms of total GDP, of the sample countries 
from 1900-1994.
The most important country of the sample in 1900, in terms of GDP, was 
Mexico. In the mid-1920s, Argentina had the biggest weight. During the 1940s, 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had very similar shares. Lastly, from the end o f the 
1940s until 1994, Brazil was the most important economy in the region.
Table 3.5 Latin America: Share of Each Country in Total GDP o f the Six 
Countries, 1900-1994 ( percent)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela Total
1900 21.9 16.4 10.2 6.3 43.1 2.2 100
1929 31.2 21.9 9.4 8.2 25.1 4.3 100
1950 24.3 28.0 6.9 8.0 26.3 6.6 100
1980 13.4 38.6 3.4 6.5 31.5 6.6 100
1994 12.5 37.5 4.6 8.1 31.3 6.0 100
Source: Appendix B.
Figure 3.1 Latin America: Share o f Individual Countries in the Six Country Total 
GDP, 1900-1994 (in percentages)
50 -,-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 11 m i m i i n m i m i 111 m i m i i n 11 i l m i i n n u  n i m i 11 i l n i i m  i m  I il 11 i l 1111 i n i l  11 i n 11
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-----------Argentina - -------- Brazil -----------Chile
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Source: Same as Table 3.5.
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In Table 3.6 the annual fluctuations in GDP are presented on the basis of 
aggregating total GDP of the six countries. The 1950 benchmark is not very clear 
in terms of fluctuations of GDP growth, as Latin America continued the growth 
process initiated in the late 1930s. It can be concluded that growth in Latin 
America from 1950 onwards was more stable than in the period after the Great 
Depression.
The 1900-1994 period will be analysed graphically for each country on the 
basis of yearly GDP estimates for each country in order to see whether the 
individual country cycles coincide with the phases distinguished above. For each 
country we will also analyse the sensitivity of changes in the benchmarks to growth 
rates.
Table 3.6 Year-to-Year Percentage Change in Aggregate GDP o f the Six 
Countries, 1900-1994 (annual growth rates)
1900 1914 -3.2 1930 -4.4 1950 5.4 1973 8.9 1981 0.7
1901 8.1 1915 -0.2 1931 -5.3 1951 6.0 1974 6.6 1982 -0.7
1902 -1.6 1916 2.0 1932 -4.1 1952 3.2 1975 3.7 1983 -2.4
1903 8.6 1917 0.5 1933 9.5 1953 4.8 1976 6.2 1984 3.8
1904 3.8 1918 5.3 1934 8.2 1954 6.9 1977 5.0 1985 3.3
1905 8.5 1919 0.3 1935 4.9 1955 6.2 1978 4.9 1986 3.5
1906 2.0 1920 6.0 1936 6.4 1956 4.2 1979 7.1 1987 3.1
1907 5.7 1921 0.4 1937 5.2 1957 7.3 1980 7.1 1988 1.0
1908 1.4 1922 6.2 1938 2.5 1958 5.3 1989 1.6
1909 4.6 1923 8.6 1939 4.6 1959 2.6 1990 0.4
1910 4.6 1924 3.3 1940 1.5 1960 7.4 1991 3.3
1911 1.1 1925 3.1 1941 6.0 1961 7.1 1992 2.7
1912 5.7 1926 4.8 1942 0.2 1962 4.0 1993 3.1
1913 1.5 1927 3.4 1943 3.5 1963 3.5 1994 4.5
1928 7.8 1944 8.0 1964 8.0
1929 2.0 1945 2.7 1965 5.4
1946 9.5 1966 4.6
1947 5.8 1967 4.8
1948 6.7 1968 7.9





CAUSES O F CYCLICAL INSTABILITY
There are many factors, external or internal, which may cause instability. Of 
course, they cannot be separated completely and a combination o f the two can 
generate all kinds of different results. A good example of the combined effects of 
internal and external factors was the first oil crisis in 1973 which caused distinct
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domestic reactions with different results in terms of economic stability. Most 
countries experienced a fall in growth rates as they adopted policies to adjust to the 
change in relative prices. Latin American countries, including the non-oil 
exporters, borrowed heavily, with only minor adjustment to changes in relative 
prices, and the growth process continued. In the 1980s the combined effect o f lack 
of price adjustment and heavy indebtedness caused the ‘lost decade’.
Here we will give a description of the most recurrent causes of cyclical 
fluctuations in Latin America.4 Several causes of instability of external origin can 
be identified:
-  As already indicated in Chapter 2, the sudden drop in capital and trade flows 
due to external reasons represents a major cause of instability in Latin America. 
The crises o f the 1820s, the 1870s, the 1930s and the 1980s were caused 
predominandy by such developments.
-  Another relevant factor producing instability is extreme dependence on one or 
a few primary commodities, with fluctuations in demand or supply factors 
generating instability. This factor is quite important in Latin America as the 
single most important export product is still a primary commodity in all 
countries of our sample.
-  External factors of a non-economic character, like war or extreme political 
unrest, influence stability through falls in exports and deterioration of the terms 
of trade.
Many internal factors are also important:
-  Climatic variations can create instability in countries specialising in agricultural 
primary products. Droughts, with their effects on harvests or energy generation; 
extreme temperature changes, either at sea or on land; storms; and earthquakes, 
still have significant influence.
-  A traditionally important cyclical factor in Latin America is the political 
process, where electoral considerations often have powerful economic effects. 
This has been the case in countries with relatively high political stability, for 
example Mexico, or countries with higher instability and more populist 
political processes.
-  Another cause of economic instability stemming from internal political events 
comes in the form of extreme situations such as military interventions. This has 
been the case in Chile, Argentina and many other countries. Arguably, other 
extreme cases fall into this same category, like the Unidad Popular experiment 
of President Allende in the early 1970s in Chile.
-  Some crises in Latin America can be clearly attributed to mistakes in domestic 
economic policy. Populism and neo-conservative experiments in Argentina and 
Chile in the 1970s and the Mexican crisis in the 1990s are examples.
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INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY EXPERIENCE OF INSTABILITY
In Figure 3.2, concerning Argentina, one can observe clearly that 1913 was the last 
year of a phase of rapid growth. This growth, the fastest in Latin America, was 
export-led, especially by agricultural products (see Diaz-Alejandro, 1970), and was 
accompanied by high (foreign) investment and large immigration from Europe.
Argentina’s impressive per capita GDP growth between 1900-1913 declined 
rapidly during the 1913-29 period, caused, in the view of some commentators, by 
the lack of government support for industry. These commentators have called this 
period ‘the Long Delay’, to be situated between Rostow’s ‘Preconditions’ and 
‘Take-off.5 Diaz-Alejandro (1970) provides some strong arguments against this 
thesis, indicating that the 1913-29 period can be divided into two sub-periods 
(1913-19) and (1919-29). The first period of economic depression started before 
World War I, and was touched off by the decline in foreign capital due to 
monetary restrictions in Europe, aggravated by the bad harvest o f 1914, and of 
course the onset of World War I. From 1917 onwards foreign capital and exports 
recovered, and GDP grew rapidly especially in manufacturing and construction.6
During 1929-50 Argentina’s growth performance was the worst in our sample 
of Latin American countries, GDP growth being negative (-0.8) during the Great 
Depression and growing at 1.7 per cent during 1938-50. Argentina was a 
prototype country of the liberal world order, and was hit extremely hard by the 
depression, which cut its markets for exports and foreign capital and reduced 
migration to a minimum. As a result o f the depression, there was a change in 
Argentina’s long-run economic policies, with more emphasis on import 
substitution and less on export promotion.
In the period 1913-50, the crises of World War I and the Great Depression 
figure clearly, but the contractionary effects o f World War II are not that evident. 
In fact, the growth rates for the 1938-50 period (around 1938, Argentina again 
reached pre-Great Depression GDP levels) and the 1950-73 period are similar 
(see Table 3.4). From 1973 onwards, there is a clear drop in growth rates which 
lasted until the 1980s, and negative growth rates until the early 1990s. It can be 
concluded that 1913 and 1973 are reasonable benchmarks for Argentina. The 1950 
benchmark cannot be clearly distinguished, but 1980 represents a turning point for 
Argentina.
It is also evident that the performance in the second half o f the twentieth 
century until recent years was significantly below the performance of the first half, 
and that, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, during the 1970s and 1980s external 
instability was compounded by domestic policy errors.
Brazil
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Brazil experienced a period of rapid growth at the beginning o f the twentieth 
century, following important political changes during the last quarter o f the 
nineteenth century such as the abolition of slavery and the establishment of the 
Republic. As in the case of Argentina this growth was export-led, based upon 
exports of agricultural products such as coffee and rubber, but the Brazilian 
government also initiated a programme of public works. Unlike in Argentina, this 
was the starting point of a period of rapid growth which was to continue until the 
1980s (see Merrick and Graham, 1979 and Villela and Suzigan, 1977).
Brazil’s performance was among the best in Latin America during the 1913-50 
period. Of particular note is the fact that the country recovered relatively rapidly 
from the adverse effects of the Great Depression. One element that has been 
stressed is the coffee support programme which had some countercyclical effects 
of a Keynesian nature.7 The promotion of industry through import substitution was 
not a deliberate policy choice; however, the industrial sector benefited indirectly 
from the coffee support programme and the various stabilisation programmes, for 
example from the protection offered by the numerous exchange-rate devaluations 
and the tariffs on imports.
Although 1913 and 1929 are years characterised by slower growth and even 
economic recession, it is hardly possible to conclude that the 1900-1913 period is 
distinctively different from 1913-50. During the whole period Brazil experienced 
a growth rate of around 2.5 per cent and the crises of 1913 and 1929 only 
interrupted this growth process briefly. In the second half of the twentieth century 
Brazil experienced an acceleration in growth to rates around 4 per cent while the 
1973-80 period shows even higher rates of growth.
Figure 3.2 shows very clearly that Brazilian growth accelerated after the Great 
Depression and continued growing until the crisis of the 1980s. External factors 
had a major impact on economic growth in Brazil in the twentieth century; 
however, in the 1980s and also 1990s internal political and policy factors limited 
growth (see also Chapter 7).
Chile
As Figure 3.2 shows conclusively, Chile is by far the most vulnerable country in 
Latin America in terms of GDP fluctuations. At least six major economic crises 
can be identified during the twentieth century. The first was related to World War 
I, a second occurred at the beginning of the 1920s and the Great Depression also 
hit hard in Chile. From the middle of the 1930s, Chile experienced a rather stable 
low growth path until the early 1970s. In the 1970s and the 1980s, another pair of 
profound crises beset the Chilean economy.
Economic growth in Chile during the first years of the twentieth century was
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influenced by the natural sodium nitrate boom which had started in the 1880s. The 
enormous expansion in production and exports of nitrate transformed Chile’s 
society and economy as documented in Carióla and Sunkel (1985) and Mamalakis 
(1976). Per capita GDP grew at a fast rate that would not be repeated until very 
recently in the twentieth century.
During 1913-50 Chile’s growth performance can be divided into the 1913-29 
period of somewhat higher than average per capita GDP growth for Latin America, 
and the 1929-50 period of much Iowa- comparative performance. The nitrate 
boom was affected by the outbreak of World War I and the contraction of 
European markets; however, the rapid growth o f the North American market 
compensated for the loss of European markets and the boom apparently continued 
until the 1930s when the combined effect of the discovery o f artificial nitrate and 
the low technological level caused the industry to collapse. Copper production and 
exports entered a new period of expansion after the great decline from 1880 until 
the 1920s; however, the interactions between large-scale copper production and 
the rest of Chile’s economy were limited, and fewer linkages were established than 
in the case o f nitrate. Chile was hit hard by the Great Depression and average per 
capita GDP fell between 1929-38. This development prompted the government to 
adopt a policy designed to reduce external dependence, and industrialisation 
became an important instrument for attaining economic growth.
Again it becomes clear that 1913 and 1973 are good benchmarks. Since the 
beginning of the 1980s, following a severe crisis, Chile is experiencing high 
economic growth, compared with the rest of the century. Chile is the country where 
external dependency and domestic policy errors caused extremely high economic 
volatility, as will be documented in Chapter 7.
Colombia
In complete contrast to Chile in terms of volatility is Colombia, which has 
experienced by far the most stable economic growth of all Latin American 
countries during this century. Growth accelerated in Colombia at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, after the period of stagnation caused by the War of a 
Thousand Days. The pace set between 1900-1913 was to continue throughout the 
rest o f the twentieth century, and during certain periods growth was even faster 
(see McGreevy, 1985). World War I did not affect Colombia very much, and 1913 
was not a crisis year in Colombia.
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Figure 3.2 Latin America: Volume Movements of GDP; 1900-1994
Argentina Brazil
1900-1950 1900-1950 - 1950-1994
Mexico Venezuela
1900-1950 1950-1994 1900-1950 1950-1994
Economie Performance in Latin America 43
Figure 3.2 (continued)
Latin America
1 9 0 0 - 1 9 5 0   1 9 5 0 - 1 9 9 4
Source: Appendix B.
However, the Great Depression negatively impacted the growth process and 
for the only time in the twentieth century, the country experienced negative growth. 
The recovery from the recession has been comparatively swift in Colombia owing 
partly to an anti-cyclical policy (at the national and especially the local level) and 
partly to exports of gold and coffee (see Maddison, 1985). During World War II 
per capita GDP remained stable, but from 1945 onwards growth resumed. 
Colombia is the only country in our group to record lower growth rates in the 
1938-50 period compared to the 1929-38 period, as a result o f the fall in 
economic growth in the early 1940s. From then on, the country recorded 
uninterrupted growth until the early 1980s when the debt crisis caused the country 
to experience a fall in growth rates.
Mexico
During the final years of the ‘Porfiriato’ (1876-1910) growth was relatively fast in 
Mexico but this process was interrupted by the Mexican Revolution and later by 
the Great Depression. Mexico’s growth performance during 1913-50 was of 
course greatly affected by the revolution and the civil war. Our figures show 
constant per capita GDP for 1913-29 and an average performance between 
1929-50. During the later period per capita GDP was stagnant from 1929-38 
when the first reaction to the Great Depression was to enforce a restrictive 
monetary policy, but during the Cárdenas government (1934-40) a more 
Keynesian policy was followed. Growth sped up from 1938-50, especially as a 
result of World War II, which improved exports from, and tourism to, the United 
States and boosted remittances from temporary workers in that country.
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However, Fitzgerald (1984) emphasises that:
the orthodox view of the decade leading up to 1929 in Mexico as one of economic and 
institutional stagnation, awaiting the reforms of the 1930s and growth in the 1940s, is 
not correct. It is in fact a period of considerable change: the basis of the modem State 
was laid; commercial agriculture and manufacturing were emerging as new leading 
sectors; and pressure on both peasants’ and workers’ incomes was increasing. It is 
against this background that the impact of the Depression should be assessed, (p. 248)
Therefore, economic growth in Mexico was extremely low during the first 
three to four decades of this century. From the mid-1930s until the 1980s Mexico 
experienced a long period of rather stable growth which was interrupted by the 
debt crisis o f the 1980s.
At the end o f the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the country was 
growing at modest rates, though this was again interrupted at the end of 1994 when 
a new crisis broke out causing a serious recession in 1995 (see also Chapter 7).
Venezuela
During the first two decades of the twentieth century Venezuela experienced fairly 
low growth rates. This changed in the 1920s when the country, boosted by the oil 
sector, began to experience extremely high growth rates. The period 1913-50 was 
a very prosperous one for Venezuela, with growth rates of per capita GDP well 
above the Latin American average. The acceleration of the growth process initiated 
in the second and third decade was very closely associated with foreign firms’ 
(particularly Anglo-Dutch and US) exploitation of the oil reserves (Quero Morales, 
1978). From 1913-29 and 1938-50, Venezuela grew at the unprecedented rates of
7.3 and 5.0 per cent per capita, respectively. Growth rates were somewhat lower in 
the 1929-38 period as the country was severely hit by the Great Depression, 
followed by swift recovery until a new crisis at the end of the 1930s caused 
negative growth; but the rest of the 1940s were again years o f extremely high 
growth. From 1950 onwards growth rates tended to fall and between 1980-94 
there was a tendency towards recession. However, the overall growth rate recorded 
in the twentieth century has been the highest of all countries in our sample.
The above analysis indicates that, for the first half of the twentieth century, the 
benchmarks normally accepted do fit the Latin American situation to a reasonable 
degree. In almost all cases 1913 is a crisis year (except in Colombia and 
Venezuela). Looking at the two major crises that affected the world in the 1913-50 
period, Latin America was hit on a comparable scale during the Great Depression, 
although the region recovered fairly quickly, but World War II did not have as 
devastating an effect on Latin America as it had on the rest o f the world, and in 
several countries in Latin America it provided opportunities for growth.
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It therefore seems reasonable also to include 1938 in the case of Latin 
America, since its growth performance was quite different from the rest o f the 
world between 1938-50. In the post-war period the 1973 benchmark seems quite 
acceptable, as argued for above; but it is also necessary to include 1980 as a 
benchmark in the case of Latin America because the beginning o f the 1980s 
marked one of the most profound crises in Latin America.
The main conclusions which can be drawn from the above discussion are 
reflected in the Latin American total in Figure 3.2. The years 1929,1980 and, to a 
lesser degree, 1913 show recessions. Slower growth occurred around the 1940s, 
and 1973 marked a slowdown in growth in most sample countries outside Latin 
America. In Latin America 1950 is not as clear a benchmark year as in the other 
countries in our sample. As a general conclusion, it seems acceptable to use the 
benchmarks identified for the international comparison, although it would be 
reasonable to include two additional benchmarks in the case of Latin America: 
1938 and 1980.
In order to be able to combine the results obtained by other scholars, I have 
chosen to present a combination of the phases identified for the rest of the world 
and those for Latin America. A good case can be made, on the basis o f empirically 
measurable characteristics, for the following phases in the cases of Latin America. 
A first phase ended in 1929 with very similar overall growth rates in the periods 
1900-1913 and 1913-29. Argentina and Mexico slowed down while Venezuela 
accelerated, starting its oil based growth boom. A second phase from 1929-50 was 
characterised by a sharp recession as a result o f the Great Depression but also a 
fairly quick recovery, compared to the rest of the world. During this period Latin 
America was forced into a strategy of import substitution. This was especially due 
to external conditions such as the protective measures adopted by many countries 
in the 1930s and the de facto trade contraction caused by World War 13.
A third phase can be identified from 1950 to 1980, with relatively stable 
growth rates, although with a slight trend towards slowdown at the end of the 
period, especially since 1973. In this phase most Latin American countries adopted 
a development strategy based upon import substitution. A final phase started in 
1980, showing a drastic slowdown in economic growth and the start of a process of 
changing the development strategy towards a more outward-oriented one. From the 
late 1980s (in some countries even earlier) and the 1990s onwards several 
countries are growing again, and the benchmark adopted for this recovery 
period is 1989.
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NOTES
1. This result is, of course, dependent on the périodisation since the ‘Great Depression’ in Latin 
America was rather short-lived, and by 1938 most countries were approaching or above the 
previous total GDP peak level (see also Table 2.5). In the 1980s the crisis lasted much longer, 
and several countries only recovered to pre-crisis levels at the end of the decade.
2. The Asian countries selected are, of course, not at all representative of Asia, and therefore 
summarizing them as ‘the Asian case’ is misleading. This is even more the case in the period 
before 1950 when Korea and Taiwan were colonies of Japan.
3. This phase started much earlier than 1900, possibly around 1870. See Maddison (1995) for a 
description of phases of growth in the nineteenth century, in which he distinguishes a first 
growth acceleration in Europe and its ‘offshoots’, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
USA, starting around 1820 when Europe had more or less recovered from the previous period 
of revolution, war and economic blockade affecting it since the 1790s. Another well-accepted 
benchmark, also especially relevant for Latin America, is around 1870 when a sharp growth 
acceleration occurred in a much greater area of the world compared to the 1820 acceleration. 
For Latin America, as for most other countries, growth acceleration happened around this 
benchmark, in the case of Chile, Brazil and Argentina probably somewhat earlier, and Mexico, 
Colombia and Venezuela somewhat later (see Reynolds, 1983). So also for Latin America a 
case can be made for 1870-1913 as a period of growth acceleration which ended with the 
outbreak of World War I.
4. There are many sources for cyclical analysis in Latin America, one of the best known is the 
Economic Survey, which ECLAC has published since the end of the 1940s; for many countries 
and for the first half of the century there exists an ever growing literature. See for a 
classification of business cycle causality, Maddison (1985).
5. See Di Telia and Zymelman (1973) who situated this period from 1914 to 1933.
6. See Diaz-Alejandro (1970) pp. 6 1 ^ 5 .
7. In the study of the economic development of Brazil, the anticyclical Keynesian policy followed 
during the Great Depression is a topic of great debate: see Fishlow (1972), Furtado (1963) and 
Villela and Suzigan (1977).
4. New Standardised Estimates of Labour 
Input and Human Capital
INTRODUCTION
Traditional analysis o f growth performance always included measures of 
employment and labour productivity, and Denison (1962 and 1967) was one of the 
first to present a more sophisticated analysis of labour input, considering length of 
the work year, disaggregation of inputs by age and by levels of education. Since 
then most growth analysts have emphasized the importance o f taking a broader 
view of human capital, though large series cross country econometric work has 
often used rough proxies for education -  enrolment rates -  rather than educational 
stock. Here we have followed the Denison tradition to ensure that the components 
of our labour input analysis are robust.
Recently, the human capital dimension to economic growth has again returned 
to centre.1 As Denison (1993) observed in one of his last contributions:
If one were forced to choose a single growth source as most important in the long run,
the choice would have to be advances in knowledge, (p. 58)
Appendices A and C present a comprehensive set of tables on population and 
employment, the number of days and hours worked per person and data on sectoral 
employment and educational level of the population. The main conclusions that 
can be inferred from this database for the six Latin American countries are 
commented on, and the existing empirical material reviewed to corroborate our 
results. The basic sources are national censuses, population censuses, agricultural 
censuses and so on, and the surveys (for example household surveys) which are 
conducted regularly in each country. However, these censuses contain big 
differences between countries and I attempt to make adjustments in order to make 
the series as comparable as possible for the Latin American countries.
This chapter also includes disaggregated estimates of employment for 1950-94 
broken down into agriculture, industry and services. It presents estimates of the 
average number of years of formal education of the population. The quality of 
human capital is affected by many other factors such as health and nutrition. 
Widespread schooling and good health care and nutrition early in a country’s 
development have a positive effect on its economic performance. There is a
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growing consensus in Latin America and elsewhere that investments in schooling, 
training, health and nutrition are important elements of a successful development 
strategy.
The past four decades of development show that appropriate government 
policies for human capital development are just as critical as macroeconomic 
stability, global competitiveness and physical infrastructure. Human resource 
investments are required both to facilitate the adjustment process in the short term, 
so that production and employment can adapt to the changing national and 
international economic picture and to increase the prospects for sustained 
productivity growth over the long term. Moreover, better schooled and trained 
people are more likely to explore and share market and technological innovations. 
Furthermore, overall social reform can be pursued more effectively, through such 
investments, providing opportunities for all members of society to participate in 
the benefits o f development (IDB, 1993).
POPULATION
Table 4.1 presents population growth rates for the sample of countries. This table 
reflects the process of demographic transition that has been taking place since the 
beginning of the twentieth century.2 Average growth rates rose till the late 1960s 
and started falling afterwards. The last column of Table 4.1 shows the average 
population growth from 1900-1994. The country that grew fastest at the beginning 
of the century (Argentina), is currently growing at the slowest pace. On the 
contrary, Venezuela, the slowest growing country at the beginning of the century, 
has been the fastest growing country in the last decades.
As indicated above, population grew at very different rates in the various 
countries of Latin America during the 1900-1913 period, when the highest growth 
rates were experienced by Argentina with an average annual growth rate of 3.8 per 
cent. This was due in large part to immigration from Europe which accounted for 
more than 50 per cent of total population growth. About half o f all immigrants 
came from Italy while around 30 per cent came from Spain.3 In 1914, foreigners 
made up about 30 per cent of the total population (Sanchez-Albomoz, 1991).
Brazil also had rather high population growth rates, though much lower than 
Argentina. An important reason for this was the much lower, though still 
significant, influx of foreigners. This accounts for almost 15 per cent of population 
growth (Merrick and Graham, 1979). Between 1880 and 1930, Brazil received 
around four million immigrants from Italy (36 per cent), Portugal (29 per cent), 
Spain (14 per cent), Germany (5 per cent) and Japan (3 per cent), as documented 
in Sanchez-Albomoz (1991).
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Table 4.1 Population (average annual compound growth rates)
1900-13 1913-29 1929-50 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1900-94
Argentina 3.8 2.6 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 2.1
Brazil 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.9 2.4 2.1 1.8 2.3
Chile 1.2 1.3 1.7 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
Colombia 2.0 2.6 2.0 2.8 2.2 2.0 1.7 2.3
Mexico 0.7 0.8 2.4 3.1 2.8 2.1 1.9 2.0
Venezuela
Arithmetic
0.9 0.8 2.1 3.7 3.6 2.6 2.4 2.3
average 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.8 2.1
Korea 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.7
Taiwan
Arithmetic
1.5 1.6 2.7 3.0 1.9 1.4 1.0 2.1
average 1.3 1.7 2.4 2.6 1.8 1.3 0.9 1.9
Portugal 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.1 1.9 -0.1 0.1 0.7
Spain
Arithmetic
0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.8
average 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.6 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.8
Ranee 0.2 -0.1 0.1 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4
Germany 1.4 0.4 1.0 0.9 -0.1 0.1 1.5 0.6
Japan 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.3 1.1
Netherlands 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.2
UK 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.4
USA
Arithmetic
1.9 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3
average 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.8
Sources: Latin America from Appendix A and other countries from Maddison (1995). Korea and 
Thailand updated to 1994 with growth rates from IMF (1995a) and Taiwan from Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (1994), 1994 updated using growth rate for 1992-93.
Chile’s population grew at a slightly lower rate partly because immigration was 
less important; significantly lower growth rates can be found in Mexico and 
Venezuela. Colombia grew by 2.0 per cent a year between 1900-1913. In Mexico 
the low growth rate was due to the effects of the revolution from 1911-21. From 
1900-1910, the growth rate was about 1.6 per cent (INEGI, 1985). The population 
grew very slowly in Venezuela but the low growth rate of 0.9 per cent does not 
seem very plausible and may be due to errors in the census estimates.
In Argentina, the birth rate began to fall rapidly in the first half of the twentieth 
century while the death rate continued falling, although not as rapidly. There were 
major changes in net migration. After the unprecedented increase during the first 
years of the twentieth century, net migration was negative from 1915-19, only to 
resume growth in the 1920s and then taper off to much lower rates in the 1930s 
and the 1940s. Population growth rate went down from 3.8 per cent during 
1900-1913 to 2.6 per cent for 1913-29 and 1.9 for 1929-50. In 1950 Argentina
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was the first country in Latin America to reach the final stage of the demographic 
transition, recording more or less stable, low crude birth and death rates.
Brazil continued the trend of 1900-1913 in terms of a constant birth rate and a 
slightly falling death rate. Net immigration came to a halt during World War I but 
resumed during the 1920s faltering, as in Argentina, in the 1930s and 1940s.4 The 
population growth rate was 2.1 per cent for 1913-29, the same as during 
1900-1913, and a slightly higher 2.3 per cent for 1929-50. From 1920 onwards 
Chile experienced an accelerated decline of its rather high, by Latin American 
standards, crude death rate. Initially the birth rate also tended to fall, but later 
stabilised, rising somewhat at the end of the 1940s. In the case of Chile, 
immigration was not as important in size as in Argentina and Brazil, although 
entrepreneurs seeking fortune in Chile have had a great impact on its economic 
development. The population growth rate rose somewhat from 1.2 per cent 
between 1900-1913 to 1.3 per cent between 1913-29, and reached 1.7 per cent in 
the period 1929-50.
Demographic developments in Colombia closely resembled those in Brazil, 
except for the migratory movement. The crude birth rate was stable during the first 
half of the twentieth century, while the crude death rate experienced a slow but 
constant decline. The resulting growth rates were 2.6 per cent between 1913-29 
and 2.0 per cent between 1929-50. Population growth in Mexico was of course 
strongly affected by the Mexican revolution. Starting in the 1920s, the birth rate 
remained at a high level for much of the twentieth century while the death rate 
showed a systematic decline. In the case of Venezuela the long-run population 
estimates do not seem to be very reliable. However, the figures indicate a constant 
crude birth rate during the first part of the century, even showing a tendency to rise 
from the mid-1930s onwards. The crude death rate started to decline from the 
1920s onwards resulting in a growth rate of 0.8 per cent between 1913-29 and 
about 2.1 per cent between 1929-50.
At the beginning of the 1950s, most Latin American countries were still in the 
first phase o f demographic transition. However, in most countries the growth 
acceleration between 1950-73 was more accentuated than between 1929-50, and 
this was principally due to the fall in mortality. The Southern Cone countries were 
at a more advanced stage in the demographic transition, especially Argentina, 
which was growing at less than 2 per cent; and, to a lesser degree, Chile, which still 
had rather high birth and mortality rates.
The 1973-80 period shows a uniform tendency in all Latin American countries 
towards a fall in population growth. This indicates that all countries are now at a 
more advanced stage of demographic transition, in which the fertility rates also 
start to fall. During the 1980-94 period, the abovementioned trend continued and 
all countries (except Chile, whose population growth rate had fallen strongly from 
1973-80), experienced lower population growth.
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The growth rates of the population presented in Table 4.1 are the result of a 
myriad of underlying processes, some of which are reflected in Table 4.3. The 
birth rate fell on average from 41 per 1000 to around 26 at present. Mortality rates 
are now half those of the 1950s. Life expectancy has risen from 54 to 69 years in 
the second half of the twentieth century. The most drastic trend concerns infant 
mortality which fell to a third of the rate recorded in the 1950s. At the beginning of 
the century birth rates were somewhat higher, mortality rates were much higher, 
and life expectancy at birth was around 35 or lower (Maddison, 1995).
As can be seen in Table 4.2, the total population of the Latin American sample 
countries was 359 million people in 1994, compared to 121 million in 1950. This 
increase of 238 million people in 44 years is the result of high rates of population 
growth, close to 3 per cent in the 1950-73 period. Those rates resulted from 
constantly falling death rates, observed since the end of World War II or even 
earlier, and persistently high birth rates.
High population growth was accompanied by a rapid urbanisation process that 
involved massive movement from rural areas to cities. In 1950, nearly 60 per cent 
of Latin Americans lived in rural areas, but in 1990 less than 30 per cent lived in 
those areas. This is a characteristic trait of Latin America, which has distinguished 
it from other developing regions for many years (CELADE, 1993).
Table 4.2 Total Population, 1900-1994 (in thousands at mid-year)
1900 1913 1929 1950 1973 1980 1989 1994
Argentina 4,693 7,653 11,592 17,150 25,193 28,114 32,114 34,587
Brazil 17,984 23,660 32,894 53,444 102,982 121,286 145,803 161,790
Chile 2,974 3,491 4,306 6,082 9,992 11,147 12,883 14,210
Colombia 3,998 5,195 7,821 11,946 22,778 26,525 31,739 35,101
Mexico 13,607 14,970 16,903 27,737 55,539 67,570 81,666 91,145
Venezuela 2,542 2,874 3,259 5,094 11,796 15,091 19,025 21,844
Total 45,798 57,843 76,775 121,453 228,280 269,733 323,230 358,677
Korea 8,772 10,277 13,397 20,557 33,935 38,124 42,380 44,389
Taiwan 2,864 3,469 4,493 7,882 15,427 17,642 20,006 20,983
Total 11,636 13,746 17,890 28,439 49,362 55,766 62,386 65,372
Portugal 5,450 6,004 6,729 8,512 8,630 9,819 9,795 9,850
Spain 18,566 20,263 23,210 27,868 34,810 37,386 38,888 39,205
Total 24,016 26,267 29,939 36,380 43,440 47,205 48,683 49,055
France 40,598 41,463 41,230 41,836 52,118 53,880 56,423 58,022
Germany 34,666 37,843 40,595 49,983 61,976 61,566 62,063 66,802
Japan 44,103 51,672 63,244 83,563 108,660 116,800 123,120 125,188
Netherlands 5,142 6,164 7,782 10,114 13,439 14,150 14,849 15,389
UK 38,426 42,622 45,672 50,363 56,210 56,314 57,236 58,702
USA 76,391 97,606 122,245 152,271 211,909 227,757 248,781 261,558
Total 239,326 277,370 320,768 388,130 504,312 530,467 562,472 585,661
Sources: See Table 4.1.
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In the 1970s a slowdown in population growth was observed in Latin America, 
caused by a decrease in fertility in most of the countries, and in all strata of the 
population. The growth rate declined from an average of 2.4 per cent in the 1970s 
to 1.9 per cent in the 1980s and to 1.8 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s. 
These growth rates are similar to those in Asian countries, but much higher than in 
the advanced countries.
Table 4.3 compares birth rates, mortality rates and life expectancy around 1950 
and 1990. All countries, with the exception o f Argentina, show a drastic fall in 
birth rates as well as mortality rates, with a subsequent rise in life expectancy at 
birth from an average of 54 years to 69 years.
Table 4.3 Comparative Characteristics o f the Demographic Situation around 
1950 and 1990
Birth Rate Life Expectancy Mortality Rate Infant Mortality 
(per thousand) (years) (per thousand) (per thousand)
1950 1990 1950 1990 1950 1990 1950 1990
Argentina 25.4 21.3 62.7 70.6 9.2 8.6 63.6 32.2
Brazil 44.6 26.7 51.0 64.9 15.1 7.8 134.7 63.2
Chile 37.2 23.8 53.8 71.5 14.3 6.1 126.2 18.1
Colombia 47.3 25.9 50.6 68.2 16.7 6.4 123.2 39.7
Mexico 45.5 30.0 50.8 68.8 16.6 5.9 113.9 41.3
Venezuela
Arithmetic
47.0 28.5 55.2 69.7 12.4 5.4 106.4 35.9
average 41.2 26.0 54.0 69.0 14.1 6.7 111.3 38.4
Korea 37.0 16.5 47.5 69.4 32.0 6.1 115.0 25.0
Taiwan
Arithmetic
46.6 15.7 47.2 73.7 9.9 5.1 n.a. 6.0
average 41.8 16.1 47.3 71.5 20.9 5.6 115.0 15.5
Portugal 24.1 12.4 59.3 73.8 11.8 9.8 91.0 14.0
Spain
Arithmetic
20.3 10.9 66.5 77.0 10.2 8.2 62.0 8.0
average 22.2 11.7 62.9 75.4 11.0 9.0 76.5 11.0
fiance 19.5 13.8 66.5 76.0 12.8 9.6 45.0 8.0
Germany 16.0 11.1 67.5 74.8 11.1 11.6 51.0 8.0
Japan 23.7 11.1 63.9 78.3 9.4 6.3 51.0 5.0
Netherlands 22.1 12.7 72.1 76.8 7.5 8.5 24.0 9.0
UK 15.9 13.6 69.2 75.0 11.7 11.5 29.0 9.0
USA
Arithmetic
24.3 16.0 69.0 74.9 9.5 8.8 28.0 10.0
average 20.3 13.1 68.0 76.0 10.3 9.4 38.0 8.2
Note: n.a.: not available
Sources: CELADE (1993), Council for Economic Planning and Development (1994) and United 
Nations (1993).
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The increase in life expectancy of about 15 years was mainly due to the reduction 
in death rates in the early years of life and, especially, infant mortality, the decrease 
being much less among older people. The reduced incidence of infectious diseases 
(diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and immune-preventible diseases) in infant 
and child mortality, as well as reduced death rates related to chronic diseases in 
adulthood such as cancer and cardiovascular disease, have been two of the most 
significant factors in the so-called epidemiological transition (CELADE, 1993).
Comparisons of the levels of, and trends in, Latin American death rates and 
those of the other countries in the sample show that the gap in life expectancy has 
fallen from 13 years to 5 years. Nevertheless, current levels o f life expectancy are 
similar to those experienced in the United States 40 years ago, when there was 
neither the current knowledge nor the means of preventing and treating a large 
number of diseases (CELADE, 1990).
Table 4.4 Total and Sectoral Employment (thousands o f persons)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
Agriculture
1950 1,723 10,606 722 2,164 5,338 710
1973 1,429 14,199 626 2,577 6,032 782
1980 1,333 13,078 540 2,524 7,221 731
1989 1,464 13,527 709 3,004 6,076 780
1994 1,508 13,243 822 3,258 5,645 845
Industry
1950 2,141 3,116 684 700 1,464 315
1973 3,182 7,911 1,011 1,498 4,211 851
1980 3,654 12,596 984 2,204 5,239 1,341
1989 3,033 13,226 1,031 2,501 6,542 1,364
1994 2,673 13,056 1,054 2,642 7,568 1,438
Services
1950 2,957 3,935 850 980 1,963 546
1973 4,791 11,055 1,257 2,541 4,937 1,705
1980 5,078 17,417 1,794 3,685 7,162 2,554
1989 7,233 27,893 2,563 4,982 11,701 3,578
1994 8,302 33,610 3,078 5,770 14,804 4,441
Total
1950 6,821 17,657 2,256 3,844 8,765 1,571
1973 9,402 33,165 2,894 6,616 15,180 3,338
1980 10,065 43,091 3,318 8,413 19,622 4,626
1989 11,730 54,646 4,303 10,487 24,319 5,722
1994 12,483 59,909 4,954 11,670 28,017 6,724
Sources: Appendix C.
This circumstance implies that the region could have made even greater 
progress than it has to date, especially since the gains achieved by the Asian 
countries of our sample were bigger than those of Latin America, with the former
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reaching a life expectancy of about 70 years, while the level at the beginning of the 
1950s was about 7 years lower than the average for Latin America.
Another area where substantial progress has been made is in infant mortality 
which has declined, especially due to mass vaccination, oral rehydration and 
expanded health services, and again it becomes clear that in a comparative 
perspective the Latin American countries performed worse than the other countries 
in our sample, regardless of whether, at the initial point, those countries were 
below the level of Latin America, at the same level or above it.
LABOUR INPUT
For the Latin American countries total and sectoral employment was estimated 
separately for agriculture, industry and services (according to the International 
Industrial Uniform Classification IIUC Rev. 1, see Table 4.4). I have used the 
following statistical sources: (i) population estimates by the Latin American 
Demographic Centre (CELADE); (ii) specific participation rates of the male and 
female population derived from Population Censuses and Household Surveys; (iii) 
employment rates obtained from Population Censuses; and (iv) 1990 estimates of 
the economically active population generated by CELADE (1992) were used and 
the ECLAC Projections Centre provided us with estimates of total employment 
based upon national surveys. The benchmark years used in this study that did not 
coincide with census and survey years were intrapolated and 1994 was 
extrapolated.
Methodology and Results
The methodology for estimating the employment series consisted of the following 
steps: estimation o f the economically active population (EAP) for the 1950-80 
period; estimation of total employment for the 1950-80 period; estimation of 
sectoral composition of employment; and estimation of the EAP and employment 
for 1990. For each country, the EAP was estimated on the basis o f population data 
and participation rates, for the age group ten years and older (see Table 4.5). The 
data on population aged 10 years and over was obtained from CELADE (1993). 
The participation rates were obtained from a study by ECLAC (1985). These were 
updated to 1990 using the CELADE (1992) study on the economically active 
population. Some cases showed rather big differences in trends (for example, 
Argentina and Mexico) and the specific adjustments made are commented on in 
Appendix C on human capital.
The ECLAC (1985) study, based upon population censuses and household 
surveys, presents a homogeneous series of specific participation rates of the 
economic active population aged 10 years and over for 1950, 1960, 1970 and
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1980 in the Latin American countries. The study also presents all procedures used 
to adjust the information to the same benchmark years, to standardise the age 
groups and to make the definitions of the EAP homogeneous. For 1990, the same 
adjustments were made, as far as possible, in order to create a consistent data base.
Table 4.5 Determinants o f Total Employment, 1950-90 (in thousands o f persons 











1950 17,150 40.9 7,017 97.2 6,821
1960 20,614 39.1 8,059 97.4 7,849
1970 23,962 38.9 9,318 98.0 9,132
1980 28,114 36.3 10,218 98.5 10,065
1990 32,546 37.8 12,313 92.2 11,932
Brazil
1950 54,444 33.3 17,799 99.2 17,657
1960 72,594 32.1 23,325 99.2 23,138
1970 95,847 31.6 30,249 98.0 29,643
1980 121,286 36.3 44,060 97.8 43,091
1990 148,477 39.1 58,023 96.7 56,108
Chile
1950 6,082 37.6 2,290 98.5 2,256
1960 7,608 32.6 2,478 95.0 2,354
1970 9,496 30.5 2,894 94.3 2,729
1980 11,147 31.6 3,519 94.3 3,318
1990 13,100 36.4 4,772 92.8 4,429
Colombia
1950 11,946 32.5 3,887 98.9 3,844
1960 15,939 29.5 4,704 96.0 4,516
1970 21,360 29.1 6,217 96.0 5,968
1980 26,525 33.0 8,763 96.0 8,413
1990 32,300 36.8 11,889 90.4 10,747
Mexico
1950 27,737 32.0 8,881 98.7 8,766
1960 36,945 29.2 10,771 98.4 10,600
1970 50,596 27.9 14,136 96.2 13,599
1980 67,570 30.2 20,396 96.2 19,622
1990 83,226 30.8 25,649 97.1 25,905
Venezuela
1950 5,094 32.9 1,677 93.7 1,571
1960 7,579 31.2 2,364 87.4 2,066
1970 10,721 28.5 3,055 95.0 2,902
1980 15,091 32.6 4,921 94.0 4,626
1990 19,502 34.9 6,812 86.0 5,859
Sources: 1950-80 from ECLAC (1990c) and for 1990 estimate see the sources in Appendix C.
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In Appendix C tables are given with all relevant data starting from population and 
ending with the total amount o f hours worked in the benchmark years. In this 
Appendix I also indicate for each country what specific adjustments have been 
made in each case.
The step from the economically active population to total employment was 
made by estimating employment rates. The employment rates were obtained from 
population censuses based upon a uniform definition of the working population for 
the entire 1950-80 period. In order to obtain this uniformity, a thorough analysis 
of all definitions used in the population censuses was made, especially concerning 
period of reference, the inclusion in the category unemployed of those who seek 
work for the first time, the minimum age to be included in the EAP and the 
minimum time worked in order to be included. The uniform census employment 
rates therefore have a standard definition for all countries except in some, 
explicitly mentioned, cases.
Table 4.6 presents the sectoral composition of agriculture, industry and 
services. The distribution was estimated using information on the sectoral 
economically active population obtained from the population censuses. The 
information for 1990 was obtained, where possible, from the same census source 
as the 1950-80 estimates. If the census for 1990 was not available, an estimate by 
ECLAC’s Projections Centre was used.
It was necessary to standardise the sectoral distributions in line with the 
International Industrial Uniform Classification, revision 1 (DUC 1). In those cases 
where the censuses used revision 2 (DUC 2) the necessary adjustments were made, 
and when the censuses were conducted in different years, the percentile 
distribution data were intrapolated to obtain homogeneous series.
The employment estimate for 1990 was based upon a study by CELADE 
(1992) which provided estimates of the economically active population. These 
estimates are projections made by CELADE based upon assumptions with respect 
to population growth and male and female participation rates, and do not 
completely reflect changes in demographic and participation rates tendencies. This 
is clearly shown in some cases where the population census for around 1990 is 
available. In the case o f Chile the estimates are rather precise but in the case of 
Mexico it was shown that the 1980 population census contained substantial errors 
and new estimates were provided by CELADE.
The ECLAC Projections Centre estimated total employment based upon 
National Household Surveys. Disaggregated unemployment was assumed to be 2 
per cent in agriculture, and unemployment for the remaining sectors was then 
estimated assuming equal unemployment rates in the other sectors. I also assumed 
equal unemployment rates for female and male workers as it is extremely difficult 
to obtain data on disaggregated employment rates.
Unemployment is normally somewhat higher in the case of women and 
Arriagada (1994) presents the results for three capital cities in our sample
countries, reporting higher female unemployment rates in two cases, with 20 per 
cent higher unemployment rate on average. Unemployment estimates for 1990 
come from the population censuses or from national sources as indicated in 
Appendix C.
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Table 4.6 Sectoral Composition of Employment, 1950-94 (per cent)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
Agriculture
1950 25.3 60.1 32.0 56.3 60.9 45.2
1973 15.2 42.8 21.6 38.9 39.7 23.4
1980 13.2 30.3 16.3 30.0 36.8 15.8
1989 12.5 24.8 16.5 28.6 25.0 13.6
1994 12.1 22.1 16.6 27.9 20.1 12.6
Industiy
1950 31.4 17.6 30.3 18.2 16.7 20.1
1973 33.8 23.9 34.9 22.6 27.7 25.5
1980 36.3 29.2 29.7 26.2 26.7 29.0
1989 25.9 24.2 24.0 23.8 26.9 23.8
1994 21.4 21.8 21.3 22.6 27.0 21.4
Services
1950 43.4 22.3 37.7 25.5 22.4 34.8
1973 51.0 33.3 43.4 38.4 32.5 51.1
1980 50.5 40.4 54.1 43.8 36.5 55.2
1989 61.7 51.0 59.6 47.5 48.1 62.5
1994 66.5 56.1 62.1 49.4 52.8 66.0
Total
1950 100 100 100 100 100 100
1973 100 100 100 100 100 100
1980 100 100 100 100 100 100
1989 100 100 100 100 100 100
1994 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Derived from Table 4.4.
In order to check the results a comparison with alternative estimates was made. 
The economically active population and employment were compared, using as 
additional sources CELADE, ELO and national studies. The results show some 
differences in the cases of Mexico and Colombia. With respect to the EAP, there 
exist two other estimates, one by CELADE (see CELADE 1985a and 1985b) and 
the other by the International Labour Organisation (ELO, 1986). The estimates of 
the EAP made by CELADE and ILO correspond to a comprehensive and 
consistent set of data, based on uniform concepts, methods and classification 
schemes for all countries. The data take into account information on the 
economically active population obtained from national population censuses, labour 
force sample surveys and other related surveys conducted during the period 
1945-85.
58 The Economic Development o f Latin America
In general the levels are rather similar, though the estimates of this study are 
somewhat closer to those of ILO. The greatest differences with respect to 
CELADE’s EAP concerned Colombia with a difference of 9.5 per cent in 1980, 
and Chile, with 7.5 per cent, also in 1980. In the case of the ILO’s measure of the 
EAP, the biggest difference was in Mexico, with a 9.4 per cent difference in 1980, 
and Chile, with a 6.7 per cent difference in the same year. Another comparison 
consisted of the sectoral composition of the EAP compared with the ILO. The 
comparison showed both to be very similar, with the exception of Colombia in 
1980 and Mexico in 1960, with differences o f 4.2 and 5.6 per cent in agriculture, 
respectively.
Finally, with respect to the comparison of the employment series, two sources 
were used; first, an estimation of employment series on the basis o f ILO data and 
second, estimates based upon national case studies. The procedure followed to 
estimate the employment series on the basis of ILO data was as follows: (i) the 
basis information was the EAP of the ILO disaggregated in agriculture, industry 
and services; (ii) an unemployment rate was chosen on the basis o f the available 
information of the censuses and PREALC; (iii) the non-agricultural unemployment 
rate was estimated on the basis that the agricultural unemployment rate was half of 
the non-agricultural rate; (iv) it was assumed that the ILO estimate o f EAP 
correspond to employment in the latter sector since population censuses tend to 
overestimate unemployment in agriculture, due to the type of questions used in 
rural areas.
Hours worked
The measurement of labour inputs for growth accounting purposes can be done 
either in terms of the number of persons employed or number of hours worked. In 
Latin America the first method has been used almost exclusively, because o f its 
simplicity and the easier availability of statistics. It is obvious, however, that the 
second method is preferable for our purposes, the measurement of productivity, 
comparing not only countries within the region, which may themselves feature 
substantial differences in hours worked, but also with countries outside the region 
where the variation is known to be large.3
Table 4.7 shows the summary results on working hours per person per year for 
the period 1950-94, indicating a clear downward trend for all countries6. The 
average decline was about 200 hours or around 10 per cent. The extent of the 
decline varied from 122 hours in Mexico to 348 hours in Colombia. The Latin 
American sample shows remarkable homogeneity, at the end of the reference 
period, in terms o f the number o f hours worked per person. The standard deviation 
was somewhat less than 20 per cent in the 1950s, and fell below 10 per cent in the 
1980s.
Summary Table 4.8 shows total hours of labour input for 1950-94. 
Remarkable differences in growth rates are evident, with Argentina’s labour input 
growing a mere 69 per cent while Venezuela’s input grew 375 per cent. The high 
increase in hours of labour input is explained in great part by the growth o f persons 
employed. The latter is related to high rates of population growth, with relatively 
stable participation rates (see Table 4.9). The changes in the amount of hours of 
work per person per year are also relatively small.
In Table 4.9 the total participation rates of Table 4.5 are disaggregated in terms 
of female and male participation rates. Although total participation rates do not 
show a specific tendency, the picture is distinctly different on a more disaggregated 
level. Male participation rates fell in all countries with Argentina experiencing the 
greatest fall (8.9 percentage points) while Brazil and Colombia showed only small 
reductions. Female participation rates rose in all countries, with the biggest 
increases in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela.
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Table 4.7 Total Hours o f Work per Person per Year, 1950-94
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1994
Argentina 2,034 2,073 2,006 1,974 1,850 1,875
Brazil 2,042 2,134 2,145 1,985 1,879 1,860
Olile 2,212 2,031 1,962 1,938 1,984 2,002
Colombia 2,323 2,218 2,170 2,074 1,969 1,975
Mexico 2,154 2,150 2,066 2,051 2,060 2,032
Venezuela 2,179 2,024 1,951 1,997 1,889 1,910
Average 2,157 2,105 2,050 2,003 1,939 1,942
Sources: Appendix C.
Table 4.8 Total Hours o f Labour Input, 1950-94 (thousands)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1994
Argentina 13,871 16,271 18,322 19,868 20,997 23,406
Brazil 36,053 49,367 63,571 85,517 105,954 111,429
Chile 4,991 4,351 5,361 6,430 8,851 9,918
Colombia 8,930 10,017 12,950 17,445 21,159 23,049
Mexico 18,442 22,404 27,865 39,788 52,354 56,943
Venezuela 3,424 3,801 5,662 9,181 10,931 12,842
Source: Table 4  of Appendix C.
Measuring the labour force in developing countries on the basis of 
demographic censuses and household surveys raises some specific problems, 
depending on the concepts and definitions used, as well as problems of 
classification of specific groups. The male and female participation rates used here
60 The Economic Development o f  Latin America
are based on an ECLAC study that presented a homogeneous series of specific 
participation rates (ECLAC, 1985). Table 2 of Appendix C presents absolute 
employment figures. Estimating the unemployment rate for developing countries is 
one of the trickiest problems in this kind of statistical exercise. Generally speaking 
census material has been used (see Appendix C for explanation for each country).
Table 4.9 Female and Male Participation Rates (percentage o f total population)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1994
Argentina
Total 40.9 39.1 38.9 36.4 37.8 38.4
Male 64.1 61.6 58.6 54.1 55.5 56.0
Female 16.3 15.9 19.1 19.1 20.8 21.5
Brazil
Total 33.3 32.1 31.6 36.3 39.1 40.2
Male 56.5 53.0 50.3 53.3 55.1 55.9
Female 10.0 11.2 12.8 19.3 23.1 24.7
Chile
Total 37.6 32.6 30.5 31.6 36.4 38.6
Male 57.8 51.4 48.0 48.4 52.0 53.3
Female 17.9 14.2 13.4 15.2 21.2 24.3
Colombia
Total 32.5 29.5 29.1 33.0 36.8 38.4
Male 55.1 49.4 46.4 50.9 54.8 56.2
Female 10.3 9.9 12.0 15.3 19.2 21.0
Mexico
Total 32.0 29.1 27.9 30.2 30.8 31.1
Male 55.8 48.1 44.7 48.3 47.6 47.2
Female 8.3 10.3 11.1 12.1 14.3 15.3
Venezuela
Total 32.9 31.2 28.5 32.6 34.9 35.9
Male 54.9 51.9 45.3 48.1 49.3 49.9
Female 10.4 8.3 11.3 16.8 20.3 21.9
Source: Table 1 of Appendix C.
In Latin America there are no national institutes or international organisations 
which systematically gather and analyse this type of data and there are no sources 
of information common to all countries (except for some ILO estimates). The 
estimates presented here have been gathered from different sources, each with a 
different methodological approach, and tend therefore to be only very rough, initial 
estimates. For a summary of the findings on annual hours of work per employee, 
see Table 3 o f Appendix C. Mexico is the only country where the variable 
remained stable, while Brazil showed a rising trend until the 1970s, followed by a 
remarkable slowdown. The other countries show a steadily declining trend.
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Human Capital
In growth accounting considerable effort has been devoted to capturing quality 
changes in labour input.7 The most important of these, considered to have a direct 
effect on productivity, is the level o f education and its rate of change. There are, as 
mentioned in the introduction, other aspects which have an important effect on 
increasing productivity and reducing poverty, such as health care and nutrition, but 
no estimates for these are provided in this chapter. Some factors which do have an 
effect on the productivity of the labour force are not included in the quantification. 
For example, one factor already considered by Denison (1967) is work effort. 
Denison cites industry observers which indicate that the pace of work in Canada 
and the United States is markedly faster than in Western Europe. It would not be 
too difficult to arrive at a similar opinion with respect to the Latin American 
countries, and making a case for a much wider gap than exists between Europe and 
the United States. However, these differences are very difficult to quantify, insofar 
as they are not due to differences in working hours or education, and belong 
largely to the realm of the ultimate causes of economic growth. Another factor is 
the general health of the population and the labour force; however, the impact of 
malnutrition and disease on labour input and productivity in developing countries 
has until now largely gone unmeasured.
Length of work year
One factor which has been considered by Denison (1967) and some other growth 
analysts is the length of the work year, measured by hours worked. They assumed 
that, above a certain level, decreases in time worked were fully compensated by 
increases in work intensity and, up until a level of about 1700 hours a year, a 
partial compensation was used. Currently, most growth analysts do not include this 
kind of analysis, maybe because of the relative uniformity of working hours in the 
advanced countries. This issue might be again of interest in comparisons between 
advanced and developing countries, marked by huge differences in annual working 
time. However, in this study I have assumed, as did Maddison (1987), that a 
reduction in working hours leads to an equiproportionate cut in labour input.
Education
In the advanced countries and successful ‘late industrialisers’, there is a clear 
recognition of the central role that education and the generation of knowledge play 
in the development process, and this attitude has been spreading gradually to the 
countries of Latin America. In most countries of the region the systems of 
education, training, and scientific and technological development have undergone 
noteworthy expansion in the last decades. However, they still display shortcomings 
in terms of the quality of their results, their degree of adaptation to the
requirements of the economic and social environment, and the extent to which they 
are accessible to the different strata of society (ECLAC, 1992).
The rise in the average educational level of the population in the post-war 
period has had a crucial effect on the quality of labour. An individual’s level of 
education affects the type of work he or she can do and the efficiency with which 
work is performed. In all countries in our sample the population’s average number 
of formal years of education has risen rapidly (see Table 4.10). However, the most 
rapid growth was experienced by the developing countries, with the Asian 
developing countries growing at by far the fastest rate. In a recent publication 
concerning the rapid growth of some East Asian countries, several explanatory 
factors were put forward to explain the fast growth in human capital. These were 
identified as rapid economic growth, the decline in population growth, the 
relatively equal income distribution, and policies with respect to human capital 
formation (World Bank, 1993a).
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Table 4.10 Average Years o f Formal Educational Experience o f the Population 
Aged 15-64,1950-94
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
Total
1950 4.72 1.83 4.46 2.45 2.06 1.93
1973 6.87 3.23 6.46 4.41 3.81 3.94
1980 7.41 4.22 7.34 5.07 5.72 5.51
1989 8.38 5.25 8.65 6.91 6.78 7.76
1994 8.96 5.93 9.48 8.20 7.45 9.38
Primary
1950 3.86 1.53 3.65 2.04 1.88 1.74
1973 4.92 2.41 4.55 3.19 3.14 3.11
1980 4.97 3.22 4.91 3.45 4.17 4.11
1989 5.09 3.87 5.30 4.29 4.60 5.23
1994 5.15 4.29 5.54 4.83 4.86 5.98
Secondary
1950 0.77 0.25 0.70 0.34 0.16 0.16
1973 1.68 0.69 1.55 1.06 0.56 0.74
1980 2.04 0.88 2.12 1.40 1.32 1.20
1989 2.65 1.23 2.93 2.27 1.83 2.16
1994 3.01 1.48 3.45 2.93 2.16 2.90
Higher
1950 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.03
1973 0.27 0.13 0.35 0.15 0.11 0.09
1980 0.40 0.12 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.20
1989 0.63 0.15 0.42 0.34 0.34 0.36
1994 0.81 0.16 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.51
Source: Appendix C.
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The number o f formal years of education enjoyed by the population aged 
between 15 and 64 years is probably not the most adequate measure o f quality 
change. First, some authors consider the labour force as the more relevant unit 
o f analysis and, second, important elements such as on-the-job training are 
not taken into consideration. On the one hand, unfortunately, in Latin 
America, the only data available for the whole period and all countries of 
coverage concerns years of formal education o f the population. However, it is 
also true that higher levels o f education o f the population as a whole have 
positive effects, especially in terms o f adaptability to changing markets and 
new technologies; these factors assume greater importance in the global 
integration process marked by rapid changes in markets and technologies and, 
in the case of Latin America, export-oriented development strategies.
Table 4.11 presents a comparison o f formal years o f education o f the total 
population and o f the labour force. The general conclusion is that differences 
are small at the primary level but can be significant at the tertiary level. This 
information, obtained from population censuses, is only available for a few 
benchmark years in a limited number of countries. Hence, I have opted for average 
years of formal education of the population as the best proxy available for human 
capital improvement.
As regards on-the-job training, Psacharopoulos (1993) indicates that there 
exists strong education-training complementarities. Psacharopoulos and Vêlez 
(1992), using data for Colombia, found a strong positive interaction between 
training and years of formal education in determining earnings. They concluded 
that training really has an effect on earnings only after a worker has eight years of 
formal education. A study by Mingat and Tan (1988) confirmed the above- 
mentioned findings since they concluded that training was particularly productive 
when a country’s educational system is highly developed. The rate of return on 
training was, according to their most conservative estimate, in the order of 20 per 
cent, assuming that 50 per cent of the population is literate.
Unfortunately, as education expanded in Latin America, its overall quality 
declined and the educational system became more inefficient. Several factors can 
be identified. One was the explosion of social demand for education, which led to 
the incorporation of more and more children, without redefining the educational 
content or increasing resources to meet expanded enrolments. Moreover, the 
traditional preference for physical investments over qualitative ones and the lack of 
interest in education also contributed to a poor implementation of the growth of the 
educational system, with the corresponding deterioration in results. In Latin 
America, it is o f fundamental importance to design and put into effect a strategy 
for promoting the transformation of education and training and increasing the 
scientific and technological potential o f the region which makes sustained growth 
possible on the basis of the incorporation and spread of technological progress 
(ECLAC, 1992). A very important consideration is whether the quantity indicator
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of years of education also reflects the quality changes, which have occurred in the 
sample countries. The crisis o f the 1980s has affected the quality o f education in 
countries of Latin America while, for example, the Asian countries may well have 
improved their educational systems, but this is not reflected in our data. Although 
it is very difficult to make an assessment of quality changes, I will analyse some 
aspects of deteriorating education in Latin America, together with policies for 
improving the quality of education.
One striking difference between Latin America and the other regions is its 
much higher level o f grade repetition, especially in the first grade; 50 per cent in 
1980 and 42 per cent in 1988.8 There is some grade repetition in any school 
system because some students are not yet mature enough to be promoted or show 
some learning disability. Students then benefit enough from repetition to make it 
efficient from an economic viewpoint. However, the high repetition rates suggest a 
major problem. The greatest problem lies not in the lack of schools but in the 
quality of education. High repetition rates limit access to education, delay entrance, 
and have high resource costs. Some rather simple measures have been suggested 
for the schooling system, such as wider provision of textbooks and writing 
materials, which could reduce the enormous amount of resources now devoted to 
grade repetition (IDB, 1993).
Some micro-evidence on the effects of schooling indicates that the impact of 
educational attainment on wages and economic productivity is considerable. One 
important element, as indicated above, is the fact that schooling has both important 
private and social returns. In fact, the IDB (1993) study indicates that private 
returns are lower and social returns higher than in standard estimates.
Psacharopoulos gives a brief summary of the recent research on returns to 
investment in education; primary education continues to be the number one 
investment priority in developing countries; educating females is marginally more 
profitable than educating males; the general secondary school curriculum is a 
better investment than the technical/vocational track; and the returns to education 
obey the same rules as investment in conventional capital, that is, they decline as 
investment expands (Psacharopoulos, 1993). One of the conclusions with respect 
to differences in pay between different segments of employment, self-employment 
and dependent employment, is that empirical studies generally find no significant 
difference in income between the two as documented by Psacharopoulos (1993). 
This result, although important in itself, is also useful with respect to the 
determination of the respective factor shares.
The estimates of educational levels are presented for each country as a whole 
and in this sense the wide variations within countries in average years of education 
are not taken into account. For example, in Brazil, there are huge educational 
differences between the north-eastern region and other parts of the country. In 
Latin America, the quality of schooling and attendance rates tends to be 
systematically lower in rural areas and for the indigenous people.
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Hours worked by males and females, and within each sex by individuals of 
different age, change over time. Women do proportionally more temporary or part- 
time work, and their labour market participation and skill acquisition is interrupted 
by child bearing and raising, resulting in lower compensation rates. Lower 
compensation for women is partly due to discrimination, which therefore 
exacerbates the quality differential between men and women. Psacharopoulos and 
Tzannatos (1992) estimate that women’s pay is 70.5 per cent o f men’s for Latin 
America as a whole, with a somewhat higher figure for our sample countries.
Table 4.11 Comparison o f Educational Level o f Total Population and Labour 
Force (years o f formal education)




Labour force Difference (%)
1951 Colombia Primary 2.07 2.04 -1.3
Secondary 0.35 0.35 0.0
Higher 0.07 0.07 0.0
Total 2.49 2.46 -1.2
1961 Venezuela Primary 2.14 2.19 2.3
Secondary 0.24 0.27 14.1
Higher 0.05 0.07 31.0
Total 2.43 2.53 4.1
1970 Chile Primary 4.42 4.40 -0.5
Secondary 1.43 1.46 2.1
Higher 0.28 0.37 32.1
Total 6.13 6.23 1.6
1980 Argentina Primary 4.97 5.07 2.1
Secondary 2.04 1.98 -3.0
Higher 0.40 0.49 22.8
Total 7.41 7.54 1.8
1981 Venezuela Primary 4.27 4.32 1.2
Secondary 1.28 1.43 11.8
Higher 0.22 0.26 16.3
Total 5.77 6.01 4.1
1990 Mexico Primary 4.63 4.73 1.7
Secondary 1.90 2.36 24.2
Higher 0.63 0.50 38.9
Total 7.16 7.59 6.0
1992 Chile Primary 5.44 5.44 0.0
Secondary 3.14 3.20 1.9
Higher 0.44 0.58 31.8
Total 9.02 9.22 2.2
Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of population censuses.
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In a comparison between the age-participation profiles o f women in advanced 
countries and Latin America, two facts stand out. First, the participation rate of 
women in developed countries is higher than in developing countries. Maddison 
(1991a) shows that the average female participation rate in the labour force was 
almost constant at around 30 per cent during the first half of the twentieth century, 
for a sample of 16 developed countries. From 1950 to the late 1980s, the female 
participation rate in the labour force increased to over 40 per cent. It is somewhat 
surprising that our sample of Latin American countries has not yet reached the 
level which the advanced countries attained as early as 1910 (see Table 4.12). 
However, the increase in women’s participation rates has been much higher in the 
developing countries than in the developed countries.
Second, the age profile of female participation in advanced countries is 
characterised by a double peak: the first peak occurs just before childbearing starts, 
while the second peak is reached once the last child begins going to school. In 
contrast, there are no indications that women re-enter the labour market after an 
interruption in employment in Latin America (see Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos, 
1992).9 On average, about two-thirds of the female workers in Latin America work 
in the services sector, especially domestic work, compared to about one third of 
male workers. However, the increase in women’s participation as a result of fewer 
household responsibilities, fewer children to take care of, higher education and 
other factors, has been the principal cause of the increase of participation rates of 
some age groups, especially women of 35-44 years of age whose participation rate 
increased as much as 10 percentage points between 1980 and 1990 (Arriagada, 
1994).
Table 4.12 Females as a Proportion o f Total Employment, 1950-90
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 19.4 20.0 24.5 26.6 28.0
Brazil 15.1 17.4 20.2 26.6 29.6
Chile 24.0 22.0 22.2 24.4 29.5
Colombia 15.9 16.9 20.8 23.4 26.3
Mexico 13.2 17.6 19.6 19.6 22.8
Venezuela 17.8 17.6 20.9 25.4 28.8
Average 17.6 18.6 21.4 24.3 27.5
Sources: Appendix C.
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NOTES
1. The renewed focus on causes of economic growth in the ‘new growth theory’ and especially in 
the role of human capital, see for example Lucas (1988), was preceded in die 1960s when the 
human capital theory received much attention, promoted amongst others by Becker (1964), 
Harbison and Myers (1964), Schultz (1961) and Tinbergen and Bos (1965).
2. Most of the data on vital rates is obtained from the excellent book by Collver (1965).
3. See Diaz-Alejandro (1970, tables 1 -14  and 1-15, pp. 37-38). Another indicator of the 
importance of immigration is that in 1914 30.3 per cent of the population were foreigners. This 
indicates that the relative importance of immigrants was much higher in Argentina than in the 
USA, where the ratio of foreigners in the total population reached a maximum of 14.4 per cent 
(in 1890 and 1910). See Diaz Alejandro (1970, p. 36).
4. An interesting thesis suggested by Collver (1965), which falls outside the scope of this study, is 
that the immigrants themselves played a major part in the change in reproductive behaviour in 
Brazil and especially Argentina.
5. The 1950 level of hours worked per year was quite similar in the different country groupings. It 
was somewhat lower in the advanced countries, with high levels in Japan, Germany and the 
Netherlands, and somewhat higher in the Asian developing countries. By 1990, this situation 
changed and differences are substantial -  with levels around 2300 hours in the Asian countries 
and somewhat above 1600 hours in the advanced countries.
6. It should be noted that in many cases the only available information concerned the formal sector 
and no statistics were available regarding the informal and rural sector where people tend to 
work very long hours.
7. See the works of Denison, and in Latin America for example, Selowski, Elias and Langoni.
8. These averages relate to the whole of Latin America; our sample countries have a lower average 
(35 per cent) because the Southern Cone countries have much lower levels (especially Chile).
9. The female participation rates in this study coincide rather well with our estimates. However, it 
is necessary to be cautious with their mean because it apparently contains a calculation error.

5. New Standardised Estimates of Capital 
Stock for Latin America and the USA
INTRODUCTION
The lack of comparable estimates of fixed capital stocks in Latin American 
countries has hindered the analysis of economic development within the region, as 
well as comparisons with other developing and developed countries. This chapter 
tries to fill the gap by providing standardised estimates of gross and net stocks for 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.
The estimates were generated by employing the ‘Perpetual Inventory Method’ 
(PIM) currently used by most OECD countries and, hence, the most appropriate in 
an international comparison. The analysis concentrates on the methodology and 
results for Latin America but also includes a comparison with the USA,1 using the 
same methodology.
In spite of both the theoretical and practical difficulties associated with the use, 
estimation and meaning of capital stock estimates, they continue to be extensively 
employed and are useful for many kinds of economic analysis, such as growth 
accounting, productivity analysis, economic forecasting, studies of cyclical 
fluctuations and of the relationship between capital, output and labour and the role 
of technical progress.
In the past, significant efforts have been made to estimate capital stocks in 
many Latin American countries, and a review of these is presented in Appendix H. 
However, no official time series on capital stocks are prepared on a regular basis. 
Hence there have been estimates by a variety of independent researchers and 
institutes. This explains the great differences in methodology and coverage. These 
estimates may be useful for various types of analysis within each country, but are 
difficult to use in international comparisons because of differences in definitions 
and assumptions with respect to the different variables such as GDP, capital 
formation and its disaggregation, estimation of the initial stock, length of asset 
lives, retirement patterns (that is, distribution of service lives around the mean life), 
and differences in the relative prices of assets.
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M ETHODOLOGY
There are basically two methods, each with its variations, for measuring capital 
stocks:
(a) direct measurement of the stock for a benchmark year, through different types 
of survey of physical assets, insured values, company book values, or stock 
exchange values;
(b) by cumulating historical series on past investment and deducting assets which 
are scrapped, written off or destroyed by war.
The second is widely known as the 'Perpetual Inventory Method’ and was 
pioneered by Raymond Goldsmith (1951). In this chapter, annual fixed capital 
stock estimates are presented for the 1950-94 period using the Goldsmith 
method.2 The attraction of the perpetual inventory model is based on its use of a 
methodology which facilitates international comparison. It produces more 
meaningful figures because all the hypotheses and calculations are transparent and 
consistent It permits analysis o f the structure and age distribution of the capital 
stock. It is now generally used in official estimates, sometimes in combination with 
direct estimates o f the initial stock, for example Japanese statisticians use a post­
war wealth survey benchmark.3
The capital assets considered in this study are the same as those included in 
gross fixed capital formation in the national accounts. Generally the countries 
examined in this study follow the United Nations classification (United Nations, 
1968), where gross fixed capital formation is defined as outlays (purchases and 
own-account production) by industries, producers of government services, and 
producers of private non-profit services to households, for new durable goods 
(commodities) less net sales of similar second-hand and scrapped goods. Excluded 
are government outlays on durable goods for military use. In general, the goods 
included are durable (lasting more than one year), reproducible and tangible. 
Intangible assets like patents and other intellectual property are excluded, as are 
inventories, work in progress and non-reproducible assets like forests, land and 
mineral deposits.4
Capital formation is separated here into three asset types -  residential 
structures, non-residential structures, and machinery and equipment. For each type 
fixed capital stocks have been estimated on the basis of past investment. Estimates 
are given for both gross and net fixed capital stocks. This makes it possible to 
differentiate between ‘ex-post’ and ‘ex-ante’ concepts of capital,5 that is, between 
actual and expected contributions of capital to production. Here the ‘ex-post’ 
concept is used. Capital stocks are valued at constant 1980 prices. GDP and capital 
stocks were converted to international dollars, using the International Comparison 
Project (ICP) purchasing power parities (PPP), rather than exchange rates.
New Standardised Estimates o f  Capital Stock 71
Separate PPPs were used for GDP, investment in residential structures, non- 
residential structures and machinery and equipment.
The perpetual inventory method estimates capital stock as a weighted sum of 
past investment flows. This involves estimation of a base year capital stock 
consisting of the sum of past investment during the assumed life-times o f the 
different asset categories. The gross stock is calculated by adding investment 
during the year and subtracting assets that are scrapped. The net stock is obtained 
by adding investment during the year and deducting depreciation.
The objective of this chapter is to generate capital stocks for the 1950-94 
period. To be able to use the perpetual inventory method, historical time series of 
gross fixed investment are needed over a long period of time, basically since 1900. 
This requirement was difficult to meet for Latin America since in many cases 
official series do not go further back than 1950.
The reliability of the stock estimates depends primarily on the accuracy of 
these basic data. Hence, Appendices B and D provide a detailed description o f the 
sources and series used for each country. A set o f three tables is provided for each 
country with long-term series (1900-1994) for GDP at constant 1980 national 
prices, GDP at constant 1980 international dollars, population, GDP per capita, 
gross total and disaggregated investment in national currencies and as a percentage 
of GDP. These appendices also contain an explanation o f the estimation 
procedures applied to fill holes in the data base.
For most countries it was relatively easy to obtain information dating back to 
1925 although, for example, finding data on investment in residential construction 
gave problems for the whole period in some countries. For 1900-1925 the basic 
series are mostly very rough estimates.
A working life of 50 years was assumed for residential structures, 40 years for 
other structures and 15 years for machinery and equipment, for all countries, over 
the whole period. These assumptions seem rather realistic for non-residential 
structures and machinery and equipment.
Several countries use asset life estimates which are close to the ones used here 
(for example the asset lives which the US Bureau of Economic Analysis uses in its 
estimation for the United States are practically the same, although the official 
United States estimates are more finely disaggregated). In the case of residential 
structures, the asset life of 50 years is probably rather low but it is practically 
impossible to obtain data on residential investment before 1900 in Latin America.6 
In order to be able to generate the initial total capital stock for 1950, data on capital 
formation in machinery and equipment was needed since 1935, in non-residential 
construction since 1910 and in residential construction since 1900.
A rectangular retirement pattern was assumed, that is, assets are completely 
scrapped after serving their respective lives (15, 40 and 50 years). These 
assumptions about the mortality function and the fixed nature of service life have 
been adopted for reasons of transparency and simplicity. Blades (1989) analyses
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these different assumptions in detail. In my model, the simultaneous exit mortality 
function was applied, which is also still in use in Canada, Japan and Norway. 
Simultaneous exit may be regarded as a limiting case of a bell-shaped function 
which Blades considers the only plausible candidate for a mortality function. In my 
approach all assets of a given vintage disappear simultaneously, but the results are 
not very different from the bell-shaped hypothesis.7
A major problem in this kind of research is the estimation of the length of life 
of capital assets. For developing countries, especially Latin American ones, these 
length-of-life assumptions may be critical as they are often not only related to 
technological and economic considerations but also to shortages of foreign 
exchange and the absence of regular repairs and maintenance because of budgetary 
constraints. Furthermore, the obsolescence of capital seems to be less significant 
than the collapse o f the product market in determining utilisation rates. Future 
research should clarify the relative importance of these issues for Latin American 
capital stock estimates. Not much empirical information is available about service 
lives, especially in Latin America.8 Changing service life assumptions affect the 
size of the capital stock and its rate of growth.9
One obvious question is whether average service lives remain constant over 
time as I assumed. The service life of a given type of asset almost certainly varies 
both between different users and from one period to another. When business 
conditions are favourable, assets will be used more intensively and discarded 
sooner. Relative price movements, maintenance levels, management efficiency and 
tax rates also have an effect. OECD concludes that there was ‘little evidence o f any 
secular tendency for given types of assets to be retained in production for longer or 
shorter periods’ (OECD, 1993, p. 39). This does not, of course, mean that the 
average life o f the aggregate capital stock remains constant because this is affected 
by changes in the structure of the stock.
For the calculation of net capital stock, one has to define a depreciation 
function for allocating the cost of the asset over its service life.10 There exists a 
close relationship between replacement, service life and depreciation; see 
Jorgenson (1974) for theoretical aspects of replacement and its twin, the theory of 
depreciation. There is currendy no agreement over this depreciation function, but 
in the literature two approaches stand out. The first is the straight-line pattern of 
depreciation, in which efficiency declines linearly over the lifetime of the capital 
good. A second method, also used quite often, is the so-called declining balance 
depreciation in which efficiency of the capital good declines geometrically.11
In order to obtain the net capital stock I chose the first method, assuming that 
the capital services are used up in equal instalments over time, that is, applying 
straight-line depreciation over the working life of the different types of assets. Not 
much attention is given in the literature on capital stock estimation to the moment 
depreciation starts. This assumption, however, is not without importance.12 Very 
fast depreciation is often allowed for tax purposes in the developed countries, but
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is much less frequent in Latin America. After instalment machinery and equipment 
as well as structures need some time to start operating normally. Hulten (1990) 
presents a perpetual inventory model in which no first-year depreciation takes 
place, and Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) also apply a depreciation lag. Thus, in 
this study, straight-line depreciation starts with a lag of one year. It has also been 
assumed that the scrap value of capital goods at the end of their economic life is 
zero, which is o f course often not the case, but this treatment of obsolescence 
simplifies the calculation a great deal. This procedure is used in several OECD 
countries for estimation of net capital stock.
A model layout for capital stock estimation was developed to make all 
procedures transparent and to facilitate the replication of these results by other 
researchers (see Appendix E). Here I give the algebra involved in the procedures. 
In Table E.2 in Appendix E an example is presented of the procedure for 
estimating alternative benchmark capital stocks in non-residential structures as at 
31 December 1949 in Argentina, a procedure which is the same for each country. 
The procedure is also the same for each category of investment and the only 
difference is that, in the case of residential capital stock the series starts in 1900, 
and in the case o f machinery and equipment in 1935. The gross gross increment to 
capital stock in column 3 of Table E.2 is the result from the multiplying GDP at 
constant 1980 prices in column 1 and the ratio of total gross fixed investment in 
construction to GDP at constant prices in column 2. At the end of 1949 gross fixed 
capital stock in construction equals the sum of 1910-49 gross fixed investment or 
gross increments to capital stock as given at the bottom of column 3. The initial 
end-year gross capital stock was calculated as follows:
GGI\ = alt* GDP, (5.1)
b
GKb= X  GGVm (5.2)
m=b-9'+I
Gross increment to capital stock of asset i during period t
Gross domestic product in t
Gross initial capital stock of asset i at b
Ratio of total gross fixed investment of asset i to GDP at constant 
prices in t 
Initial year
Length of life of asset i 
Type of asset 
Time
where:
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Column 4 o f Table E.2 presents the annual depreciation provision based upon 
straight-line depreciation which means that, in each year in which depreciation 
takes place, l/40th o f gross investment is depreciated. Column 5 gives the yearly 
components of depreciated capital formation remaining by the end of 1949, 
corresponding to l/40th for 1910,2/40th for 1911, and so on. End 1949 net stock 
consists o f the sum of 1910-49 components of depreciated capital formation 
which equals the 1910-49 sum of column 5. Net mid-year capital stock was 
calculated as follows:
Nt?b Net initial capital stock o f asset i at b
This procedure of benchmark year capital stock estimation can of course also 
be used to estimate the 1950-94 end-year net and gross capital stocks. 
Alternatively, the procedures which are detailed in Table E.3 o f Appendix E can 
be applied. In this table capital stock estimates for the 1950-94 period are 
elaborated. In Table E .3 ,1950 end-year gross capital stock (column 6) equals the 
benchmark end-year 1949 capital stock plus the gross gross increment in capital 
stock in 1950 as given in column 3 minus retirement of gross gross increment to 
capital stock of 40 years ago (column 4). The 1950 end-year net stock equals the 
1949 stock plus the gross gross increment to capital stock (column 3) minus annual 
depreciation (column 7). The respective net and gross end-year capital stock series 





Ü , Depreciation of asset i during t
b (m - b  +  e l L  
  Qi   GGIrn (5.4)
GK't -  GK't-i + GGl‘i - GGl‘t-e (t > b ) (5.5)
NKÌ = NKÌ.i + GGIÌ-D" (5.6)
where:
GK‘t Gross capital stock of asset i at t
NK‘t Net capital stock of asset i at t
Columns 10 and 11 o f Table E.3 present average ages of gross and net capital 
stocks, respectively, and in columns 12 and 13 the end-year gross and net capital 
stock estimates are brought to a mid-year basis. Column 14 gives the average of
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mid-year net and gross capital stocks and the formulas for the calculation of 
average age and re-adjustment to mid-year13 are given below. Finally, the formulas 
for total gross and net capital stock aggregation and total gross and net capital 
stock average age calculation are presented.
j  (t-m)*GGIim 
GK\
AAGK\ = ~ ^ --------- ;-------------  (5.7)
. ÌÌI - t + fl*
A A N K ^ ^ 1  ----------:-----------------------  (5.8)
NK,
GM K, = G K i^ G K i  (59)
(,10)
n
TGK, = ^ G K Ì  (5.11)
(=7
n
TNK, = ^ N K ' t (5.12)
i= l
^  AAGKÌ *  GK‘t 
TGKt
AAGKt =  — -------------------------  (5.13)
^ A A N K Ì* N K Ì  
TNK,
AANKt =  — ------------------------- (5.14)
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where:
AAGKp Average age of gross capital stock of asset i in t
AANKV Average age of net capital stock of asset i in t
GMK¿ Gross capital stock, mid-year t
NMKp Net capital stock, mid-year t
TGK,• Total gross capital stock in t
TNK,: Total net capital stock in t
AAGKp Average age of total gross capital stock in t
AANK,: Average age of net capital stock in t
n: Number of assets i
RESULTS
Appendix E presents a complete set of net and gross capital stock estimates for 
each country, that is, gross and net fixed tangible capital stocks by type of asset, 
1950-94 at constant 1980 national prices as well as at constant 1980 international 
dollars. It also gives average age, average service lives and capital-output ratios 
for 1950-94 on the basis of national currencies and calculated on the basis of 
international dollars.
Previous Estimates
Appendix H contains a detailed analysis of previous capital stock estimates in 
Latin America. Table 5.1 presents a comparison of the national estimates with the 
standardized capital stock estimates of this chapter. The existing estimates have 
been elaborated for different time periods and we present those closest to our 
benchmark years. It is especially interesting to compare the national capital stock 
estimates with the standardised ones for the initial year. The standardised estimates 
were generated with the perpetual inventory method while many of the national 
estimates calculated the initial stock on the basis of direct estimation or used 
another methodology, for example the one developed by Harberger (1972).
For Argentina the Goldberg and Ianchivolici (1986) article is an excellent 
study which is also the only existing estimate completely based upon the perpetual 
inventory method. The differences with our standardised estimates come mainly 
from the different assumptions regarding service lives of assets which are higher 
than our standardised estimate. As a result the Secretaría de Planificación (1991) 
study, which is an update of Goldberg and Ianchivolici (1986), has higher fixed 
capital stock levels and lower growth rates than our estimate. The initial values of 
the IEERAL and ECLAC studies are quite high, especially the United Nations 
study (1959).
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In the case of Brazil the estimates of Goldsmith (1986) and Langoni (1974) are 
worth consideration. The Goldsmith estimate is mainly based upon the study by 
Langoni which is one of the few dealing with the problem of fixed capital stock 
estimation in Brazil. However, his initial fixed stock estimate seems rather high 
and the falling capital-output ratio shows a tendency contrary to ours. Most o f the 
other estimates also show relatively high initial capital stock estimates, much 
higher than the standardised estimates.
The movement of the capital-output ratio in the Haindl and Fuentes (1986) 
study for Chile coincides with ours. This is also largely the case in the Gutierrez 
study.
In Colombia the estimates of Harberger (1972) coincide largely with ours in 
terms of both trend and level. The more recent estimates of Henao (1983) show 
much higher levels and a clear downward tendency of the capital-output ratio. The 
ECLAC (1957) study finds much higher initial levels. The Mexican estimates by 
the Banco de Mexico (1969) are very difficult to interpret because they lack a 
methodological explanation. In the case of Venezuela the Baptista (1991) 
estimates growth rates are similar to ours but the levels show important differences. 
The Banco Central de Venezuela (1968) estimate is very similar to ours, but not 
much is known about the methodology used.
Exchange Rates and Purchasing Power Parities
A crucial consideration in international comparisons is how to convert estimates in 
local currencies into a common currency, either using exchange rates or 
purchasing power parities (PPP).14 The use of exchange rates as the conversion 
factor is the easiest and most direct way,15 but at best the official exchange rate 
reflects the purchasing power of tradable goods and services. It does not include 
non-tradables and thus may give rise to distortions. These distortions may be small, 
as is probably the case between two very open economies such as the Netherlands 
and Belgium, but can be quite large in the case of low-income developing 
countries.
The aim of the present study is to make internationally comparable estimates. 
Therefore, purchasing power parities are needed for non-residential and residential 
construction and machinery and equipment. Capital stocks normally consist partly 
of tradables, especially machinery and equipment, which in Latin America are 
purchased mainly from abroad, and partly of non-tradables. It is for this reason that 
purchasing power parities are the most appropriate conversion factor. However, 
purchasing power parities are only available for a limited number of countries for a 
limited number of years.
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Table 5.1 A Comparison of Standardised and National Estimates (on the basis o f  
national currency capital-output ratios)
Argentina Standardised Goldberg/' 1EERAL ECLAC United
estimates Ianchilovici (1986) (1954) Nations
(1986) (1959)
Gross Net Gross Net Net Net Net
1950 3.6 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.6
1973 3.5 2.3 2.3
1980 4.1 2.7 4.2 2.7 2.8
1984 4.6 2.9 4.9 3.2
Brazil Standardised Langoni (1974) Goldsmith ECLAC United
estimates (1986) (1954) Nations
(1959)
Gross Net Net Net Net Net
1950 1.4 0.9 2.6 2.6 1.8
1952 1.6 1.1 2.5 1.8
1968 2.0 1.4 2.2 2.0
1980 2.4 1.8 2.0
Chile Standardised Gutiérrez (1983) Haindl/Fuentes ECLAC
estimates (1986) (1954)
Gross Net Net Net Net
1950 3.6 2.3 2.8 2.2
1973 3.9 2.4 2.8 3.0
1980 3.6 2.1 2.4 2.6
1984 4.2 2.4 3.0
Colombia Standardised Harberger (1972) Henao(1983) ECLAC
estimates (1957)
Gross Net Net Net Net
1952 2.8 1.8 2.0 3.3 2.9
1967 2.7 1.6 1.9 2.7
1973 2.4 1.5 2.2
1980 2.4 1.5 2.2
Mexico Standardised Banco de México ECLAC United
estimates (1969) (1954) Nations
(1957b)
Gross Net Net Net Net
1950 1.7 1.2 2.8 1.8 2.2
1967 2.2 1.6 2.3
Venezuela Standardised Banco Central de Baptista (1974)
estimates Venezuela (1986)
Gross Net Net Gross Net
1950 2.8 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.3
1965 3.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.2
1973 3.0 2.0 2.0 1.3
1980 3.8 2.7 3.1 2.2
1989 5.0 2.9 3.8 2.2
Source: See Appendix H.
In Latin America the first efforts to estimate purchasing power parities date 
from the late 1940s, under the influence of the path-breaking study by Colin Clark
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(1940). One of the earliest was an interesting, yet largely unknown, study 
conducted at the Inter-American Statistical Institute. Under the technical guidance 
of Simon Kuznets, Dominguez (1947) used PPPs to convert 1940 national income 
estimates into dollars. The national income data available at that time were not 
very reliable and the basket of goods compared in order to estimate a PPP 
consisted only of 12 items, all o f them foodstuffs. Despite its shortcomings, the 
study provided a rough estimate of real income levels and gave an indication of the 
range of income disparities within Latin America and facilitated comparisons with 
the USA.
The first ECLAC estimates of real income in dollars were made for the 
1945-52 period (ECLAC, 1954). However, the methodology was not very 
rigorous and was based partly on a 1950 United Nations study which calculated 
dollar estimates of real income on the basis of projections of exchange rates for a 
‘normal’ period, and partly on arbitrary estimates by economists who were familiar 
with price levels and living standards in Latin America. The first systematic effort 
to calculate purchasing power figures in Latin America was the pioneering 1963 
ECLAC study conducted by Stanley Braithwaite.
Towards the end of the 1960s, ECIEL,16 a research programme of comparative 
studies on economic integration, initiated an international comparison project on 
the same lines as the ECLAC study. Finally, during the 1970s and the 1980s, 
ECLAC and ECIEL cooperated in the various phases of the International 
Comparison Project (ICP), which at the onset was a joint effort o f the United 
Nations and the World Bank and, in later phases, involved the Statistical Office of 
the European Communities (EUROSTAT) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).17
Table 5.2 presents the exchange rate and the purchasing power parities (PPPs) 
prepared during phase IV of the ICP project. I also give the adjusted exchange 
rates used in 1980 by ECLAC and the World Bank for conversion to dollars. For 
1980, the benchmark year, I compare the PPPs used, which were supplied to us by 
Alan Heston, formerly with the ICP project, with the ones published by the United 
Nations/EUROSTAT (1987).
In this table the AH column includes also PPPs for Mexico which were not 
published in ICP IV. The AH results show that all countries, with the exception of 
Argentina, have much higher exchange rates than PPPs as can be seen in the lower 
panel which gives PPP-GDP exchange rate deviation indices. The range varies 
from 0.46 in Colombia to 1.41 in Argentina. The PPP-exchange rate deviation 
indices in the lower panel of Table 5.2 indicates that the AH results for 1980 are 
similar to those of ICP IV.
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Table 5.2 Exchange Rates and GDP Purchasing Power Parities, 1980 (national 
currency units per dollar and ratio)
Exchange rate ICP IV AH ECLAC World Bank
GDP purchasing power parities
Argentina 1837 2709 2596 3334 4117
Brazil 52.7 30.6 32.4 50.9 51.0
Chile 39.0 28.8 26.5 41.7 44.7
Colombia 47.3 23.1 21.6 48.6 52.5
Mexico 23.0 13.4 25.4 30.8
Venezuela 4.3 3.6 3.1 5.0 9.7
PPP-exchange rate deviation indices
Argentina 1.47 1.41 1.82 2.24
Brazil 0.58 0.61 0.96 0.97
Chile 0.74 0.68 1.07 1.15
Colombia 0.49 0.46 1.03 1.11
Mexico 0.58 1.10 1.34
Venezuela 0.84 0.73 1.17 1.09
Sources: Exchange rates from IMF, International Financial Statistics-, ICPIV refers to the fourth phase 
of the International Comparison Project, see Kravis, Kenessey, Heston and Summers (1975) and Kravis, 
Heston and Summers (1978 and 1982) and United Nations/Eurostat (1987); AH refers to PPPs for Latin 
America which were kindly supplied by Alan Heston of the University of Pennsylvania and former 
director of the ICP project; ECLAC and World Bank refer to the adjusted exchange rates used by these 
organisations.
Table 5.3 shows PPPs for capital goods along with the resulting 
PPP-exchange rate deviation indices as estimated by ICP IV and the Alan Heston 
estimates. Here the results of the two estimates for 1980, ICP IV and AH, are 
given. Comparing the ICP IV and AH 1980 results, it becomes quite clear that the 
main difference occurred in the case of non-residential structures. It is because of 
these differences between exchange rates and PPPs that the appendices include 
capital stock estimates at both national and international prices. This gives the 
potential user the option of applying other PPPs or exchange rates than the ones 
used by us, without the need to go through the whole procedure of calculating the 
capital stock.
Standardised Estimates
By developing the model layout for capital stock estimation as described above, all 
procedures have been made transparent.18 Also for each country a detailed 
description and explanation is given of all sources and series used in the 
preparation of the final 1980 constant price series.19 In Figure 5.1 the results are 
presented in terms of capital output ratios, that is, capital per unit o f output. The 
total capital stock refers to the sum of residential and non-residential fixed capital 
stock. The non-residential fixed capital stock consist of the sum of non-residential
construction and machinery and equipment and reflects better the productive 
capacity of the fixed capital stock.
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Table 5.3 Capital Formation PPP-Exchange Rate Deviation Indices, 1980 
(national currency units per dollar and ratio)
(ICP phase IV) (Alan Heston)
Res. N.R. M&E Res. N.R. M&E
PPPs for capital goods
Argentina 4025 1389 3959 4057 4670 3899
Brazil 33.7 27.1 46.3 32.0 25.9 47.0
Chile 52.2 15.4 51.2 52.1 27.0 50.7
Colombia 20.1 17.6 53.6 19.6 22.3 54.8
Mexico 16.2 19.2 21.2
Venezuela 5.1 6.4 4.5 5.5 5.1 4.5
PPP-Exchange rate deviation indices for capital goods
Argentina 2.19 0.76 2.15 2.21 2.54 2.12
Brazil 0.64 0.51 0.88 0.61 0.49 0.89
Chile 1.34 0.39 1.31 1.34 0.69 1.30
Colombia 0.42 0.37 1.13 0.41 0.47 1.16
Mexico 0.70 0.83 0.92
Venezuela 1.19 1.49 1.06 1.29 1.20 1.06
Notes: Res. = Residential
N.R. = Non residential
M&E = Machinery and equipment
Source: Same as Table 5.2.
The average age of the capital stock has been estimated by giving each vintage 
of capital formation a weight proportional to the number of years it formed part of 
the capital stock (which in the case of machinery and equipment is a minimum of 1 
year and a maximum of 15 years). The average service life expectancy of the 
capital stock has been estimated by dividing the gross stock of a given year by the 
depreciation allowance in the same year. As straight-line depreciation was applied 
this gives a reasonable estimate of average service life.20
Table 5.4 presents a summary of the results with respect to average service life 
expectancy of the capital stock, that is, how long the assets remain, on average, in 
the capital stock. It shows that the weighted average service life fell in most 
countries (except for Brazil and Venezuela) from 1950-80 and remained relatively 
constant thereafter. As fixed asset lives for the separate assets were assumed, this 
shortening of lives is caused by changes in the composition of the capital stock, 
basically an increase for machinery and equipment and a decrease for residential 
structures (see also Tables 5.11 and 5.12).
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In Table 5.5 the average age of the total, non-residential and residential gross 
capital stock is presented. This figure reflects a combination of changes in the 
composition of the capital stock as well as its growth rate. A faster rate of growth 
of the capital stock, without changes in its composition, leads to a greater share of 
newer vintages in the stock and a reduction of its average age. However, changes 
in the composition o f the capital stock can also substantially affect the average age.
Table 5.4 Latin America: Weighted Average Service Life o f Total and Non- 
Residential Fixed Capital Stock, 1950-94 (on the basis of international 
dollars)
Total N.R. Res. Total N.R. Res.
1950 1973
Argentina 38.6 29.4 50 34.3 26.7 50
Brazil 30.4 23.9 50 33.6 28.9 50
Chile 36.5 32.3 50 33.8 29.9 50
Colombia 39.3 35.3 50 37.5 32.9 50
Mexico 38.0 35.1 50 31.9 27.5 50
Venezuela 26.3 24.8 50 28.3 25.4 50
1980 1994
Argentina 33.3 25.7 50 32.4 23.5 50
Brazil 32.4 28.4 50 34.8 30.6 50
Chile 34.4 30.6 50 34.3 31.2 50
Colombia 36.5 32.1 50 35.6 31.0 50
Mexico 30.7 26.3 50 30.7 24.7 50
Venezuela 27.6 24.7 50 27.2 24.5 50
Source: Appendix E.
Table 5.5 shows only a relatively small reduction in average age in the 
1950-80 period. As the composition of the capital stock did not change very 
much, on average, this largely reflects the acceleration in growth of the capital 
stock. In 1980-94, the combined effect of changing composition and falling 
capital stock growth causes a sharp increase in the stock’s average age.
The changes in the level of total and non-residential gross fixed capital stock 
per capita relative to the United States were especially important during 1950-73 
(Table 5.6). On average, there was an increase in per capita stocks relative to the 
United States from 1950-80 but thereafter the relative levels fell somewhat.
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Figure 5.1 Latin America: Total and Non-Residential Capital Productivity, 
1950-94 (ratio of GDP to gross fixed capital stock in constant prices)
Argentina Brazil
 total stock  non-resldenttal
Source: Appendices B and E.
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More detailed analysis o f specific countries makes it clear that all countries 
(except Colombia) increased their comparative level from 1950-73 and even until 
1980, with only Chile and Colombia showing a fall from 1973-80. The data for 
1980-94 show a drastic fall in per capita levels in Argentina and Venezuela, while 
the other countries remained stable or showed moderate growth.
Table 5.5 Average Age o f Total, Non-Residential and Residential Fixed Capital 
Stocks, 1950-94 (in years and on the basis o f international 1980 dollars)
Total N.R. Res. Total N.R. Res.
1950 1973
Argentina 18.9 13.5 23.3 14.7 12.1 17.8
Brazil 11.9 9.4 15.9 9.8 8.5 12.9
Chile 16.4 15.6 18.9 15.0 13.5 19.0
Colombia 15.3 15.2 15.4 15.0 13.7 17.8
Mexico 11.8 11.1 14.1 10.9 10.9 10.8
Venezuela 8.8 8.0 15.3 11.4 11.3 12.2
Arithmetic average 13.9 12.1 17.0 12.8 11.7 15.1
1980 1994
Argentina 13.9 12.2 16.0 17.0 14.6 19.4
Brazil 9.5 8.6 12.2 13.8 13.1 15.6
Chile 16.5 14.9 20.8 15.7 14.0 21.7
Colombia 14.7 13.1 18.3 14.9 13.7 17.6
Mexico 10.9 10.7 11.6 13.5 13.1 14.1
Venezuela 10.7 10.4 12.1 15.5 14.1 21.3
Arithmetic average 12.7 11.6 15.2 15.1 13.8 18.3
Source: Appendix E.
A growing literature has emerged recently on the importance of machinery and 
equipment in economic growth and in Table 5.7 the non-residential stock is 
disaggregated in non-residential structures and machinery and equipment. In 1950, 
machinery and equipment per capita was only 14 per cent of the US level and 
clearly lower than the level o f non-residential structures. The comparative level 
rose to 17 per cent in 1980 and fell during the 1980s. The average comparative 
level is very much influenced by the case of Venezuela. This country had a very 
high comparative level in machinery and equipment, 40 per cent in 1950, as a 
result of very heavy investment in the oil sector.
As can be observed in Figure 5.4, Venezuela invested less in machinery and 
equipment in the 1960s while the other Latin American countries continued to 
grow. In the 1970s machinery stock grew rapidly in almost all countries. In all 
countries the relative level of the machinery and equipment stock is lower than that 
of non-residential as well as residential structures. Given the above-mentioned 
importance o f machinery in economic growth, through the incorporation of
technical progress, this may have been an important limiting factor in post-war 
economic growth in Latin America (see also Chapter 6).
Table 5.6 Levels o f Total and Residential Gross Fixed Capital Stock per Capita, 
1950-94 (in 1980 international dollars)
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Total Capital Stock/per capita Residential Capital Stock/per capita
1950 1973 1980 1994 1950 1973 1980 1994
Argentina 6,415 10,598 13,000 14,256 3,562 4,858 5,870 7,165
Brazil 1,235 4,419 7,517 10,740 483 1,318 1,978 3,153
Chile 6,096 8,809 8,953 11,392 1,881 2,444 2,451 2,621
Colombia 3,596 4,628 5,498 7,567 1,095 1,543 1,736 2,340
Mexico 2,231 6,593 9,181 12,748 500 1,821 2,615 4,580
Venezuela 5,132 9,568 12,833 12,067 579 1,824 2,518 2,360
USA 26,168 34,183 41,267 54,089 8,665 7,864 9,391 13,558
(as percentage of USA per capita level)
Argentina 25 31 32 26 41 62 63 53
Brazil 5 13 18 20 6 17 21 23
Chile 23 26 22 21 22 31 26 19
Colombia 14 14 13 14 13 20 18 17
Mexico 9 19 22 24 6 23 28 34
Venezuela 20 28 31 22 7 23 27 17
Arithmetic
average 16 22 23 21 16 29 30 27
USA 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Appendices A and E.
Figure 5.2 presents levels o f per capita gross total fixed capital stock in the six 
Latin American countries. Here the impressive growth recorded in Brazil and 
Mexico in 1950-94 stands out. Argentina maintains its position as the country with 
the highest total capital stock per capita. Chile’s relative position weakened 
considerably although capital stock started growing rapidly in the 1990s. Colombia 
experienced relatively slow growth.
The growth performance of Venezuela is impressive: starting from an already 
high level in 1950, its per capita stock grew initially very rapidly, reaching the 
highest level in Latin America in the late 1950s. After a spurt in growth in the 
1970s, as a result of the oil crisis, Venezuela again had the highest per capita 
capital stock. However, the crisis of the 1980s hit Venezuela very hard and capital 
stock started to decline rapidly, and still continues to do so. Chile, Argentina and 
Colombia have all experienced rather steady growth.
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Table 5.7 Levels o f Gross Fixed Capital Stock per Capita o f Non-Residential 
Structures and Machinery and Equipment, 1950-94 (in 1980 international 
dollars)
Non-residential structure/per capita M&E /per capita
1950 1973 1980 1994 1950 1973 1980 1994
Argentina 2,168 3,737 4,453 3,910 685 2,004 2,677 3,181
Brazil 346 2,067 3,716 6,037 406 1,035 1,823 1,531
Chile 3,494 4,908 5,098 6,807 721 1,385 1,405 1,901
Colombia 2,238 2,559 3,038 4,132 262 526 724 1,095
Mexico 1,483 3,086 3,965 4,946 248 1,685 2,602 3,223
Venezuela 2,362 4,743 5,955 6,086 2,191 3,001 4,359 3,621
USA 11,967 16,563 18,653 22,216 5,536 9,756 13,224 18,315
(as percentage of USA per capita level) 
Argentina 18 23 24 18 12 21 20 17
Brazil 3 12 20 27 7 11 14 8
Chile 29 30 27 31 13 14 11 10
Colombia 19 15 16 19 5 5 5 6
Mexico 12 19 21 22 4 17 20 18
Venezuela 20 29 32 27 40 31 33 20
Arithmetic
average 17 21 23 24 14 16 17 13
USA 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Appendices A and E.
Another interesting point is the fact that all countries, with the exception of 
Venezuela, resumed growth in capital stock per capita in the 1990s. Venezuela has 
yet to recover from the crisis o f the 1980s, which had a severe impact on all 
countries. As mentioned above, Colombia experienced steady growth but at a low 
rate, especially in the 1950s and the 1960s, and its total capital stock per capita 
ended at the lowest level in the Latin American sample. Figure 5.3 reflects level 
and growth of the residential fixed capital stock. In comparison with the other 
stock components the stock of dwellings grow at a smoother rate. One of the main 
reasons for this is the fact that the service life of dwellings is the longest (50 years) 
o f all assets considered.
Figure 5 2  Total Gross Fixed Capital Stock per Capita, 1950-94 (1980 
international dollars)
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Source: Appendices A and E.
Figure 5.3 Residential Gross Fixed Capital Stock per Capita, 1950-94 (1980 
international dollars)
Source Appendices A and E
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Figure 5.4 Non-Residential Gross Fixed Capital Stock per Capita, 1950-94 (1980 
international dollars)
Source: Appendices A and E.
Figure 5.4 shows the level of gross fixed non-residential capital stock per 
capita in the sample of Latin American countries for the 1950-94 period. Figure 
5.4. is, of course, very similar to Figure 5.2 but there are also interesting 
differences. The non-residential stock is the best indicator of a country’s productive 
capacity, and is therefore the most appropriate indicator in a growth accounting 
exercise. Brazil has been the fastest growing country. The growth of per capita 
non-residential capital in Venezuela is very similar to that in Figure 5.2. 
Colombia’s non-residential stock per capita grew steadily but not very fast. Chile 
and Argentina were other poor performers.
Figure 5.5 shows per capita stock of machinery and equipment. As one would 
expect, this type of capital asset was the most volatile, as becomes especially clear 
in the case of Venezuela where it is related to the big investment boost in the oil 
sector which occurred in the 1940s and 1950 and again after the first oil crisis in 
the 1970s. Brazil’s stock grew rapidly from the mid-1960s until the beginning of 
the 1980s. Since then machinery and equipment growth has been extremely low.
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Figure 5.5 Gross Fixed Machinery and Equipment Capital Stock per Capita, 
1950-94 (1980 international dollars)
Source'. Appendices A and E.
Tables 5.8 to 5.11 show these movements in more detail. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 
give annual average compound growth rates for total and non-residential capital 
stock in 1950-94.
Table 5.8 Latin America: Total Gross Fixed Capital Stock, 1950-94 (annual 
average compound growth rates)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-94
Argentina 3.9 4.6 2.1
Brazil 8.8 10.4 4.6
Chile 3.8 1.8 3.4
Colombia 4.0 4.7 4.3
Mexico 8.0 7.8 4.4
Venezuela 6.7 8.0 2.1
Arithmetic average 5.9 6.2 3.5
Source: Appendix E.
With respect to growth rates, the countries can be divided into two distinct 
groups: the fast growers -  Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela -  and the slower growers 
-  Argentina, Chile and Colombia. Table 5.9 presents the growth rates for non- 
residential capital stock which are somewhat higher than the growth rates for total 
stock in four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela) and lower in
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Colombia and Mexico in the 1950-80 period. From 1980-94 the growth of non- 
residential capital stock was slower than that of total stock in most of the countries.
Table 5.9 Latin America: Gross Fixed Non-Residential Capital Stock, 1950-94 
(annual average compound growth rates)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-94
Argentina 4.8 4.8 1.4
Brazil 9.4 11.2 4.3
Chile 4.2 1.9 3.8
Colombia 3.8 5.1 4.3
Mexico 7.7 7.6 3.6
Venezuela 6.2 7.8 2.1
Arithmetic average 6.0 6.4 3.3
Source: Appendix E.
The relationship between the growth of net and gross stocks depends on the 
history of capital formation. When growth slows down as in 1980-94, gross stock 
will grow more rapidly than net stock. This is what happened in all the countries. 
The converse is true in periods of growth acceleration. Table 5.10 gives annual 
average compound growth rates for total net and gross capital stock for the 
1950-94 period.
Table 5.10 Comparative Growth of Gross and Net Total Fixed Capital Stock, 









Argentina 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.9 2.1 1.1
Brazil 8.8 9.2 10.4 10.5 4.6 3.6
Chile 3.8 4.0 1.8 0.9 3.4 3.6
Colombia 4.0 4.0 4.7 4.8 4.3 4.1
Mexico 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.5 4.4 3.8
Venezuela 6.7 6.2 8.0 8.7 2.1 0.6
Arithmetic average 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.2 3.5 2.8
Source: See Appendix E.
During 1950-80 net stock grew faster in Argentina and Brazil. The growth 
rates of both stocks were about the same in Colombia and Mexico, indicating a 
process of steady growth. For Chile and Venezuela, the period 1950-94 was not 
homogeneous as both had sub-periods of faster and slower growth in net stock 
compared to gross. In the case of some countries, especially Chile, the 1980-94
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period should be divided into a crisis period in the 1980s and recuperation in the 
1990s.
The changing composition and age structure of the capital stock gives an 
indication of the rate at which technical change has been embodied in the capital 
stock (Maddison, 1993). Table 5.11 gives an indication of changes in the 
composition of gross total capital stock, measured in international dollars, during 
the 1950-94 period. In all countries the share of machinery and equipment in the 
total capital stock increased from 1950 to 1980 (except in Brazil and Venezuela, 
which had very high shares) and stabilised or dropped slightly during 1980-94. 
The share of residential structures fell in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and rose in 
Mexico and Venezuela. The share of non-residential structures increased in Brazil, 
Chile and Venezuela and fell in Argentina, Colombia and Mexico. Here I am 
interested in the effect on the growth rates of the different stocks. Growth rates 
expressed in international dollars may be different from those in national 
currencies, because the PPPs change the composition of the capital stock. The sign 
of the change in the growth rate will depend on these compositional changes.
Table 5.11 Latin America: Composition of Gross Total Fixed Capital Stock, 
1950-94 (in 1980 international dollars and as a % of total capital stock)
Dwellings Non-residential structures M&E
1950 1973 1980 1994 1950 1973 1980 1994 1950 1973 1980 1994
Argentina 55 46 45 50 34 35 34 27 11 19 21 22
Brazil 39 30 26 30 28 47 49 56 33 23 24 14
Chile 31 28 27 23 57 56 57 60 12 16 16 17
Colombia 31 33 32 31 62 55 55 55 7 11 13 14
Mexico 22 28 29 36 67 47 43 39 11 25 28 25
Venezuela
Arithmetic
11 19 20 20 46 50 46 50 43 31 34 30
average 32 31 30 32 49 48 47 48 19 21 23 20
Source: Appendix E.
A comparison of Tables 5.11 and 5.12 shows that whether the measurement is 
performed in international dollars or national currencies makes a big difference to 
the composition of the capital stock. The difference was very notable in the cases 
of machinery and equipment in Chile and Colombia.
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Table 5.12 Latin America: Composition of Gross Total Fixed Capital Stock, 
1950-94 (on the basis of national currencies and asa%  of total capital stock)
Dwellings Non-residential structures M&E
1950 1973 1980 1994 1950 1973 1980 1994 1950 1973 1980 1994
Argentina 53 44 43 49 37 39 38 30 10 17 19 21
Brazil 35 29 26 30 21 37 39 48 44 34 35 22
Chile 43 38 38 33 41 42 41 44 16 21 21 23
Colombia 25 26 24 23 58 49 48 47 17 25 28 30
Mexico 19 24 24 31 68 47 44 40 13 29 32 29
Venezuela 13 21 22 22 48 51 47 51 39 28 31 27
Arithmetic
average 31 30 30 31 46 44 43 43 23 26 28 25
Source: Appendix E.
Table 5.13 Latin America: Difference between Growth of Fixed Capital Stocks in 
National Currencies and International Dollars, 1950-94 (difference in annual 










Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Brazil 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5
Chile 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2
Colombia -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 0.0
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Venezuela 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Non-residential capital stock
Argentina 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Brazil 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7
Chile -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Colombia -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Mexico -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Venezuela 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Note: * Difference calculated as growth rate in international dollars minus growth rate in national 
currency.
Source: Appendix E.
Table 5.13 compares the growth of capital stock as measured in national 
currencies with measures in international dollars (the latter being the method I 
prefer). Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela show very small differences between 
the two growth rates, while the other countries show larger differences.
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There are sometimes differences of over 10 per cent in the growth rates, 
especially in the 1980-94 period when growth was slow. For 1950-80 only 
Colombia showed differences of over 10 per cent with respect to non-residential 
capital stock. Brazil showed the largest absolute differences in total capital stock 
and in non-residential capital stock in 1950-73 and 1980-94, while Colombia 
presented the largest differences in 1973-80.
Table 5.14 presents the ratio of non-residential capital stock to total capital 
stock. This ratio can be seen as an indicator of the share of the productive capital 
stock (measured as the non-residential stock) in the total stock. The initial 1950 
ratio of productive to total fixed capital was very low in Argentina where 
residential capital stock is more substantial than non-residential. The other 
countries had much higher productive capital stock participation levels. In 1994, at 
the end of the period under consideration, Argentina remains the country with the 
highest level of residential capital stock. The role of productive capital is more 
dominant in the other countries, of which Venezuela has the lowest residential 
capital stock levels.
Table 5.14 Latin America: Ratio ofNon-Residential Fixed Capital Stock to Total 
Fixed Capital Stock, 1950-94 (on the basis of international dollars)
1950 1973 1980 1994
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
Argentina 0.44 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.45
Brazil 0.61 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.68
Chile 0.69 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.77 0.78
Colombia 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68
Mexico 0.78 0.77 0.72 0.69 0.72 0.68 0.64 0.59
Venezuela 0.89 0.89 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.79
Arithmetic average 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.66
Source-. Appendix E.
The following tables present estimates of capital-output ratios. There are many 
forces that affect the development of the capital-output ratios, including technical 
progress, capital widening or deepening, demand and supply factors, the interest 
rate and so on. It is not the objective of this chapter to attempt to explain 
developments for six countries over a 44-year period. These estimates are 
included, however, because they are used quite intensively in economic 
forecasting, planning and econometric models.
In Tables 5.15 to 5.17, a comparison of capital-output ratios of total and non- 
residential capital stock is given for the 1950-94 period based on estimations in 
international dollars. It becomes clear from Table 5.15 that in 1950 the Latin 
American countries showed considerable variation in their gross capital-output 
ratios. Measured in national currencies, Argentina had the highest, and Brazil and
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Mexico the lowest. In 1980 international dollars, Colombia had the highest level in 
1950. This situation had changed at the end of the period under consideration. In 
national currencies, Argentina and Venezuela again had the highest level, and 
Colombia the lowest. In international dollars Brazil and Venezuela had the highest 
level, and Chile and Colombia the lowest. During the 1950-94 period, the 
capital-output ratios of Chile and Colombia have remained more or less stable 
while the ratios of the other countries have risen substantially.
Table 5.15 Total Fixed Gross Capital-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (in 1980 
international dollars)
1950 1973 1980 1994
Argentina 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.8
Brazil 1.2 1.8 2.2 3.3
Chile 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.5
Colombia 2.8 2.2 2.1 2.3
Mexico 1.2 1.7 1.9 2.6
Venezuela 2.1 2.1 2.8 3.1
Arithmetic average 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.8
Source: Appendix E.
The gross non-residential capital-output ratios (Table 5.16) show quite 
different, and much lower, ratios than the total fixed gross capital-output ratios of 
Table 5.15. In 1994 the gross total capital-output ratio of Brazil (the highest) was 
about 50 per cent higher than the ratio in Colombia (the lowest). With respect to 
gross non-residential capital-output ratios, in 1994 this spread was much wider (80 
per cent), with Venezuela being the highest and Argentina the lowest. This 
difference in spread between total capital and non-residential capital-output ratios 
can be observed for the whole 1950-94 period.
Table 5.16 Non-Residential Fixed Gross Capital-Output Ratios, 1950-94 
(in 1980 international dollars)
1950 1973 1980 1994
Argentina 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.4
Brazil 0.7 1.3 1.6 2.3
Chile 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.9
Colombia 1.9 1.4 1.5 1.6
Mexico 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.7
Venezuela 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.5
Arithmetic average 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9
Source: Appendix E.
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Table 5.17 shows a comparison of gross and net capital-output ratios for the 
1950-94 period. Table 5.13 showed that the comparison of the growth rates of 
capital stock in national currencies and international dollars does not yield very 
large differences.
Table 5.17 A Comparison of Gross and Net Total Capital-Output Ratios, 









Argentina 2.3 1.4 2.3 1.5 2.6 1.7 2.8 1.6
Brazil 1.2 0.8 1.8 1.3 2.2 1.7 3.3 2.2
Chile 2.8 1.7 3.0 1.9 2.8 1.6 2.5 1.5
Colombia 2.8 1.8 2.2 1.4 2.1 1.4 2.3 1.5
Mexico 1.2 0.9 1.7 1.2 1.9 1.3 2.6 1.7
Venezuela 2.1 1.5 2.1 1.4 2.8 1.9 3.1 1.8
Arithmetic average 2.1 1.4 2.2 1.5 2.4 1.6 2.8 1.7
Source: Appendix E.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presented a comprehensive set of standardised and hitherto 
unavailable capital stock estimates for six Latin American countries, employing the 
perpetual inventory method. These estimates can be used in the analysis of 
comparative economic performance, productivity growth, convergence and catch­
up.
Total capital stock increased in all Latin American countries but at very 
different rates. In Brazil it grew by about 8 per cent between 1950-94, but only by 
some 3 per cent in Argentina and Chile. In 1950 Argentina had the highest level of 
total stock per capita, with Brazil by far the lowest. At the end of the period under 
consideration, Argentina remained the country with the highest level, while 
Colombia had the lowest. The non-residential stock level for the period as a whole 
was clearly highest in Venezuela, while Brazil made an impressive catch-up from 
the lowest level in 1950.
These trends are also true for the ‘productive’, that is, non-residential, capital 
stock. This stock grew slightly faster then total stock in the 1950-80 period, 
especially in the cases of Argentina and Brazil. When economic activity fell down 
sharply in the 1980s the growth rate of the ‘productive’ fixed capital stock became 
lower than the rate of the total stock.
It is also important to emphasise some points with respect to the composition 
of the stock. On the one hand, the relatively high level of the residential capital 
stock in Argentina and the corresponding somewhat lower level, in comparative
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perspective, of its productive capital stock. Venezuela is the extreme case on the 
other hand, presenting a relatively small stock of dwellings and the highest stock of 
machinery and equipment in our sample. This last fact is related to the very heavy 
investment in the oil sector over time. In the case of Brazil it is possible to observe 
rather high levels of machinery and equipment, especially initially in the 1950s, in 
the composition of the total capital stock.
Maddison (1993) found that the evidence for advanced capitalist countries did 
not confirm Kaldor’s (1961) hypothesis of constant capital-output ratios over the 
long run in capitalist countries. The Latin American evidence also contradicts 
Kaldor’s view and indicates increasing capital-output ratios in Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela. Capital productivity remained almost constant in Chile 
and increased somewhat in Colombia. There are some small differences between 
the evidence for total as opposed to non-residential capital-output ratios 
(Argentina and Chile for example) but the general trend is clear. However, 
Maddison’s evidence refers to a much longer period, for some countries since 
1820. For Latin America the evidence is restricted to the relatively short, for this 
type of analysis, 1950-94 period.
NOTES
1. The investment estimates for the USA are taken from Maddison (1995) but the stock estimation 
procedure was adjusted slightly due to changes in the benchmark year and for the use of somewhat 
different asset service life assumptions.
2. The description of this model is based upon Michael Ward (1976a).
3. See Maddison (1991a), Appendix D.
4. See Derek Blades (1989), p. 3.
5. See Ward (1976a), pp. 19-20.
6. The official estimate of the US Department of Commerce (1993), uses a service life of 80 years for 
new, one- to four-unit structures and 65 years for new, five or more unit structures based upon 
estimates from Goldsmith and Lipsey (1963). Improvements to residential structures are assigned 
the following lives: additions and alterations are assumed to have lives one-half as long as those for 
new structures; and lives for residential major replacements are based cm industry estimates far 
items replaced during the 1970s. Mobile homes are assigned a life of 20 years on the basis of trade 
association data. The resulting average service life is probably above our 50 years estimate but well 
below 80 years.
7. See Blades (1989, figure 2, p. 25).
8. Well-known studies for the USA were made by Terborgh (1954) and Winfiey (1935). The main 
sources used by the OECD countries as described in OECD (1993) ate: asset lives prescribed by 
tax authorities, company accounts, surveys, expat advice and other countries, estimates. Tax 
authorities in many countries specify the number of years over which the depreciation of assets may 
be deducted from profits before charging taxes. The estimation procedure for these asset lives is not 
very clear, Hibbert, Griffin and Walker (1977), note that tax lives in the United Kingdom are based 
on ‘custom and practice rather than any scientific study on the longevity of assets’. However, about 
half of the OECD countries make use of tax life estimates in their capital stock estimation, five 
countries use company accounts and industry studies. Japan is the only country for which large 
scale surveys are available; in the USA and the United Kingdom some small scale surveys have 
been carried out In several countries, investigations are under way with respect to service lives; for
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example, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Finally, most countries rely on expert advice 
and use other countries’ estimates (at least to check their own estimates). The empirical material for 
OECD countries is abundant compared to what is available for Latin America (see Bernstein and 
Shah, 1993).
9. If service life assumptions are changed with respect to die whole period of capital stock estimation, 
this will cause the stock size to change but the effect on the growth rate will be limited to change in 
the stocks composition. Changes within the period of estimation can have substantial effects on 
growth rates.
10. Hudson and Matthews (1963) analyse three theoretical variants of calculating depreciation charges 
over the working life of the asset: reducing, constant or increasing depreciation. Hie authors 
indicate that increasing depreciation over the asset’s life is a rather unreal example, because it 
obviously implies that net services will continue to increase throughout the asset’s life until the 
asset is ready for scrapping. They also discuss diminishing-balance and straight-line depreciation. 
With respect to the latter they observe: ‘A pattern of gradually diminishing periodic net services 
could arise in practice as a result, say, of the need for increasing maintenance expenses in the later 
years of the asset’s life’ (Hudson and Matthews, 1963, p. 234).
11. The specification of the depreciation function is especially relevant far tax deduction purposes. The 
imposed tax system asset lives have, therefore, a direct effect on depreciation. Hulten and Wykoff 
(1980) conclude in a study cm the USA that economic depreciation and tax depreciation are 
interrelated.
12. Depreciation represents a decline in efficiency and here we have assumed that efficiency decline is 
constant over time. For calculating convenience this assumption has to be expressed in discrete 
time for which we use the normal year period. We have assumed that the stock is at its maximum 
efficiency during the first period and starts declining by a fixed proportion in the subsequent 
periods (see Jorgenson 1974 and Jorgenson and Sullivan 1981). This assumption can have a sizable 
effect on the levels of the net capital stock. To give an example: assuming constant investment 
(100) and a working life of four years, means that the gross stock will be 400 at the end of the 
period. The net stock with immediate depreciation will amount to 150 (75 + 50 + 25) and with 
lagged depreciation will be 250 (100 + 75 + 50 + 25). The difference will vary according to 
investment flows and, again, will depend especially on working life assumptions, being lower with 
longer lives.
13. The calculation procedure comes from Ward (1976a, p. 58) who calls this the approximate method.
14. I use the 1980 international dollar which represents the same purchasing power parity over total 
GDP as the US dollar, but with a purchasing power over subaggregates and over detailed categories 
determined by average international prices rather than by US relative prices.
15. The exchange rates normally used are the annual average (rf) series of the IMF, published in 
International Financial Statistics.
16. Spanish acronym standing for: Programa de Estudios Conjuntos sobre la Integration Econ6mica 
Latinoamericana.
17. Unfortunately the Latin American countries did not participate in die last phases of the ICP, which 
makes it impossible to change die benchmark to a more recent year.
18. For an example of this layout see Appendix E and for a complete description see the pages above.
19. See Appendices B and D.
20. See Maddison (1982, p. 216).

6. Explaining Latin American Post-War 
Development -  The Growth Accounts
There have been relatively few growth accounting studies for Latin America.1 One 
of the problems in comparing these is the great variety of methodologies used. The 
heterogeneity is especially evident in the case of capital stock estimation, but GDP 
and employment measures also differ widely. A major contribution of the present 
study is the use of a standardised approach applied both to Latin American and 
other countries with which Latin America is compared.
STARTING POINT AND COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE
Table 6.1 presents comparative levels of economic performance between 1950 and 
1994 in 16 countries and averages for regional groups. 1950 was for many 
countries a new dynamic starting point after two world wars and the Great 
Depression. In the post-war period many European and Asian countries started 
growing and converging much faster. This convergence process was much weaker 
in Latin America.
In 1950, per capita real income in Latin America was three times as high as 
that of developing Asia, a bit higher than the Iberian level and about a third of that 
of the United States. Within Latin America, real per capita income ranged in 1950 
from around 40 per cent of the United States’ level in Argentina and Venezuela, 30 
per cent in Chile and Mexico and 19 and 15 per cent in Colombia and Brazil, 
respectively.
This picture had changed totally by 1994 when per capita real income in Latin 
America was about 30 per cent lower than in developing Asia, about two thirds of 
the Iberian level, around a quarter to a third of that in the United States and the 
other advanced countries. However, within Latin America, some convergence can 
be observed with levels of per capita GDP ranging from 35 per cent of the United 
States level for Argentina to 22 per cent in Colombia.
Latin American labour productivity (GDP per hour worked) was 3.5 times as 
high as developing Asia in 1950. Venezuela and Argentina had the highest level at 
around 40 per cent of the United States, Chile and Mexico about 30 per cent and 
Colombia and Brazil around 20 per cent. In 1994, labour productivity in Latin
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Table 6.1 Comparative Levels of Economic Performance of 16 Countries Between 
1950 and 1994 (USA = 100)
GDP GDP per hour 
per capita worked




Years of education 
per capita
1950 1994
Argentina 41 35 38 39 107 90 45 61
Brazil 15 23 17 24 89 92 18 37
Chile 33 31 30 34 109 94 43 63
Colombia 19 22 20 25 99 88 24 54
Mexico 27 33 30 40 90 84 19 49
Venezuela 38 27 42 34 90 79 18 61
Arithmetic average 29 29 29 33 97 88 28 54
Korea 8 46 9 33 90 141 30 86
Taiwan 8 47 7 36 106 132 32 98
Arithmetic average 8 46 8 34 98 136 31 92
Portugal 16 37 15 36 109 102 22 54
Spain 25 51 21 75 122 69 42 62
Arithmetic average 21 44 18 56 116 85 32 58
France 44 72 37 92 120 79 85 88
Germany 37 76 29 86 130 88 92 67
Japan 17 81 14 64 122 128 81 82
Netherlands 53 71 45 92 119 77 72 74
UK 62 69 54 82 115 85 96 78
Arithmetic average 43 74 36 83 121 91 85 78
Total land area per Merchandise exports Gross NR. capital stock
capita po-capita per employee
1950 1994 1950 1994 1950 1994
Argentina 214 224 102 23 16 19
Brazil 99 108 38 14 4 20
Chile 72 61 68 42 25 23
Colombia 88 59 49 12 15 14
Mexico 92 52 28 20 10 22
Venezuela 110 52 275 37 27 26
Arithmetic average 113 93 93 25 16 21
Korea 7 6 2 110 5 48
Taiwan 5 3 14 97 6 24
Arithmetic average 6 5 8 103 5 36
Portugal 22 34 33 91 10 26
Spain 51 56 21 95 34 40
Arithmetic average 37 45 27 93 22 33
Ranee 33 38 109 207 45 97
Germany 10 13 59 326 29 103
Japan 5 5 15 162 21 128
Netherlands 8 8 207 516 45 89
UK 12 15 186 178 30 64
Arithmetic average 13 16 115 278 34 96
Source: Latin America from Appendices A, B, C, E  and F. Other countries from Maddtson (1995), 
updated to 1994 using his sources, and OECD and FAO sources. Capital stocks estimated by the author.
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America is the same as in the Asian developing countries, which is surprising 
given that average per capita income in the Latin American countries is 30 per cent 
lower than in Asia. However, only about 35 per cent of the population is employed 
in Latin America compared with almost 50 per cent in the Asian countries. Annual 
hours worked were less than 2000 hours per person employed, compared to over 
2300 in Asia. Latin American labour productivity in 1994 was 33 per cent of the 
level in the United States, 40 per cent of that in the advanced capitalist countries 
and 59 per cent of the Iberian countries (see Maddison, 1995).
An element of growth that continues to receive much attention in the literature 
is the role of human capital, that is the increase of a country’s productive potential 
through education and training. Table 6.1 shows that in 1950 the levels for Latin 
America, the Iberian Peninsula and the Asian countries were very similar (around 
30 per cent of the US level). Although all countries show impressive growth in 
years of education, by 1994 the Latin American level is less than two thirds of the 
Asian level.
With respect to natural resources, the Latin American advantage was, and still 
is, overwhelming. A comparison of levels of total land area per capita in 1950 
shows Latin American endowments above the level of the United States (the best 
endowed developed country among those considered), and well over ten times the 
natural resource endowment of our two South-East Asian countries. Moreover, this 
measure does not include mineral resources, which most probably would amplify 
the differences. With respect to the physical reproducible capital stock, Latin 
America’s position relative to the United States improved slightly from an average 
of 16 per cent per capita in 1950 to around 21 per cent in 1994.
Latin American export performance has also been poor. From a relatively 
strong position in 1950, Latin America became the worst performer in 1994, 
indicating an important comparative loss of growth potential to realise efficiency 
gains through specialisation.
THE 1950-94 GROWTH ACCOUNTS
The objective of this book is to analyse economic development in Latin America 
in the twentieth century. In this chapter growth accounts are presented which 
constitute a useful framework for assembling quantitative ‘facts’ and qualified 
hypotheses about growth causality in a coherent way (Maddison, 1987). The 
growth accounts start in 1950 as data inadequacy prevents systematic analysis of 
previous periods for Latin America. Growth accounting exercises are important 
because they can serve many different purposes -  explaining differences in growth 
rates and levels between countries, illuminating processes of convergence and 
divergence, assessing the role of technical progress and calculating potential output 
losses. The results with respect to the most traditional explanatory factors, that is 
changes in the quantity and quality of labour inputs and changes in the quantity and
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quality of capital inputs are presented. I also include natural resources as an 
explanatory factor.
In order to explain in more detail the complex developments which have 
occurred since 1950, measures of total factor productivity have been prepared 
which differ from the traditional labour productivity indicator presented in Chapter 
3. Increases in different factor inputs are measured in terms of average annual 
compound growth rates. Labour input is derived by multiplying employment and 
annual hours per person. The quantity and quality effects are weighted by the 
relevant factor shares to show the contribution of augmented labour input.2
The average annual compound growth rates of the gross capital stock and of 
the quality of the capital stock (vintage effect) were also weighted by the respective 
factor shares to give the augmented capital input. The sum of augmented capital 
and labour input, and the growth rate of the natural resources input weighted by 
0.1, gives the augmented joint factor input, which is an indicator of the impact of 
factor inputs on economic growth.
A very important element of the analytical framework is its transparency. The 
appendices present all the basic series, giving the reader the opportunity to follow 
each step in the reasoning and test alternative hypotheses, because in this kind of 
research, large judgmental elements are inevitable.
Labour Input
Labour input was estimated in terms of hours worked rather than employment 
because average annual hours worked per employee year vary substantially 
between countries and over time.3 Average annual hours in 1994 were around 
2500 in Korea, compared to about 1400 in the Netherlands. Within Latin America 
the variation is much lower.
It is important to adjust for changes in the quality of labour input. In this study, 
this is represented by changes in the level of education of the population aged 
between 15 and 64 years. Our estimate consists of equivalent years of education 
per person. The quality effect of labour results from the growth of equivalent years 
of education, and is based on the assumption that a 1 per cent increase in education 
causes a 0.5 proportionate gain in labour quality.4
Table 6.2 shows the growth rates of the labour force and employment, 
respectively. The labour force is related, much more than employment, to 
demographic forces, and in the post-war period many countries in Latin America 
entered the initial phase of demographic transition, with its characteristics of still 
high birth rates, and falling mortality rates. During 1950-73, the labour force grew 
somewhat more rapidly than employment. In the period from 1973-80, 
employment growth accelerated and both employment and the labour force grew at 
approximately the same rate. This situation changed in the crisis period since 1980, 
when in all countries (except Mexico) employment grew more slowly than the
labour force, with unemployment growing especially fast in Colombia and 
Venezuela.
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Table 6.2 Latin America: Labour Force (LF) and Employment (EMP), 1950-94 









Argentina 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.0 1.8 1.6
Brazil 2.8 2.8 3.8 3.8 2.7 2.4
Chile 1.3 1.1 1.9 2.0 3.1 2.9
Colombia 2.5 2.4 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.4
Mexico 2.6 2.4 3.6 3.7 2.2 2.6
Venezuela 3.3 3.3 5.0 4.8 3.2 2.7
Arithmetic average 2.3 2.2 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.4
Source: Appendix C.
Table 4.7 of Chapter 4 showed a downward trend in working hours per person 
per year for the 1950-94 period in all countries, with an average decline of about 
10 per cent. The range of decline varied from 122 hours for Mexico to 348 hours 
in the case of Colombia.
Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of the increasing average educational 
level in the post-war period as a crucial element in raising the quality of labour and 
labour productivity. The type of work an individual can do and the efficiency with 
which he or she performs is determined to a large degree by the level of 
educational attainment.
Table 6.3 presents the increase in the level of formal education of the 
population, measured in years. For growth accounting purposes, primary education 
has been given a weight of 1, secondary education a weight of 1.4 and higher 
education a weight of 2. These weights were applied to the whole sample and are 
the same as used by Maddison (1995). Maddison based his weights on 
Psacharopoulos’ (1984) evidence on the relative earnings associated with different 
levels of education.
In all Latin American countries, the average level of education increased 
rapidly from 1950 to 1994, primary education was the first to increase, ultimately 
followed by secondary and higher education. The differences in levels of education 
are still very considerable, ranging in 1994 from 6.7 years in Brazil to 11.4 in 
Chile. Many authors consider the educational level of the labour force, instead of 
the total population, as the relevant measure for the quality of labour adjustment. 
Unfortunately, information regarding educational level for the whole 1950-94 
period is not available in most countries in Latin America.5
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Table 6.3 Latin America: Level of Education of the Population Aged 15-64 
(weighted years of formal education)
1950 1973 1980 1989 1994
Argentina 5.12 7.63 8.63 10.07 10.97
Brazil 1.98 3.64 4.69 5.89 6.69
Chile 4.85 7.41 8.50 10.25 11.38
Colombia 2.66 4.92 5.85 8.16 9.82
Mexico 2.16 4.46 6.48 7.86 8.75
Venezuela 2.02 4.42 6.19 8.99 11.06
Arithmetic average 3.13 5.41 6.72 8.54 9.78
Sources: Appendix C and applying the following weights; 1 for primary education, 1.4 for secondaty 
education and 2 for higher education.
Table 6.4 summarises the main trends in labour quantity and quality growth in 
Latin America. Employment in Latin America also grew fast but annual hours per 
person declined steadily during the whole period. Labour quality, which is 
reflected in educational level, shows a steady increase over the whole period.
In Table 6.4 the quantitative and qualitative changes in labour inputs are 
presented separately. No uniform trend can be distinguished from this table. 
Comparing the 1950-73 and 1973-80 periods, all countries, except Argentina and 
Brazil, showed slow to marked acceleration in the incorporation of labour. In 
1980-89, four countries experienced a slowdown (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela), while in the case of Chile the trend was acceleration. In the 1989-94 
period, most countries increased the rate of incorporation of labour, with the 
exception of Brazil and Chile. However, in the case of Chile labour quantity 
incorporation was maintained at a comparatively high level.
Reproducible Capital Input
An important element in growth accounting from a comparative perspective is the 
availability of reliable measures of capital stock. In Chapter 4 comparable capital 
stock estimates were generated using the perpetual inventory method. With respect 
to quality improvement in successive vintages of the capital stock, representing 
technical progress in physical investment, modest assumptions were made 
regarding the embodiment in non-residential structures and machinery and 
equipment (see also the section on capital and investment in this chapter).
It is interesting to see that capital productivity, presented in Table 6.5, behaves 
quite different from labour productivity. Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 shows that labour 
productivity growth is generally positive: long-run growth is about 2.4 per cent 
annually and only 1980-89 shows negative growth. Table 6.5 shows that capital 
productivity growth in the Latin American countries has been negative for large 
periods. On average, capital productivity fell over the 1950-89 period and only
1989-94 shows increasing capital productivity. However, on a country-by-country 
comparison large differences can be observed, as well as between periods in 
particular countries.
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1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1950-73
Labour quality 
1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Argentina 1.32 0.82 1.06 1.39 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.86
Brazil 2.90 3.01 2.11 1.54 1.33 1.83 1.27 1.28
Chile 0.55 1.85 3.17 3.10 0.93 0.99 1.05 1.05
Colombia 2.03 3.02 1.95 2.12 1.35 1.24 1.87 1.87
Mexico 2.22 3.66 2.46 2.60 1.59 2.70 1.08 1.08
Venezuela
Arithmetic
2.87 5.01 1.83 3.39 1.80 1.01 1.35 0.27
average 1.98 2.90 2.10 2.36 1.31 1.44 1.25 1.07
Source: Appendix C.
The quantity and quality increases of capital are presented in Table 6.6 below6. 
On the quality side the average growth rates were 0.7 per cent during the 1950-73 
period, 0.9 per cent in 1973-80, 0.8 per cent in 1980-89, and 0.6 per cent in 
1989-94. The combined effect of quantity and quality growth makes clear that 
especially in 1950-80, capital inputs grew at a very high pace. Since then, growth 
has been much slower.
Table 6.5 Capital Productivity Growth, 1950-94 (annual average compound 
growth rates)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Argentina 0.03 -0.44 -1.21 0.91
Brazil -1.46 -0.88 -1.03 -0.29
Chile -0.25 0.29 0.20 0.34
Colombia 0.84 -0.06 -0.49 0.08
Mexico -1.52 -0.40 -1.21 1.39
Venezuela 0.03 -1.12 -1.13 0.92
Arithmetic average -0.39 -0.44 -0.81 0.56
Source: Appendices B  and E.
The results with respect to quantity increases were discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. During 1950-73, Argentina, Chile and Colombia witnessed the slowest 
growth, and fastest growth occurred in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. During the 
1973-80 period, capital stock growth showed no signs of slowing down (except 
in Chile). However, in the 1980-94 period, growth rates decelerated drastically in 
all countries, with the exception of Chile and Colombia.
Table 6.6 Rate of Growth of Capital Inputs, 1950-94 (annual average compound 
growth rates)
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Capital quantity Capital quality
1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Argentina 3.59 4.56 2.11 1.74 0.75 1.10 0.88 0.34
Brazil 8.50 10.35 4.99 2.25 0.74 1.06 0.44 -0.02
Chile 3.85 1.87 2.42 4.75 0.62 0.48 0.86 1.23
Colombia 4.25 5.17 4.63 3.89 0.64 0.92 0.95 0.74
Mexico 8.14 7.85 4.57 3.70 0.61 0.86 0.63 0.52
Venezuela
Arithmetic
6.68 8.04 2.94 0.37 0.58 0.93 0.73 0.47
average 5.84 6.31 3.61 2.78 0.66 0.89 0.75 0.55
Source: Appendix E.
Land
Land was used as a proxy indicator of natural resource endowment for the 
countries, using respective weights of 1 for arable and permanent crop land, 0.3 for 
permanent pasture and 0.1 for forest land. The factor share used for weighting land 
was 0.10 for all countries (see next section). Table 6.7 shows clearly that the 
movement of the agricultural frontier has slowed down since 1950. In some cases 
land has been increasingly diverted from agricultural uses since 1973.
Table 6.7 Latin America: Movement of the Agricultural Frontier -  Expansion of 
Area of Land in Use for Agriculture (annual average compound growth rate)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-94
Argentina 0.77 0.11 0.01
Brazil 2.07 1.37 0.50
Chile 0.87 0.75 -0.93
Colombia 0.00 -0.09 0.88
Mexico 0.36 0.99 -0.70
Venezuela 0.67 -0.01 0.00
Arithmetic average 0.79 0.52 -0.04
Source: FAO (various issues).
Factor Shares
Factor shares are necessaiy for calculating total factor productivity, as each factor 
input has to be weighted by its respective factor share. The factor weights used in 
growth accounting affect the results of the exercises substantially, because rather
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big differences exist in growth rates of labour and capital stocks. The three main 
components of GDP are fixed capital consumption, compensation of employees 
and operating surplus. This last component must be divided between capital, 
labour and land income.
In Latin America an important part of the operating surplus, much more than in 
the advanced countries, consists of labour compensation for the self-employed and 
these earnings have to be attributed to labour’s share. The total capital share has 
been disaggregated into the capital shares of its three components, residential and 
non-residential capital and machinery and equipment. In some growth-accounting 
exercises, the individual items in the capital stock are weighted at their total stock 
value. However, the service flow per unit of capital in machinery and equipment is 
much higher than from a unit of residential capital. Therefore, the components of 
the capital stock have been weighted by their asset life, and the resulting 
disaggregated capital stock shares were multiplied by the national accounts total 
capital share. For the standardised capital shares the disaggregation of Maddison 
(1991a) has been used. For land income, used as a proxy for natural resource 
endowment, it was impossible to obtain estimates for all countries and a 10 per 
cent share was assumed for the whole period based on national accounts estimates 
available for some years in the case of Argentina and Mexico. Table 6.8 presents 
the resulting shares of capital, labour and natural resources in GDP for the six 
Latin American countries.
However, several authors have expressed their preference for constant factor 
shares (for example Maddison, 1987) and the sensitivity of the results was tested 
by using alternatively a set of standardised factor shares, with similar weights as 
used in Maddison (1991a), constant over time for all countries, as presented in 
Table 6.9. In general, the standardised factor shares will generate somewhat lower 
factor input growth as a result of a slightly lower standardised capital share 
combined with the fact that the capital stock generally grows faster than labour 
input.
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Table 6.8 Capital, Labour and Natural Resource Shares in GDP, 1950-94 
(percentage of GDP)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Argentina Brazil
Labour 52.9 49.7 37.8 36.0 70.1 56.8 56.7 57.6
Residential capital 11.8 11.4 14.9 16.3 3.1 4.6 4.9 5.6
Non-res. structures 12.1 12.5 14.5 13.5 4.4 8.2 9.6 11.0
M&E 13.2 16.5 22.7 24.2 12.5 20.4 18.8 15.7
Total capital 37.1 40.3 52.2 54.0 19.9 33.2 33.3 32.4
Natural resources 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Chile Colombia
Labour 5.9 54.4 54.4 55.6 53.3 53.6 52.2 49.3
Residential capital 14.7 13.2 12.5 11.4 9.4 5.1 4.8 5.0
Non-res. structures 12.1 11.4 12.4 12.3 18.8 12.4 12.3 13.0
M&E 11.2 11.0 10.7 10.8 8.5 18.9 20.7 22.7
Total capital 38.1 35.6 35.6 34.4 36.7 36.4 37.8 40.7
Natural resources 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mexico Venezuela
Labour 42.7 54.3 41.6 35.5 63.0 51.5 48.3 43.4
Residential capital 6.1 4.6 6.9 9.0 2.9 4.5 4.8 5.5
Non-res. structures 16.7 10.8 14.4 15.9 9.2 12.7 13.2 15.9
M&E 24.5 20.4 27.1 29.6 15.0 21.3 23.7 25.2
Total capital 47.3 35.7 48.4 54.5 27.0 38.5 41.7 46.6
Natural resources 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Estimated by the author on the basis of national account and census information.
Table 6.9 Standardised Capital, Labour and Natural Resource Shares in GDP, 
1950-94 (percentage of GDP)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Labour 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0
Residential capital 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Non-residential structures 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
M&E 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Total capital 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Natural resources 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Estimated by the author.
The Growth Accounts 109
Table 6.10 Basic Indicators of Growth Performance, 1950-94 (annual average 
compound growth rates)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Argentina Brazil
Population 1.69 1.58 1.49 1.25 2.89 2.36 2.07 1.77
GDP 3.99 3.04 -1.02 6.09 6.91 7.18 2.26 0.90
Employment 1.41 0.98 1.72 1.25 2.78 3.81 2.67 1.86
Hours per employee -0.08 -0.16 -0.65 0.14 0.11 -0.77 -0.55 -0.31
Education 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.86 1.33 1.83 1.27 1.28
M&E 6.71 5.84 3.11 1.52 7.44 10.76 2.05 -2.66
Residential capital 3.07 4.36 2.92 2.75 7.48 8.48 6.17 4.06
Non-res. struct 4.12 4.16 0.50 0.40 11.21 11.31 6.54 3.81
Capital quality 0.75 1.10 0.88 0.34 0.74 1.06 0.44 -0.02
Natural resources 0.77 0.11
Chile
0.03 -0.03 2.07 1.37 
Colombia
0.49 0.52
Population 2.18 1.57 1.62 1.67 2.85 2.20 2.01 1.71
GDP 3.58 2.84 2.95 6.38 5.12 4.97 3.31 4.27
Employment 
Hours per
1.09 1.97 2.93 2.86 2.39 3.49 2.48 2.16
employee -0.54 -0.12 0.23 0.23 -0.35 -0.45 -0.52 -0.04
Education 0.93 0.99 1.05 1.05 1.35 1.24 1.87 1.87
M&E 5.13 2.25 1.91 7.60 6.16 7.08 5.16 4.37
Residential capital 3.35 1.61 1.58 3.12 4.39 3.93 3.93 4.42
Non-res. struct 3.77 1.91 3.40 4.60 3.45 4.74 4.64 3.33
Capital quality 0.62 0.48 0.68 1.23 0.64 0.92 0.95 0.74
Natural resources 0.87 0.75
Mexico
-1.53 0.14 0.00 -0.09 
Venezuela
1.33 0.07
Population 3.06 2.84 2.13 1.86 3.79 3.58 2.61 2.36
GDP 6.50 6.43 1.36 2.99 6.44 4.10 -0.01 3.61
Employment 
Hours per
2.42 3.73 2.41 2.87 3.33 4.77 2.39 3.28
employee -0.19 -0.07 0.04 -0.26 -0.45 0.23 -0.55 0.11
Education 1.59 2.70 1.08 1.08 1.80 1.01 1.35 0.27
M&E 12.29 9.30 3.21 3.62 5.22 9.43 3.18 -3.20
Residential capital 9.03 8.30 6.00 6.57 9.03 8.46 2.72 0.84
Non-res. struct 6.40 6.59 4.70 1.81 6.91 7.01 2.87 2.34
Capital quality 0.61 0.86 0.63 0.52 0.58 0.93 0.73 0.47
Natural resources 0.36 0.99 -1.05 -0.06 0.67 -0.01 0.02 -0.04
Source: Appendices A, B, C and E.
Results
The core of the causal analysis is presented in Tables 6.10-6.12 stating the basic 
indicators of growth performance and the sources of growth. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 
on sources of GDP growth have been generated weighting the basic indicators of 
Table 6.10 by their respective factor shares. Table 6.11 represents the specific
factor weights, either in time as per country, as presented in Table 6.8 and in Table 
6.12 the standardised shares of Table 6.9 were employed.
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Table 6.11 Sources of GDP Growth with Country-Specific Factor Shares, 
1950-94 (annual average percentage point contribution to growth rates)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Argentina Brazil
GDP 3.99 3.04 -1.02 6.09 6.91 7.18 2.26 0.90
Employment 0.74 0.49 0.65 0.45 1.95 2.17 1.52 1.07
Hours per employee -0.04 -0.08 -0.24 0.05 0.08 -0.44 -0.31 -0.18
Education 0.46 0.44 0.33 0.31 0.93 1.04 0.72 0.74
M&E 0.52 0.75 0.48 0.42 1.06 2.11 0.94 0.35
Residential capital 0.47 0.52 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.47. 0.25 0.13
Non-res. structures 0.48 0.57 0.31 0.24 0.38 0.85 0.48 0.25
Capital quality 0.28 0.44 0.46 0.18 0.15 0.35 0.15 -0.01
Natural resources 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.14 0.05 0.05
Total factor input 
Doubly augmented 
total factor
2.98 3.14 2.29 1.93 5.01 6.68 3.78 2.40
productivity 1.00 -0.10 -3.31 
Chile
4.16 1.90 0.50 -1.53 
Colombia
-1.50
GDP 3.58 2.84 2.95 6.38 5.12 4.97 3.31 4.27
Employment 0.56 1.07 1.59 1.59 1.27 1.87 1.29 1.07
Hours per employee -0.28 -0.07 0.13 0.13 -0.19 -0.24 -0.27 -0.02
Education 0.48 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.72 0.67 0.97 0.92
M&E 0.61 0.30 0.38 0.75 0.36 0.98 0.96 0.88
Residential capital 0.37 0.16 0.19 0.34 0.40 0.26 0.22 0.20
Non-res. structures 0.48 0.21 0.29 0.55 0.80 0.64 0.57 0.50
Capital quality 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.34 0.36 0.30
Natural resources 0.09 0.07 -0.15 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.01
Total factor input 
Doubly augmented 
total factor
2.56 2.45 3.24 4.38 3.60 4.50 4.24 3.86
productivity 1.03 0.39 -0.29 
Mexico
2.01 1.53 0.47 -0.92 
Venezuela
0.41
GDP 6.50 6.43 1.36 2.99 6.44 4.10 -0.01 3.61
Employment 1.03 2.03 1.00 1.02 2.10 2.46 1.16 1.42
Hours per employee -0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.09 -0.28 0.12 -0.27 0.05
Education 0.68 1.47 0.45 0.38 1.13 0.52 0.65 0.12
M&E 1.99 1.60 1.24 1.10 1.00 1.71 0.70 0.09
Residential capital 0.50 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.19 0.36 0.14 0.02
Non-res. structures 1.36 0.84 0.66 0.59 0.61 1.02 0.39 0.06
Capital quality 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.16 0.36 0.30 0.22
Natural resources 0.04 0.10 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total factor input 
Doubly augmented 
total factor
5.81 6.66 3.88 3.60 4.98 6.55 3.07 1.97
productivity 0.70 -0.24 -2.52 -0.62 1.46 -2.45 -3.08 1.64
Source: Tables 6.8 and 6.10.
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Table 6.12 Sources of GDP Growth, Standardised Factor Shares, 1950-94 
(annual average percentage point contribution to growth rates)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Argentina Brazil
GDP 3.99 3.04 -1.02 6.09 6.91 7.18 2.26 0.90
Employment 0.84 0.59 1.03 0.75 1.67 2.29 1.60 1.11
Hours per employee -0.05 -0.09 -0.39 0.08 0.07 -0.46 -0.33 -0.19
Education 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.80 1.10 0.76 0.77
M&E 0.49 0.57 0.26 0.22 1.06 1.29 0.62 0.28
Residential capital 0.30 0.34 0.16 0.13 0.64 0.78 0.37 0.17
Non-res. structures 0.40 0.46 0.21 0.17 0.85 1.03 0.50 0.23
Capital quality 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.08 0.17 0.24 0.10 0.00
Natural resources 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.14 0.05 0.05
Total factor input 2.75 2.65 1.99 1.95 5.46 6.40 3.69 2.42
Doubly augmented
total factor
productivity 1.24 0.39 -3.01 4.15 1.46 0.78 -1.43 -1.52
Chile Colombia
GDP 3.58 2.84 2.95 6.38 5.12 4.97 3.31 4.27
Employment 0.65 1.18 1.76 1.71 1.43 2.10 1.49 1.30
Hours per employee -0.32 -0.07 0.14 0.14 -0.21 -0.27 -0.31 -0.02
Education 0.56 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.81 0.75 1.12 1.12
M&E 0.48 0.23 0.30 0.59 0.53 0.65 0.58 0.49
Residential capital 0.29 0.14 0.18 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.35 0.29
Non-res. structures 0.38 0.19 0.24 0.48 0.42 0.52 0.46 0.39
Capital quality 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.28 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.17
Natural resources 0.09 0.07 -0.15 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.01
Total factor input 2.27 2.44 3.25 4.20 3.45 4.32 4.03 3.73
Doubly augmented
total factor
productivity 1.22 0.40 -0.30 2.18 1.68 0.65 -0.72 0.53
Mexico Venezuela
GDP 6.50 6.43 1.36 2.99 6.44 4.10 -0.01 3.61
Employment 1.45 2.24 1.45 1.72 2.00 2.86 1.43 1.97
Hours per employee -0.12 -0.04 0.03 -0.16 -0.27 0.14 -0.33 0.06
Education 0.95 1.62 0.65 0.65 1.08 0.60 0.81 0.16
M&E 1.02 0.98 0.57 0.46 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.05
Residential capital 0.61 0.59 0.34 0.28 0.50 0.60 0.22 0.03
Non-res. structures 0.81 0.78 0.46 0.37 0.67 0.80 0.29 0.04
Capital quality 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.16 0.11
Natural resources 0.04 0.10 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total factor input 4.90 6.47 3.53 3.43 5.01 6.23 2.96 2.40
Doubly augmented
total factor
productivity 1.60 0.04 -2.17 -0.45 1.43 -2.13 -2.96 1.20
Source: Tables 6.9 and 6.10.
The results indicate that the growth accounts are a useful framework in the 
quantitative interpretation of economic growth in Latin America in the post-war
112 The Economic Development o f Latin America
period. The degree of explanation of the exercise over a 44-year period shows 
positive results for the countries as a group, though for individual countries the 
degree to which growth is explained leads in some periods for some countries to 
overexplanation. It was also possible to compare Latin America’s relative stance in 
a comparative perspective. The main results of the growth accounting exercise are 
presented in Tables 6.10-6.15 and Figures 6.1-6.5.
The interpretation of total factor productivity is still a matter of debate; here, a 
step-by step approach has been followed, starting with measurement of total factor 
productivity, including quantities of factor inputs and doubly augmented total 
factor productivity, which includes also the quality improvement of the factor 
inputs. The doubly augmented total factor productivity which finally remains can 
be considered as an approximate measure of the effect of disembodied technical 
progress on long term growth, but it is also includes other measured influences, 
especially changes in capacity utilisation rates, statistical and other errors.
The finally remaining ‘residual’ includes advances of knowledge, it also picks 
up the net error (positive or negative) in the other estimates as well as the net 
contribution of other sources of growth for which no estimation was attempted 
(Denison, 1967). I will return to this subject in the next section on growth causality 
in Latin America.
Table 6.13 resumes the explanatory power of the growth components 
presented in the causal analysis of Tables 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12. Two variants of 
total factor productivity are expressed as a percentage of GDP, in order to give an 
idea of the order of magnitude of the role of factor inputs and TFP in the growth 
performance of Latin America. I have left out the period 1980-89, showing highly 
negative total factor productivity growth caused by the significant difference 
between actual and potential output in this period, see also below. The degree of 
explanation varies significantly across countries and, within each country, between 
periods.
Table 6.13 Explanatory Power of Total Factor Productivity in Growth, 1950-94 
(by sub-period, in percentages of GDP growth)
Total factor productivity (TFP) Doubly augmented total factor
productivity (DATFP)
1950-73 1973-80 1989-94 1950-73 1973-80 1989-94
Argentina 50 39 78 33 13 68
Brazil 38 31 -77 24 13 -162
Chile 59 41 49 39 17 34
Colombia 51 32 43 33 13 13
Mexico 42 29 10 25 1 -15
Venezuela 42 -32 41 23 -52 33
Arithmetic average Latin 
America 47 23 24 30 1 -5
Source: Tables 6.10 and 6.12.
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Table 6.14 shows the results in terms of growth rates of two measures of total 
factor productivity growth; total factor productivity without capital and labour 
augmentation and doubly augmented total factor productivity.
Table 6.14 GDP and Total Factor Productivity based on Standardised Factor 




Argentina 3.99 3.04 -1.02 6.09
Brazil 6.91 7.18 2.26 0.90
Chile 3.58 2.84 2.95 6.38
Colombia 5.12 4.97 3.31 4.27
Mexico 6.50 6.43 1.36 2.99
Venezuela 6.44 4.10 -0.01 3.61
Arithmetic average Latin America 5.43 4.76
TFP
1.48 4.04
Argentina 2.01 1.18 -2.29 4.74
Brazil 2.63 2.25 -0.52 -0.70
Chile 2.10 1.17 0.32 3.10
Colombia 2.63 1.60 0.75 1.83
Mexico 2.73 1.88 -1.49 0.31
Venezuela 2.71 -1.31 -1.99 1.46
Arithmetic average Latin America 2.47 1.13 -0.87 
DATFP
1.79
Argentina 1.31 0.40 -3.00 4.15
Brazil 1.66 0.92 -1.38 -1.46
Chile 1.40 0.47 -0.46 2.19
Colombia 1.68 0.64 -0.58 0.54
Mexico 1.63 0.06 -2.27 -0.45
Venezuela 1.50 -2.13 -2.96 1.20
Arithmetic average Latin America 1.53 0.06 -1.78 1.03
Source: Appendix B and Tables 6.10 and 6.12.
In the 1980-89 period the Latin American economies experienced a severe 
crisis due to the large debt accumulated in the 1970s and a deterioration in the 
international capital and goods markets. The fall in demand caused a movement 
away from the production possibilities frontier and resulted in the under-utilisation 
of installed capacity (see also Chapter 7 for a more detailed treatment of policy in 
this period7). Jorgenson (1990) concluded that the aggregate production model 
used for analysing economic growth is appropriate for studying long-term growth 
trends. However, the results for Latin America in the shorter run and especially in 
the period of crisis of the 1980s have to be treated with caution. The negative 
growth of total factor productivity can be attributed partly to demand-side 
distortions which cause economic growth to decline. The debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused economic growth to stagnate in Latin America. Negative total factor
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productivity growth has to be attributed in part to this difference between potential 
and actual growth. In Table 6.14 this is reflected in the very low average GDP 
growth rate of 1.48 per cent for the 1980-89 period and in the negative total factor 
productivity.
When comparing the results of growth accounting exercises, one must be 
aware that the residual may differ, depending of the factors included in its 
calculation. Very often a total factor productivity without quality augmentation is 
what is presented in this kind of study. Figure 6.1 presents this estimate for the 
Latin American countries. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 include the quality effects of labour 
and capital respectively. Figure 6.4 presents doubly augmented total factor 
productivity growth including both capital and labour quality effects.
Figure 6.1, presenting total factor productivity growth without quality 
augmentation, shows that only two countries, Colombia and Chile, experienced 
continuous total factor productivity growth over the whole 1950-94 period. 
Argentina was consistendy the lowest ranking country over the whole period 
despite its rapid recuperation in 1989-94. Venezuela was the only country to 
experience a significant fall in the 1973-80 period. In 1980-89, Brazil, Mexico, 
Venezuela and Argentina all showed falling total factor productivity. All countries, 
with the exception of Brazil, witnessed positive total factor productivity growth in 
the 1989-94 period.
Figure 6.2, presenting labour-augmented total factor productivity growth, 
shows some interesting differences with respect to Table 6.1. Colombia scores 
higher than all other countries for the whole period. At the lower end, Argentina 
managed to leave Mexico and Venezuela behind in the 1989-94 period.
In Venezuela the fall in total factor productivity growth started in 1973. Also 
Mexico and Argentina had experienced negative labour-augmented total factor 
productivity growth, although to a lower degree than Venezuela, in 1973-80.
In Figure 6.3 quality improvement through embodiment of capital quality is 
taken into account. It is similar to the figures presented above. Mexico is the 
country with the lowest overall total factor productivity growth, if capital and 
labour augmentation are taken into account. In general, it is possible to conclude 
that only Colombia maintained a relatively stable total factor productivity growth 
over the whole period, while the other Latin American countries experienced 
major setbacks in one or more periods. Finally, Figure 6.4 presents doubly 
augmented total factor productivity growth in Latin America.
When analysing total factor productivity in a comparative perspective at least 
two striking results become clear.8 First, the similarity of total factor productivity 
growth rates between Asia and the advanced and Iberian countries, especially in 
the 1950-80 period. From 1980 onwards Asian total factor productivity growth 
rates are much higher than in Iberia and the advanced countries. Latin America’s 
total factor productivity growth rates are much lower than those of Asia or the 
other countries of our sample.
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Figure 6.1 Latin America: Total Factor Productivity without Augmentation, 
1950-94 (index 1950 = 100)
Source: Table 6.12.
Figure 6.2 Latin America: Labour-Augmented Total Factor Productivity, 
1950-94 (index 1950 = 100)
Source: Table 6.12.
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Figure 6.3 Latin America: Capital-Augmented Total Factor Productivity, 
1950-94 (index 1950 = 100)
Source: Table 6.12.
Figure 6.4 Latin America: Doubly-Augmented Total Factor Productivity, 
1950-94 (index 1950 = 100)
Source: Table 6.12.
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The second striking result is, the relatively small differences in total factor 
productivity growth, measured as a percentage of GDP growth, between Latin 
America and the Asian group for the 1950-80 period, both as regards total factor 
productivity and doubly augmented total factor productivity. In very general terms, 
there is less than a 10 percentage point difference between the Latin American and 
Asian group (Asia being higher) along with a difference of equal magnitude, or 
somewhat higher, between Asia and the advanced countries.
Table 6.15 International Comparison: GDP and Total Factor Productivity, 
1950-94 (average annual compound growth rates and % of GDP)
1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 1989-94
Arithmetic averages: 
GDP
Latin America 5.4 4.8 1.5 4.0
Asia 8.4 7.7 8.0 6.9
Iberian countries 5.8 2.7 2.7 1.8
Advanced countries 5.3 2.2
TFP
2.6 1.8
Latin America 2.5 1.1 -0.9 1.8
Asia 4.4 1.6 3.9 3.4
Iberian countries 4.1 1.1 1.3 0.8
Advanced countries 3.5 1.0
DATFP
1.3 1.1
Latin America 1.5 0.1 -1.8 1.0
Asia 2.9 -0.1 2.5 2.0
Iberian countries 2.9 0.0 -0.2 0.1
Advanced countries 2.8 0.3 0.6 0.8
Explanatory Power of Total Factor Productivity 
(as % of GDP):
TFP
Latin America 46 23 -60 45
Asia 52 21 48 50
Iberian countries 71 41 48 44
Advanced countries 66 45
DATFP
50 61
Latin America 28 2 -120 25
Asia 35 -2 31 29
Iberian countries 50 0 -7 6
Advanced countries 53 14 23 41
Source: See note 7.
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Krugman (1994) generated a lively debate about the Asian growth 
performance by asserting that:
Asian growth seems to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labour and
capital rather than by gains in efficiency, (p. 70)
He considered in particular Singapore, using the data of Young (1994), 
showing that total factor productivity was zero. However, my data show that 
although factor accumulation explains a great part of the growth performance in 
Asia (see Table 6.15), total factor productivity also played an important role.9
Latin America’s ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s caused the residual to become 
highly negative, indicating that total factor productivity growth was negative. This 
was not, however, the case in the Asian or the developed countries (although 
doubly augmented total factor productivity was also negative in some periods in 
those countries), since their total factor productivity remained positive, albeit with 
declining growth rates.
Figure 6.5 Doubly-Augmented Total Factor Productivity: An International 
Comparison, 1950-94 10 (index 1950 ~ 100)
Source: Table 6.13, Maddison (1995) and see note 7
The Growth Accounts 119
Figure 6.5 indicates clearly that Latin America’s performance has been worse 
than all the other regions of our sample. Total factor productivity grew at an annual 
2.5 per cent between 1950-73, falling to 1 per cent from 1973-80, and then 
became sharply negative in the 1980s (some recovery occurred in the 1989-94 
period). It shows a widening gap between Latin America and the other groups of 
countries for the whole period since 1950. Interestingly, Figure 6.5 shows that 
Latin America’s performance was nearest to that of the United States.
G RO W TH  CAUSALITY IN  LA TIN AM ERICA
In this and the following sections, some aspects of growth causality will be 
discussed. First I analyse some of the proximate causes of growth, and then look at 
ultimate causes of growth in the last section of this chapter. Through growth 
accounting it is possible to identify and quantify the proximate causes of growth 
but no light is shed on the ultimate causes of growth.
A major shortcoming of the growth accounts is that interactions among the 
sources are not taken into account. The proximate sources of growth are probably 
not as independent as is assumed in growth accounting. Abramovitz (1993) traced 
one line of dependence, namely the dependence of tangible and human capital 
accumulation on the pace and character of technological progress.
As Abramovitz (1993) stated:
Standard growth accounting is based on the notion that the several proximate sources of 
growth that it identifies operate independently of one another. The implication of this 
assumption is that the contributions attributable to each can be added up. And if the 
contributions of every substantial source other than technological progress has been 
estimated, whatever of growth is left over -  that is, not accounted for by the sum of the 
measured sources -  is the presumptive contribution of technological progress, (p. 220)
Maddison (1991a) stressed that:
The most difficult problem at the proximate level is analysing the role of technical 
progress, which interacts in myriad ways with other items in the growth accounts. 
Hence technical progress must be treated separately from other elements of proximate 
causality, because it is almost as difficult to quantify satisfactorily as are the elements of 
ultimate causality, (p. 11)
A new line of reasoning, with inverted causality from capital accumulation to 
technical progress, is emphasised in the new growth theories. In the last decade the 
general theme of interdependence has become imbedded in those new theories of 
economic growth.
In the past decades the literature on technology has increasingly moved away 
from the neo-classical framework, where knowledge is assumed to be completely 
exogenous and equally accessible to all firms as in the case of a public good.
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Recent models of technological change focus on the process in which the firm 
searches for new techniques in an environment characterised by incomplete 
information. Such models also point more clearly in the direction of ultimate 
causes, such as institutional and organisational factors, which determine the pace 
of technological change.
These factors bear much resemblance to what Abramovitz referred to as the 
social capability of a society to adopt, and adapt to, new technology. The search 
for such ultimate causes is one of the major challenges in the study of comparative 
productivity levels (Van Ark, 1993). In previous chapters I have analysed in detail 
two of the most important proximate sources of growth: human resources and 
physical capital. In this section I will return to them shortly to analyse some factors 
directly related to growth accounting.
Capital and Investment
One of the most important factors explaining Latin America’s economic 
performance is without doubt its investment and capital stock formation. In 
Chapter 5 standardised estimates of capital stock were generated and analysed, and 
in this section, I will concentrate on the importance of capital stocks in growth 
accounting and the role of investment in Latin America’s development process.
Growth accounting only becomes possible if reliable estimates of the flow of 
services from physical capital are available. Making an analogy with labour, one 
would like to know the amount of machine hours used in production during the 
period of reference. However, the lack of available data normally does not permit 
this procedure, so I used the general accepted proxy for this calculation, that is, the 
estimation of the capital stock based upon the ‘perpetual inventory model’ 
developed by Raymond Goldsmith (1951).11
The capital stock was disaggregated into machinery and equipment, structures 
and dwellings with service lives of 15, 40 and 50 years, respectively. The 
‘perpetual inventory model’ provides an indication of productive capacity. It 
includes all capital assets, but some of these may be temporarily idle while others 
may have been withdrawn from production and held in reserve in case they may be 
needed to meet an unexpected rise in demand. Therefore, this model will not 
produce estimates of the ‘utilised’ stock.
The service lives used in this method refer to the total length of time from the 
initial installation of assets to the moment when they are finally scrapped. Clearly 
these lives may include periods when some assets are not being used to produce 
anything. In this study, capital stock estimates are basically used to explain Latin 
America’s performance in comparison with other regions in the 1950-94 period 
(see Table 6.16). Therefore capital has been used in the ‘ex-post’ sense, that is, in 
its observable role as a factor input in the production process. This notion should 
be distinguished from the one in which capital is used as an indicator of net worth
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which embodies potential economic services and has the capacity to generate 
future income. The present net worth of a capital asset, which is related to its future 
earning potential, progressively declines as it gets older, even though the annual 
real value of its services may remain unchanged over time.
To estimate capital-augmented total factor productivity one needs to augment 
the capital stock. The rates of vintage improvement chosen here are rather low, 1.5 
per cent for machinery and equipment and a 0.5 per cent for structures. Following 
Maddison (1991a) no vintage improvement was used for dwellings. This capital 
embodiment effect is not a ‘catch-all’ effect of technical progress (as suggested 
initially by Solow), because a portion of technical progress is embodied in the 
labour force and consists of organisational and other improvements. This quality 
effect is the result of three forces; embodied technical progress, changes in the 
average age of the stock, and changes in its composition. If the average age of the 
capital stock goes down, this raises the embodiment effect as newer vintages will 
have more weight in the total capital stock.
Table 6.16 Explanatory Power of Capital in Growth, 1950-94 (by subperiods, in 
percentages)
Quantity of capital Quality of capital
1950-73 1973-80 1980-94 1950-73 1973-80 1980-94
Argentina 30 45 40 4 8 11
Brazil 37 43 68 2 3 4
Chile 32 20 23 4 4 5
Colombia 25 31 36 3 4 5
Mexico 38 37 66 2 3 7
Venezuela 31 59 48 2 5 11
Arithmetic average Latin America 32 39 47 3 5 7
Source: Table 6.12.
The idea of embodying technical progress in the form of quality improvement 
in successive vintages of capital was first put forward by Robert Solow (1962). 
The basic argument is that physical investment is the prime vehicle by which 
technical progress is realised. The debate is about whether technical progress is 
due primarily to improvements in the design of new capital (‘embodiment’), or is 
mainly ‘disembodied’ and thus independent of the rate of capital formation 
(Hulten, 1992).
This point, also known as the Solow-Salter vintage argument (Maddison, 
1972), leads to the inclusion in growth accounting exercises of an adjustment for 
differences in vintages of capital. Denison (1993) formulates it as follows:
It was argued that when advances in knowledge permit later vintages of capital goods to 
have higher marginal product than capital with the same production cost in earlier
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vintages, the quantity of capital should be counted as increasing proportionally, thus 
transferring part of the contribution of advances in knowledge to capital, (p. 48)
Denison (1993) suggests that ‘this procedure divorces cause from effect’. A 
strong argument is that it defies measurement, like a capital stock series that 
equates different vintages by their marginal product. Maddison (1991a) finds 
Solow’s basic point extraordinarily illuminating and inclusion of a modest element 
of technical progress in the analysis does help explain the nature of the growth 
process, and clarifies the impact of changes in the age of capital in a way that is not 
possible outside the vintage context.
It has been argued that existing differences in technology between advanced 
countries are increasingly related to differences in work practice and shop-floor 
organisation, these being typically features of disembodied rather than embodied 
technological change (Van Ark, 1993). However, in the case of the Latin 
American countries the difference between their capital stock and that of the 
technological leader is still very substantial and it seems reasonable to assume that 
technological advance in Latin America will take place, at least partially, through 
the embodiment of technology in the capital stock.
The age of capital is the basic argument for the inclusion of a vintage element 
and our analysis shows a secular trend of a falling average age of the capital stock 
for all countries (except Brazil). Direct measurement of the vintage effect is very 
difficult but the empirical information on age gives us a clue as to the importance 
of this effect. However, the age effect is only one factor in the embodiment effect. 
A recent article by Hulten (1992) shows that the failure to adjust capital explicitly 
for quality changes diverts the quality effects into the conventional total-factor- 
productivity residual. Hulten found that approximately 20 per cent of the residual 
growth of quality-adjusted output could be attributed to embodied technical 
change. This estimate is based on the American economy, using data obtained 
from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983) and Gordon (1990).
Employment
Table 6.17 provides an indication of the importance of labour inputs in the 
economic performance of Latin America. On average for the 1950-94 period the 
quantity of labour ‘explains’ a quarter of economic growth, while quality of labour 
explains an additional 15 per cent. The quality effect of labour has been estimated 
with respect to the segment of the population aged 15-64, but in Chapter 4 an 
additional exercise was carried out comparing the results for the population with 
some available estimates concerning the work force.
Table 4.11 provided a comparison between the educational level of the 
population and the labour force for some countries over the 1951-92 period. On 
average the labour force had a somewhat higher level of education (2.5 per cent).
The Growth Accounts 123
The difference was small in primary education (0.8 per cent) but substantial in 
higher education (23.6 per cent). On the basis of the somewhat scanty evidence of 
Table 4.11, there is no discernible trend towards change in the differences of level 
in time. This fact, together with the lack of systematic information on the 
educational level of the labour force, obliged us to adopt the educational level of 
the population as the measure for quality improvement. In terms of my model for 
explaining economic growth, this approach probably does not introduce a large 
error. In level accounting exercises this factor obviously assumes greater 
importance (see Van Ark, 1993 and Pilat, 1994).
Table 6.17 Explanatory Power of Labour in Growth, 1950-94 (percentage of 
GDP growth)
Quantity of labour Quality of labour
1950-73 1973-80 1980-94 1950-73 1973-80 1980-9
Argentina 20 16 48 13 17 35
Brazil 25 25 65 12 15 43
Chile 9 39 45 15 21 15
Colombia 24 37 33 16 15 31
Mexico 21 34 78 15 25 33
Venezuela 27 73 113 17 15 45
Arithmetic average Latin America 21 37 64 15 18 34
Source: Table 6.12.
Some Remarks on Ultimate Causes
The breakdown of economic growth gives an indication regarding the costs of 
increasing the growth rate of output. However, growth accounting can only explain 
part of the process of economic growth, it does not take into consideration other 
factors such as economic policy, the national and international environments and 
non-economic factors such as natural disasters and war. These belong to the realm 
of what is now generally termed the ultimate causes of growth, in contrast to the 
proximate causes of growth analysed earlier.
The study of ultimate causality involves giving consideration to institutions, 
ideologies, pressures of socioeconomic interest groups, historical accidents, and 
economic policy at the national level (Maddison, 1995). The ultimate sources of 
Latin American economic performance are less clearly identified than its 
proximate causes. In Chapter 2,1 have analysed some of the topics included in the 
realm of ultimate sources; institutional set-up, social capabilities and path 
dependency.
In the next chapter, economic policy, probably the single most important 
ultimate cause in Latin America’s economic performance, will be analysed in some 
detail for the post-war period, with some consideration also of the international
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economic context. The growth accounting results presented here fit in rather well 
with the nature of the policy problems experienced, for example, in the 1970s and 
1980s. In Chapter 2 some possible historical causes of political and policy 
instability in Latin America were discussed.
Some of the ultimate sources of economic growth in Latin America have 
recently been discussed in the context of the concept of path dependency. Path 
dependency has been defined as the incapacity of a society to leave a certain 
development path due to some specific factor. Factors identified include the 
institutional set-up, historical events, social capability and technological 
congruence.
Finally, it is again important to stress the interdependency of growth factors, 
either in the proximate or the ultimate sphere, or in combination. As Abramovitz 
(1993) emphasised, the growth accounting framework, even in its extended 
version, is not able to specify the interrelationship that exists between the different 
factors.
NOTES
1. Among the first authors were Bruton (1967), Correa (1970) and Langoni (1974). More recently 
Cavallo and Mundlak (1982), De Gregorio (1991), Coeymans (1992) and Elias (1992) have 
worked on growth accounting in Latin America.
2. The country-specific factor shares were estimated by the author on the basis of national 
accounts and population censuses, especially adjusting for own account workers.
3. See Chapter 4 for a more elaborate treatment, with respect to data sources and estimation 
procedures, of human capital.
4. See Maddison (1972 and 1987), Denison (1967) and Psacharopoulos (1984) for the rationale of 
the education adjustment.
5. See Table 4.11 of Chapter 4 for a comparison of the educational level of the total population 
with that of the labour force.
6. See the section on capital and investment (pp. 120-122) for a discussion of the quality aspect 
in capital stock estimation and the actual vintages used in the calculation.
7. One of the authors who treated this theme is Ffrench-Davis, see for example Fffench-Davis 
(1994).
8. The growth accounting exercise presented here for the six Larin American countries was also 
done for the whole sample group of 16 countries. This thesis is about Latin American economic 
development so I do not present the whole data base for all countries but these are available 
upon request by the author. Most of the data with respect to GDP and employment come from 
Maddison (1995) and were updated by me using the same sources. If necessary I used national 
sources or data bases of international organisations such as OECD, IMF, World Bank or United 
Nations. The capital stock estimates necessary for this exercise come from Maddison (1993) for 
the advanced countries, and were updated to 1994 by me, using the same methodology as in the 
case of the Larin American countries. I prepared specific estimates, again using the same 
methodology, for the Asian and Iberian countries.
9. The results of Young (1995), which is an updated version of Young (1994), presenting slightly 
higher total factor productivity growth estimates, coincide to a great extent with the results of 
this study. His estimates of total factor productivity growth for Korea and Taiwan for the
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1960-90 period are 1.7 and 2.6 per cent respectively. My estimates for the 1950-94 period are 
1.7 and 3.0 per cent, respectively.
10. Hie advanced countries group includes the USA, although this country is also presented 
separately.
11. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed treatment of capital stock estimation and its limitations.

7. Performance and Policy in Latin America
INTRODU CTIO N
Performance and policy are related and Latin America is a region where policy 
regimes have changed dramatically in the twentieth century. This chapter 
concentrates on the second half of the century and relates the results obtained in 
the productivity analysis of the previous chapters to the policy regimes adopted.
Chapter 3 analysed in some detail the events of the first half of the century, 
namely the breakdown of the liberal world order and Latin America’s policy 
reaction. Of particular relevance was the period of recovery after the Great 
Depression and the subsequent world war in which Latin America adopted a more 
inward-looking policy regime of industrialisation through import substitution, 
though this was to a certain extent forced on it by the circumstances. The strong 
recovery process, both in terms of GDP growth and, especially, in labour 
productivity, had repercussions on the policy regime adopted in the second half of 
the twentieth century. The policy of industrialisation through import substitution 
remained in place long after World War II, and in some countries even until the 
debt crisis of the early 1980s. Since then almost all Latin American countries have 
drastically altered their development strategy, placing greater emphasis on neo­
liberal policies and export-oriented policies.
During the twentieth century, Latin America faced two major economic crises: 
the Great Depression of the 1930s and the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. Through 
analysis of just a few economic indicators, total GDP, GDP per capita and labour 
productivity, it becomes clear that the crisis of the 1980s, which continued partly in 
the 1990s, was more profound for Latin America than the Great Depression. On 
the other hand, our international comparison shows that Latin America’s relative 
performance in the 1930s was much more favourable than that of the other 
countries in the sample. This was in marked contrast to the current situation which 
has obliged Latin America to adopt a more outward orientation.
A comparison of trends in levels of GDP per capita in Latin America, as 
compared to the United States, shows striking results. Its relative position vis-à-vis 
the United States improved during the 1929-38 period. The results were quite 
different in 1980-94, when Latin America’s performance was disastrous compared 
to the United States and the rest of the world. The results with respect to the 
development of labour productivity in Latin America also speak for themselves:
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whereas labour productivity rose by 0.9 per cent per annum from 1929-38, it fell 
by an average 0.6 per cent per annum between 1980-89.
The situation facing Latin America today is totally different from the one it 
faced in the 1930s, when inward orientation yielded results in terms of growth 
performance. The post-war experience and especially the crisis of the 1980s 
demonstrates that Latin America now stands at the crossroads, and that the process 
of modernising its productive system, its institutions and policies can no longer be 
delayed (see also ECLAC, 1990c).
TH E PO ST-W A R GOLDEN AG E (1950-73)
For the world economy, 1950-73 was a period of unparalleled prosperity with the 
OECD countries in our sample growing at 5.3 per cent, almost three times the rate 
of the period 1913-50. The Iberian countries grew by 5.8 per cent, compared with 
a mere 1.4 per cent between 1913-50, while the Asian countries grew by 7.7 per 
cent, 3.5 times faster than in the period 1913-50. The Latin American countries 
grew by 5.4 per cent, compared with about 3.8 per cent during 1913-50. In 1950, 
per capita real income in Latin America countries was three times higher than that 
of developing Asia, a bit higher than the Iberian countries and about half of that of 
the six advanced countries. Within Latin America, real income per capita ranged 
from around 35 per cent of the US level in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, to 27 
per cent in Mexico and 19 and 15 per cent respectively for Colombia and Brazil.
In 1950, the international economy embarked on an expansion that was to 
continue unabated until 1973, when the first oil crisis erupted. Moreover, the 
growth in world output was the highest ever recorded. Latin America also achieved 
an expansion during this quarter century that probably outstripped regional growth 
in any previous 25 year period. Furthermore, the rate of growth in regional output 
between 1950 and 1973 exceeded both the rate of growth in world gross domestic 
product and the rate of output growth of the United States. However, there was a 
fundamental contrast between the growth performance of Latin America and that 
of much of the rest of the world.
In effect, while the expansion of world commerce, and especially of advanced 
countries’ trade, was appreciably more intense than the growth in world output, the 
growth of Latin America’s exports was significantly less than the growth of its 
gross domestic product and, during the final third of this period, considerably less 
than one half the rate of increase of its imports. And whereas the unprecedented 
expansion of the advanced countries was achieved with an exceptional degree of 
price stability, in Latin America the acceleration of growth was accompanied, in a 
good number of countries, by sustained price instability.
While mildly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, in combination with 
large devaluations, promoted the strong recovery of Latin American economies
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from the Great Depression, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies continued to 
be pursued or even intensified over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, that is, long 
after output had returned to, or approached, its potential. Moreover, in a number of 
countries money supply growth far exceeded the potential rate of growth of output.
The evolution of the Latin American economies thus continued to diverge 
considerably from that of other developing economies; but in this historical 
instance the departure entailed the progressive build-up of macroeconomic 
disequilibria (Bianchi and Nohara, 1988). Income growth resulting from the 
expansion of primary exports led to a rise in demand for manufactured consumer 
goods and their inputs in Latin America. This demand had increasingly been 
satisfied by domestic production that enjoyed the ‘natural protection’ provided by 
transportation costs, complemented in some cases by tariff protection prior to 
World War H. The foreign exchange scarcity created by the fall in primary exports 
during the Great Depression and limited access to foreign goods during World 
War II subsequently boosted import substitution. Only after the war, however, did 
import substitution become a doctrine, guiding policy making in much of Latin 
America.
Although there was some variation across the range of countries, the policies 
pursued by the respective governments to promote industrialisation in the early 
post-war era were broadly similar. Under these policies, the production of import 
substitutes was encouraged through the exclusion of foreign competition, the 
allocation of foreign exchange, bank credit, essential inputs at preferential rates, 
and exemption from, or remission of, certain taxes and duties. At the same time the 
production of traditional exports was discouraged by unfavourable exchange rates, 
export taxes and pricing policies (Lin, 1988).
Although average nominal protection gradually increased in the course of the 
1950s, the average tariff was still rather low in a number of Latin American 
countries in 1950. However, between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s tariffs 
soared to reach extremely high protective levels. It becomes clear that the rates of 
effective protection came rather close to those of nominal protection. As a rule, 
effective protection rates were lowest, or even negative, for commodities, 
including importables as well as traditional exports, and highest for manufactured 
consumer importables.
Argentina
The government of Juan Perbn (1943-55) established a populist tradition which 
was based on favouring import substitution industrialisation, high manufacturing 
wages, price controls, a squeeze on the agricultural sector, and antagonism towards 
the export orientation of the old landowning oligarchy, increases in public-sector 
employment, hostility to foreign capital and nationalisation of foreign assets. Diaz- 
Alejandro (1970) concluded that Argentina’s economic history, especially since
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1943, is a dramatic example of the clangers arising in the development process 
when a balance between the production of exportables, importables, and home 
goods is neglected. The paradox of post-war Argentine experience is that, if there 
had been less discrimination against exports, manufacturing expansion would have 
been greater.
Brazil
In the post-war period, Brazil continued the policy of industrialisation which had 
begun before World War Ü, and which was given an extra boost during the war, as 
was the case in many other Latin American countries. President Vargas who 
returned to power in 1951, on this occasion through elections, initiated a growth- 
oriented strategy. In response to greater international competition after the war, 
Brazil reintroduced exchange controls, imposed a system of multiple exchange 
rates and increased tariff protection, particularly favouring the domestic production 
of consumer goods. With the military threatening to take power, Vargas committed 
suicide in 1954.
Again, in 1956-61, this time under Juscelino Kubitschek, there was a new 
surge of industrialisation. Massive state investment occurred in electric power and 
transport, and in the capital and intermediate goods industries. The private sector 
was given high protection in the consumer goods industries, but low or negative 
effective protection in capital goods (which was partly compensated by direct 
government subsidies). Multiple exchange rates were also used. Liberal policies 
towards foreign capital were adopted, and in response direct foreign investment in 
manufacturing rose very rapidly. In 1969, the most recent surge of industrial 
expansion began. This period, which effectively ended in 1976, was marked by 
rapid growth and in fact is known as the ‘Brazilian miracle’ (Griffin, 1989).
Chile
In the 1950s, Chile continued the industrialisation through the import substitution 
strategy already started a decade before, in the wake of the Great Depression and 
the collapse of the nitrate market, after the replacement of natural nitrate by a 
synthetic substitute. However, this development model began to encounter 
problems, such as a stagnated agriculture, and the emphasis on import substitution 
hindered the development of new exports, severely restricting external trade 
options and the management of the balance of payments. The instability of 
traditional export prices was transmitted to the domestic economy through 
recurrent balance-of-payments shocks (Ffrench-Davis and Muñoz, 1992). The 
increasing price instability drove policy makers to the conclusion that new 
economic strategies were needed. A first attempt was based on the 
recommendations of the Klein-Saks mission which marked the return to more
Performance and Policy in Latin America 131
orthodox short-term economic policies, with maximum priority accorded to price 
stabilisation and proposals for a gradual liberalisation of the Chilean economy. 
However, as inflation was stopped it triggered the worst short-term recession since 
the Great Depression and provoked a public outcry (Mamalakis, 1976).
During the presidency of Alessandri (1958-64), the reform of the economic 
system was tackled in a more comprehensive fashion. The private sector was seen 
as the engine of growth and was supported by an active fiscal policy in the 
Keynesian tradition but the government also took an active role as entrepreneur 
through the creation of new public enterprises. This required a broader scope for 
the market, prices and competition, especially from external sources. However, 
great importance was given to stabilisation in the short run based on: a fixed 
nominal exchange rate, the elimination of ‘inflationary’ Central Bank financing of 
the fiscal deficit, wage and salaries increases in line with productivity increases and 
the promotion of domestic and foreign investment (Ffrench-Davis, 1973). This 
programme enjoyed considerable though temporary success, especially in the 
reduction of inflation1 but around the half-way mark of Alessandri’s presidency a 
balance of payments crisis occurred, caused by the rapid increase in imports, 
especially of consumer goods, while exports grew at a slower pace, which obliged 
the government to devalue, close the economy and reintroduce exchange controls 
while the inflation surfaced.
The strategy of the Frei administration was based upon a three point 
programme: First, a gradual stabilisation programme; second, an industrial 
modernisation programme, and third, a programme of structural and social change 
including agrarian reform and the first steps towards the nationalisation of the 
copper mines. The role of the state in production was reinforced, and protection 
increased to promote domestic production of electronic and other durable 
consumer goods. However, it became clear that the system’s low capacity to 
convert internal and external resources into physical, human, and institutional 
capital remained the main bottleneck to growth and economic independence. 
Another crucial element was that during Frei’s government the antagonism felt 
between the country’s principal social and political actors became more and more 
evident.
The Allende administration attempted to achieve within three years what 
Chile’s previous presidents had failed to achieve in almost a hundred years: 
maximum growth and economic independence through a revolutionary but 
bloodless redistribution of income. The policy of nationalising foreign mining 
interests, takeover of private banks, industry and transnational firms caused a great 
redistribution of income and power. Public sector salaries and wages were raised 
and the expansion of demand quickly affected sales and production, which rose 
sharply in 1971. But the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, combined with 
sluggishness of production due to labour disputes, accelerated inflation. During 
1973 output started to fall, inflation continued to rise, the external sector deficit
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reduced external reserves, black markets transactions increased, all of these 
developments together with domestic economic opposition and the foreign 
economic embargo caused the economy to enter into a state of near chaos 
(Dombusch and Edwards, 1990).
Colombia
Monetary policy was expansionary during the 1950-73 period, with a little less 
than 20 per cent average annual growth in money supply. Throughout this period 
also the size of the state did not expand appreciably. During the 1950s and through 
the mid 1960s, the peso was chronically overvalued from the viewpoint of 
competitiveness of non-coffee exports, effectively constraining export 
diversification. The country’s success in increasing exports during the 1967-75 
period was based on an outward-looking policy that was in part the result of 
significant domestic inducements to export promotion. The most important 
element of the new policies was the introduction of a crawling peg-exchange rate 
system and a package of export incentives, including fiscal incentives, 
concessionary credits for export-related activities from the Export Promotion Fund 
and an expanded and more effective import-export regime (Plan Vallejo). The 
new policies represented an attempt to compensate for the distortions in relative 
prices generated by the import-substitution effort. Together with the favourable 
development of world trade, this shift in policy emphasis brought about impressive 
results (Thomas, 1985).
Mexico
The period from the beginnings of the 1950s until the 1970s is often referred to as 
the period of stabilising development because it was one of steady GDP growth, 
while at the same time the price level stayed relatively stable (Hofman, 1982). 
However, beneath the surface a number of problems were brewing: (a) levels of 
unemployment and underemployment2 were high and rising; (b) the balance of 
payments was steadily worsening; (c) there were major sectoral disequilibria; (d) 
inadequate and deteriorating fiscal revenues.
Venezuela
Venezuela experienced rather high total GDP growth coupled with price stability 
during the period under consideration. Until 1958 the economy grew fast as a 
result of an expansive public expenditures policy based upon the revenues of oil 
exports, Venezuela’s major export product. In 1958, when oil prices fell some 25 
per cent, influenced by the reopening of the Suez canal, the development of new
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oil fields in the Middle East and a world recession, the administration opted for 
development on the basis of import substitution.
STRUCTURAL PROBLEM S STILL CONCEALED (1973-80)
For the world economy, 1973-80 saw the departure from the uniform tendency of 
very high growth experienced during the previous period. The OECD countries as 
a whole experienced a sharp slowdown, GDP per capita growth rates being less 
than a half as in the previous period. However Latin America and Asian 
developing countries continued growing. The period 1973-80 showed a uniform 
tendency in all Latin American countries to falling population growth. All our 
sample countries are now in a more advanced stage of demographic transition, in 
which the fertility rates also start falling. During this period Latin America’s GDP 
per capita continued to grow rather fast compared to the United States and its 
comparative level reached 34 per cent in 1980, the highest level of the entire 
twentieth century. However, when this is compared with other areas, Latin 
America’s performance is not as good as first appears. Asian developing countries 
more than doubled their income level, while the other OECD countries also 
markedly improved their position relative to the United States.
In Latin America the drastic changes which occurred in the world economic 
system at the beginning of the 1970s, such as the demise of the Bretton Woods 
fixed exchange rate mechanism (1971) and the action of the OPEC price cartel, 
did not have the same effect on policy making as in the developed countries, where 
a sharp change in economic policy occurred. The new disturbance was simply a 
new variation on a familiar theme, and was not regarded as a razor’s edge 
situation, calling for drastic policy change (Maddison, 1989).
Many Latin American countries delayed pursuing stabilisation policies while 
relying on expanded external borrowing to sustain a higher rate of domestic 
demand. These policies provided for stronger growth of the economy in 1974-75, 
but they also resulted in the persistence of inflationary trends and the continuation 
of large current account deficits. For Latin American countries whose exports were 
dominated by primary commodities, the upsurge of inflationary pressures in the 
world economy did not constitute a serious problem as long as their export prices 
rose. In fact, the market prices of non-oil primary commodities continued to surge 
in 1974, in line with the jump in oil prices, thus enabling many Latin American 
countries to realise large gains in export receipts.
Moreover, to business enterprises in many of these countries, having domestic 
finances that had been constricted by the persistence of inflation, the increased 
availability of external credit after the first oil shock appeared as a blessing. The 
real interest costs of these credits was negative or relatively low. This explains 
why, after the first oil shock, many governments in Latin America condoned or
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encouraged the expanded use of external credit in order to sustain a high rate of 
investment and imports. It also explains why, in countries such as Brazil and 
Mexico, the growth of real wages and real private consumption was not restrained, 
thus contributing to the persistence of inflationary pressures and balance of 
payments difficulties (Lin, 1988).
In the 1960s and especially in the early 1970s several countries implemented 
trade policies combining import protection with export promotion. However, the 
intensity of policy reform fluctuated over time because of the lack of social 
consensus. In many countries of Latin America, the rural landed class and 
organised urban labour had considerable, but opposing, political influence, with 
the import substituting industrialists occupying a middle ground. Policy conflicts 
often occurred between these groups, resulting in frequent shifts of political 
alliances and economic policies (Lin, 1988).
The combination of biased macroeconomic policies and compensatory sectoral 
subsidies with unlimited access to international capital markets led to economic 
growth in the 1973-80 period. Eventually it created pervasive imbalances, 
including stagnation of exports, overproduction of non-traded goods and services, 
uncommonly large resource gaps, unparalleled excess external debt and rampant 
domestic price instability (Bianchi and Nohara, 1988). During this period several 
countries experimented with neo-conservative economic policies, that is, the 
marriage of monetarist views concerning economic stabilisation and radical 
conservative approaches. Both ingredients were present in varying degrees in the 
economic plans of Chile after 1973 and Argentina after 1976, both put into 
practice by strong military governments (Foxley, 1983).
Argentina
Argentina’s GDP growth was among the slowest of the countries in our sample. 
During the first years of the period under consideration, Juan Perón tried to repeat 
the policies of his previous administration, with an expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policy, and wage increases combined with price control. His successor, 
Isabel Perón, first made a stabilisation effort to deal with the huge budget deficit, 
but under pressure from union interests, large wage increases were granted. In 
early 1976, in the midst of a severe economic social and political crisis, the armed 
forces once again took power in Argentina. The economic objectives of the new 
government were to correct the basic macroeconomic disequilibria and to change 
the course of the inward-oriented development strategy, which had been followed 
since the Great Depression (Ramos, 1986).
This neo-conservative experiment started with a substantial devaluation, 
reduction in real wages and the government deficit, deregulation of prices and 
abolition of subsidies, followed by a tight monetary policy, gradual tariff reduction 
and liberalisation of exchange controls. There was a notable improvement in the
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balance-of-payments situation, but inflation slowed down only partially. A second 
period was characterised by the ready availability of foreign capital and the 
extensive use of such capital to reduce inflation. The exchange rate was used 
principally to control inflation, and tariffs were lowered. What progress there was 
in this phase was at the expense of an increasingly artificial exchange rate. The 
neo-conservative policies took four years to bring down the average annual rate of 
inflation from 443 to 101 per cent, but also depressed economic activity, caused 
widespread bankruptcies, led to a large trade deficit in 1980 and permitted large- 
scale capital flight by Argentineans who correctly foresaw that they would unlikely 
be able to continue buying US dollars so cheaply (Maddison, 1985).
Brazil
Brazil relaxed its export promotion drive and shifted its trade policies in favour of 
a renewed inward orientation. This took the form of increased import control, 
widespread tariff increases, and the establishment of a prohibitive prior deposit 
system. The country also became dependent on external borrowing when its terms 
of trade worsened drastically. However, Brazil’s creditworthiness was very high 
because of the creditors’ continued belief in its development potential and also, of 
course, because of the great liquidity in the international capital markets due to the 
first oil shock.
The Brazilian approach to policy in 1973-80 was rather eclectic and growth 
oriented. It avoided the deflationary shocks imposed by extreme neo-conservatism 
in Chile and Argentina, its expansionism was never as wild as that of the Lopez 
Portillo administration in Mexico, and the policy course was very much steadier 
than in Argentina. The political regime was a stable military autocracy which was 
somewhat liberalised in the 1980s. The government intervened actively to control 
economic activity with very high levels of public investment, effective control of 
wage rates, exchange controls, and various devices to manipulate exports and 
imports. It also followed a rather consistent crawling peg policy for most of the 
period, without episodes of extreme overvaluation. Brazil is also notable in Latin 
America for its export diversification into manufactures and a wide variety of new 
primary products like soybeans and iron ore.
Chile
Two overriding concerns marked the economic policy of the Chilean junta upon its 
assumption of power at the end of 1973: (1) the unavoidable need to restore basic 
macroeconomic equilibria, and (2) the intention to instil dynamism in an economy 
whose performance in recent decades was considered quite unsatisfactory. The 
main objective of the first period (1973-76) was to restore market mechanisms in 
an economy with extended controls and severe imbalances. The initial policy mix
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sought to: (a) free virtually all prices; (b) devalue the exchange rate sharply with 
the purpose of narrowing the deficit in the balance of payments; (c) control wages 
by demobilising labour unions and by changing the wage adjustment system (from 
looking backward to looking forward); (d) follow a restrictive monetary policy to 
reduce the fiscal deficit. During the second period of the Chilean neo-conservative 
experiment, the price stabilisation strategy was modified as inflation was still 
advancing at 250 per cent per year. Emphasis was not placed on monetary and 
wage restrictions, but rather on controlling expectations and exerting downward 
pressure on domestic prices via foreign competition and real exchange 
appreciation.
Foxley (1983) summarises the economic results for Chile in the 1973-80 
period as follows: the rate of inflation decreased; after a deep recession GDP 
reached pre-recession levels; the fiscal deficit was eliminated; there was an 
accumulation of reserves, and nontraditional exports expanded rapidly. At the 
same time, a low investment rate, a significant deficit in the trade balance, 
increasing external indebtedness, high unemployment, real wage reduction, and a 
deterioration in the distribution of income, consumption, and basic social services 
were among the negative factors.
Colombia
Activism in export promotion in Colombia diminished significantly after the mid- 
1970s, partly on account of the increase in foreign-exchange earnings that 
accompanied the commodity price boom of 1976-79. Rapid increases in external 
demand for Colombian agriculture products were the most significant development 
of this period, with the demands for coffee and illegal drugs leading other exports 
(Thomas, 1985). These revenues were used to reduce the debt and to build up 
reserves (World Bank, 1991).
Mexico
Mexico had an excellent growth record during 1973-80, the best of the Latin 
American countries in our sample. This can be attributed partly to the stability of 
the political system and to a greater socioeconomic consensus than in the rest of 
Latin America about appropriate policies to follow. It also can be explained by the 
booming government revenues from oil exports after the first oil shock and heavy 
foreign borrowing to finance expanded public consumption and investment, and 
subsidies on basic private consumer items. In Mexico, import controls were 
tightened and tariffs increased while the exchange rate became increasingly 
overvalued.
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Venezuela
The oil crisis, together with the increase in public expenditures and private 
consumption, caused a rapid rise in GDP and imports. Inflation was on the rise but 
for Latin American standards was still very low. In the latter part of the 1970s the 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies caused bottlenecks in domestic 
production and caused GDP growth to fall and inflation to rise. Severe balance-of- 
payments problems and a rapid increase in the foreign debt were also features of 
the economy.
TH E LO ST DECA D E (1980-89) AND TH E FIRST SIGNS O F 
RECO V ERY  (1989-94)
The period since 1980 has witnessed a broad range of economic performance and 
policy shifts. It also showed a diverging economic performance between Latin 
America and the rest of the world. The years since 1980 can be divided into the 
crisis period (1980-89) for Latin America and the subsequent period of recovery. 
As can be seen in Table 3.2 most Latin American countries experienced this 
recovery as Argentina and Chile grew almost 5 per cent per capita, Colombia 2.5 
per cent and Mexico and Venezuela over 1 per cent. The most notable exception, 
however, was Brazil which had negative growth per capita of about 1 per cent a 
year.
During 1980-89 the world economy recovered to some degree from the slow 
growth of the previous period, with the exception of Latin America. Total GDP of 
the OECD countries grew on average 2.5 per cent a year compared to around 2 per 
cent in 1973-80. The Asian developing countries continued to grow at the same or 
somewhat higher growth rates. Latin American growth performance was abysmal, 
as per capita income fell by 0.5 per cent a year.
In 1989 GDP per capita in Latin America had fallen, on average, to the lowest 
relative levels of the twentieth century, from a level of 32 per cent of the United 
States in 1980 to 24 per cent in 1989. Argentina experienced the biggest decline 
from being a rather prosperous country in 1900 (ranking sixth among our 16 
countries) to being one of the poorest in Latin America in 1989 (ranking 
fifteenth).
Between 1980 and 1989 Latin America experienced its deepest and most 
prolonged economic crisis since the ill-fated years of the Great Depression. 
Indeed, so much ground was lost that from the standpoint of economic welfare, the 
1980s turned out to be truly a lost decade. On average GDP per capita fell from 
4392 to 3727 constant 1980 international dollars with heavy per capita income 
losses in Argentina, Venezuela and, to a lesser degree, Mexico, virtual stability in 
Brazil and (recently) some improvement in Chile and Colombia.
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Another disturbing characteristic of the crisis was the generalised and 
simultaneous deterioration of virtually all main economic indicators. Many 
countries have not only experienced a decline in the level or in the rate of growth 
of total output but also a deterioration in the employment situation and decreases in 
real wages. Inflationary processes intensified enormously and became more 
widespread.
The period 1989-94 can be looked at in different ways. From the growth 
perspective it was disastrous. But it was also a period in which Latin America 
prepared itself for a change in development strategy. The growth figures for the 
1989-94 period of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that although a great effort is still 
needed, important progress was made in Latin America in the last decade.
Argentina
Argentina is one of a number of countries which went through a major crisis and 
several failures of orthodox and heterodox stabilisation programmes during the 
1980s until finally at the beginning of the 1990s the programme introduced by 
Domingo Cavallo under the presidency of Carlos Menem led to the stabilisation of 
the Argentine economy. After negative growth of 2.5 per cent per capita in 
1980-94 the Argentine economy has grown rapidly since then, recording about 4.8 
per cent per capita growth for the 1989-94 period.
The Menem government introduced a fiscal reform in 1990 which included 
centralisation of expenditure-related decisions. It put public enterprises under the 
direct authority of the minister of economic affairs in order to exercise tighter 
control over their financial management. The reform also included improved tax 
administration and tax simplification.
One of the most important and controversial elements of the stabilisation plan 
was the anchoring of the exchange rate. Under the ‘Convertibility Law’, the 
Central Bank is obliged to meet any demand for US dollars at the rate of 10.000 
australes to the dollar, that is, the exchange rate could not rise above this level 
unless Congress passed another bill allowing it to do so. The second provision 
required that the Central Bank’s monetary liabilities must at all times be less than 
the external assets making up its reserves; the purpose of this provision was to 
ensure that the currency would have backing and to limit money creation via 
domestic credit. These measures meant establishing a fixed exchange-rate system 
under which fluctuations in the primary money supply would be closely linked to 
the balance of payments.
Significant steps have been taken in the field of trade liberalisation as exports 
taxes were eliminated and overall tariffs were reduced to 0-20 per cent range. The 
government also initiated an ambitious process of privatisations and many public 
enterprises have been sold. Argentina entered the ‘Mercado Común del Sur’ 
(MERCOSUR) together with Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, in order to promote
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intra-regional trade and establish a common external tariff between the members 
and the rest of the world. Trade between these countries has risen considerably 
recently.
Argentina was strongly affected by the ‘tequila effect’ of the Mexican crisis. 
After four years of growth, unparalleled in recent history, the economy fell into a 
recession in 1995, with open unemployment reaching record levels of close to 20 
per cent. The country experienced a deficit in the capital account after receiving 
annually 10 billion US dollars in previous years. Argentina’s banking sector, at 
great risk after the Mexico crisis and the resulting removal of around 8 billion US 
dollars, experienced great liquidity problems and embarked on a major 
restructuring process reducing significantly the number of banks and financial 
institutions operating in the country. However, there are some signs of 
improvement in the major economic indicators and the Menem government has 
also reached an agreement with the United Kingdom about oil exploitation of the 
disputed ‘Islas Malvinas’ or Falkland Islands. At the beginning of 1996 the bulk of 
the capital that left the country after 20 December 1994 has returned; however, the 
economy is growing at much lower rates than before the crisis. The country’s 
annual inflation rate has fallen to less than 2 per cent, the lowest it has been in the 
last 50 years.
Brazil
Brazil experienced a major growth crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, but during 
the middle of the decade growth rates went up again and the pressure for structural 
reform became less acute. However, Brazilian growth performance at the end of 
the 1980s and in the 1990s has been very bad. Inflation, which did not subside 
after the first oil shock, accelerated sharply in 1979 when wage adjustments were 
changed from once to twice a year, at a time when the economy was subjected to 
renewed import costs and balanee-of-payments pressures (Dombusch and 
Simonsen, 1987). In Brazil, no major fiscal reform has taken place although in the 
field of trade liberalisation some measures have been taken, such as tariff 
reduction. Nonetheless, the Brazilian economy has not been, until now, opened up 
to the world. The privatisation process was set into motion and some enterprises 
have been sold, but recently privatisations have slowed down.
The Brazilian government’s latest attempt at stabilisation (the eighth in nearly a 
decade) -  the Real Plan -  has also been the most successful, having reduced 
inflation from a monthly 50 per cent in June 1994 to about 22 per cent for the 
whole of 1995, the lowest rate in the last two decades. Nonetheless, some 
difficulties have arisen which could hamper efforts to consolidate this process, 
such as emerging inflationary pressures, a significant increase in demand, the risk 
of a return to indexation, a somewhat overvalued exchange rate and problems in 
controlling liquidity. Unlike previous stabilisation plans, the Real Plan was notable
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for its transparency with regard to the measures contemplated and the timetable for 
their implementation: price freezes, intervention in labour contracts and all other 
types of drastic or unexpected action were explicidy ruled out. The plan was 
carried out in three stages, which were announced and described ahead of time in 
December 1993. The first stage involved fiscal adjustment to balance the budget in 
1994, for which purpose mandatory allocations of taxes and social security 
contributions were reduced in order to provide greater flexibility in the use of fiscal 
resources.
The second stage, launched in March 1994, sought to coordinate the 
economy’s prices. To that end, a basic indexing instrument was created, the unit of 
real value (URV), whose level was adjusted daily. In order to avoid the traumatic 
situations caused by previous plans the authorities eschewed the use of punitive 
measures opting instead, and only in the case of highly sensitive items in the family 
budget, for negotiation and persuasion.
The third stage of the plan was initiated in July 1994, with the introduction of a 
new currency, the real, the sixth since 1986. A new monetary regime was 
established; the old currency still in circulation was replaced at the rate of one real 
for one URV, or 2,750 cruzeiros reales, the value as of 30 June 1994. Furthermore, 
the plan specified mechanisms for the issuance of the new currency, under which 
the Central Bank would be required to maintain international reserves in an 
amount equivalent to the value of reales in circulation, at the selling rate of one real 
per dollar. The plan also placed quarterly limits on the monetary base.
Since the plan does not call for strict convertibility, the Central Bank will not 
make any commitment to purchase foreign exchange. In addition, the plan limits 
public-sector financing. With regard to monetary policy, the Central Bank has 
replaced the automatic buy-back of public securities with standard rediscount 
operations.
Under the Real stabilisation programme, the Brazilian economy started 
growing again after the economic and political instability of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The government of President Cardoso is embarked on an ambitious 
plan of restructuring the Brazilian economy, including major privatisations and 
reorganisation of the central and local state apparatus, the judiciary and the 
financial system. However, the maintenance of the stabilisation programme is the 
priority, and due to a worsening of the trade balance the government opted for an 
increase in tariffs on motor vehicles and electronic goods, and maintained a tight 
monetary policy with high interest rates and an increasing budget deficit. Capital 
flows have increased recently as Brazil received 28 billion US dollars in 1995, 
partly in foreign direct investment but also a substantial part of a short-term nature 
attracted by the high internal interest rates. At the same time 1995 showed an all- 
time record in exports, with a substantial share of industrial exports.
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Chile
At the beginning of the 1980s the Chilean economy was growing rapidly and the 
key instrument in the modified price-stabilisation strategy remained the exchange 
rate. Early in 1982 the Chilean economy went into a nosedive. The continued 
build-up of imbalances in the foregoing period, especially the increased disparity 
between domestic and international prices and persistently high real rates of 
interests, led to a very sharp fall in output. Increased imports and the resulting loss 
in international reserves caused an automatic adjustment and aggregate demand 
fell drastically. Because of the crisis the government was obliged to take drastic 
steps and sharply restrictive policies aimed at deflating the economy and avoiding 
devaluation were implemented. These policies proved ineffective and 
unnecessarily costly. A massive devaluation was eventually inevitable, generating 
great uncertainty and causing a massive exit of the dollar. Output fell 14 per cent in 
1982 and unemployment reached unprecedented levels (Ramos, 1986).
The adjustment programme started in 1983 was less drastic than the previous 
programmes, and included a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy combined with 
devaluations. In late 1982, Chile put into effect a ‘crawling peg’ exchange-rate 
system based on mini-devaluations. The policy of uniform import tariffs was 
basically continued but the base rate was raised to 20 per cent in March 1983 and 
to 35 per cent in September 1984, and was only lowered to 15 per cent in 1988. 
The economy started growing again in the context of macroeconomic stability, 
although there was a very high level of foreign indebtedness, see UNCTAD (1992) 
and ECLAC (1989). The 1980s ended with the Chilean economy experiencing fast 
growth, close to full utilisation of its productive capacity, and with relatively 
moderate levels of inflation.
The privatisation programme in Chile started around 1974, earlier than in any 
other country in Latin America.3 In the 1982 crisis, the privatisations programme 
experienced a reversal and the government took over 50 banks and firms from the 
‘grupos’. Many of these -  plus some others -  were sold off again in the second 
half of the 1980s. The democratic government that assumed office in 1990 
respected the sales and embarked on a limited privatisation programme.
Chile has become the showcase of the Latin American economies, growing 
rapidly since 1984 and in the 1990s. The 1989-94 per capita growth rate was close 
to 5 per cent. Inflation fell to 8 per cent, the lowest rate in more than three decades. 
The export-led growth also boosted other sectors of the economy such as 
construction, telecommunications and other services. The economic restructuring 
initiated two decades ago has brought about very important changes in economic 
strategy and the institutional framework. After initially applying rather drastic neo­
liberal policies and institutional change, the economic policy makers opted for a 
more pragmatic approach, including an active macroeconomic policy stance, 
which has yielded very good results. However, there have been some
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disappointing results with respect to the distribution of these gains, as the latest 
equity report shows a decrease of several points of the GDP share of the lowest 
deciles, together with an increase in the share of the highest decile.
The country has become a major foreign direct investor in Latin America, 
investing around 10 billion US dollars abroad in the last 5 years, especially in 
Argentina and Peru, but also increasingly in Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia. Most of 
the investments were channelled towards the energy and industrial sector.
Colombia
In the late 1970s Colombia started a public investment boom in order to counteract 
any recession the fall in coffee prices might engender. This boom involved foreign 
borrowing. The move could be regarded as a sensible countercyclical policy, and 
for a while the country was able to afford it. However, in 1981 coffee prices 
collapsed, and gradually Colombia’s Keynesian strategy got out of hand, 
especially in 1983, when a serious recession resulted. Colombia continued its 
policy of stimulating the domestic economy by fiscal and monetary expansion into 
1984, running up ever larger public-sector and current-account deficits, supporting 
the policy by a fall in reserves and heavy borrowing.
In 1984 Colombia undertook an orthodox adjustment programme, involving 
fiscal discipline and substantial depreciation; this programme was so successful 
that by 1986-88 the current account was roughly in balance (World Bank, 1991). 
Although fiscal reform started in Colombia much earlier than in many other 
countries the government found it necessary to introduce new fiscal reforms in 
1991 and 1992. Also big steps have been taken in the field of trade liberalisation in 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The objective was to change Colombia from a 
regulated and closed economy to a more open and flexible one, more responsive to 
market forces. The average tariff, which was close to 100 per cent at the beginning 
of the 1980s, was reduced to less than 10 per cent in the 1990s. Currency exchange 
controls were loosened and the market was given a greater role in determining the 
exchange rate. There were few privatisations in Colombia also because 
government intervention in the productive process had been limited.
Colombia was beset by major economic and political turmoil in the 1990s 
although the country continued growing at a stable and rather high rate. The 
country also became increasingly interesting for foreign investors mainly because 
of its abundant natural resources and -  at least in the Latin American context -  a 
relatively stable economy. Colombia is stepping up its oil production after bringing 
on stream several new oil fields in the eastern part of the country.
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Mexico
In Mexico, a country which enjoyed the benefits of increased oil revenues in the 
late 1970s, the ongoing inflation accelerated sharply in 1982 and 1983, when 
declining oil revenues and expanded external deficits compelled the authorities to 
resort increasingly to deficit financing and sharp exchange rate depreciations. At 
the beginning of 1982, the exchange crisis pieannounced the debt moratorium that 
was to come. In August 1982, the debt crisis broke out as the Minister of Finance 
flew to Washington to announce that Mexico could not meet its obligations.
The Mexican government had already started in 1983 an ambitious programme 
of privatisations, and has since then sold over a thousand state-owned enterprises, 
leaving less than a hundred in government hands. Mexico initiated around 1986 a 
rather successful stabilisation and reform programme which consisted of a drastic 
fiscal reform, a cautious exchange rate policy, a plan to deregulate, modernise and 
open the economy, and a social programme which was the result of concerted 
social agreement.4
Until 1989, the objectives were basically stabilisation and structural 
adjustment, and as inflation went down growth again became a major objective. 
However, growth was moderate at an average of 1.1 per cent per capita for 
1989-94. The current account and trade balance started showing deficits from the 
late 1980s onwards and capital flows into Mexico were increasing.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whose members are 
Canada, Mexico and the United States, was implemented in 1994. Early in the 
same year, the country was shocked by the insurgency in the province of Chiapas 
of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN).5 Several hundreds of 
people died, and the year was characterised by political unrest due to the campaign 
for the upcoming elections, in which several political candidates were murdered. 
Mexico’s dominant political party for the major part of the twentieth century is 
facing great problems, and has lost elections in several states.
At the end of 1994, the newly elected government devalued the peso by 15.3 
per cent and after losing 5 billion US dollars in international reserves in two days, 
the peso was allowed to float freely. The Mexican devaluation caused a major 
crisis of confidence in business circles, which spread rapidly to the whole of Latin 
America; indeed several observers foresaw the coming of a major crisis. However, 
this did not occur, although several countries, particularly Argentina, were severely 
affected by the crisis. The Mexican economy went into a recession; GDP per 
capita fell over 8 per cent in 1995 and inflation soared to around 50 per cent.
The Mexican crisis was caused by the financing, through large capital inflows, 
of high and unsustainable current account deficits. The high level of capital inflows 
was partly due to the very positive evaluation of Mexico by the international 
financial community, the reforms undertaken and sheers overconfidence. The 
Mexican crisis emphasised the importance of sound macroeconomic policy with
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respect to a sustainable deficit in the current account and the level and composition 
of capital inflows (short- and long-term or speculative and direct investment).
Venezuela
The debt crisis also hit Venezuela hard, its economy having experienced five 
consecutive years of negative GDP per capita growth at the beginning of the 
1980s, with GDP per capita falling over 8 per cent in 1983. In the second part of 
the 1980s the country recovered somewhat, although in 1989 the country 
implemented a severe adjustment and stabilisation programme designed to reduce 
macroeconomic imbalances that caused GDP to fall by almost 8 per cent and led 
to severe social unrest. However, after the relaxation of the adjustment 
programme, the first part of the 1990s showed a strong recovery with annual per 
capita GDP growth over 5 per cent, also influenced by the higher oil prices 
prompted by the Gulf War.
Economic, social and political instability continued, however, causing wide 
fluctuations in economic performance. The recession which started in 1993, was 
aggravated in 1994, fuelled by a crisis in the financial system, and the Government 
opted to reverse the liberalisation policy adopted in 1989. Among the many 
problems facing Venezuela are the consistendy big budget deficits and the 
continued delay of necessary fiscal and tax reforms.
Some measures have been taken in the field of trade liberalisation, in particular 
those concerning elimination of quantitative restrictions; and also the privatisation 
process has begun. Venezuela has become the country with one of the highest rates 
of inflation of all Latin American countries, with price increases of over 50 per 
cent in the last years. The country’s stabilisation process was affected by serious 
political and social problems aggravated by inconsistencies in its economic 
policies, especially with respect to economic restructuring and modernisation, the 
role of the private and public sectors, and exchange rate and prices policies.
NOTES
1. Inflation was on average less than 5 per cent during 1960-62, compared with an average of around 
40 per cent during the 1950s and about 30 per cent in the remainder of the 1960s (Ffrench-Davis, 
1973, Table 29, p. 242).
2. Underemployment refers to persons working part-time but wanting to work more and persons 
earning salaries below a certain minimum, for example, the minimum salary.
3. Some of the privatisations in the 1970s consisted of returning enterprises seized by the Unidad 
Popular to their owners, and some involved selling banks and firms to the private sector.
4. Since 1987, government, business associations and labour unions have agreed to coordinate 
economic policies in so-called pacts whose names reflect their emphasis. The names changed from 
‘Economic Solidarity Pact’ to ‘Pact for Stability and Economic Growth’, then ‘Stability, 
Competitiveness and Employment Pact’, and finally, to ‘Alliance for Economic Recovery’.
The Zapatist National Liberation Army can be compared to Emiliano Zapata’s movement which, 
during the Mexican Revolution, fought against the system of land tenure and bad living conditions 
of the people in Mexico’s south and obtained the incorporation of land reform in the 1917 
Constitution (Hofman, 1982).
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8. Conclusions
This book analyses Latin America’s economic development in the twentieth 
century in a comparative historical perspective. On the one hand, emphasis is 
placed on measurable supply-side evidence through the comparative use of growth 
accounts. This involved examination of the systematic quantification of output, 
human and physical capital, the role of diffusion and adaptation of technical 
progress and its potential in economic growth and catch-up.
On the other hand, there is considerable emphasis on the historical and 
institutional context in which economic development took place, as well as the role 
of policy. After the lost decade of the 1980s, the region is reaching a consensus on 
new types of domestic policy weapons needed to achieve macroeconomic stability. 
There is also consensus on the need for a more outward-looking strategy. The need 
for structural and institutional reform is recognised, although there is a wide 
spectrum of opinion with respect to its implementation.
Several of Latin America’s most pressing problems are rooted in its history. 
Throughout this study, elements like macroeconomic instability, institutional 
deficiencies and unequal distribution of income and wealth have been identified as 
factors in Latin America’s relatively poor performance. These have offset the 
region’s enormous comparative advantage in natural resources.
Latin America has the world’s most unequal income distribution, and there is 
evidence that this situation has not improved during the last half century. The 
region’s leading economic performer in recent years, Chile, has an impressive 
record in reducing poverty, but income distribution has not improved and there are 
slightly increasing Gini coefficients. The recurrence of financial crises and their 
effects on economic activity show that history keeps repeating itself. Latin 
America is still characterised by high inflation rates.
Latin America’s GDP per capita level relative to the United States remained 
almost stable during the first 80 years of the twentieth century, but deteriorated 
steadily during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. The relative position of the Asian 
countries in our sample worsened during the first half of the twentieth century, but 
improved dramatically from 1950 onwards. The relative position of the European 
countries and Japan deteriorated during 1900-1950 but improved gradually during 
the second half of the twentieth century, as these countries reduced the gap with the 
United States.
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The growth phases identified in this study are somewhat different from those in 
most other regions. If one looks both at performance and policy, four phases can 
be identified in the twentieth century. The first phase, which ended in 1929, was a 
rather prosperous period of stable growth. At that time world trade was the main 
engine. Average population and GDP growth were very similar in 1900-1913 and 
1913-29. From 1929 to 1950, the world experienced crisis and war but Latin 
America was relatively sheltered and its growth rates faltered less than those of 
most countries. Its fast recovery in the 1930s initiated a growth process, which 
gave great emphasis to import substitution. This emphasis in policy was 
adventitious and induced by the world crisis, but from 1950 onwards import 
substitution became the main development strategy in most Latin American 
countries. This emphasis only ended with the debt crisis of the early 1980s.
The first oil crisis that finished the golden age of expansion of the advanced 
European countries also affected Latin America, and 1973 was therefore adopted 
as an additional benchmark. From 1980 onwards, through the crisis of the ‘lost 
decade’, Latin America began to adopt neo-liberal policies and, especially, a more 
outward looking economic orientation.
The results with respect to joint factor inputs and total factor productivity 
growth are among the most interesting of this study. Total factor productivity 
provides an approximate measure of technical progress, and suggests a rather weak 
process of incorporation of technical progress in Latin America. Latin America’s 
performance in terms of total factor productivity shows that total factor 
productivity growth is a less important source of growth than in other regions. It 
shows also a steady tendency to deteriorate, only in the 1990s does one observe an 
incipient improvement of total factor productivity growth. From 1950 to 1973, 
when GDP grew quickly, total factor productivity growth was correspondingly 
high, although much lower than in other regions. From 1973 to 1980, when GDP 
growth remained fast, total factor productivity growth slowed down drastically. In 
the 1980s, during the ‘lost decade’, total factor productivity became negative.
These developments with respect to total factor productivity in the post-war 
period are related to growing macro- and microeconomic misallocations in Latin 
America. Macroeconomic misallocations became manifest with the debt crisis at 
the beginning of the 1980s, when the combination of internal and external factors 
caused a deep recession, generating highly negative total factor productivity 
growth. However, microeconomic misallocations related to the strategy of 
industrialisation through import substitution and heavy state intervention had been 
building up for a very long period. High levels of allocative and technical 
inefficiency at the micro level can explain the fact that the 1980s crisis in Latin 
America has been so profound. The implementation of a vast programme of 
structural reforms implicates a rather long transition period with a relatively poor 
economic performance.
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In the Asian countries, total factor productivity played a more important role 
than in Latin America, although the contribution was on average only 10 per cent 
higher. Technical progress during the 1950-73 period accounted for around 40 per 
cent of growth in Taiwan and about 30 per cent in Korea. During 1973-80 these 
countries increased their factor input (especially capital) and total factor 
productivity growth faltered. They did better after 1980.
Total factor productivity’s role was more important in the advanced countries 
than in the developing ones and negative estimates are rarely found. This can 
partly be explained by better resource allocation but is also due to structural 
differences with respect to factor inputs. Labour input growth in particular was 
much smaller in developed countries than in developing ones. First, there is a very 
clear difference in the role of labour input, which is increasing rapidly in the 
developing countries (although in many cases not fast enough to keep pace with 
demographic trends), while it has virtually come to a halt in the advanced 
European countries. Second, employment is growing quite fast over the whole 
range of developing countries but working hours showed markedly different 
trends. In Latin America there was a clear downward trend and in Asia they 
increased substantially. On the quality side, educational levels showed systematic 
improvement in all countries. Education grew fastest in Asia, at a moderate rate in 
Latin America and the Iberian countries, and at a much lower rate in the developed 
countries.
Recently, the human capital dimension to economic growth has returned to the 
centre of attention, and indeed the human capital factor is a very important source 
of growth. The quality of labour input is affected by many factors such as 
education, health and nutrition, as well as social norms and values. Widespread 
schooling, good health care and nutrition early in a country’s development have a 
positive effect on economic performance. It is recognised that the quality and 
flexibility of labour supply is important, but the deregulation of the labour market 
was not, until recently, a priority of the reform programme in most countries in 
Latin America.
One of the major contributions of the present study is the generation of 
comparable measures of capital stock disaggregated into machinery and 
equipment, productive structures, and dwellings, using a similar methodology, the 
perpetual inventory method. In our analysis, we have included the effect of natural 
resources, measured as the amount of land in use. Latin America saw an increase 
in cropped area (especially in Brazil), while in other parts of the world land in use 
either remained stable (as in Asia) or declined as in the advanced capitalist group.
For a comparison of the standardised capital stock estimates presented in 
Chapter 6 and the national estimates, see Appendix G, which gives details of the 
history of capital stock and national wealth estimation in Latin America in the 
twentieth century. Given the great differences between the national and the 
standardised estimates in assumptions and methodology, it was concluded that the
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latter estimates are the most appropriate for international comparisons of 
capital-output ratios, growth performance and the role of technical progress.
This study therefore presents a new comprehensive set of standardised capital 
stock estimates for the six Latin American countries, employing the perpetual 
inventory method. Total capital stock increased in all Latin American countries. 
While in Brazil it grew at about 8 per cent during 1950-94, the corresponding 
growth was just over 3 per cent in Argentina and Chile. These variations can also 
be seen when looking at the ‘productive’, non-residential capital stock.
Capital-output ratios increased in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, 
indicating a fall in capital productivity. Capital productivity remained almost 
constant in Chile and increased somewhat in Colombia. There are some small 
differences between total or non-residential capital-output ratios (Argentina and 
Chile for example) but the general trend is clear. The estimates in this study are 
presented in national currencies and international dollars, and the analysis indicates 
that the difference between the two estimates is not that big as regards the growth 
rates, but is more substantial as regards the level of the capital stocks.
There exists a growing consensus among Latin American leaders and policy 
makers with respect to economic policy (see Williamson, 1990 and Edwards, 
1995). First, it is almost universally recognised that macroeconomic adjustment 
and stabilisation is a precondition for sustainable economic growth, and in this 
respect inflation should be controlled and government spending brought into line 
with tax revenues. Second, it has become clear that Latin American leaders and 
policy makers are increasingly convinced that an outward-looking strategy is 
essential for the achievement of rapid growth. This means export-oriented policies, 
lower tariff barriers for imports, and also new approaches with respect to foreign 
capital and foreign direct investment. The strategy reflects the view that regional 
economic integration, within the process of opening up to the world, will play an 
important role in the region’s future. Third, each country has to adopt structural 
reforms in its economy, such as privatisation and deregulation, and so on. 
Structural measures are also needed with respect to equity and poverty. In order for 
the reforms to advance, there exists consensus that the political sustainability of the 
process should go hand in hand with measures directed at reducing poverty and 
inequality. Fourth, the role of the state has been reformulated, putting less 
emphasis on its role in production and more on creating institutions conducive to 
modernisation and growth.
There is still considerable disagreement on some issues (see Edwards, 1995 
and Moguillansky, 1995). First, the need for regulation and control of the financial 
system. There is a growing conviction that the financial system in many Latin 
American countries is rather weak and unable to meet the growing and diversified 
need for new financial instruments. Empirical analysis reveals that liberalisation 
and deregulation did not automatically increase the savings rate to the level of 
investment required to secure economic growth, for example increases in external
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savings correlate negatively with internal savings, and sometimes they promote 
capital outflow. The institutional framework of the financial system, the 
relationship between savings and investment, the improvement in width and depth 
of the financial market, all remain important and controversial issues in Latin 
America. A second problem is the sequencing and speed of trade reform, financial 
liberalisation and the opening of the capital account, on which a growing literature 
has emerged. Elimination of export bias and import liberalisation is one of the 
controversial sequencing issues. Most analysts agree that trade reform should 
precede the liberalisation of the capital account.
The liberalisation of the capital account is in itself controversial. Recent 
developments in Mexico have once more highlighted the importance of this issue. 
It seems increasingly clear that the unconditional liberalisation of capital flows of 
all sorts,, speculative and short-term, brings considerable risks. Keeping speculative 
capital under control, while encouraging long-term investment, seems 
recommendable but difficult to implement (Fffeneh-Davis and Griffith-Jones, 
1995).
There is a need to improve export promotion schemes or other sectoral policies 
with incentives for industry, agriculture or technological development. This subject 
is perhaps one of the most controversial, and not only in Latin America. In Latin 
America the debate has a highly ideological content, while in many other regions 
the problem is dealt with more pragmatically.
The privatisation strategy and the regulation of the private sector, such as 
energy, telecommunications and infrastructure, is also a major issue. In some 
countries privatisation is well advanced, although there are major exceptions, such 
as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. However, it is important to distinguish 
between markets which are self-regulating, through competition or contestability, 
and markets which are not. An important task facing many countries is to regulate 
those privatised sectors, such as utilities and the financial sector, which are difficult 





In this appendix population estimates, on a mid-year basis, are presented for the 
1820-1995 period. The pre-1950 data com e from the sources mentioned in 
Maddison (1995) linked with the data from CELADE (1995) latest estimates for 
the post-war period. In the case o f M exico INEGI (1985) was used for yearly 
estimates between 1900 and 1921 and the 1922-49 series was used to link 1921 
with 1950. For 1950-80 CELADE gives 5-yearly estimates which were 
interpolated, and the 1980-95 figures come from the yearly estimates o f 
CELADE.
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Table A. 1 Latin American Population, Six Countries, 1820-1995 (in thousands at 
midyear)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1820 534 4,507 885 1,206 6,587 718
1850 1,100 7,234 1,443 2,065 7,662 1,324
1870 1,796 9,797 1,943 2,392 9,219 1,653
1890 3,376 14,199 2,651 3,369 11,729 2,224
1900 4,693 17,984 2,974 3,998 13,607 2,542
1901 4,873 18,367 3,011 4,079 13,755 2516
1902 5,060 18,759 3,048 4,162 13,904 2,609
1903 5,254 19,159 3,086 4,247 14,055 2,643
1904 5,455 19,568 3,124 4,334 14,208 2,690
1905 5,664 19,985 3,163 4,422 14,363 2,706
1906 5,881 20,411 3,202 4,512 14,591 2,720
1907 6,107 20,846 3,242 4,604 14,676 2,741
1908 6,341 21,291 3,282 4,697 14,836 2,761
1909 6,584 21,745 3,323 4,793 14,997 2,780
1910 6,836 22,209 3,364 4,890 15,000 2,805
1911 7,098 22,682 3,406 4,990 14,990 2,834
1912 7,370 23,166 3,448 5,091 14,980 2,856
1913 7,653 23,660 3,491 5,195 14,970 2,874
1914 7,885 24,152 3,537 5,330 14,960 2,899
1915 8,072 24,655 3,584 5,468 14,950 2,918
1916 8,226 25,168 3,631 5,609 14,940 2,929
1917 8,374 25,692 3,679 5,754 14,930 2,944
1918 8,518 26,226 3,728 5,903 14,920 2,958
1919 8,672 26,772 3,777 6,056 14,910 2,973
1920 8,861 27,329 3,827 6,213 14,900 2,992
1921 9,092 27,898 3,877 6,374 14,895 3,008
1922 9,368 28,478 3,928 6,539 15,114 3,025
1923 9,707 29,071 3,980 6,709 15,358 3,049
1924 10,054 29,675 4,033 6,882 15,605 3,077
1925 10,358 30,293 4,086 7,061 15,857 3,114
1926 10,652 30,923 4,140 7,243 16,112 3,152
1927 10,965 31,567 4,195 7,431 16,372 3,185
1928 11,282 32,224 4,250 7,624 16,635 3,221
1929 11,592 32,894 4,306 7,821 16,903 3,259
1930 11,896 33,568 4,370 7,914 17,176 3,300
1931 12,167 34,255 4,434 8,009 17,473 3,336
1932 12,402 34,957 4,500 8,104 17,776 3,368
1933 12,623 35,673 4,567 8,201 18,085 3,401
1934 12,834 36,404 4,634 8,299 18,398 3,431
1935 13,044 37,150 4,703 8,398 18,717 3,465
1936 13,260 37,911 4,773 8,498 19,040 3,510
1937 13,490 38,687 4,843 8,599 19,370 3,565
1938 13,724 39,480 4,915 8,702 19,705 3,623
1939 13,984 40,489 5,003 8,935 20,047 3,699
1940 14,169 41,524 5,093 9,174 20,393 3,784
1941 14,402 42,585 5,184 9,419 20,955 3,858
1942 14,638 43,673 5,277 9,671 21,532 3,943
1943 14,877 44,790 5,371 9,930 22,125 4,020
1944 15,130 45,934 5,467 10,196 22,734 4,114
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Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1945 15,390 47,108 5,565 10,469 23,361 4,223
1946 15,654 48,312 5,665 10,749 24,004 4,347
1947 15,942 49,547 5,767 11,036 24,665 4,486
1948 16,307 50,813 5,870 11,332 25,345 4,656
1949 16,737 52,112 5,975 11,635 26,043 4,843
1950 17,150 53,444 6,082 11,946 27,737 5,094
1951 17,492 55,155 6,213 12,288 28,495 5,219
1952 17,840 56,922 6,346 12,641 29,273 5,437
1953 18,196 58,744 6,482 13,003 30,073 5,664
1954 18,558 60,626 6,622 13,376 30,894 5,901
1955 18,928 62,567 6,764 13,759 31,738 6,230
1956 19,254 64,455 6,925 14,170 32,717 6,398
1957 19,586 66,400 7,090 14,593 33,726 6,657
1958 19,923 68,404 7,258 15,028 34,767 6,928
1959 20,267 70,468 7,431 15,477 35,839 7,209
1960 20,616 72,594 7,608 15,939 36,945 7,579
1961 20,939 74,796 7,792 16,422 38,110 7,775
1962 21,267 77,065 7,980 16,920 39,311 8,058
1963 21,601 79,402 8,173 17,433 40,551 8,351
1964 21,939 81,811 8,370 17,961 41,829 8,655
1965 22,283 84,292 8,572 18,506 43,148 9,094
1966 22,609 86,486 8,749 19,045 44,544 9,275
1967 22,940 88,737 8,930 19,599 45,986 9,591
1968 23,276 91,046 9,115 20,169 47,474 9,917
1969 23,616 93,416 9,304 20,756 49,010 10,255
1970 23,962 95,847 9,496 21,360 50,596 10,721
1971 24,366 98,169 9,659 21,823 52,193 10,987
1972 24,776 100,547 9,824 22,295 53,840 11,385
1973 25,193 102,982 9,992 22,778 55,539 11,796
1974 25,618 105,477 10,163 23,272 57,291 12,223
1975 26,049 108,032 10,337 23,776 59,099 12,734
1976 26,449 110,562 10,494 24,302 60,704 13,105
1977 26,856 113,150 10,654 24,840 62,352 13,561
1978 27,269 115,800 10,816 25,389 64,045 14,032
1979 27,688 118,511 10,980 25,951 65,784 14,519
1980 28,114 121,286 11,147 26,525 67,570 15,091
1981 28,546 124,010 11,319 27,105 69,188 15,515
1982 28,987 126,768 11,493 27,699 70,776 15,917
1983 29,432 129,538 11,672 28,298 72,344 16,311
1984 29,879 132,303 11,856 28,895 73,904 16,713
1985 30,325 135,042 12,047 29,481 75,465 17,137
1986 30,771 137,751 12,247 30,054 77,023 17,590
1987 31,221 140,445 12,454 30,619 78,571 18,061
1988 31,670 143,127 12,667 31,180 80,117 18,542
1989 32,114 145,803 12,883 31,739 81,666 19,025
1990 32,546 148,477 13,100 32,300 83,226 19,502
1991 32,965 151,152 13,320 32,863 84,803 19,972
1992 33,374 153,824 13,545 33,426 86,391 20,441
1993 33,778 156,491 13,771 33,987 87,983 20,909
1994 34,180 159,147 13,994 34,546 89,570 21,377
1995 34,587 161,790 14,210 35,101 91,145 21,844

Appendix B. GDP Indices (1950 = 100) and 
Levels of Total and Per Capita 
GDP
As the output measure gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices was used 
because it is the most easily available aggregate for comparative purposes and also 
widely used in growth accounting (see Maddison, 1987 for a comparison o f 
different output measures used in growth accounting studies). The output measure 
as well as the capital formation measure are actually under scrutiny because o f the 
so-called ‘productivity paradox’, that is, the seeming paradox contradiction 
between the perception that technological change has accelerated in the recent 
decade and the observed fact that productivity growth has not recovered its 
average post World War II level (see OECD, 1991a).
For all countries a detailed description is given o f the sources used for the 
construction o f the GDP series. For 1950 onwards, if  not otherwise specified, the 
series used for Latin America are derived from currently collected official 
estimates by ECLAC corresponding to the most recent revision o f the United 
Nations System o f National Accounts (SNA).
For the years before 1950 the estimates have nearly all been made 
retrospectively and the underlying data are less complete. Nevertheless, most o f 
the historical estimates are based upon substantial statistical research by 
distinguished scholars, and in some cases emanate from the governmental 
statistical service responsible for making the more recent official estimates. But the 
estimates for the first half o f the twentieth century are obviously not as comparable 
as those for 1950 onwards, and in some cases may well be substantially revised 
when further research is done.
In order to compare levels o f output, capital and income per capita, or 
productivity in different countries, it is useful to have a unit which expresses the 
comparative value o f their currencies better than exchange rates. The latter reflect 
purchasing power over tradeable goods and services, and are subject to a good 
deal o f fluctuations as a result o f capital movements.
In this study the results o f the United Nations ICP IV were used which 
generated purchasing power parities (PPP) for GDP and the different types o f 
capital formation.1 The PPPs were expressed in ‘international dollars’ obtained by 
applying a common set o f prices, representative o f the world price structure, to the
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quantities o f the commodities and services entering into each country’s final 
expenditure on GDP. The PPPs for Latin America were provided by Alan Heston j  
o f the University o f Pennsylvania and former director o f the ICP. These PPPs 
differ somewhat from the ones published in United Nations/EUROSTAT (1987) 
which contained some computational errors.
Table B .l presents a comparison o f the exchange rate and the purchasing 
power parities (PPPs) prepared during different phases o f the ICP project from 
1970-85. I also give the adjusted exchange rates used in 1980 by ECLAC and 
World Bank for conversion to dollars. For 1980, our benchmark year, I compare 
the PPPs used, provided to us by Alan Heston, with the ones published by the 
United Nations/EUROSTAT (1987).
The results are presented in 1980 constant international dollars while the base 
year in Summers and Heston (1991) is 1985. A lso enclosed are the PPPs for 
M exico which were originally not published. The AH results show that all 
countries, with the exception o f Argentina which has a lower exchange rate, have 
much higher exchange rates than PPPs as can be seen in the column which gives 
the total GDP/PPP exchange rate deviation index. The range goes from 0.46 in 
Colombia to 1.41 in Argentina. This implies that for all countries, except 
Argentina, a conversion from national currencies to international dollars gives 
higher GDPs than in the case o f conversion with the exchange rate.
The PPP-exchange rate deviation index in the lower part o f Table B .l 
indicates, in spite o f the scanty evidence, that the AH results for 1980 are similar to 
those o f ICP IV. At the same time the comparison o f these results with previous 
phases o f the ICP shows that the PPPs are rather stable in time. Somewhat an 
exception are the 1985 Summers and Heston estimates which are on average 
somewhat lower than previous ones.
SOURCES
Argentina
The source for 1900-1950 is Banco Central de la República Argentina (1976). 
From 1970-94, ECLAC estimates based upon official statistics were used, taking 
into account the following considerations.
In 1987 the Central Bank o f Argentina, in cooperation with the Buenos Aires 
office o f ECLAC, initiated a project regarding the revision o f the national 
accounts, income distribution and input-output matrix. The final report2 presented 
an extensive description o f the methodology applied in the elaboration o f the new  
series. The results were the updating o f the current and constant series, by sector 
and expenditure, an estimation o f factor shares3 and a base year change from 1970
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to 1986. The increase in GDP level o f 43.2 per cent occurred mainly in the 
manufacturing and construction sector. Much o f the increase was due to improved
Table B .l Exchange Rates and Purchasing Power Parities with Respect to the








Brazil 8.2 52.7 / 39230
Chile 39.0 / 245
Colombia 18.4 23.8 30.9 47.3 2992
Mexico 12.5 23.0 2250
Venezuela 4.3 14.5
ICPI icpn icpin icpiy AH World ECLAC S&H
Bank
GDP purchasing power parities^ ^
Argentina 2709 2596 4117 3334 5689
Brazil 5.2 30.6 32.4 51.0 50.9 8045
Chile Æ i > 76.5 44.7 41.7 90.7
Colombia 7.3 9.5 10.8 23t 21.6 52.5 48.6 101.7
Mexico 7.4 13.4 30.8 25.4 900
Venezuela 3.6 3.1 9.7 5.0 7.0
PPP/exchange rate deviation index
Argentina 1.47 1.41 2.24 1.82 0.65
Brazil 0.63 0.58 0.61 0.97 0.96 0.46
Chile 0.74 0.68 1.15 1.07 0.37
Colombia 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.49 0.46 1.11 1.03 0.34
Mexico 0.59 0.58 1.34 1.10 0.40
Venezuela 0.84 0.73 1.09 1.17 0.48
Source: Table 5.2
statistical sources, for example, industrial and household surveys, and better 
coverage o f the informal sector.
Afterwards, the Banco Central de la República Argentina (1993) published 
new series, based upon the 1991 revision, but once again revised. In this last 
revision, much less detailed, the increase o f GDP was reduced from 43.2 to 35.5 
per cent and the greater part o f this reduction occurred in the construction sector, 
while the level o f output in the industrial sector increased even more.
Several problems had to be addressed in order to be able to include these new 
estimates in our series. Backwards, the revision influenced both the level and the 
growth o f the long-run series. As it was not reasonable to include all the 
differences in 19801 decided, after extensive consultations with Argentine national 
accounts experts who had participated in the latest revision and some in previous
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ones, to distribute half o f the increase in GDP as a level adjustment for the 
1900-1980 period and to treat the other half o f the increase as a linear 
augmentation o f the growth rate over the 1961-1980 period. The basic argument 
for this distribution was that the national accounts before 1961 were considered 
rather reliable and it did not seem  reasonable to increase the level o f Argentina’s 
GDP for the whole period by the whole o f the 35 per cent. For 1 9 8 0 -9 4 1 used the 
revised GDP estimates.
Brazil
Total GDP for 1900-1920 from Haddad (1975); for 1920-50 from Zerkowsky 
and D e Gusmao Veloso (1982).
Chile
Total GDP for 1900-1908 from Maddison (1989); for 1908-25 from Ballesteros 
and Davis (1965); for 1925-40 ECLAC (1951); and for 1940-50 ECLAC (1972). 
An official revision o f the national accounts for the base year 1986 was published 
in 1994.4 The most important results were an increase in the level o f capital 
formation in machinery and equipment and non-residential construction. Total 
GDP level estimates were somewhat lower due basically to changes in the sectorial 
composition.
Colombia
Total GDP for 1900-1925 from Maddison (1989) using his benchmarks for 1900, 
1913 and 1929, with interpolation for the years in between, 1925-50 from 
ECLAC (1972).
Mexico
Total GDP, 1900-1950 from Banco de M éxico (1986b). The period 1911-20 was 
interpolated on the basis o f the 1910 and 1921 data.
Venezuela
Total GDP for the period 1900-1950 was based upon Baptista (1991) which is the 
most complete statistical source available on Venezuela’s quantitative econom ic 
history.
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Table B.2 Latin American GDP Indices, Six Countries, 1900-1994 (1950  =  100)
Argentina Brazil Qtile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 15.1 9.8 24.9 13.2 27.6 5.6
1901 16.4 10.9 25.7 13.8 29.9 5.5
1902 16.1 11.7 26.6 14.3 27.8 6.0
1903 18.4 11.8 27.5 14.9 30.9 6.5
1904 20.3 11.8 28.4 15.6 31.5 6.3
1905 23.0 12.1 29.4 16.2 34.7 6.2
1906 24.2 12.6 30.4 16.9 34.4 5.8
1907 24.7 14.4 31.4 17.6 36.4 5.8
1908 27.1 13.0 32.5 18.3 36.3 6.2
1909 28.5 14.3 33.0 19.1 37.4 6.4
1910 30.5 15.4 35.7 19.9 37.7 6.6
1911 31.1 15.4 35.4 20.8 38.0 7.1
1912 33.6 17.1 39.3 21.6 38.2 7.3
1913 34.0 17.3 39.8 22.5 38.5 8.5
1914 30.5 17.5 37.1 23.4 38.7 7.4
1915 30.6 17.3 34.4 24.3 39.0 7.6
1916 29.7 18.1 40.9 25.2 39.3 7.2
1917 27.3 19.1 44.2 26.2 39.5 8.4
1918 32.3 19.5 44.2 27.2 39.8 8.4
1919 33.5 20.6 35.0 28.3 40.1 7.8
1920 36.0 22.7 39.9 29.4 40.3 9.4
1921 36.9 23.1 34.4 30.5 40.6 9.8
1922 39.8 25.6 36.8 31.7 41.5 10.0
1923 44.2 27.8 45.8 32.9 43.0 11.6
1924 47.7 27.9 49.9 34.2 42.3 13.4
1925 47.5 28.3 50.5 35.5 44.9 17.3
1926 49.8 28.9 49.2 38.9 47.6 21.0
1927 53.3 31.6 47.2 42.4 45.5 23.5
1928 56.6 36.0 57.3 45.5 45.8 26.3
1929 59.2 35.9 62.8 47.1 44.0 29.9
1930 56.8 34.4 59.0 46.7 41.3 30.4
1931 52.8 33.3 44.5 46.0 42.6 24.6
1932 51.1 34.2 44.0 49.0 36.3 23.5
1933 53.5 38.6 52.1 51.8 40.4 25.8
1934 57.7 42.0 59.3 55.1 43.1 27.5
1935 60.2 44.0 60.4 56.4 46.3 29.5
1936 60.7 49.3 62.7 59.4 50.0 32.4
1937 65.1 51.2 67.4 60.3 51.6 37.2
1938 65.3 53.8 66.3 63.5 52.5 40.2
1939 67.8 55.9 68.3 68.2 55.3 42.6
1940 68.9 56.6 71.3 69.7 56.1 41.0
1941 72.5 61.1 71.4 70.8 61.5 40.3
1942 73.3 57.7 75.3 71.0 65.0 35.2
1943 72.8 62.4 78.5 71.3 67.4 38.4
1944 81.0 65.3 79.6 76.1 72.9 47.4
1945 78.4 67.1 86.8 79.6 75.2 57.6
1946 85.4 75.4 92.2 86.9 80.1 69.2
1947 94.9 78.7 86.0 90.3 82.9 82.7
1948 100.1 85.9 96.0 93.1 86.3 92.1
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Table B.2 (continued)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1949 98.8 93.4 95.4 98.2 91.0 97.7
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1951 103.9 106.2 104.3 103.1 107.5 111.7
1952 98.6 114.5 110.3 109.6 110.7 119.8
1953 103.9 118.1 116.0 116.3 116.7 127.2
1954 108.2 131.2 116.5 124.3 123.1 139.5
1955 115.8 138.4 116.4 129.2 132.8 151.8
1956 119.0 142.9 117.0 134.4 139.9 167.9
1957 125.2 154.5 129.3 137.4 150.4 187.4
1958 132.8 166.3 132.8 140.8 157.4 189.9
1959 124.3 175.1 132.1 151.0 164.2 204.8
1960 134.0 192.0 140.8 157.4 176.4 207.7
1961 143.6 212.2 147.6 165.4 185.1 218.1
1962 142.3 221.9 154.5 174.4 193.8 238.1
1963 140.0 224.9 164.3 180.1 209.2 254.5
1964 155.5 233.8 168.0 191.2 233.7 279.2
1965 171.1 240.3 169.3 198.1 248.9 295.7
1966 173.4 249.5 188.2 208.5 266.1 302.5
1967 179.4 261.5 194.3 217.1 282.8 314.7
1968 188.5 290.8 201.3 230.0 305.8 331.4
1969 206.1 319.7 208.8 244.0 325.1 345.2
1970 218.8 327.5 213.1 259.2 347.6 371.6
1971 228.7 364.7 232.1 274.6 362.1 383.0
1972 235.1 408.2 229.3 295.7 392.9 395.5
1973 245.8 465.2 224.8 315.6 425.9 420.2
1974 261.0 503.1 227.0 333.1 451.9 445.7
1975 261.3 529.1 196.8 341.4 477.3 472.8
1976 263.3 583.4 203.2 357.6 497.5 514.2
1977 282.1 612.2 220.0 372.5 514.7 548.8
1978 275.1 642.6 237.0 404.0 557.1 560.5
1979 296.5 686.1 253.9 425.7 608.1 568.0
1980 303.1 755.9 ¿73.5 443.1 658.7 556.7
1981 286.7 723.8 291.8 453.2 716.5 555.1
1982 277.6 729.8 252.6 457.5 712.0 558.8
1983 289.0 708.4 243.8 464.7 682.2 527.5
1984 294.8 746.7 258.7 480.3 706.8 520.3
1985 274.3 805.3 267.7 495.2 725.1 521.3
1986 293.9 865.6 282.7 524.1 697.9 555.3
1987 301.3 896.1 301.3 552.2 710.8 575.1
1988 295.4 895.6 323.3 574.6 719.7 608.6
1989 274.7 923.9 355.2 594.3 749.9 556.5
1990 271.1 882.9 366.8 619.7 787.9 592.5
1991 299.5 885.9 393.4 632.1 821.2 650.1
1992 330.4 878.6 436.9 657.7 851.0 689.5
1993 351.0 915.4 464.3 691.7 867.6 686.7
1994 381.0 970.3 484.0 733.4 905.9 664.3
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Table B.3 Levels o f  Latin American GDP, Six Countries, 1900-1994 (national 



















1900 1,917 161,934 95,016 47,060 187,004 2,551
1901 2,079 180,932 98,229 49,035 203,230 2,509
1902 2,037 193,597 101,551 51,093 188,739 2,729
1903 2,329 194,501 104,985 53,237 209,877 2,950
1904 2,577 195,406 108,535 55,471 213,567 2,880
1905 2,919 199,929 112,205 57,799 235,756 2,846
1906 3,066 208,976 115,999 60,225 233,093 2,656
1907 3,131 237,925 119,922 62,752 246,770 2,654
1908 3,437 214,404 123,977 65,386 246,395 2,839
1909 3,607 237,020 125,990 68,130 253,636 2,938
1910 3,869 254,209 136,346 70,989 255,893 3,033
1911 3,939 255,114 135,195 73,968 257,615 3,246
1912 4,261 282,253 150,153 77,073 259,350 3,356
1913 4,305 286,777 151,879 80,307 261,095 3,875
1914 3,859 290,395 141,523 83,407 262,853 3,388
1915 3,879 286,777 131,456 86,626 264,622 3,491
1916 3,768 299,442 155,906 89,970 266,404 3,296
1917 3,463 315,726 168,562 93,443 268,197 3,845
1918 4,097 322,058 168,850 97,049 270,002 3,820
1919 4,248 341,056 133,469 100,795 271,820 3,570
1920 4,557 375,433 152,454 104,686 273,650 4,286
1921 4,674 381,613 131,168 108,726 275,492 4,459
1922 5,048 423,328 140,373 112,923 281,911 4,584
1923 5,604 460,408 174,603 117,282 291,596 5,289
1924 6,041 461,953 190,424 121,809 286,831 6,128
1925 6,015 468,133 192,725 126,510 304,670 7,919
1926 6,305 477,403 187,808 138,589 322,949 9,578
1927 6,753 522,207 180,192 151,073 308,743 10,743
1928 7,171 596,367 218,592 162,169 310,657 12,030
1929 7,501 594,822 239,810 168,006 298,642 13,641
1930 7,191 568,557 225,300 166,561 279,923 13,886
1931 6,692 551,562 169,690 163,903 289,201 11,225
1932 6,470 565,467 167,819 174,768 246,061 10,751
1933 6,774 638,082 198,657 184,593 273,863 11,762
1934 7,309 695,246 226,182 196,209 292,345 12,555
1935 7,627 727,691 230,431 201,006 314,013 13,463
1936 7,690 815,756 239,196 211,640 339,135 14,788
1937 8,248 846,656 257,394 214,935 350,360 16,968
1938 8,273 889,915 253,038 226,320 356,038 18,347
1939 8,590 925,450 260,708 242,965 375,180 19,454
1940 8,729 936,265 272,118 248,224 380,353 18,699
1941 9,185 1,010,425 272,423 252,385 417,400 18,393
1942 9,287 954,805 287,473 252,905 440,819 16,083
1943 9,223 1,032,055 299,472 253,945 457,144 17,554
1944 10,262 1,079,949 303,743 271,110 494,460 21,656
1945 9,933 1,110,849 331,301 283,825 509,994 26,321
1946 10,820 1,248,354 351,740 309,516 543,506 31,583




















1947 12,023 1,302,428 328,250 321,697 562,225 37,780
1948 12,682 1,421,393 366,282 331,664 585,391 42,058
1949 12,517 1,544,992 364,045 349,991 617,478 44,631
1950 12,669 1,654,687 381,637 356,359 678,580 45,659
1951 13,161 1,757,506 398,110 367,446 729,585 50,986
1952 12,498 1,894,044 420,888 390,639 751,441 54,700
1953 13,161 1,954,403 442,853 414,389 792,059 58,083
1954 13,704 2,171,698 444,683 443,041 835,207 63,676
1955 14,672 2,289,503 444,073 460,363 901,244 69,330
1956 15,080 2,364,016 446,616 479,043 949,418 76,652
1957 15,861 2,556,751 493,494 489,717 1,020,705 85,553
1958 16,829 2,751,567 506,917 501,751 1,067,789 86,690
1959 15,742 2,896,846 504,200 538,020 1,113,943 93,513
1960 16,982 3,176,998 537,404 560,970 1,197,080 94,830
1961 18,188 3,510,849 563,105 589,524 1,256,095 99,583
1962 18,032 3,671,115 589,789 621,426 1,314,783 108,700
1963 17,735 3,720,651 627,100 641,854 1,419,816 116,184
1964 19,707 3,868,428 641,053 681,446 1,585,837 127,466
1965 21,673 3,976,659 646,235 705,973 1,688,675 135,009
1966 21,974 4,128,651 718,298 742,943 1,805,725 138,111
1967 22,723 4,327,622 741,618 773,663 1,918,943 143,683
1968 23,876 4,811,233 768,166 819,565 2,075,061 151,317
1969 26,106 5,289,316 796,751 869,579 2,206,284 157,627
1970 27,715 5,419,200 813,135 923,561 2,358,990 169,677
1971 28,970 6,033,900 885,953 978,612 2,457,397 174,888
1972 29,791 6,754,300 875,205 1,053,663 2,665,977 180,585
1973 31,136 7,697,800 857,832 1,124,501 2,890,162 191,881
1974 33,062 8,325,500 866,191 1,186,949 3,066,771 203,516
1975 33,110 8,755,700 751,212 1,216,738 3,238,851 215,865
1976 33,353 9,653,700 77535S 1,274,270 3,376,136 234,798
1977 35,745 10,130,100 839,453 1,327,260 3,492,367 250,582
1978 34,848 10,633,500 904,525 1,439,678 3,780,483 255,940
1979 37,571 11,352,300 969,008 1,517,120 4,126,581 259,358
1980 38,400 12,508,000 1,043,92CI 1,579,130 4,470,077 254,201
1981 36,318 11,976,000 Ì,1Ì3,6Ì9 1,615,166 4,862,219 253,434
1982 35,171 12,076,000 964,151 1,630,403 4,831,689 255,163
1983 36,617 11,722,000 930,511 1,656,064 4,628,937 240,830
1984 37,350 12,355,000 987,196 1,711,554 4,796,050 237,570
1985 34,754 13,325,000 1,021,550 1,764,734 4,920,430 238,029
1986 37,237 14,323,000 1,078,718 1,867,513 4,735,721 253,525
1987 38,179 14,828,000 1,149,852 1,967,779 4,823,604 262,606
1988 37,432 14,819,000 1,233,921 2,047,753 4,883,679 277,893
1989 34,809 15,288,000 1,355,756 2,117,665 5,088,710 254,078
1990 34,343 14,610,000 1,399,930 2,208,343 5,346,622 270,512
1991 37,949 14,659,367 1,501,538 2,252,546 5,572,369 296,832
1992 41,857 14,538,692 1,667,315 2,343,659 5,774,572 314,821
1993 44,473 15,147,556 1,771,909 2,465,036 5,887,206 313,554
1994 48,264 16,055,367 1,847,183 2,613,490 6,147,145 303,301
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Table B.4 Levels o f  Latin American GDP, Six Countries, 1900-1994 (million 
1980 international dollars)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 7,076 5,292 3,299 2,037 13,955 707
1901 7,675 5,913 3,411 2,123 15,166 695
1902 7,520 6,327 3,526 2,212 14,085 756
1903 8,596 6,356 3,645 2,305 15,662 817
1904 9,513 6,386 3,769 2,401 15,938 798
1905 10,775 6,534 3,896 2,502 17,594 788
1906 11,317 6,829 4,028 2,607 17,395 736
1907 11,556 7,775 4,164 2,717 18,416 735
1908 12,688 7,007 4,305 2,831 18,388 786
1909 13,315 7,746 4,375 2,949 18,928 814
1910 14,283 8,307 4,734 3,073 19,096 840
1911 14,540 8,337 4,694 3,202 19,225 899
1912 15,728 9,224 5,214 3,336 19,354 930
1913 15,891 9,372 5,274 3,476 19,485 1,074
1914 14,246 9,490 4,914 3,611 19,616 938
1915 14,321 9,372 4,564 3,750 19,748 967
1916 13,908 9,786 5,413 3,895 19,881 913
1917 12,782 10,318 5,853 4,045 20,015 1,065
1918 15,125 10,525 5,863 4,201 20,149 1,058
1919 15,681 11,146 4,634 4,363 20,285 989
1920 16,822 12,269 5,294 4,532 20,422 1,187
1921 17,252 12,471 4,554 4,707 20,559 1,235
1922 18,632 13,834 4,874 4,888 21,038 1,270
1923 20,685 15,046 6,063 5,077 21,761 1,465
1924 22,299 15,096 6,612 5,273 21,405 1,698
1925 22,205 15,298 6,692 5,477 22,737 2,194
1926 23,276 15,601 6,521 6,000 24,101 2,653
1927 24,927 17,066 6,257 6,540 23,041 2,976
1928 26,471 19,489 7,590 7,020 23,183 3,332
1929 27,691 19,439 8,327 7,273 22,287 3,779
1930 26,545 18,580 7,823 7,210 20,890 3,847
1931 24,703 18,025 5,892 7,095 21,582 3,109
1932 23,884 18,479 5,827 7,566 18,363 2,978
1933 25,007 20,852 6,898 7,991 20,438 3,258
1934 26,981 22,720 7,854 8,494 21,817 3,478
1935 28,154 23,781 8,001 8,702 23,434 3,729
1936 28,388 26,659 8,305 9,162 25,309 4,096
1937 30,445 27,668 8,937 9,305 26,146 4,700
1938 30,539 29,082 8,786 9,797 26,570 5,082
1939 31,708 30,243 9,052 10,518 27,999 5,389
1940 32,223 30,597 9,449 10,746 28,385 5,180
1941 33,907 33,020 9,459 10,926 31,149 5,095
1942 34,280 31,203 9,982 10,948 32,897 4,455
1943 34,047 33,727 10,398 10,993 34,115 4,863
1944 37,882 35,292 10,547 11,736 36,900 5,999
1945 36,666 36,302 11,504 12,287 38,059 7,291
1946 39,940 40,796 12,213 13,399 40,560 8,749
1947 44,382 42,563 11,398 13,926 41,957 10,465
1948 46,814 46,451 12,718 14,358 43,686 11,651
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Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1949 46,207 50,490 12,640 15,151 46,080 12,363
1950 <54,075 13,251 15,427 50,640 12,648
1951 57,435 13,823 15,907 54,447 14,124
1952 46,136 61,897 14,614 16,911 56,078 15,152
1953 48,582 63,869 15,377 17,939 59,109 16,089
1954 50,588 70,971 15,440 19,179 62,329 17,639
1955 54,161 74,820 15,419 19,929 67,257 19,205
1956 55,665 77,255 15,507 20,738 70,852 21,233
1957 58,551 83,554 17,135 21,200 76,172 23,699
1958 62,124 89,920 17,601 21,721 79,686 24,014
1959 58,111 94,668 17,507 23,291 83,130 25,904
1960 62,687 103,823 18,660 24,284 89,334 26,269
1961 67,139 114,734 19,552 25,521 93,738 27,585
1962 66,564 119,971 20,479 26,902 98,118 30,111
1963 65,468 121,590 21,774 27,786 105,956 32,184
1964 72,747 126,419 22,259 29,500 118,346 35,309
1965 80,002 129,956 22,439 30,562 126,020 37,399
1966 81,116 134,923 24,941 32,162 134,756 38,258
1967 83,880 141,426 25,751 33,492 143,205 39,801
1968 88,135 157,230 26,672 35,479 154,855 41,916
1969 96,369 172,853 27,665 37,644 164,648 43,664
1970 102,306 177,098 28,234 39,981 176,044 47,002
1971 106,941 197,186 30,762 42,364 183,388 48,445
1972 109,970 220,729 30,389 45,613 198,953 50,024
1973 114,935 251,562 29,786 48,680 215,684 53,153
1974 122,044 272,075 30,076 51,383 228,864 56,376
1975 122,223 286,134 26,084 52,673 241,705 59,7%
1976 123,118 315,480 26,922 55,163 251,950 65,041
1977 131,951 331,049 29,148 57,457 260,624 69,413
1978 128,638 347,500 31,407 62,324 282,126 70,898
1979 138,688 370,990 33,646 65,676 307,954 71,844
1980 141,750 408,758 36,247 68,361 333,588 70,416
1981 134,065 391,373 38,667 69,921 362,852 70,203
1982 129,831 394,641 33,477 70,580 360,574 70,682
1983 135,170 383,072 32,309 71,691 345,443 66,712
1984 137,873 403,758 34,278 74,093 357,914 65,809
1985 128,289 435,458 35,470 76,395 367,196 65,936
1986 137,457 468,072 37,455 80,845 353,412 70,229
1987 140,932 484,575 39,925 85,185 359,970 72,744
1988 138,175 484,281 42,844 88,647 364,454 76,979
1989 128,493 499,608 47,075 91,674 379,754 70,382
1990 126,774 477,451 48,609 95,599 399,002 74,934
1991 140,083 479,064 52,137 97,513 415,848 82,225
1992 154,511 475,121 57,893 101,457 430,938 87,208
1993 164,169 495,018 61,525 106,712 439,344 86,857
1994 178,163 524,685 64,138 113,138 458,742 84,017
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Table B.5 Levels o f  GDP p er  Capita in Latin America, Six Countries, 1900-1994  
(1980 international dollars)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 1,508 294 1,109 510 1,026 278
1901 1,575 322 1,133 520 1,103 270
1902 1,486 337 1,157 531 1,013 290
1903 1,636 332 1,181 543 1,114 309
1904 1,744 326 1,206 554 1,122 297
1905 1,902 327 1,232 566 1,225 291
1906 1,924 335 1,258 578 1,192 270
1907 1,892 373 1,284 590 1,255 268
1908 2,001 329 1,312 603 1,239 285
1909 2,022 356 1,316 615 1,262 293
1910 2,089 374 1,407 628 1,273 300
1911 2,048 368 1,378 642 1,283 317
1912 2,134 398 1,512 655 1,292 325
1913 2,076 396 1,511 669 1,302 374
1914 1,807 393 1,389 677 1,311 324
1915 1,774 380 1,274 686 1,321 331
1916 1,691 389 1,491 694 1,331 312
1917 1,526 402 1,591 703 1,341 362
1918 1,776 401 1,573 712 1,350 358
1919 1,808 416 1,227 720 1,361 333
1920 1,898 449 1,383 729 1,371 397
1921 1,898 447 1,175 738 1,380 411
1922 1,989 486 1,241 748 1,392 420
1923 2,131 518 1,523 757 1,417 481
1924 2,218 509 1,640 766 1,372 552
1925 2,144 505 1,638 776 1,434 704
1926 2,185 505 1,575 828 1,496 842
1927 2,273 - 541 1,492 880 1,407 934
1928 2,346 605 1,786 921 1,394 1,035
1929 2,389 591 1,934 930 1,319 1,159
1930 2,231 554 1,790 911 1,216 1,166
1931 2,030 526 1,329 886 1,235 932
1932 1,926 529 1,295 934 1,033 884
1933 1,981 585 1,510 974 1,130 958
1934 2,102 624 1,695 1,024 1,186 1,014
1935 2,158 640 1,701 1,036 1,252 1,076
1936 2,141 703 1,740 1,078 1,329 1,167
1937 2,257 715 1,845 1,082 1,350 1,318
1938 2,225 737 1,788 1,126 1,348 1,403
1939 2,267 747 1,809 1,177 1,397 1,457
1940 2,274 737 1,855 1,171 1,392 1,369
1941 2,354 775 1,825 1,160 1,487 1,321
1942 2,342 714 1,892 1,132 1,528 1,130
1943 2,289 753 1,936 1,107 1,542 1,210
1944 2,504 768 1,929 1,151 1,623 1,458
1945 2,382 771 2,067 1,174 1,629 1,727
1946 2,551 844 2,156 1,247 1,690 2,013
1947 2,784 859 1,977 1,262 1,701 2,333
1948 2,871 914 2,167 1,267 1,724 2,502
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Table B.5 (continued)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1949 2,761 969 2,116 1,302 1,769 2,553
1950 2,727 1,012 2,179 1,291 1,826 2,483
1951 2,777 1,041 2,225 1,294 1,911 2,706
1952 2,586 1,087 2,303 1,338 1,916 2,787
1953 2,670 1,087 2,372 1,380 1,966 2,841
1954 2,726 1,171 2,332 1,434 2,018 2,989
1955 2,861 1,196 2,280 1,448 2,119 3,083
1956 2,891 1,199 2,239 1,464 2,166 3,319
1957 2,989 1,258 2,417 1,453 2,259 3,560
1958 3,118 1,315 2,425 1,445 2,292 3,466
1959 2,867 1,343 2,356 1,505 2,320 3,593
1960 3,041 1,430 2,453 1,524 2,418 3,466
1961 3,206 1,534 2,509 1,554 2,460 3,548
1962 3,130 1,557 2,566 1,590 2,496 3,737
1963 3,031 1,531 2,664 1,594 2,613 3,854
1964 3,316 1,545 2,659 1,642 2,829 4,080
1965 3,590 1,542 2,618 1,651 2,921 4,112
1966 3,588 1,560 2,851 1,689 3,025 4,125
1967 3,657 1,594 2,884 1,709 3,114 4,150
1968 3,787 1,727 2,926 1,759 3,262 4,227
1969 4,081 1,850 2,974 1,814 3,359 4,258
1970 4,269 1,848 2,973 1,872 3,479 4,384
1971 4,389 2,009 3,185 1,941 3,514 4,409
1972 4,439 2,195 3,093 2,046 3,695 4,394
1973 4,562 2,443 2,981 2,137 3,883 4,506
1974 4,764 2,579 2,959 2,208 3,995 4,612
1975 4,692 2,649 2,523 2,215 4,090 4,696
1976 4,655 2,853 2,565 2,270 4,150 4,963
1977 4,913 2,926 2,736 2,313 4,180 5,119
1978 4,717 3,001 2,904 2,455 4,405 5,053
1979 5,009 3,130 3,064 2,531 4,681 4,948
1980 5,042 3,370 2,577 4,937 4,666
1981 4,696 3,156 3,416 2,580 5,244 4,525
1982 4,479 3,113 2,913 2,548 5,095 4,441
1983 4,593 2,957 2,768 2,533 4,775 4,090
1984 4,614 3,052 2,891 2,564 4,843 3,938
1985 4,230 3,225 2,944 2,591 4,866 3,848
1986 4,467 3,398 3,058 2,690 4,588 3,993
1987 4,514 3,450 3,206 2,782 4,581 4,028
1988 4,363 3,384 3,382 2,843 4,549 4,152
1989 4,001 3,427 3,654 2,888 4,650 3,699
1990 3,895 3,216 3,711 2,960 4,794 3,842
1991 4,249 3,169 3,914 2,967 4,904 4,117
1992 4,630 3,089 4,274 3,035 4,988 4,266
1993 4,860 3,163 4,468 3,140 4,994 4,154
1994 5,213 3,297 4,583 3,275 5,122 3,930
Appendix B 171
NOTES
1. See Chapter 6 for a more extensive analysis of exchange rates and purchasing power parities. I 
used the results of ICP IV for 1980 because Latin America did not participate in the following 
rounds. Mexico now participates as an OECD member with the OECD secretariat and 
EUROSTAT. There exist good prospects that Latin America will participate in the next round 
of ICP as many countries expressed their interest, especially the MERCOSUR and Andean Pact 
countries. ECLAC will coordinate the ICP work with the substantive and financial assistance of 
World Bank and OECD.
2. Banco Central de la República Argentina (1991) is only available in mimeographed form and 
was never published officially.
3. Of which no official estimates were available since 1973.
4. Banco Central de Chile (1994).

Appendix C. Activity Rates, Employment, 
Education and Labour 
Productivity
In order to analyse the labour market in Latin America some basic quantification is 
necessary. There are many institutes working on this theme, som e regional like the 
former PREALC. The basic value added o f this appendix is its presentation o f 
series since 1950, estimates on hours worked and the human capital estimates. The 
appendix presents a complete description o f the sources for each country. First, a 
general source note is given which presents the databases and other general 
information we used in common for all countries. Then, in specific source notes, 
the sources and procedures are detailed if they are different from the one described 
in the general source note. It should be noted that the basic tables have as 
benchmark years: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. This is the case because the 
information with respect to activity rates, labour force and employment normally 
comes from population censuses which are only available on a decade basis. These 
benchmarks are used in this appendix although the text often presents a 
périodisation with benchmarks in 1950, 1973, 1980, 1989 and 1994. If not 




M ale and female activity rates for 1950-80 from ECLAC (1985). These activity 
rates were calculated on the basis o f population censuses and household surveys. 
However, the population figures o f CELADE are adjusted for undercounting, 
especially for males, in the censuses. This adjustment causes small changes in total 
activity rates. W e used ECLAC’s sex-specific activity rates for the respective 
population and calculated the total activity rate. For 1990 I used population 
censuses when available. For Brazil and Colombia CELADE (1992) was used.
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Table C.2
The employment rates for 1950-80 come from the Projections Center o f ECLAC 
and are based upon population censuses. The 1990 estimate was elaborated by the 
author using population censuses. For Brazil IBGE (1990) was used and in the 
case o f Colombia the 1985 census (DANE, 1986), updated to 1990 and ECLAC 
(1992). The updating to 1994 was done with the employment information o f the 
household surveys o f the countries available at the employment data base o f the 
Statistics and Projections Division o f ECLAC. Unemployment rates were assumed 
equal for both sexes.
Table C.3
Annual hours per person employed were calculated on the basis o f the number o f 
days worked per year and the average number o f hours worked per day. Number 
o f days worked during the year on the basis o f public and statutory holidays from 
ILO (1982) and estimated for missing years. H alf day Saturday working was 
assumed in 1950 and 1960 in the cases o f Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and 
M exico, and only in 1950 in the cases o f Chile and Venezuela and a free Saturday 
onwards. Time lost through industrial disputes from ILO, Yearbook o f  Labour 
Statistics, various issues. Annual hours data from DLO, Yearbook o f  Labour 
Statistics, various issues, and other sources. In the case o f Brazil the 1960 and 
1970 estimate from Bonelli (1976), with 1959 and 1969 estimates for 
manufacturing. The estimates for 1980 and 1990 were based upon IBGE, Anuario 
Estadístico do Brasil, various issues, and IBGE, Recenseamento Geral do Brasil, 
1970 and 1980. The Chile 1960 and 1970 estimates were on the basis o f 
information from Instituto de Economía, Ocupación y  Desocupación, Universidad 
de Chile, Santiago (various issues) and INE, Muestra Nacional de Hogares, 
Santiago, 1966 and 1971. In the case o f Colombia, 1950 from DANE (1956), 
Anuario General de Estadística Colombia. 1956, p. 412, figures for 1956 and 
1980 and 1990 were estimates. M exico for 1950-90, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, Encuesta Anual de Trabajo y  Salarios Nacionales, various issues. The 
1950 and 1960 figures for Venezuela are estimates. The 1994 estimates were from 
ILO (1995) in the case o f Chile and M exico; the remainder were estimated by the 
author.
Table C.5
The 1950-80 sectoral employment data were provided by ECLAC’s Projections 
Center. For 1990 national census and country sources were used as follows: 
Argentina’s 1990 sectoral employment from PREALC (1993); the 1990 sectoral 
employment in Brazil from IBGE (1990) which represents the 1988 estimate; the
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Chilean 1990 sectoral employment from García (1992); Colombia’s 1990 sectoral 
employment was estimated on the basis o f Junguito (1990) and ECLAC (1992); 
the M exican 1990 sectoral employment data was from INEGI (1992); the 1990 
sectoral employment in Venezuela was from OCEI (1990).
Table C.6
The estimates for average years o f formal education o f the population between 15 
and 64 years were made on the basis o f the population censuses o f the countries. In 
many cases the information o f the census had to be adjusted which generally (for 
specifics see the country notes) has been done as follows: in the cases where the 
census presented only data o f the educational level o f 15 years and older, the 
information from previous censuses was used to estimate the cohort 65-75  and the 
census was adjusted with this information. If information within the 50 -6 4  group 
was insufficient we tried to apply the same procedures. W e adjusted for differences 
in the number o f years particulary in primary and secondary education. The first 
six years were considered primary education and the second six years secondary 
education. If, for example, Argentina has seven years o f primary education and 
five years o f secondary, then we considered the seventh year o f primary as the first 
year o f secondary and so on.
In case the census was not available from national sources, the World Bank 
database on capital stock, which was kindly provided to us by the World Bank, or 
the estimates o f Maddison (1989) were used as indicated in the country source 
notes. In Table C.9 o f this appendix, the Maddison (1989) and the World Bank 
data with respect to formal years o f education are presented. In the case o f the 
World Bank data the extremely low (in comparison with Maddison’s (1989) and 
my data) level o f secondary education draws the attention. This becom es extreme, 
for example, in the case o f Argentina, where formal educational experience in 
higher education exceeds the experience in secondary education, implying that 
Argentina’s brilliant youngsters jump directly from primary to higher education.
Argentina’s 1950 estimate was obtained from Maddison (1989) using as the 
linkage year 1980, for which we had estimates in common. Total years of 
education in 1990 was estimated by using the World Bank database 1980-87  
growth rate. The disaggregation o f years o f education was obtained on the basis o f 
retropolation, in the case o f 1950, or extrapolation, in 1990 o f the available 
distribution. Brazil’s 1950-70 estimates are based upon Langoni (1974). The 1990 
estimate was based upon the 1980 population census, containing the educational 
level o f the population aged 25 -64  and IBGE (1992) which contained information 
about educational level o f the population aged 15-24.
The estimates for Chile in 1950,1980 and 1990 were based on intrapolation of 
the census information o f 1952, 1982 and 1992. In 1952 the group with special 
education was distributed over secondary and higher education and not, as in the
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case o f Maddison (1989), completely to higher education. The level o f education 
from 1962 onwards was given for total population over 15. In order to obtain 
population figures for the age group 15-64 previous population censuses were 
used to subtract the educational level o f the cohort over 64. The Colombian 
estimates for 1950-80 were based on intrapolation o f the census information o f 
1951, 1964, 1973 and 1985. Special adjustments were made using cohorts o f 
previous population censuses to estimate the educational level o f the 6 0 -6 4  age 
group. For 1990 the 1980-87 growth rate o f the World Bank database was used. 
The 1950 estimate for M exico was obtained from Maddison (1989) using as the 
linkage year 1980 for which we had estimates in common. For 1960-80 an 
adjustment was made, using cohorts from other censuses to estimate the 
educational level over 65, to obtain the educational level 15-64. In the case o f 
Venezuela for 1960-80 the estimates for 1961,1971 and 1981 were retropolated. 
The distribution with respect to educational level for 1971 was obtained through 
cohort analysis o f the available censuses. For 1990 the 1980-87 growth rate o f the 
World Bank database was used.
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Table C .l Latin America: Total Female and Male Activity Rates, Six Countries, 
1950-94 (economic active population divided by total population)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
Total
1950 40.91 33.30 37.64 32.54 32.02 32.92
1960 39.09 32.13 32.57 29.51 29.15 31.19
1970 38.89 31.56 30.47 29.11 27.94 28.49
1973 38.11 32.92 30.80 30.23 28.59 29.67
1980 36.34 36.33 31.57 33.04 30.19 32.61
1989 36.79 37.13 32.96 34.13 30.37 33.29
1990 37.83 39.08 36.43 36.81 30.82 34.93
1994 38.45 40.24 38.58 38.43 31.08 35.91
Female
1950 16.33 10.04 17.91 10.31 8.30 10.39
1960 15.87 11.18 14.18 9.90 10.28 8.25
1970 19.09 12.77 13.38 12.04 11.13 11.27
1973 19.08 14.46 13.90 12.95 11.42 12.70
1980 19.06 19.33 15.19 15.34 12.11 16.78
1989 19.57 20.39 16.80 16.41 12.73 17.76
1990 20.80 23.07 21.24 19.20 14.31 20.29
1994 21.54 24.76 24.29 21.00 15.30 21.89
Male
1950 64.10 56.54 57.77 55.07 55.77 54.88
1960 61.59 53.00 51.38 49.36 48.12 51.91
1970 58.56 50.30 48.02 46.36 44.73 45.28
1973 57.17 51.20 48.13 47.69 45.78 46.10
1980 54.07 53.34 48.39 50.95 48.32 48.05
1989 54.49 53.88 49.44 52.04 48.09 48.43
1990 55.47 55.14 51.98 54.68 47.55 49.33
1994 56.04 55.88 53.49 56.25 47.24 49.86
Source: Hie values for 1973 and 1989 are intrapolations. 1994 was extrapolated using the 1980-90 
growth rate.
Table C.2 Latin American Employment, Six Countries, 1913-94 (thousand 
persons engaged at mid-year)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1913 3,201 11,302 1,323 2,099 5,521 529
1950 6,821 17,657 2,256 3,844 8,766 1,571
1960 7,849 23,138 2,354 4,516 10,600 2,066
1970 9,132 29,643 2,729 5,968 13,599 2,902
1973 9,402 33,164 2,894 6,616 15,180 3,338
1980 10,065 43,091 3,318 8,413 19,622 4,626
1989 11,731 54,646 4,303 10,487 24,318 5,722
1990 11,932 56,108 4,429 10,747 24,905 5,859
1994 12,483 59,908 4,954 11,670 28,018 6,724
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Table C.3 Latin America: Annual Hours per  Person Employed, Six Countries, 
1950-94
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1950 2,034 2,042 2,212 2,323 2,154 2,179
1960 2,073 2,134 2,031 2,218 2,150 2,024
1970 2,006 2,145 1,962 2,170 2,066 1,951
1973 1,996 2,096 1,955 2,141 2,061 1,965
1980 1,974 1,985 1,938 2,074 2,051 1,997
1989 1,862 1,889 1,979 1,979 2,059 1,900
1990 1,850 1,879 1,984 1,969 2,060 1,889
1994 1,875 1,860 2,002 1,975 2,032 1,910
Table C.4 Latin America: Total Hours Worked, Six Countries, 1950-94 (billion)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1950 13,871 36,053 4,991 8,930 18,878 3,423
1960 16,271 49,367 4,781 10,017 22,785 4,181
1970 18,322 63,571 5,354 12,950 28,090 5,662
1973 18,766 69,512 5,658 14,165 31,286 6,559
1980 19,868 85,517 6,432 17,445 40,239 9,238
1989 21,843 103,226 8,516 20,754 50,071 10,872
1990 22,068 105,428 8,788 21,159 51,295 11,069
1994 23,406 111,429 9,918 23,049 56,943 12,842
Source: Appendix Tables C.2 and C.3
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Table C.5 Latin America: Sectoral Employment, Six Countries, 1950-94  
(thousand persons employed at mid-year)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
Agriculture
1950 1,723 10,606 722 2,164 5,338 710
1960 1,589 12,687 705 2,317 5,247 728
1970 1,483 13,437 636 2,477 5,684 747
1973 1,429 14,199 626 2,577 6,032 782
1980 1,333 13,078 540 2,524 7,221 731
1989 1,464 13,527 709 3,004 6,076 780
1990 1,480 13,578 731 3,063 5,960 786
1994 1,508 13,243 822 3,258 5,645 845
Industry
1950 2,141 3,116 684 700 1,464 315
1960 2,807 4,146 704 867 2,258 457
1970 3,130 6,619 920 1,301 3,549 716
1973 3,182 7,911 1,011 1,498 4,211 851
1980 3,654 12,596 984 2,204 5,239 1,341
1989 3,033 13,226 1,031 2,501 6,542 1,364
1990 2,971 13,298 1,036 2,536 6,705 1,367
1994 2,673 13,056 1,054 2,642 7,568 1,438
Services
1950 2,957 3,935 850 980 1,963 546
1960 3,453 6,304 945 1,332 3,095 881
1970 4,519 9,587 1,173 2,190 4,365 1,439
1973 4,791 11,055 1,257 2,541 4,937 1,705
1980 5,078 17,417 1,794 3,685 7,162 2,554
1989 7,233 27,893 2,563 4,982 11,701 3,578
1990 7,481 29,232 2,662 5,148 12,240 3,706
1994 8,302 33,610 3,078 5,770 14,804 4,441
Total
1950 6,821 17,657 2,256 3,844 8,765 1,571
1960 7,849 23,137 2,354 4,516 10,600 2,066
1970 9,132 29,643 2,729 5,968 13,598 2,902
1973 9,402 33,165 2,894 6,616 15,180 3,338
1980 10,065 43,091 3,318 8,413 19,622 4,626
1989 11,730 54,646 4,303 10,487 24,319 5,722
1990 11,932 56,108 4,429 10,747 24,905 5,859
1994 12,483 59,909 4,954 11,670 28,017 6,724
180 The Economic Development of Latin America
Table C.6 Latin America: Average Years o f  Formal Education o f  Population 
Aged 15-64, Six Countries, 1950-94
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venez
Total
1950 4.72 1.83 4.46 2.45 2.07 1.93
1960 5.09 2.09 5.16 3.05 2.66 2.38
1970 6.41 2.92 6.13 4.05 3.51 3.51
1973 6.87 3.23 6.45 4.40 3.81 3.94
1980 7.41 4.22 7.34 5.07 5.72 5.51
1989 8.37 5.25 8.65 6.90 6.77 7.75
1990 8.49 5.38 8.82 7.15 6.91 8.06
1994 8.97 5.93 9.48 8.20 7.45 9.39
Primary
1950 3.86 1.53 3.65 2.04 1.88 1.74
1960 4.00 1.73 4.00 2.37 2.33 2.10
1970 4.69 2.23 4.42 2.98 2.93 2.84
1973 4.92 2.41 4.55 3.19 3.14 3.11
1980 4.97 3.22 4.91 3.45 4.17 4.11
1989 5.09 3.87 5.30 4.29 4.60 5.23
1990 5.10 3.95 5.35 4.39 4.65 5.37
1994 5.15 4.29 5.54 4.83 4.86 5.98
Secondary
1950 0.77 0.25 0.70 0.34 0.16 0.16
1960 0.96 0.30 1.03 0.54 0.29 0.23
1970 1.49 0.58 1.43 0.92 0.49 0.59
1973 1.68 0.69 1.55 1.06 0.56 0.74
1980 2.04 0.88 2.12 1.40 1.32 1.20
1989 2.65 1.23 2.93 2.27 1.83 2.16
1990 2.73 1.28 3.04 2.40 1.90 2.30
1994 3.01 1.48 3.45 2.93 2.16 2.90
Higher
1950 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.03
1960 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.05
1970 0.23 0.11 0.28 0.15 0.09 0.08
1973 0.27 0.13 0.35 0.15 0.11 0.09
1980 0.40 0.12 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.20
1989 0.63 0.15 0.42 0.34 0.34 0.36
1990 0.66 0.15 0.43 0.36 0.36 0.39
1994 0.81 0.16 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.51
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Table C. 7 Latin American Labour Productivity, GDP per Person Employed, Six 
Countries, 1950-94 (in 1980 international dollars)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1950 8,519 3,062 5,875 4,013 5,777 8,050
1960 7,986 4,487 7,926 5,378 8,428 12,716
1970 11,203 5,974 10,346 6,699 12,946 16,196
1973 12,224 7,585 10,292 7,358 14,208 15,924
1980 14,084 9,486 10,924 8,126 17,001 15,222
1989 11,428 7,162 10,940 8,742 15,616 12,300
1990 10,625 8,510 10,976 8,895 16,021 12,790
1994 14,272 8,758 12,947 9,695 16,373 12,496
Source: Appendix Tables B.3 and C.2.
Table C.8 Latin American Labour Productivity, GDP per Hour Worked, Six 
Countries, 1950-94 (in 1980 international dollars)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1950 3.37 1.50 2.66 1.73 2.68 3.69
1960 3.85 2.10 3.90 2.42 3.92 6.28
1970 5.58 2.79 5.27 3.09 6.27 8.30
1973 6.12 3.62 5.26 3.44 6.89 8.10
1980 7.13 4.78 5.64 3.92 8.29 7.62
1989 5.88 4.84 5.53 4.42 7.58 6.47
1990 5.74 4.53 5.53 4.52 7.78 6.77
1994 7.61 4.71 6.47 4.91 8.06 6.54
Source: Appendix Tables B.3 and C.3.
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Table C.9 Latin America: Average Years o f  Formal Educational Experience o f  
Population Aged 15-64  in 1950 and 1980, Five Countries
Total Primary Secondary Higher
Argentina
1950 4.60 4.15 0.42 0.03
1980 7.21 5.00 1.74 0.47
Brazil
1950 1.83 1.36 0.42 0.05
1980 3.94 2.52 1.31 0.11
Chile
1950 4.88 3.59 1.16 0.13
1980 7.57 4.38 2.77 0.42
Colombia
1950 3.61 2.95 0.56 0.10
1980 6.66 3.47 2.77 0.42
Mexico
1950 2.30 1.61 0.65 0.04
1980 4.94 2.87 1.95 0.12
Source: Maddison (1989).
Appendix D. Total and Disaggregated Gross 
Investment, 1900-1994
Estimates for total and disaggregated capital formation are the essential building 
blocks for the construction o f capital stock estimates using the ‘perpetual inventory 
method’. Tables D .l to D .8 present total and disaggregated gross fixed investment 
for the 1900-1994 period, in national currencies as w ell as a percentage o f GDP. 
For all countries a detailed description is given o f the sources used for the 
construction o f the series which consist o f total capital formation, capital formation 
in machinery and equipment and capital formation in residential and non- 
residential structures. For 1950 onwards, if not otherwise specified, the series used 
for Latin America are derived from currently collected official estimates by 
ECLAC corresponding to the most recent revision o f the United Nations System o f 
National Accounts (SNA).
These official estimates since 1950 apply especially to GDP and in many cases 
total capital formation estimates. In the case o f disaggregated capital formation the 
official series in Latin America often only start in the 1970s and for residential 
capital formation sometimes no official estimates were available. As already 
indicated in Appendix B , for years before 1950, the estimates have nearly all been 
made retrospectively and the underlying data are less complete. Nevertheless, most 
of the historical estimates are based upon substantial statistical research by 
distinguished scholars. But the estimates for the first half o f the twentieth century 
are obviously not as comparable as those for 1950 onwards, and in some cases 
may well be substantially revised when further research is done. This applies 
especially for the data before 1925 in the case o f disaggregated capital formation.
SOURCES
Argentina1
The source for 1900-1950 including GDP, total fixed capital formation and fixed 
capital formation in machinery and equipment is Banco Central de la Republica 
Argentina (1976). Fixed capital formation in residential structures for 1900-1955  
is from ECLAC (1958). For 1955-70 fixed capital formation was estimated at 46
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per cent o f fixed capital formation in non-residential structures, which is the 
average residential/non-residential structures ratio for 1955 and 1970. From 
1970-94, ECLAC estimates based upon official statistics were used, taking into 
account the following considerations. In 1987 the Central Bank o f Argentina, in 
cooperation with the Buenos Aires office o f ECLAC, initiated a project regarding 
the revision o f the national accounts, income distribution and input-output matrix. 
The final report2 presented an extensive description o f the methodology applied in 
the elaboration o f the new series. The results were the updating o f the current and 
constant series, by sector and expenditure, an estimation o f factor shares3 and a 
base year change from 1970 to 1986. The increase in the GDP level o f 43.2 per 
cent occurred mainly in the manufacturing and construction sector, and 
expenditure-wise in fixed capital formation in private construction (114 per cent) 
and machinery and equipment (64 per cent). Much o f the increase was due to 
improved statistical sources, for example, industrial and household surveys, and 
better coverage o f the informal sector. Afterwards, the Banco Central de la 
República de Argentina (1993) published new series, based upon the 1991 
revision, but once again revised. Expenditure-wise capital formation grew less than 
in the former revision.
Several problems had to be addressed in order to be able to include these new  
estimates in our series. Backwards, the revision influenced both the level and the 
growth o f the long-run series. From 1980 onwards only gross total capital 
formation was presented, so estimates had to be made for fixed capital formation. 
A s it was not reasonable to include all the difference in 1980 I decided, after 
extensive consultations with Argentine national accounts experts, who had 
participated in the latest revision and some in previous ones, to distribute half o f  
the increase in GDP and fixed capital formation as a level adjustment for the 
1900-1980 period and to treat the other half o f the increase as a linear 
augmentation o f the growth rate over the 1961-80 period. The basic argument for 
this distribution was that the national accounts before 1961 were considered rather 
reliable and it did not seem  reasonable to increase the level o f Argentina’s GDP for 
the whole period by the whole o f the 35 per cent. For 1980-94 we used the revised 
GDP estimates.
In order to be able to reach the needed level o f disaggregation in capital 
formation, available in the 1991 revision, but not in the April 1993 revision, the 
following procedure was applied. The new (1993) revision contained a major 
change in methodology with respect to the estimation o f capital formation in 
residential construction. I used therefore the unchanged 1991 estimates for 
machinery and equipment. A lso public capital formation was unchanged, assumed 
to be non-residential, so I had to disaggregate private capital formation in 
residential and non-residential capital formation. A  level increase o f private non- 
residential capital formation o f 50 per cent was assumed. This resulted in level 
increase o f 64 per cent in machinery and equipment, 85 per cent in residential and
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22 per cent in non-residential capital formation. H alf o f this level increase was 
applied to increase the level o f the 1900-1980 series and the remainder half 
consisted o f a linear augmentation o f the growth rate over the 1961-80 period. For 
the 1980-94 period capital formation was disaggregated using these growth rates. 
Comparing the results o f disaggregated fixed capital formation series with total 
capital formation o f the new 1993 series and the stock variations estimate available 
from the old series leads to an upward adjustment o f 10 per cent o f the components 
o f capital formation and the resulting increase in stocks distribution fitted rather 
well with the older series, as w ell as with fluctuations o f the economy.
Brazil
Total capital formation for 1900-1925 is calculated as the sum o f capital 
formation in machinery and equipment and capital formation in residential and 
non-residential construction. For 1925-50 ECLAC (1951) was used to calculate a 
capital coefficient as the ratio o f capital goods and the sum o f agricultural and 
industrial production with an adjustment for differences in base year. The figures 
for capital formation in machinery and equipment for 1900-1925 are from V illela 
and Suzigan (1977), table 133, p. 363 using a quantum index o f industrial capital 
goods imports, for 1925-49 from ECLAC (1951), using index o f imports o f other 
capital goods; and for 1949-69 from Langoni (1974), based upon an unpublished 
study o f the Getulio Vargas Foundation (1970). The figures for capital formation 
in non-residential structures for 1900-1925 are based upon V illela and Suzigan 
(1977, p. 359), using a combined quantum index o f domestic cement consumption 
and domestic rolled-steel consumption. The figures for capital formation in 
residential structures for 1900-1920 are from V illela and Suzigan (1977, p. 359), 
using a quantum index o f domestic cement consumption and 1920-85 was based 
upon IBGE, Brasil, Censo Demografico, 1920, 1940, 1950, 1970, 1980. For the 
1985 data the national household survey o f IBGE was used. On the basis o f the 
census and household survey information a stock o f housing was estimated. Gross 
investment was calculated on the basis o f the yearly increase o f the housing stock 
plus the depreciation. With these data an index o f investment in residential 
structures was calculated with base year 1974. For 1974, Borges and Vasconcellos 
(1974), estimated capital formation in residential structures at 20 per cent o f total 
capital formation. For 1985-92 capital formation in residential structures was 
estimated as 39 per cent o f capital formation in non-residential structures.
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Chile
Total capital formation for 1900-1904 and 1916-19 was estimated at three times 
capital formation in machinery and equipment, and for 1905-15 it was estimated 
at two times capital formation in machinery and equipment. Total capital formation 
for 1920-22 was estimated at 9 per cent o f GDP and for 1923-24 at 14 per cent o f 
GDP, for 1925-40 ECLAC (1951) (adjusted for 1925-31 to 2/3) and for 1940-50  
ECLAC (1972). Capital formation in machinery and equipment for 1900-1940, 
using a quantum index o f imports o f capital goods from ECLAC (1951) (adjusting 
the 1900-1931 level by 2/3 to avoid extremely high estimates caused by linking 
problems) and for 1940-50, CORFO (1963). Capital formation in residential 
structures for 1920-25 was estimated applying the index o f total capital formation 
and for 1925-28 using the 1928 ratio o f capital formation in residential structures 
to total capital formation. For 1928-40 ECLAC (1951) was used; for 1940-54  
CORFO (1957); for 1954-60, CORFO (1963); for 1960-75 ODEPLAN (1976). 
For 1974-82, ECLAC was used, based upon official estimates and for 1982-92  
Banco Central de Chile, Boletín Mensual, various issues. In the case o f Chile a 
revision o f the national accounts for the base year 1986 took place in the early 
1990s. The most important results are an increase o f capital formation in 
machinery and equipment and non-residential construction.
Colombia
Total GDP for 1900-1925 is from Maddison (1989) using his benchmarks for 
1900, 1913 and 1929, and interpolating the years in between, and for 1925-50  
from ECLAC (1972). Total capital formation for 1900-1909 was estimated 
constant at 10 per cent o f GDP, for 1910-24 at 18 per cent o f GDP based upon the 
périodisation and description o f M cGreevey (1985), and for 1925-50 from 
ECLAC (1972). Capital formation in machinery and equipment for 1900-1925  
was estimated at 33 per cent o f total capital formation and for 1925-50 from 
ECLAC (1957). Capital formation in residential structures from 1900-1925 was 
estimated at 25 per cent o f capital formation in non-residential structures and for 
1925-50 from ECLAC (1957). For 1950-70, it was estimated at 28 per cent o f 
capital formation in non-residential structures.
Mexico
Total capital formation for 1900-1910 and for 1920-25 was estimated at 10 per 
cent o f GDP. For the period 1911-20 we have assumed that no capital formation 
occurred, that is, capital formation in this period was offset by war destruction 
caused by the M exican Revolution. For total capital formation from 1925-39, 
ECLAC (1951) was used to calculate a capital coefficient as the ratio total o f
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available capital goods (see table 6, p. 414) and national production (table 3A, p. 
404) and for 1939-60 from Banco de M exico (1986a). Capital formation in 
machinery and equipment for 1920-25 was calculated applying the ratio o f 1925 
and for 1925-39 using ECLAC (1951), based upon imports o f other capital goods 
(see table 6, p. 414). The figures for 1939-50 were from the W orld Bank (1953), 
and for 1950-60 from Banco de M exico (1969). Capital formation in non- 
residential structures for 1900-1929 were assumed to move as total capital 
formation, the figures for 1929-70 are from INEGI (1985) using an index o f the 
total housing stock adjusted for the changing weight o f brick houses in total 
housing stock.
Venezuela
Capital formation estimates were based upon Baptista (1991) which is the most 
complete statistical historical source available on Venezuela’s quantitative 
economic history. Total capital formation was estimated as follows: 1900-1909 at 
10 per cent o f GDP, with 3.1 per cent in residential and non-residential structures 
each, and 3.7 per cent in machinery and equipment; 1910-19 at 15 per cent o f 
GDP, with 4.7 per cent in residential and non-residential construction and 5.6 per 
cent in machinery and equipment on the basis o f the growth figures o f Baptista 
(1991) and the description o f Venezuela’s economic development in Quero 
Morales (1978) and Brito Figueroa (1966) which both indicate that the period 
1900-1909 was one o f stagnation and that during 1910—19 foreign investment 
increased especially in the oil sector (63 per cent o f total capital formation in 
industry came from foreign investment, see Brito Figueroa, 1966, p. 398). Total 
and disaggregated capital formation from 1920-50 is based upon Baptista (1991, 
Cuadro IV-1, p. 149). For 1950-76, the figures are from Banco Central de 
Venezuela (1978, p. 177).
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Table D. 1 Latin America: Gross Total Fixed Investment, Six Countries, 



















1900 318,869 26,187 12,880 4,706 18,907 255
1901 331,235 26,185 15,224 4,903 20,548 251
1902 327,113 18,491 19,371 5,109 19,082 273
1903 358,362 21,147 19,886 5,324 21,220 295
1904 518,461 23,728 25,760 5,547 21,593 288
1905 801,693 33,675 22,583 5,780 23,836 285
1906 958,601 37,901 36,544 6,022 23,567 266
1907 1,183,723 52,330 41,576 6,275 24,950 265
1908 1,009,662 52,898 43,929 6,539 24,912 284
1909 1,137,848 54,392 29,332 6,813 25,644 294
1910 1,360,311 65,337 27,769 12,778 25,872 455
1911 1,339,833 80,830 44,753 13,314 0 487
1912 1,092,371 107,437 44,186 13,873 0 503
1913 1,107,796 91,538 42,950 14,455 0 581
1914 686,538 39,161 31,976 15,013 0 508
1915 412,216 19,847 14,769 15493 0 524
1916 364,744 23,348 27,331 16,195 0 494
1917 275,652 20,654 36,965 16,820 0 577
1918 278,046 19,235 26,687 17,469 0 573
1919 325,118 40,112 27,846 18,143 0 536
1920 603,297 61,349 15,403 18,843 27,667 553
1921 697,841 60,666 13,252 19,571 27,854 706
1922 819,245 53,935 14,182 20,326 28,503 645
1923 1,131,731 64,229 26,461 21,111 29,482 888
1924 1,214,307 86,677 28,858 21,926 29,000 1,451
1925 1,222,817 110,147 43,810 23,957 36,952 2,620
1926 1,206,063 93,486 63,010 29,896 31,850 3,682
1927 1,385,310 91,396 42,999 36,085 28,639 3,570
1928 1,646,336 97,380 44,503 42,773 29,346 3,158
1929 1,883,426 113,489 63,470 36,933 32488 4,061
1930 1,585,833 61,082 64,990 24,057 26,336 3,428
1931 970,568 26,399 31,335 19,814 18,058 1,816
1932 680,687 27,067 16,017 23,408 11,060 1,258
1933 760,471 44,302 19,449 22,909 16482 2,076
1934 1,007,667 57,348 25,421 23,358 22,414 2,198
1935 991,977 71,106 37,297 26,702 27,697 1,927
1936 1,042,506 78,640 41,416 29,397 28,779 3,067
1937 1,398,474 105,919 46,559 34,138 38,538 3,993
1938 1,540,090 100,927 52,197 34,887 20,890 4,922
1939 1,291,298 91,470 44,559 39,828 27,044 5,089
1940 1,132,795 76,386 50,943 38,281 35,308 4,125
1941 1,135,587 74,721 50,309 36,684 43,072 3,041
1942 1,062,053 52,594 39,951 32,242 37,318 2,677
1943 1,031,470 62,799 42,911 34,188 37,350 2,926
1944 1,185,585 92,065 48,195 37,233 46,994 5,010
1945 1,176,144 99,829 50,943 46,416 67,509 7,211
1946 1,463,631 98,654 70,602 54,851 89,993 9,795
Appendix D 189



















1947 2,323,034 235,526 77,578 66,181 101,421 12,845
1948 2,322,236 199,158 68,911 64,733 %,143 15,836
1949 1,950,311 241,019 78,846 49,411 87,604 16,373
1950 1,959,353 310,611 72,716 57,047 100,638 14,502
1951 2,410,316 380,546 82,651 56,636 127,610 15,422
1952 2,145,958 409,003 86,667 61,019 132,307 19,363
1953 2,120,041 345,337 87,513 82,566 127,545 21,260
1954 2,035,378 375,723 84,765 %,108 132,379 24,285
1955 2,361,937 354,019 98,082 101,582 149,319 22,926
1956 2,513,985 381,511 93,431 %,3% 173,320 24,854
1957 2,755,881 432,636 106,960 72,276 187,775 26,422
1958 3,002,960 458,199 105,269 68,716 176,758 26,1%
1959 2,377,487 517,524 90,683 73,840 179,131 26,951
1960 3,592,148 538,746 117,529 86,970 205,852 20,993
1961 4,188,247 566,238 119,040 94,358 207,555 17,856
1962 3,852,110 583,601 133,646 94,708 218,773 18,643
1963 3,297,120 567,202 153,375 87,135 243,945 19,136
1964 3,695,795 581,189 144,635 98,042 293,610 23,006
1965 3,898,929 566,238 135,895 92,588 315,182 24,694
1966 4,067,647 680,064 140,265 105,406 343,114 25,223
1967 4,312,835 692,604 143,266 114,666 390,132 26,067
1968 4,898,295 842,122 156,816 130,468 427,579 29,799
1969 5,937,388 1,019,131 164,727 142,819 459,119 32,078
1970 6,310,089 1,114,600 175,361 160,105 497,179 31,508
1971 6,891,500 1,285,600 171,294 167,885 488,666 35,347
1972 7,037,744 1,500,600 136,878 164,577 548,467 40,640
1973 6,595,551 1,815,500 128,630 178,890 629,341 44,455
1974 6,931,004 2,056,200 142,438 194,422 679,070 43,356
1975 7,015,7% 2,256,400 111,818 186,974 741,988 54,473
1976 7,825,806 2,414,900 95,517 204,759 745,319 69,984
1977 9,557,860 2,386,600 114,088 206,201 695,276 90,249
1978 8,419,729 2,500,000 133,672 225,476 800,774 93,843
1979 9,081,094 2,597,100 153,504 234,059 %2,921 75,034
1980 9,619,295 2,947,000 194,537 264,894 1,106,758 64,145
1981 8,197,575 2,589,000 230,491 281,500 1,286,376 66,070
1982 6,571,945 2,413,000 136,520 289,830 1,070,371 63,604
1983 6,595,427 2,019,000 113,958 293,252 767,667 46,850
1984 6,424,684 2,015,000 143,519 2%,899 817,006 38,012
1985 5,505,986 2,191,000 161,269 281,398 881,160 40,501
1986 6,135,219 2,687,000 165,168 302,900 777,198 44,087
1987 7,021,012 2,650,000 201,031 305,371 776,246 44,317
1988 6,706,316 2,519,000 229,482 338,568 821,117 48,247
1989 5,234,993 2,549,000 284,174 320,840 873,599 35,944
1990 4,714,846 2,269,000 289,322 310,111 988,265 33,789
1991 5,899,822 2,1% , 000 283,0% 290,%8 1,070,379 45,7%
1992 7,723,865 1,9%, 000 356,663 327,0% 1,186,485 58,263
1993 8,799,094 2,192,000 419,860 435,544 1,171,780 54,786
1994 10,400,469 2,466,000 434,451 493,906 1,267,019 40,870
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Table D.2 Latin America: Gross Fixed Investment in Machinery and Equipment, 



















1900 30,536 22,791 4,293 1,569 0 95
1901 25,938 22,783 5,075 1,634 0 93
1902 36,094 12,715 6,457 1,703 0 102
1903 48,925 15,242 6,629 1,775 0 110
1904 81,039 16,566 8,587 1,849 0 107
1905 86,803 24,989 11,291 1,927 0 106
1906 120,289 26,513 18,272 2,007 0 99
1907 129,553 37,303 20,788 2,092 0 99
1908 102,105 38,667 21,964 2,180 0 106
1909 119,123 41,274 14,666 2,271 0 109
1910 136,346 47,612 13,884 4,259 0 170
1911 138,611 61,610 22,376 4,438 0 181
1912 162,765 82,348 22,093 4,624 0 188
1913 176,489 61,209 21,475 4,818 0 217
1914 116,996 25,430 15,988 5,004 0 189
1915 87,627 10,108 7,384 5,198 0 195
1916 89,548 12,916 9,110 5,398 0 184
1917 71,021 12,836 12,322 5,606 0 215
1918 62,924 14,801 8,896 5,823 0 213
1919 83,647 25,912 9,282 6,048 0 200
1920 136,072 43,360 7,943 6,281 6,465 257
1921 151,099 50,460 9,376 6,524 6,509 301
1922 135,180 36,702 10,141 6,775 6,660 305
1923 196,114 47,892 13,275 7,037 6,889 399
1924 246,206 60,568 16,108 7,308 6,776 622
1925 288,887 83,912 15,834 8,520 8,635 982
1926 313,796 63,475 22,935 10,350 7,775 1,459
1927 315,854 58,394 15,310 14,375 7,138 1,355
1928 381,454 67,164 15,748 17,511 7,624 1,339
1929 421,116 84,058 22,574 13,904 7,999 1,594
1930 302,954 46,170 22,995 5,907 6,569 1,442
1931 201,397 16,603 10,871 3,189 4,327 767
1932 130,033 16,021 2,769 2,980 2,134 546
1933 144,855 24,695 2,718 4,025 2,855 808
1934 176,420 31,484 5,152 5,645 3,892 920
1935 226,855 46,974 9,943 5,698 5,043 931
1936 242,020 45,771 11,888 7,318 5,430 1,327
1937 348,242 64,646 12,880 9,775 6,557 1,918
1938 384,062 66,708 14,219 10,350 3,772 2,273
1939 279,692 49,694 11,515 10,820 4,774 2,502
1940 248,539 34,047 13,292 8,207 5,857 2,159
1941 229,874 36,742 12,837 7,684 7,198 1,620
1942 185,752 23,569 10,427 2,875 4,051 1,243
1943 158,991 29,846 10,722 2,718 4,314 1,073
1944 160,432 45,676 9,333 4,652 6,429 2,040
1945 164,274 50,219 11,042 11,604 13,799 3,231






















1947 706,091 135,416 23,510 26,084 19,442 6,610
1948 575,509 115,934 21,727 20,857 19,376 8,543
1949 343,096 137,460 25,772 17,041 16,686 7,900
1950 324,912 151,929 23,731 22,582 18,097 6,619
1951 500,381 216,559 28,404 24,914 23,958 5,319
1952 436,574 212,701 29,510 26,769 23,153 8,538
1953 413,066 123,955 26,436 40,712 24,964 9,698
1954 392,077 164,469 23,362 44,670 24,293 11,451
1955 528,087 137,460 29,264 47,002 28,104 9,964
1956 591,894 147,106 34,183 42,388 31,765 9,573
1957 646,465 180,868 45,495 23,698 35,128 11,496
1958 662,417 182,797 45,618 22,779 32,136 11,767
1959 533,124 220,418 31,847 22,631 33,545 12,832
1960 1,012,516 211,254 40,085 34,488 36,919 8,327
1961 1,268,583 219,936 48,663 36,853 82,823 7,559
1962 1,176,214 228,135 46,142 34,981 87,299 8,819
1963 945,815 224,759 40,552 32,534 97,344 8,422
1964 1,086,203 227,170 44,323 39,152 117,162 9,588
1965 1,154,111 215,595 38,676 34,603 125,771 9,753
1966 1,186,988 286,013 47,868 41,186 136,917 9,768
1967 1,231,262 279,260 49,971 36,872 155,679 9,211
1968 1,364,647 345,337 57,137 44,487 170,622 10,361
1969 1,646,348 419,614 56,165 49,613 183,207 11,789
1970 1,735,159 463,500 59,310 63,371 198,395 11,409
1971 1,923,174 553,100 53,699 70,195 194,684 13,187
1972 2,062,034 637,000 41,246 69,333 219,624 15,054
1973 2,047,341 771,400 46,019 68,846 256,874 16,758
1974 2,052,797 917,100 43,211 76,039 284,541 17,360
1975 1,945,225 1,025,000 43,908 75,803 317,039 23,342
1976 2,068,574 1,058,300 38,572 87,087 305,320 30,359
1977 2,941,236 959,000 53,283 83,915 268,912 41,256
1978 2,276,889 983,800 64,994 98,764 317,253 41,296
1979 2,737,406 1,024,600 74,369 108,925 412,392 29,022
1980 3,096,194 1,120,700 90,001 121,830 485,720 25,918
1981 3,367,910 874,000 104,663 127,728 579,675 28,749
1982 2,403,583 739,100 56,844 130,322 409,180 29,043
1983 2,701,008 587,000 38,991 127,494 255,205 19,018
1984 2,898,643 600,000 44,901 124,717 284,491 18,187
1985 2,390,729 692,000 51,859 102,791 329,424 22,360
1986 2,713,125 920,000 50,095 113,742 280,329 24,977
1987 3,111,747 870,000 68,508 133,176 269,902 24,617
1988 2,902,700 794,000 82,679 144,646 321,096 27,418
1989 2,385,729 772,000 108,575 142,875 357,709 20,245
1990 2,220,375 665,000 108,706 146,864 434,832 15,086
1991 2,313,505 646,000 101,549 129,709 499,674 21,565
1992 3,028,884 549,000 141,891 153,420 574,165 26,895
1993 3,450,630 674,000 172,223 204,286 540,104 23,347
1994 4,078,701 876,200 180,663 231,660 584,002 17,417
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Table D.3 Latin America: Gross Fixed Investment in Residential Structures, Six 



















1900 247,063 1,459 2,582 784 1,891 80
1901 245,226 1,460 4,364 817 2,055 79
1902 225,012 2,301 5,553 852 1,908 86
1903 218,478 2,497 5,701 887 2,122 93
1904 238,284 3,678 7,384 925 2,159 90
1905 384,480 5,071 4,855 963 2,384 89
1906 485,143 7,055 7,857 1,004 2,357 83
1907 694,024 7,016 8,939 1,046 2,495 83
1908 677,485 7,744 9,445 1,090 2,491 89
1909 672,380 7,897 6,306 1,136 2,564 92
1910 856,351 10,339 5,970 2,130 2,587 143
1911 849,612 10,515 9,622 2,219 0 153
1912 652,574 14,361 9,500 2,312 0 158
1913 654,004 18,208 9,234 2,409 0 182
1914 287,900 7,075 6,875 2,502 0 159
1915 147,626 5,670 3,175 2,599 0 164
1916 124,144 6,645 7,835 2,699 0 155
1917 98,009 3,858 10,597 2,803 0 181
1918 120,877 2,023 7,650 2,911 0 180
1919 142,113 7,764 7,983 3,024 0 168
1920 306,277 6,770 3,208 3,141 2,949 144
1921 352,219 6,140 1,667 3,262 2,248 152
1922 469,216 12,507 1,738 3,388 2,648 153
1923 706,479 8,742 5,670 3,518 2,761 173
1924 677,893 12,413 5,482 3,654 3,137 187
1925 621,334 16,460 12,021 2,304 2,990 219
1926 517,404 17,937 17,289 3,213 2,898 245
1927 576,822 19,224 11,798 4,142 3,377 273
1928 676,668 18,971 12,211 5,531 3,086 329
1929 845,325 19,283 13,680 6,078 2,994 363
1930 752,829 10,000 10,603 4,311 3,276 389
1931 506,378 6,000 4,700 3,930 3,586 325
1932 356,915 7,000 6,057 4,924 3,924 324
1933 341,805 14,000 7,894 6,205 4,295 335
1934 442,877 21,350 14,145 5,574 4,701 361
1935 338,538 21,579 15,135 6,380 5,145 403
1936 293,413 24,677 13,073 6,667 5,630 402
1937 402,652 27,720 15,645 8,311 6,162 458
1938 434,301 26,615 14,339 8,118 6,744 482
1939 456,761 29,505 18,247 10,526 7,900 516
1940 410,615 30,543 20,819 10,450 6,874 516
1941 490,452 27,678 20,598 9,673 7,579 520
1942 541,702 25,944 18,137 10,008 8,356 453
1943 574,576 27,725 22,110 10,634 9,212 486
1944 646,244 32,109 25,391 9,763 10,156 578
1945 636,239 33,757 19,748 9,984 11,197 684






















1947 737,515 49,076 27,145 12,915 13,610 937
1948 811,838 45,375 25,065 14,568 15,005 1,021
1949 799,996 51,788 24,013 12,754 16,543 1,072
1950 908,213 67,656 26,099 13,786 18,238 1,164
1951 917,606 75,056 25,360 12,689 18,765 2,499
1952 908,213 85,378 26,118 13,700 20,535 2,844
1953 838,382 93,821 30,735 16,741 22,472 3,952
1954 883,711 92,815 34,339 20,575 24,592 3,225
1955 958,647 96,078 39,318 21,832 26,911 3,246
1956 1,005,567 102,830 25,868 21,603 29,449 4,045
1957 1,103,504 109,549 19,982 19,431 32,227 3,473
1958 1,223,282 118,070 18,629 18,375 35,266 5,003
1959 964,184 126,177 25,627 20,484 38,592 2,927
1960 1,354,067 136,749 32,577 20,993 42,232 2,818
1961 1,535,081 144,307 27,637 17,252 48,764 2,231
1962 1,413,104 149,380 38,058 17,918 53,670 3,122
1963 1,244,965 148,578 45,469 16,380 59,070 3,462
1964 1,388,293 154,576 37,209 17,667 65,014 4,539
1965 1,466,593 156,673 39,525 17,396 71,555 5,384
1966 1,545,005 171,591 40,760 19,266 78,755 5,755
1967 1,658,669 180,143 38,444 23,338 86,680 5,585
1968 1,908,657 206,233 44,157 25,794 95,401 5,961
1969 2,327,030 237,727 50,101 27,962 105,000 5,946
1970 2,692,252 255,560 49,020 29,921 115,565 6419
1971 2,685,340 285,914 56,740 29,120 142,727 7,940
1972 2,560,080 326,220 47,554 26,229 148,696 9,495
1973 2,419,476 380,166 39,448 34,477 152,304 10,633
1974 2,740,898 411,240 45,006 34,117 149,498 9,839
1975 3,479,417 441,877 33,752 29,369 175,814 10,814
1976 3,355,967 481,732 27,229 31,344 194,237 13,032
1977 3,012,400 507,238 27,498 35,083 186,692 14,332
1978 3,054,126 537,855 23,545 40,724 173,841 15,600
1979 3,361,661 560,090 32,061 36,469 190,016 16,655
1980 3,472,979 636,185 45,414 35,695 198,510 15,243
1981 3,047,975 613,828 43,103 37,981 214,240 12482
1982 2,580,584 610,906 27,705 39,328 217,557 9,090
1983 2,383,802 554,065 22,662 47,064 204,734 6,748
1984 2,452,109 558,594 22,246 47,405 215,051 4,983
1985 2,242,132 590,972 29,813 49,129 232,479 4,591
1986 2,469,233 689,130 35,410 52,712 228,704 4,664
1987 2,827,810 694,200 40,236 57,066 238,828 4,665
1988 2,757,813 672,750 47,921 55,273 235,924 4,390
1989 2,071,202 693,030 58,088 55,273 262,825 3,465
1990 1,817,076 625,560 58,907 51,299 319,491 2,234
1991 2,618,598 604,500 66,032 60,319 367,133 2,422
1992 3,436,159 564,330 79,462 71,182 421,865 3,225
1993 3,923,568 592,020 93,541 94,782 396,839 3,159
1994 4,648,330 620,022 96,792 107,482 429,093 2,357
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Table D.4 Latin America: Gross Fixed Investment in Non-Residential Structures, 



















1900 41,270 1,938 6,005 2,353 0 80
1901 60,071 1,942 5,785 2,452 0 79
1902 66,008 3,475 7,361 2,555 0 86
1903 90,958 3,408 7,557 2,662 0 93
1904 199,138 3,484 9,789 2,774 0 90
1905 330,410 3,615 6,436 2,890 0 89
1906 353,168 4,333 10,415 3,011 0 83
1907 360,147 8,010 11,849 3,138 0 83
1908 230,072 6,487 12,520 3,269 0 89
1909 346,345 5,221 8,359 3,407 0 92
1910 367,614 7,386 7,914 6,389 0 143
1911 351,610 8,705 12,755 6,657 0 153
1912 277,032 10,728 12,593 6,937 0 158
1913 277,304 12,121 12,241 7,228 0 182
1914 281,642 6,655 9,113 7,507 0 159
1915 176,963 4,069 4,209 7,796 0 164
1916 151,052 3,787 10,386 8,097 0 155
1917 106,623 3,960 14,047 8,410 0 181
1918 94,245 2,411 10,141 8,734 0 180
1919 99,359 6,436 10,582 9,072 0 168
1920 160,948 11,219 4,252 9,422 18,253 151
1921 194,523 4,067 2,209 9,785 19,097 254
1922 214,849 4,727 2,304 10,163 19,194 187
1923 229,138 7,594 7,516 10,555 19,832 316
1924 290,208 13,697 7,267 10,963 19,086 642
1925 312,597 9,775 15,956 13,132 25,328 1,420
1926 374,863 12,073 22,786 16,333 21,177 1,979
1927 492,634 13,777 15,891 17,569 18,124 1,942
1928 588,213 11,246 16,545 19,730 18,636 1,491
1929 616,985 10,148 27,216 16,951 21,596 2,104
1930 530,050 4,911 31,391 13,839 16,491 1,597
1931 262,793 3,796 15,765 12,696 10,144 723
1932 193,739 4,046 7,191 15,505 5,002 388
1933 273,811 5,606 8,838 12,679 9,432 933
1934 388,371 4,513 6,125 12,139 13,821 917
1935 426,583 2,553 12,219 14,625 17,510 592
1936 507,073 8,192 16,454 15,412 17,719 1,338
1937 647,580 13,553 18,035 16,052 25,819 1,616
1938 721,728 7,604 23,639 16,419 10,374 2,167
1939 554,845 12,270 14,798 18,482 14,370 2,071
1940 473,641 11,796 16,832 19,624 22,576 1,451
1941 415,261 10,301 16,874 19,327 28,295 902
1942 334,599 3,082 11,387 19,359 24,911 982
1943 297,903 5,228 10,079 20,836 23,823 1,367
1944 378,909 14,279 13,472 22,818 30,408 2,392
1945 375,630 15,853 20,154 24,828 42,513 3,296






















1947 879,427 51,034 26,923 27,182 68,369 5,298
1948 934,889 37,848 22,119 29,308 61,762 6,272
1949 807,220 51,771 29,061 19,616 54,376 7,401
1950 726,228 91,026 22,886 20,679 64,303 6,718
1951 992,329 88,931 28,887 19,033 84,887 7,604
1952 801,171 110,924 31,039 20,550 88,618 7,980
1953 868,593 127,562 30,342 25,112 80,109 7,610
1954 759,589 118,438 27,063 30,862 83,495 9,609
1955 875,203 120,481 29,499 32,748 94,304 9,715
1956 916,524 131,575 33,381 32,405 112,107 11,237
1957 1,005,911 142,219 41,483 29,147 120,420 11,453
1958 1,117,260 157,332 41,022 27,562 109,356 9,425
1959 880,179 170,929 33,210 30,726 106,995 11,192
1960 1,225,565 190,742 44,867 31,489 126,702 9,848
1961 1,384,583 201,995 42,741 40,254 75,969 8,067
1962 1,262,792 206,086 49,446 41,809 77,804 6,701
1963 1,106,340 193,865 67,353 38,221 87,531 7,251
1964 1,221,299 199,443 63,102 41,223 111,434 8,879
1965 1,278,225 193,970 57,694 40,590 117,856 9,556
1966 1,335,654 222,460 51,636 44,954 127,442 9,699
1967 1,422,904 233,201 54,851 54,456 147,774 11,271
1968 1,624,991 290,551 55,522 60,187 161,557 13,477
1969 1,964,011 361,790 58,461 65,244 170,911 14,343
1970 1,882,678 395,540 67,030 66,814 183,219 13,580
1971 2,282,986 446,586 60,855 68,569 151,256 14,220
1972 2,415,629 537,380 48,078 69,016 180,147 16,090
1973 2,128,734 663,934 43,163 75,567 220,163 17,065
1974 2,137,309 727,860 54,221 84,266 245,031 16,157
1975 1,591,154 789,523 34,158 81,802 249,136 20,317
1976 2,401,265 874,868 29,715 86,328 245,762 26,593
1977 3,604,225 920,362 33,307 87,203 239,672 34,662
1978 3,088,715 978,345 45,134 85,988 309,680 36,947
1979 2,982,027 1,012,410 47,073 88,665 360,512 29,358
1980 3,050,122 1,190,115 59,122 107,369 422,528 22,984
1981 1,781,690 1,101,172 82,724 115,791 492,461 24,738
1982 1,587,778 1,062,994 51,972 120,181 443,634 25,471
1983 1,510,616 877,935 52,306 118,694 307,728 21,083
1984 1,073,932 856,406 76,371 124,778 317,464 14,842
1985 873,125 908,028 79,597 129,479 319,257 13,550
1986 952,861 1,077,870 79,663 136,447 268,165 14,445
1987 1,081,455 1,085,800 92,287 115,128 267,516 15,036
1988 1,045,803 1,052,250 98,882 138,649 264,097 16,440
1989 778,062 1,083,970 117,512 122,692 253,065 12,234
1990 677,396 978,440 121,709 111,948 233,942 16,469
1991 967,719 945,500 115,515 100,940 203,572 21,809
1992 1,258,822 882,670 135,311 102,495 190,455 28,143
1993 1,424,896 925,980 154,096 136,477 234,837 28,279
1994 1,673,438 969,778 156,997 154,764 253,924 21,096
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Table D.5 Latin America: Gross Total Fixed Investment, Six Countries, 
1900-1994 (as percentage o f  GDP a t constant 1980 national currencies)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 16.6 16.2 13.6 10.0 10.1 10.0
1901 15.9 14.5 15.5 10.0 10.1 10.0
1902 16.1 9.6 19.1 10.0 10.1 10.0
1903 15.4 10.9 18.9 10.0 10.1 10.0
1904 20.1 12.1 23.7 10.0 10.1 10.0
1905 27.5 16.8 20.1 10.0 10.1 10.0
1906 31.3 18.1 31.5 10.0 10.1 10.0
1907 37.8 22.0 34.7 10.0 10.1 10.0
1908 29.4 24.7 35.4 10.0 10.1 10.0
1909 31.5 22.9 23.3 10.0 10.1 10.0
1910 35.2 25.7 20.4 18.0 10.1 15.0
1911 34.0 31.7 33.1 18.0 0.0 15.0
1912 25.6 38.1 29.4 18.0 0.0 15.0
1913 25.7 31.9 28.3 18.0 0.0 15.0
1914 17.8 13.5 22.6 18.0 0.0 15.0
1915 10.6 6.9 11.2 18.0 0.0 15.0
1916 9.7 7.8 17.5 18.0 0.0 15.0
1917 8.0 6.5 21.9 18.0 0.0 15.0
1918 6.8 6.0 15.8 18.0 0.0 15.0
1919 7.7 11.8 20.9 18.0 0.0 15.0
1920 13.2 16.3 10.1 18.0 10.1 12.9
1921 14.9 15.9 10.1 18.0 10.1 15.8
1922 16.2 12.7 10.1 18.0 10.1 14.1
1923 20.2 14.0 15.2 18.0 10.1 16.8
1924 20.1 18.8 15.2 18.0 10.1 23.7
1925 20.3 23.5 22.7 18.9 12.1 33.1
1926 19.1 19.6 33.6 21.6 9.9 38.4
1927 20.5 17.5 23.9 23.9 9.3 33.2
1928 23.0 16.3 20.4 26.4 9.4 26.2
1929 25.1 19.1 26.5 22.0 10.9 29.8
1930 22.1 10.7 28.8 14.4 9.4 24.7
1931 14.5 4.8 18.5 12.1 6.2 16.2
1932 10.5 4.8 9.5 13.4 4.5 11.7
1933 11.2 6.9 9.8 12.4 6.1 17.7
1934 13.8 8.2 11.2 11.9 7.7 17.5
1935 13.0 9.8 16.2 13.3 8.8 14.3
1936 13.6 9.6 17.3 13.9 8.5 20.7
1937 17.0 12.5 18.1 15.9 11.0 23.5
1938 18.6 11.3 20.6 15.4 5.9 26.8
1939 15.0 9.9 17.1 16.4 7.2 26.2
1940 13.0 8.2 18.7 15.4 9.3 22.1
1941 12.4 7.4 18.5 14.5 10.3 16.5
1942 11.4 5.5 13.9 12.7 8.5 16.6
1943 11.2 6.1 14.3 13.5 8.2 16.7
1944 11.6 8.5 15.9 13.7 9.5 23.1
1945 11.8 9.0 15.4 16.4 13.2 27.4
1946 13.5 7.9 20.1 17.7 16.6 31.0
1947 19.3 18.1 23.6 20.6 18.0 34.0




Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1949 15.6 15.6 21.7 14.1 14.2 36.7
1950 15.5 18.8 19.1 16.0 14.8 31.8
1951 18.3 21.7 20.8 15.4 17.5 30.2
1952 17.2 21.6 20.6 15.6 17.6 35.4
1953 16.1 17.7 19.8 19.9 16.1 36.6
1954 14.9 17.3 19.1 21.7 15.8 38.1
1955 16.1 15.5 22.1 22.1 16.6 33.1
1956 16.7 16.1 20.9 20.1 18.3 32.4
1957 17.4 16.9 21.7 14.8 18.4 30.9
1958 17.8 16.7 20.8 13.7 16.6 30.2
1959 15.1 17.9 18.0 13.7 16.1 28.8
1960 21.2 17.0 21.9 15.5 17.2 22.1
1961 23.0 16.1 21.1 16.0 16.5 17.9
1962 21.4 15.9 22.7 15.2 16.6 17.2
1963 18.6 15.2 24.5 13.6 17.2 16.5
1964 18.8 15.0 22.6 14.4 18.5 18.0
1965 18.0 14.2 21.0 13.1 18.7 18.3
1966 18.5 16.5 19.5 14.2 19.0 18.3
1967 19.0 16.0 19.3 14.8 20.3 18.1
1968 20.5 17.5 20.4 15.9 20.6 19.7
1969 22.7 19.3 20.7 16.4 20.8 20.4
1970 22.8 20.6 21.6 17.3 21.1 18.6
1971 23.8 21.3 19.3 17.2 19.9 20.2
1972 23.6 22.2 15.6 15.6 20.6 22.5
1973 21.2 23.6 15.0 15.9 21.8 23.2
1974 21.0 24.7 16.4 16.4 22.1 21.3
1975 21.2 25.8 14.9 15.4 22.9 25.2
1976 23.5 25.0 12.3 16.1 22.1 29.8
1977 26.7 23.6 13.6 15.5 19.9 36.0
1978 24.2 23.5 14.8 15.7 21.2 36.7
1979 24.2 22.9 15.8 15.4 23.3 28.9
1980 25.1 23.6 18.6 16.8 24.8 25.2
1981 22.6 21.6 20.7 17.4 26.5 26.1
1982 18.7 20.0 14.2 17.8 22.2 24.9
1983 18.1 17.2 12.2 17.7 16.6 19.5
1984 17.4 16.3 14.5 17.3 17.0 16.0
1985 15.9 16.4 15.8 15.9 17.9 17.0
1986 16.5 18.8 15.3 16.2 16.4 17.4
1987 18.4 17.9 17.5 15.5 16.1 16.9
1988 18.0 17.0 18.6 16.5 16.8 17.4
1989 14.9 16.7 21.0 15.2 17.3 14.1
1990 13.5 15.5 20.7 14.0 18.7 12.5
1991 15.5 15.0 18.9 12.9 19.6 15.4
1992 18.6 13.7 21.4 14.0 21.1 18.5
1993 20.0 14.5 23.7 17.6 20.7 17.5
1994 22.1 15.4 23.5 18.9 21.7 13.5
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Table D.6 Latin America: Gross Fixed Investment in Machinery and Equipment, 
Six Countries, 1900—1994 (as percentage o f  GDP a t constant 1980 national 
currencies)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 1.6 14.1 4.5 3.3 0.0 3.7
1901 1.2 12.6 5.2 3.3 0.0 3.7
1902 1.8 6.6 6.4 3.3 0.0 3.7
1903 2.1 7.8 6.3 3.3 0.0 3.7
1904 3.1 8.5 7.9 3.3 0.0 3.7
1905 3.0 12.5 10.1 3.3 0.0 3.7
1906 3.9 12.7 15.8 3.3 0.0 3.7
1907 4.1 15.7 17.3 3.3 0.0 3.7
1908 3.0 18.0 17.7 3.3 0.0 3.7
1909 3.3 17.4 11.6 3.3 0.0 3.7
1910 3.5 18.7 10.2 6.0 0.0 5.6
1911 3.5 24.2 16.6 6.0 0.0 5.6
1912 3.8 29.2 14.7 6.0 0.0 5.6
1913 4.1 21.3 14.1 6.0 0.0 5.6
1914 3.0 8.8 11.3 6.0 0.0 5.6
1915 2.3 3.5 5.6 6.0 0.0 5.6
1916 2.4 4.3 5.8 6.0 0.0 5.6
1917 2.1 4.1 7.3 6.0 0.0 5.6
1918 1.5 4.6 5.3 6.0 0.0 5.6
1919 2.0 7.6 7.0 6.0 0.0 5.6
1920 3.0 11.5 5.2 6.0 2.4 6.0
1921 3.2 13.2 7.1 6.0 2.4 6.7
1922 2.7 8.7 7.2 6.0 2.4 6.6
1923 3.5 10.4 7.6 6.0 2.4 7.6
1924 4.1 13.1 8.5 6.0 2.4 10.1
1925 4.8 17.9 8.2 6.7 2.8 12.4
1926 5.0 13.3 12.2 7.5 2.4 15.2
1927 4.7 11.2 8.5 9.5 2.3 12.6
1928 5.3 11.3 7.2 10.8 2.5 11.1
1929 5.6 14.1 9.4 8.3 2.7 11.7
1930 4.2 8.1 10.2 3.5 2.3 10.4
1931 3.0 3.0 6.4 1.9 1.5 6.8
1932 2.0 2.8 1.7 1.7 0.9 5.1
1933 2.1 3.9 1.4 2.2 1.0 6.9
1934 2.4 4.5 2.3 2.9 1.3 7.3
1935 3.0 6.5 4.3 2.8 1.6 6.9
1936 3.1 5.6 5.0 3.5 1.6 9.0
1937 4.2 7.6 5.0 4.5 1.9 11.3
1938 4.6 7.5 5.6 4.6 1.1 12.4
1939 3.3 5.4 4.4 4.5 1.3 12.9
1940 2.8 3.6 4.9 3.3 1.5 11.5
1941 2.5 3.6 4.7 3.0 1.7 8.8
1942 2.0 2.5 3.6 1.1 0.9 7.7
1943 1.7 2.9 3.6 1.1 0.9 6.1
1944 1.6 4.2 3.1 1.7 1.3 9.4
1945 1.7 4.5 3.3 4.1 2.7 12.3
1946 2.6 6.7 4.6 5.7 3.1 13.8
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Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1947 5.9 10.4 7.2 8.1 3.5 17.5
1948 4.5 8.2 5.9 6.3 3.3 20.3
1949 2.7 8.9 7.1 4.9 2.7 17.7
1950 2.6 9.2 6.2 6.3 2.7 14.5
1951 3.8 12.3 7.1 6.8 3.3 10.4
1952 3.5 11.2 7.0 6.9 3.1 15.6
1953 3.1 6.3 6.0 9.8 3.2 16.7
1954 2.9 7.6 5.3 10.1 2.9 18.0
1955 3.6 6.0 6.6 10.2 3.1 14.4
1956 3.9 6.2 7.7 8.8 3.3 12.5
1957 4.1 7.1 9.2 4.8 3.4 13.4
1958 3.9 6.6 9.0 4.5 3.0 13.6
1959 3.4 7.6 6.3 4.2 3.0 13.7
1960 6.0 6.6 7.5 6.1 3.1 8.8
1961 7.0 6.3 8.6 6.3 6.6 7.6
1962 6.5 6.2 7.8 5.6 6.6 8.1
1963 5.3 6.0 6.5 5.1 6.9 7.2
1964 5.5 5.9 6.9 5.7 7.4 7.5
1965 5.3 5.4 6.0 4.9 7.4 7.2
1966 5.4 6.9 6.7 5.5 7.6 7.1
1967 5.4 6.5 6.7 4.8 8.1 6.4
1968 5.7 7.2 7.4 5.4 8.2 6.8
1969 6.3 7.9 7.0 5.7 8.3 7.5
1970 6.3 8.6 7.3 6.9 8.4 6.7
1971 6.6 9.2 6.1 7.2 7.9 7.5
1972 6.9 9.4 4.7 6.6 8.2 8.3
1973 6.6 10.0 5.4 6.1 8.9 8.7
1974 6.2 11.0 5.0 6.4 9.3 8.5
1975 5.9 11.7 5.8 6.2 9.8 10.8
1976 6.2 11.0 5.0 6.8 9.0 12.9
1977 8.2 9.5 6.3 6.3 7.7 16.5
1978 6.5 9.3 7.2 6.9 8.4 16.1
1979 7.3 9.0 7.7 7.2 10.0 11.2
1980 8.1 9.0 8.6 7.7 10.9 10.2
1981 9.3 7.3 9.4 7.9 11.9 11.3
1982 6.9 6.1 5.9 8.0 8.5 11.4
1983 7.4 5.0 4.2 7.7 5.5 7.9
1984 7.8 4.9 4.5 7.3 5.9 7.7
1985 6.9 5.2 5.1 5.8 6.7 9.4
1986 7.3 6.4 4.6 6.1 5.9 9.9
1987 8.2 5.9 6.0 6.8 5.6 9.4
1988 7.8 5.4 6.7 7.1 6.6 9.9
1989 6.8 5.0 8.0 6.7 7.1 8.0
1990 6.3 4.6 7.8 6.7 8.2 5.6
1991 6.1 4.4 6.8 5.8 9.1 7.3
1992 7.3 3.8 8.5 6.5 10.2 8.5
1993 7.8 4.5 9.7 8.3 9.6 7.4
1994 8.7 5.5 9.8 8.9 10.0 5.7
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Table D .7 Latin America: Gross Fixed Investment in Residential Structures, Six 
Countries, 1900-1994 (as percentage o f  GDP a t constant 1980 national 
currencies)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 12.9 0.9 2.7 1.7 1.0 3.1
1901 11.8 0.8 4.4 1.7 1.0 3.1
1902 11.0 1.2 5.5 1.7 1.0 3.1
1903 9.4 1.3 5.4 1.7 1.0 3.1
1904 9.2 1.9 6.8 1.7 1.0 3.1
1905 13.2 2.5 4.3 1.7 1.0 3.1
1906 15.8 3.4 6.8 1.7 1.0 3.1
1907 22.2 2.9 7.5 1.7 1.0 3.1
1908 19.7 3.6 7.6 1.7 1.0 3.1
1909 18.6 3.3 5.0 1.7 1.0 3.1
1910 22.1 4.1 4.4 3.0 1.0 4.7
1911 21.6 4.1 7.1 3.0 0.0 4.7
1912 15.3 5.1 6.3 3.0 0.0 4.7
1913 15.2 6.3 6.1 3.0 0.0 4.7
1914 7.5 2.4 4.9 3.0 0.0 4.7
1915 3.8 2.0 2.4 3.0 0.0 4.7
1916 3.3 2.2 5.0 3.0 0.0 4.7
1917 2.8 1.2 6.3 3.0 0.0 4.7
1918 3.0 0.6 4.5 3.0 0.0 4.7
1919 3.3 2.3 6.0 3.0 0.0 4.7
1920 6.7 1.8 2.1 3.0 1.1 3.4
1921 7.5 1.6 1.3 3.0 0.8 3.4
1922 9.3 3.0 1.2 3.0 0.9 3.3
1923 12.6 1.9 3.2 3.0 0.9 3.3
1924 11.2 2.7 2.9 3.0 1.1 3.1
1925 10.3 3.5 6.2 1.8 1.0 2.8
1926 8.2 3.8 9.2 2.3 0.9 2.6
1927 8.5 3.7 6.5 2.7 1.1 2.5
1928 9.4 3.2 5.6 3.4 1.0 2.7
1929 11.3 3.2 5.7 3.6 1.0 2.7
1930 10.5 1.8 4.7 2.6 1.2 2.8
1931 7.6 1.1 2.8 2.4 1.2 2.9
1932 5.5 1.2 3.6 2.8 1.6 3.0
1933 5.0 2.2 4.0 3.4 1.6 2.9
1934 6.1 3.1 6.3 2.8 1.6 2.9
1935 4.4 3.0 6.6 3.2 1.6 3.0
1936 3.8 3.0 5.5 3.2 1.7 2.7
1937 4.9 3.3 6.1 3.9 1.8 2.7
1938 5.2 3.0 5.7 3.6 1.9 2.6
1939 5.3 3.2 7.0 4.3 2.1 2.7
1940 4.7 3.3 7.7 4.2 1.8 2.8
1941 5.3 2.7 7.6 3.8 1.8 2.8
1942 5.8 2.7 6.3 4.0 1.9 2.8
1943 6.2 2.7 7.4 4.2 2.0 2.8
1944 6.3 3.0 8.4 3.6 2.1 2.7
1945 6.4 3.0 6.0 3.5 2.2 2.6




Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1947 6.1 3.8 8.3 4.0 2.4 2.5
1948 6.4 3.2 6.8 4.4 2.6 2.4
1949 6.4 3.4 6.6 3.6 2.7 2.4
1950 7.2 4.1 6.8 3.9 2.7 2.6
1951 7.0 4.3 6.4 3.5 2.6 4.9
1952 7.3 4.5 6.2 3.5 2.7 5.2
1953 6.4 4.8 6.9 4.0 2.8 6.8
1954 6.4 4.3 7.7 4.6 2.9 5.1
1955 6.5 4.2 8.9 4.7 3.0 4.7
1956 6.7 4.3 5.8 4.5 3.1 5.3
1957 7.0 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.2 4.1
1958 7.3 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.3 5.8
1959 6.1 4.4 5.1 3.8 3.5 3.1
1960 8.0 4.3 6.1 3.7 3.5 3.0
1961 8.4 4.1 4.9 2.9 3.9 2.2
1962 7.8 4.1 6.5 2.9 4.1 2.9
1963 7.0 4.0 7.3 2.6 4.2 3.0
1964 7.0 4.0 5.8 2.6 4.1 3.6
1965 6.8 3.9 6.1 2.5 4.2 4.0
1966 7.0 4.2 5.7 2.6 4.4 4.2
1967 7.3 4.2 5.2 3.0 4.5 3.9
1968 8.0 4.3 5.7 3.1 4.6 3.9
1969 8.9 4.5 6.3 3.2 4.8 3.8
1970 9.7 4.7 6.0 3.2 4.9 3.8
1971 9.3 4.7 6.4 3.0 5.8 4.5
1972 8.6 4.8 5.4 2.5 5.6 5.3
1973 7.8 4.9 4.6 3.1 5.3 5.5
1974 8.3 4.9 5.2 2.9 4.9 4.8
1975 10.5 5.0 4.5 2.4 5.4 5.0
1976 10.1 5.0 3.5 2.5 5.8 5.6
1977 8.4 5.0 3.3 2.6 5.3 5.7
1978 8.8 5.1 2.6 2.8 4.6 6.1
1979 8.9 4.9 3.3 2.4 4.6 6.4
1980 9.0 5.1 4.4 2.3 4.4 6.0
1981 8.4 5.1 3.9 2.4 4.4 5.0
1982 7.4 5.1 2.9 2.4 4.5 3.6
1983 6.6 4.7 2.4 2.8 4.4 2.8
1984 6.6 4.5 2.3 2.8 4.5 2.1
1985 6.5 4.4 2.9 2.8 4.7 1.9
1986 6.7 4.8 3.3 2.8 4.8 1.8
1987 7.4 4.7 3.5 2.9 5.0 1.8
1988 7.4 4.5 3.9 2.7 4.8 1.6
1989 5.9 4.5 4.3 2.6 5.2 1.4
1990 5.2 4.3 4.2 2.3 6.1 0.8
1991 6.9 4.1 4.4 2.7 6.7 0.8
1992 8.3 3.9 4.8 3.0 7.5 1.0
1993 8.9 3.9 5.3 3.8 7.0 1.0
1994 9.9 3.9 5.2 4.1 7.3 0.8
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Table D .8 Latin America: Gross Fixed Investment in Non-Residential Structures, 
Six Countries, 1900—1994 (as percentage o f  GDP at constant 1980 national 
currencies)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 2.2 1.2 6.3 5.0 0.0 3.1
1901 2.9 1.1 5.9 5.0 0.0 3.1
1902 3.2 1.8 7.2 5.0 0.0 3.1
1903 3.9 1.8 7.2 5.0 0.0 3.1
1904 7.7 1.8 9.0 5.0 0.0 3.1
1905 11.3 1.8 5.7 5.0 0.0 3.1
1906 11.5 2.1 9.0 5.0 0.0 3.1
1907 11.5 3.4 9.9 5.0 0.0 3.1
1908 6.7 3.0 10.1 5.0 0.0 3.1
1909 9.6 2.2 6.6 5.0 0.0 3.1
1910 9.5 2.9 5.8 9.0 0.0 4.7
1911 8.9 3.4 9.4 9.0 0.0 4.7
1912 6.5 3.8 8.4 9.0 0.0 4.7
1913 6.4 4.2 8.1 9.0 0.0 4.7
1914 7.3 2.3 6.4 9.0 0.0 4.7
1915 4.6 1.4 3.2 9.0 0.0 4.7
1916 4.0 1.3 6.7 9.0 0.0 4.7
1917 3.1 1.3 8.3 9.0 0.0 4.7
1918 2.3 0.7 6.0 9.0 0.0 4.7
1919 2.3 1.9 7.9 9.0 0.0 4.7
1920 3.5 3.0 2.8 9.0 6.7 3.5
1921 4.2 1.1 1.7 9.0 6.9 5.7
1922 4.3 1.1 1.6 9.0 6.8 4.1
1923 4.1 1.6 4.3 9.0 6.8 6.0
1924 4.8 3.0 3.8 9.0 6.7 10.5
1925 5.2 2.1 8.3 10.4 8.3 17.9
1926 5.9 2.5 12.1 11.8 6.6 20.7
1927 7.3 2.6 8.8 11.6 5.9 18.1
1928 8.2 1.9 7.6 12.2 6.0 12.4
1929 8.2 1.7 11.3 10.1 7.2 15.4
1930 7.4 0.9 13.9 8.3 5.9 11.5
1931 3.9 0.7 9.3 7.7 3.5 6.4
1932 3.0 0.7 4.3 8.9 2.0 3.6
1933 4.0 0.9 4.4 6.9 3.4 7.9
1934 5.3 0.6 2.7 6.2 4.7 7.3
1935 5.6 0.4 5.3 7.3 5.6 4.4
1936 6.6 1.0 6.9 7.3 5.2 9.0
1937 7.9 1.6 7.0 7.5 7.4 9.5
1938 8.7 0.9 9.3 7.3 2.9 11.8
1939 6.5 1.3 5.7 7.6 3.8 10.6
1940 5.4 1.3 6.2 7.9 5.9 7.8
1941 4.5 1.0 6.2 7.7 6.8 4.9
1942 3.6 0.3 4.0 7.7 5.7 6.1
1943 3.2 0.5 3.4 8.2 5.2 7.8
1944 3.7 1.3 4.4 8.4 6.1 11.0
1945 3.8 1.4 6.1 8.7 8.3 12.5
1946 4.5 0.4 5.4 8.5 11.2 14.7
Appendix D
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Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1947 7.3 3.9 8.2 8.4 12.2 14.0
1948 7.4 2.7 6.0 8.8 10.6 14.9
1949 6.4 3.4 8.0 5.6 8.8 16.6
1950 5.7 5.5 6.0 5.8 9.5 14.7
1951 7.5 5.1 7.3 5.2 11.6 14.9
1952 6.4 5.9 7.4 5.3 11.8 14.6
1953 6.6 6.5 6.9 6.1 10.1 13.1
1954 5.5 5.5 6.1 7.0 10.0 15.1
1955 6.0 5.3 6.6 7.1 10.5 14.0
1956 6.1 5.6 7.5 6.8 11.8 14.7
1957 6.3 5.6 8.4 6.0 11.8 13.4
1958 6.6 5.7 8.1 5.5 10.2 10.9
1959 5.6 5.9 6.6 5.7 9.6 12.0
1960 7.2 6.0 8.3 5.6 10.6 10.4
1961 7.6 5.8 7.6 6.8 6.0 8.1
1962 7.0 5.6 8.4 6.7 5.9 6.2
1963 6.2 5.2 10.7 6.0 6.2 6.2
1964 6.2 5.2 9.8 6.0 7.0 7.0
1965 5.9 4.9 8.9 5.7 7.0 7.1
1966 6.1 5.4 7.2 6.1 7.1 7.0
1967 6.3 5.4 7.4 7.0 7.7 7.8
1968 6.8 6.0 7.2 7.3 7.8 8.9
1969 7.5 6.8 7.3 7.5 7.7 9.1
1970 6.8 7.3 8.2 7.2 7.8 8.0
1971 7.9 7.4 6.9 7.0 6.2 8.1
1972 8.1 8.0 5.5 6.6 6.8 8.9
1973 6.8 8.6 5.0 6.7 7.6 8.9
1974 6.5 8.7 6.3 7.1 8.0 7.9
1975 4.8 9.0 4.5 6.7 7.7 9.4
1976 7.2 9.1 3.8 6.8 7.3 11.3
1977 10.1 9.1 4.0 6.6 6.9 13.8
1978 8.9 9.2 5.0 6.0 8.2 14.4
1979 7.9 8.9 4.9 5.8 8.7 11.3
1980 7.9 9.5 5.7 6.8 9.5 9.0
1981 4.9 9.2 7.4 7.2 10.1 9.8
1982 4.5 8.8 5.4 7.4 9.2 10.0
1983 4.2 7.5 5.6 7.2 6.6 8.8
1984 2.9 6.9 7.7 7.3 6.6 6.2
1985 2.5 6.8 7.8 7.3 6.5 5.7
1986 2.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 5.7 5.7
1987 2.8 7.3 8.0 5.9 5.5 5.7
1988 2.8 7.1 8.0 6.8 5.4 5.9
1989 2.2 7.1 8.7 5.8 5.0 4.8
1990 1.9 6.7 8.7 5.1 4.4 6.1
1991 2.5 6.5 7.7 4.5 3.7 7.3
1992 3.0 6.1 8.1 4.4 3.4 8.9
1993 3.2 6.1 8.7 5.5 4.2 9.0
1994 3.6 6.1 8.5 5.9 4.3 7.0
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NOTES
1. The source note is the same as in Appendix B but includes also the disaggregation of capital 
formation.
2. Banco Central de la República de Argentina (1991) is only available in mimeographed form 
and was never published officially.
3. Of which no official estimates were available since 1973.
Appendix E. Standardised Estimates of 
Capital Stock
This appendix presents standardised gross and net fixed capital stock estim ates, 
starting with the estimation o f the initial capital stock and subsequently the 
yearly additions to the gross and net stocks. It gives the potential user the 
possibility to check on our assumptions and eventually replicate the capital stock 
estim ates using different assumptions about, for exam ple, service lives.
In the second part o f this appendix a set o f four tables for each o f the Latin 
American countries and the U SA  is presented, giving gross and net fixed  
tangible reproducible capital stocks for 1950-94 in national currencies and 1980 
international dollars. It also presents, again on the basis o f estim ates in national 
currencies and 1980 international dollars, average ages, average service lives 
and capital-output ratios for 1950-94. A s indicated in Chapter 6 the capital 
stocks have been generated applying the perpetual inventory method which 
estim ates capital stocks as a weighted sum o f past investment flow s. The 
detailed sources used for the calculation o f the investment series used in the 
capital stock estimation are given in Appendix D.
A  very crucial elem ent in international comparisons is how to convert 
estim ates in local currencies into estim ates expressed in a common currency, 
either existing, for example the US dollar, or fictitious such as the concept o f the 
constant 1980 international dollar.1 The use o f exchange rates as the conversion 
factor is the easiest and most direct way,2 but the official exchange rate basically 
reflects the purchasing power o f tradable goods and services and does not 
include the non-tradables, and thus may give rise to distortions. See Chapter 6 
for a detailed description o f real incom e estimation in Latin America.
In Table E .l the disaggregated PPPs with respect to capital formation are 
presented with the resulting PPP-exchange rate deviation index as estimated by 
various phases o f ICP which is still the only source for this kind o f 
disaggregated information. Here the results for the two estim ates for 1980, ICP 
IV and AH are given, and these PPPs are also analysed for the 1970-80 period 
since for 1985 we do not dispose o f the disaggregation. Comparing the ICP IV  
and AH 1980 results it becom es directly clear that the main difference occurred 
in the case o f non-residential structures. In this case the results for ICP IV are 
not very reliable as a major transcription error occurred.
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In analysing the PPPs o f the components o f gross investment in tim e the 
pattern is obviously not as uniform as in the case o f total GDP, but the deviation 
index o f machinery and equipment is higher in all cases. Non-residential 
structures PPPs are generally lower. In the case o f Colom bia, with five 
observations, the first three (1970,1973 and 1975) are alm ost identical, and also 
the 1980 estimates show a fairly stable tendency. In the case o f Brazil the 
estim ates for 1975 and 1980 are rather similar, as is the case in M exico although 
with somewhat higher differences.
It is in the light o f all the abovementioned that this appendix shows capital 
stock estimates both in national currencies and at international prices, therefore 
giving the potential user the option to apply other PPPs or exchange rates than 
the ones used by us, without having to go through the whole procedure o f 
calculating the capital stock. The application o f these disaggregated PPPs has, as 
shown in Chapter 6, a great impact on the capital stock levels. Tables E.2 and 
E.3 give a step-by-step explanation o f the procedures used to calculate the 
capital stock using as an exam ple non-residential stock estim ation in Argentina.
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Table E .l Capital Formation PPPs-Exchange Rate Deviation Index, 1970-80  
(national currency units per  international dollar)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
PPPs of capital formation








1975 (ICP phase HI)
Res. 4.6 8.3 6.6
N.R. 5.4 7.4 5.9
M&E 7.6 4.3 17.0
1980 (ICP phase IV)
Res. 4025 33.7 52.2 20.1 5.1
N.R. 1389 27.1 15.4 17.6 6.4
M&E 3959 46.3 51.2 53.6 4.55
1980 (Alan Heston)
Res. 4057 32.0 52.1 19.6 16.2 5.5
N.R. 4670 25.9 27.0 22.3 19.2 5.1
M&E 3899 47.0 50.7 54.8 21.2 4.5
PPP-Exchange rate deviation index








1975 (ICP phase HI)
Res. 0.56 0.27 0.53
N.R. 0.66 0.24 0.47
M&E 0.93 1.38 1.34
1980 (ICP phase IV)
Res. 2.19 0.64 1.34 0.42 1.19
N.R. 0.76 0.51 0.39 0.37 1.49
M&E 2.15 0.88 1.31 1.13 1.06
1980 (Alan Heston)
Res. 2.21 0.61 1.34 0.41 0.70 1.29
N.R. 2.54 0.49 0.69 0.47 0.83 1.20
M&E 2.12 0.89 1.30 1.16 0.92 1.06
Notes: Res. = Residential; N.R. = Non-residential; M&E = Machinery and equipment 
Source: Table 5.2.
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Table E.2 Argentina: Procedure fo r  Estimating Alternative Benchmark o f  the 
Stocks o f  Non-Residential Structures a t 31 December 1949
GDP (1980 Ratio of total 







Gross gross Annual 
increment to straight-line 
capital stock depreciation 
in course of provision 
year specified (equals l/40th 















progress of 1 
per cent per 
annum)
(6)
1910 3,869 9.5 368 9 9 1,00
1911 3,939 8.9 352 9 18 1,01
1912 4,261 6.5 277 7 21 1,02
1913 4,305 6.4 277 7 28 1,03
1914 3,859 7.3 282 7 35 1,04
1915 3,879 4.6 177 4 27 1,05
1916 3,768 4.0 151 4 26 1,06
1917 3,463 3.1 107 3 21 1,07
1918 4,097 2.3 94 2 21 1,08
1919 4,248 2.3 99 2 25 1,09
1920 4,557 3.5 161 4 44 1,10
1921 4,674 4.2 195 5 58 1,12
1922 5,048 4.3 215 5 70 1,13
1923 5,604 4.1 229 6 80 1,14
1924 6,041 4.8 290 7 109 1,15
1925 6,015 5.2 313 8 125 1,16
1926 6,305 5.9 375 9 159 1,17
1927 6,753 7.3 493 12 222 1,18
1928 7,171 8.2 588 15 279 1,20
1929 7,501 8.2 617 15 308 1,21
1930 7,191 7.4 530 13 278 1,22
1931 6,692 3.9 263 7 145 1,23
1932 6,470 3.0 194 5 111 1,24
1933 6,774 4.0 274 7 164 1,26
1934 7,309 5.3 388 10 243 1,27
1935 7,627 5.6 427 11 277 1,28
1936 7,690 6.6 507 13 342 1,30
1937 8,248 7.9 648 16 453 1,31
1938 8,273 8.7 722 18 523 1,32
1939 8,590 6.5 555 14 416 1,33
1940 8,729 5.4 474 12 367 1,35
1941 9,185 4.5 415 10 332 1,36
1942 9,287 3.6 335 8 276 1,37
1943 9,223 3.2 298 7 253 1,39
1944 10,262 3.7 379 9 332 1,40
1945 9,933 3.8 376 9 338 1,42
1946 10,820 4.5 483 12 447 1,43
1947 12,023 7.3 879 22 835 1,45
1948 12,682 7.4 935 23 912 1,46
1949 12,517 6.4 807 20 807 1,47
Total 15546 389 9539
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Table E.3 Argentina: Procedure fo r  Estimating Alternative Variants o f  1950—94 Estimates o f  the Stock 
o f Non-Residential Structures
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 ) (13) (14) (15) (16)
1949 12517 6.4 807 15546 9539 16.46 10.52
1950 12669 5.7 726 368 359 15904 389 338 9877 16.16 10.55 15725 9708 12716 0.8 1.2
1951 13161 7.5 992 352 641 16545 398 595 10471 15.68 10.28 16225 10174 13199 0.8 1.2
1952 12498 6.4 801 277 524 17069 414 388 10859 15.55 10.21 16807 10665 13736 0.9 1.3
1953 13161 6.6 869 277 591 17660 427 442 11301 15.40 10.14 17365 11080 14222 0.8 1.3
1954 13704 5.5 760 282 478 18138 442 318 11619 15.38 10.14 17899 11460 14680 0.8 1.3
1955 14672 6.0 875 177 698 18837 453 422 12041 15.43 10 .11 18487 11830 15159 0.8 1.3
1956 15080 6.1 917 151 765 19602 471 446 12486 15.52 10 .12 19219 12263 15741 0.8 1.3
1957 15861 6.3 1006 107 899 20501 490 516 13002 15.63 10.20 20052 12744 16398 0.8 1.3
1958 16829 6.6 1117 94 1023 21524 513 605 13607 15.71 10.31 21013 13304 17159 0.8 1.2
1959 15742 5.6 880 99 781 22305 538 342 13949 15.99 10.48 21915 13778 17846 0.9 1.4
1960 16982 7.2 1226 161 1065 23370 558 668 14617 15.98 10.32 22837 14283 18560 0.8 1.3
1961 18188 7.6 1385 195 1190 24560 584 800 15417 15.89 10.12 23965 15017 19491 0.8 1.3
1962 18032 7.0 1263 215 1048 25608 614 649 16066 15.90 10.07 25084 15741 20413 0.9 1.4
1963 17735 6.2 1106 229 877 26485 640 466 16532 16.03 10.14 26046 16299 21173 0.9 1.5
1964 19707 6.2 1221 290 931 27416 662 559 17091 16.06 10.15 26951 16812 21881 0.9 1.4
1965 21673 5.9 1278 313 966 28382 685 593 17684 16.08 10.17 27899 17388 22643 0.8 1.3
1966 21974 6.1 1336 375 961 29342 710 626 18310 16.04 10.27 28862 17997 23430 0.8 1.3
1967 22723 6.3 1423 493 930 30273 734 689 18999 15.90 10.26 29808 18655 24231 0.8 1.3
1968 23876 6.8 1625 588 1037 31310 757 868 19868 15.62 10 .11 30791 19434 25112 0.8 1.3
1969 26106 7.5 1964 617 1347 32657 783 1181 21049 15.22 9.96 31983 20458 26221 0.8 1.2
1970 27715 6.8 1883 530 1353 34009 816 1066 22115 14.99 9.95 33333 21582 27457 0.8 1.2
1971 28970 7.9 2283 263 2020 36029 850 1433 23548 14.86 9.79 35019 22832 28925 0.8 1.2
1972 29791 8.1 2416 194 2222 38251 901 1515 25063 14.79 9.64 37140 24305 30723 0.8 1.2
1973 31136 6.8 2129 274 1855 40106 956 1172 26235 14.83 9.64 39179 25649 32414 0.8 1.3
1974 33062 6.5 2137 388 1749 41855 1003 1135 27370 14.84 9.59 40981 26803 33892 0.8 1.2
1975 33110 4.8 1591 427 1165 43020 1046 545 27915 15.04 9.83 42437 27642 35040 0.8 1.3
1976 33353 7.2 2401 507 1894 44914 1075 1326 29240 14.96 9.80 43967 28578 36272 0.9 1.3
1977 35745 10.1 3604 648 2957 47871 1123 2481 31722 14.49 9.49 46392 30481 38437 0.9 1.3
Table E.3 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
1978 34848 8.9 3089 722 2367 50238 1197 1892 33614 14.24 9.34 49054 32668 40861 0.9 1.4
1979 37571 7.9 2982 555 2427 52665 1256 1726 35340 14.16 9.38 51451 34477 42964 0.9 1.4
1980 38400 7.9 3050 474 2576 55241 1317 1734 37073 14.16 9.39 53953 36207 45080 0.9 1.4
1981 36318 4.9 1782 415 1366 56608 1381 401 37474 14.52 9.79 55924 37274 46599 1.0 1.5
1982 35171 4.5 1588 335 1253 57861 1415 173 37647 14.97 10.14 57234 37560 47397 1.1 1.6
1983 36617 4.1 1511 298 1213 59073 1447 64 37711 15.47 10.53 58467 37679 48073 1.0 1.6
1984 37350 2.9 1074 379 695 59769 1477 -403 37308 16.03 11.07 59421 37509 48465 1.0 1.6
1985 34754 2.5 873 376 497 60266 1494 -621 36687 16.65 11.56 60017 36997 48507 1.1 1.7
1986 37237 2.6 953 483 470 60736 1507 -554 36133 17.20 12.04 60501 36410 48455 1.0 1.6
1987 38179 2.8 1081 879 202 60938 1518 -437 35696 17.57 12.34 60837 35914 48376 0.9 1.6
1988 37432 2.7 1020 935 85 61023 1523 -504 35192 17.93 12.76 60980 35444 48212 0.9 1.6
1989 34809 2.2 762 807 -45 60977 1526 -764 34429 18.42 13.22 61000 34811 47905 1.0 1.8
1990 34343 1.8 625 726 -10 2 60876 1524 -900 33529 18.97 13.76 60927 33979 47453 1.0 1.8
1991 37949 2.5 938 992 -54 60822 1522 -584 32945 19.33 14.06 60849 33237 47043 0.9 1.6
1992 41857 3.0 1245 801 443 61265 1521 -276 32669 19.67 14.27 61043 32807 46925 0.8 1.5
1993 44473 3.2 1435 869 566 61831 1532 -97 32572 19.93 14.36 61548 32621 47084 0.7 1.4
1994 48264 3.6 1736 760 976 62807 1546 190 32762 20.13 14.32 62319 32667 47493 0.7 1.3
Note:
(1) GDP (1980 australes)
(2) Ratio o f total gross fixed capital form ation to GDP at constant prices
(3) Gross Gross increm ent to capital stock in course of year specified
(4) Retirements
(5) Increm ent to gross capital stock in year specified (col.3 -4 )
(6) End-year gross stock equals benchmark stock 
(see table A R1H  co l.5
(7) Annual depreciation
(8) Increm ent to net capital stock equals col.3 -7
(9) End-year net stock equals benchmark stock 
(see table AR1 + col.8)
(10) End-year gross stock average age
(11) End-year net stock average age
(12) M id-year gross capital stock
(13) M id-year net capital stock
(14) A verage o f m id-year gross and net stocks
(15) C apital-ou tpu t ratios net
(16) C apital-ou tpu t ratios gross
















































Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital 
>e o f  Asset, 1950-94 (constant 1980 australes)
Gross stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
45,084 20,304 4,579 15,725 24,781
46,429 20,982 4,757 16,225 25,447
47,863 21,737 4,930 16,807 26,125
49,131 22,354 4,989 17,365 26,777
50,369 22,959 5,060 17,899 27,409
51,762 23,743 5,256 18,487 28,019
53,362 24,7% 5,577 19,219 28,567
55,071 26,040 5,988 20,052 29,031
56,992 27,483 6,470 21,013 29,509
58,751 28,823 6,908 21,915 29,928
60,679 30,356 7,519 22,837 30,323
63,318 32,404 8,439 23,%5 30,914
65,891 34,254 9,170 25,084 31,637
67,949 35,636 9,590 26,046 32,313
70,256 37,097 10,147 26,951 33,159
73,200 38,832 10,933 27,899 34,368
76,291 40,553 11,691 28,862 35,738
79,468 42,239 12,431 29,808 37,229
82,999 44,0% 13,305 30,791 38,903
87,280 46,391 14,408 31,983 40,890
92,146 48,971 15,638 33,333 43,175
97,461 51,927 16,907 35,019 45,535
103,168 55,421 18,281 37,140 47,747
108,508 58,860 19,681 39,179 49,649
113,651 62,114 21,133 40,981 51,537
118,794 64,797 22,360 42,437 53,997
124,038 67,193 23,226 43,%7 56,845
130,383 70,901 24,508 46,392 59,482
136,999 75,110 26,056 49,054 61,889
143,335 78,999 27,548 51,451 64,336
150,251 83,297 29,344 53,953 66,954
156,915 87,330 31,406 55,924 69,585
162,284 90,317 33,082 57,234 71,%8
166,904 92,804 34,337 58,467 74,100
171,178 95,052 35,631 59,421 76,126
174,685 %,602 36,585 60,017 78,083
177,931 97,809 37308 60,501 80,122
181,487 99,064 38,228 60,837 82,423
184,887 100,124 39,144 60,980 84,763
187,353 100,677 39,677 61,000 86,676
188,891 100,797 39,870 60,927 88,094
190,608 100,857 40,009 60,849 89,751
193,369 101,166 40,122 61,043 92,203
197,614 102,2% 40,748 61,548 95,318

















































ed) A & i j
Net stocks
The Economic Development of Latin America
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
26,089 12,374 2,666 9,708 13,715
27,079 12,947 2,773 10,174 14,132
28,126 13,590 2,925 10,665 14,536
28,987 14,101 3,021 11,080 14,887
29,763 14,551 3,091 11,460 15,212
30,629 15,043 3,214 11,830 15,585
31,694 15,687 3,423 12,263 16,007
32,905 16,415 3,671 12,744 16,490
34,303 17,230 3,926 13,304 17,073
35,447 17,870 4,092 13,778 17,577
36,824 18,687 4,405 14,283 18,137
39,036 20,061 5,044 15,017 18,975
41,276 21,445 5,704 15,741 19,831
42,980 22,452 6,153 16,299 20,527
44,539 23,342 6,530 16,812 21,198
46,323 24,361 6,974 17,388 21,962
48,193 25,413 7,415 17,997 22,780
50,168 26,500 7,845 18,655 23,667
52,455 27,748 8,314 19,434 24,707
55,438 29,391 8,933 20,458 26,046
58,983 31,245 9,663 21,582 27,738
62,845 33,281 10,450 22,832 29,563
66,896 35,621 11,315 24,305 31,276
70,611 37,800 12,151 25,649 32,810
74,089 39,692 12,889 26,803 34,398
77,599 41,122 13,479 27,642 36,477
81,388 42,573 13,996 28,578 38,815
86,295 45,433 14,952 30,481 40,862
91,301 48,595 15,927 32,668 42,706
95,850 51,174 16,697 34,477 44,676
100,791 53,984 17,778 36,207 46,806
105,055 56,327 19,053 37,274 48,728
107,556 57,406 19,845 37,560 50,150
109,064 57,871 20,192 37,679 51,193
110,341 58,212 20,703 37,509 52,129
110,923 57,970 20,972 36,997 52,954
111,243 57,495 21,085 36,410 53,748
112,219 57,425 21,510 35,914 54,794
113,281 57,377 21,933 35,444 55,904
113,285 56,717 21,907 34,811 56,567
112,118 55,433 21,454 33,979 56,686
111,209 54,178 20,941 33,237 57,031
111,904 53,700 20,892 32,807 58,204
114,107 54,073 21,452 32,621 60,034
















































tentina 2. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital 
>e o f  Asset, 1950-94 (constant million 1980 international dollars)
Gross stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
106,498 45,416 11,744 33,672 61,081
109,668 46,943 12,201 34,742 62,725
113,031 48,635 12,645 35,990 64,395
115,981 49,980 12,796 37,184 66,001
118,867 51,306 12,977 38,329 67,561
122,132 53,068 13,480 39,588 69,064
125,871 55,458 14,303 41,155 70,413
129,854 58,295 15,358 42,938 71,559
134,326 61,590 16,594 44,996 72,736
138,413 64,645 17,718 46,927 73,769
142,928 68,186 19,283 48,903 74,742
149,160 72,960 21,643 51,317 76,200
155,214 77,232 23,518 53,713 77,982
160,018 80,370 24,596 55,774 79,648
165,466 83,734 26,024 57,710 81,732
172,495 87,781 28,040 59,741 84,714
179,878 91,788 29,984 61,804 88,090
187,477 95,712 31,884 63,828 91,765
195,949 100,058 34,123 65,934 95,892
206,226 105,439 36,952 68,487 100,788
217,907 111,485 40,108 71,377 106,421
230,589 118,352 43,363 74,988 112,237
244,106 126,416 46,886 79,530 117,689
256,750 134,372 50,477 83,895 122,377
268,987 141,956 54,202 87,754 127,031
281,316 148,220 57,347 90,873 133,096
293,834 153,717 59,569 94,148 140,117
308,817 162,200 62,858 99,342 146,617
324,419 171,870 66,829 105,042 152,549
339,408 180,828 70,653 110,175 158,580
355,826 190,793 75,261 115,532 165,034
371,820 200,302 80,548 119,753 171,518
384,798 207,407 84,848 122,558 177,391
395,912 213,264 88,065 125,198 182,648
406,267 218,626 91,385 127,241 187,641
414,813 222,349 93,832 128,518 192,464
422,730 225,239 95,685 129,553 197,491
431,479 228,317 98,044 130,273 203,162
439,904 230,974 100,395 130,580 208,929
446,030 232,385 101,763 130,622 213,645
449,864 232,723 102,258 130,465 217,141
454,136 232,911 102,612 130,298 221,225
460,888 233,620 102,904 130,715 227,268
471,252 236,304 104,508 131,796 234,948

















































The Economic Development of Latin America
Net stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
61,431 27,626 6,838 20,788 33,805
63,733 28,899 7,113 21,786 34,834
66,168 30,339 7,501 22,838 35,830
68,168 31,474 7,748 23,726 36,694
69,%3 32,467 7,927 24,539 37,497
71,989 33,574 8,242 25,331 38,416
74,495 35,040 8,780 26,260 39,455
77,350 36,704 9,414 27,289 40,646
80,641 38,558 10,069 28,489 42,083
83,323 39,999 10,4% 29,503 43,324
86,587 41,881 11,297 30,584 44,706
91,864 45,093 12,936 32,156 46,772
97,218 48,337 14,629 33,708 48,881
101,281 50,684 15,782 34,902 50,597
104,997 52,748 16,748 35,999 52,250
109,253 55,119 17,886 37,233 54,134
113,708 57,557 19,019 38,538 56,151
118,405 60,067 20,121 39,946 58,337
123,837 62,938 21,324 41,614 60,899
130,920 66,719 22,911 43,808 64,201
139,370 70,998 24,784 46,215 68,371
148,562 75,692 26,801 48,890 72,870
158,157 81,067 29,021 52,046 77,090
166,962 86,088 31,165 54,923 80,873
175,237 90,451 33,058 57,394 84,786
183,674 93,763 34,571 59,192 89,911
192,763 97,090 35,895 61,195 95,674
204,339 103,619 38,349 65,271 100,720
216,067 110,803 40,850 69,953 105,264
226,772 116,652 42,825 73,827 110,120
238,498 123,126 45,595 77,531 115,372
248,791 128,683 48,867 79,816 120,108
254,943 131,329 50,899 80,430 123,614
258,656 132,471 51,788 80,683 126,185
261,910 133,418 53,098 80,320 128,492
263,537 133,013 53,789 79,224 130,524
264,526 132,045 54,078 77,966 132,481
267,134 132,074 55,169 76,905 135,060
269,947 132,151 56,253 75,898 137,796
270,158 130,727 56,186 74,541 139,431
267,508 127,784 55,023 72,761 139,724
265,455 124,881 53,708 71,172 140,575
267,302 123,836 53,584 70,252 143,466
272,848 124,872 55,019 69,852 147,976

















































E.6 Argentina 3. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives and
al-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of national currencies at constant
prices)









Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
19.18 12.01 14.17 9.16 38,69 29,73 3,6 2,1 1,6 1,0
18.91 11.72 13.75 8.93 39,07 30,35 33 2,1 1,6 1,0
18.83 11.58 13.63 8.88 38,65 29,81 3,8 2,3 1,7 1,1
18.80 11.49 13.51 8.87 38,64 29,89 3,7 2,2 1,7 1,1
18.81 11.43 13.50 8.92 38,72 30,00 3,7 2,2 1,7 1,1
18.68 11.30 13.51 8.88 38,94 3030 3,5 2,1 1,6 1,0
18.49 11.18 13.54 8.85 38,79 30,53 33 2,1 1,6 1,0
18.16 11.07 13.58 8.87 3838 3038 3,5 2,1 1,6 1,0
17.82 10.97 13.63 8.93 38,38 30,47 3,4 2,0 1,6 1,0
17.72 11.04 13.88 9.08 37,60 29,81 3,7 2,3 1,8 1,1
17.19 10.77 13.75 8.80 37,92 30,38 3,6 2,2 1,8 1,1
16.59 10.45 13.50 8.46 3733 30,07 33 2,1 1,8 1,1
16.25 10.31 13.36 8.34 3633 28,94 3,7 2,3 1,9 1,2
16.09 10.36 13.41 8.40 36,10 28,61 3,8 2,4 2,0 1,3
16.03 10.34 13.38 8.39 36,44 28,87 3,6 2,3 1,9 1,2
16.03 10.31 13.34 8.39 36,28 28,65 3,4 2,1 1,8 1,1
16.03 10.32 13.26 8.46 35,92 28,22 3,5 2,2 1,8 1,2
16.00 10.27 13.12 8.46 35,81 28,06 3,5 2,2 1,9 1,2
15.86 10.13 12.88 8.34 35,78 27,97 33 2,2 1,8 1,2
15.60 9.91 12.54 8.19 35,91 28,03 3,3 2,1 1,8 1,1
15.31 9.73 12.32 8.14 35,59 27,63 3,3 2,1 1,8 1,1
15.07 9.53 12.19 7.99 3536 27,73 3,4 2,2 1,8 1,1
14.87 9.39 12.11 7.86 35,27 27,62 3,5 2,2 1,9 1,2
14.70 9.36 12.12 7.84 34,70 27,22 3,5 2,3 1,9 1,2
14.54 9.32 12.13 7.80 3431 27,00 3,4 2,2 1,9 1,2
14.42 9.34 12.25 7.97 34,09 26,28 3,6 2,3 2,0 1,2
14.28 9.31 12.19 7.98 34,22 26,39 3,7 2,4 2,0 1,3
13.97 9.16 11.81 7.72 34,68 27,15 3,6 2,4 2,0 1,3
13.82 9.17 11.69 7.68 34,13 26,63 3,9 2,6 2,2 1,4
13.65 9.19 11.62 7.70 34,11 26,68 3,8 2,6 2,1 1,4
13.52 9.19 11.59 7.67 34,04 26,67 3,9 2,6 2,2 1,4
13.64 9.37 11.74 7.85 33,55 26,19 4,3 2,9 2,4 1,6
13.95 9.66 12.08 8.12 32,93 25,56 4,6 3,1 2,6 1,6
14.28 9.94 12.41 8.37 32,84 25,49 4,6 3,0 2,5 1,6
14.59 10.26 12.74 8.68 3239 25,20 4,6 3,0 2,5 1,6
15.01 10.61 13.17 9.01 32,31 24,85 5,0 3,2 2,8 1,7
15.37 10.90 13.51 9.29 32,38 24,81 4,8 3,0 2,6 1,5
15.60 11.06 13.68 9.40 32,41 24,73 4,8 2,9 2,6 1,5
15.85 11.30 13.88 9.63 32,26 24,48 4,9 3,0 2,7 1,5
16.24 11.65 14.22 9.93 32,02 24,22 5,4 3,3 2,9 1,6
16.72 12.08 14.65 10.32 31,97 24,12 5,5 3,3 2,9 1,6
17.03 12.31 14.93 10.52 32,17 24,12 5,0 2,9 2,7 1,4
17.21 12.35 15.10 10.55 32,46 24,18 4,6 2,7 2,4 1,3
17.28 12.27 15.18 10.44 32,92 2432 4,4 2,6 2,3 1,2
17.23 12.03 15.15 10.17 33,13 24,56 4,2 2,4 2,2 1,1
Table E. 7 Argentina 4. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives and 
Capital-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of constant 1980 international 
dollars)
216 The Economic Development of Latin America
Average age capital stock Average service life capital Capital-output ratios
stock ___
Total Non- Total Non- Total Non-
___________ residential re s id en tia l______________ residential
Mid­
year
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
1950 19.27 12.05 13.88 8.96 37.40 28.58 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.6
1951 19.01 11.76 13.46 8.72 37.43 29.20 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.6
1952 18.94 11.62 13.34 8.68 37.27 28.65 2.4 1.4 1.1 0.7
1953 18.92 11.53 13.23 8.68 38.26 28.71 2.4 1.4 1.0 0.6
1954 18.93 11.47 13.22 8.74 3836 28.85 2.3 1.4 1.0 0.6
1955 18.79 11.33 13.23 8.69 38.58 29.35 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.6
1956 18.59 11.20 13.25 8.66 38.42 2939 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.6
1957 18.24 11.08 13.29 8.67 38.18 29.43 2.2 1.3 1.0 0.6
1958 17.88 10.97 13.33 8.73 37.96 2931 2.2 1.3 1.0 0.6
1959 17.75 11.04 13.58 8.87 37.16 28.66 2.4 1.4 1.1 0.7
1960 17.20 10.76 13.43 8.58 37.48 29.25 2.3 1.4 1.1 0.7
1961 16.57 10.42 13.17 8.23 37.06 28.94 2.2 1.4 1.1 0.7
1962 16.21 10.29 13.01 8.10 36.02 27.78 2.3 1.5 1.2 0.7
1963 16.03 10.33 13.05 8.17 35.58 27.45 2.4 1.5 1.2 0.8
1964 15.97 10.31 13.01 8.16 35.93 27.74 2.3 1.4 1.2 0.7
1965 15.97 10.28 12.97 8.16 35.76 27.52 2.2 1.4 1.1 0.7
1966 15.97 10,28 12.89 8.22 35.39 27.08 2.2 1.4 1.1 0.7
1967 15.94 10.23 12.76 8.22 35.28 26.93 2.2 1.4 1.1 0.7
1968 15.81 10.09 12.53 8.11 35.25 26.84 2.2 1.4 1.1 0.7
1969 15.55 9.86 12.20 7.96 35.36 26.90 2.1 1.4 1.1 0.7
1970 15.26 9.68 11.99 7.90 35.04 26.51 2.1 1.4 1.1 0.7
1971 15.02 9.48 11.86 7.76 34.98 26.58 2.2 1.4 1.1 0.7
1972 14.82 9.34 11.78 7.64 34.67 26.47 2.2 1.4 1.1 0.7
1973 14.64 9.31 11.78 7.61 34.11 26.09 2.2 1.5 1.2 0.7
1974 14.46 9.26 11.80 7.58 33.91 25.89 2.2 1.4 1.2 0.7
1975 14.33 9.28 11.91 7.74 33.50 25.18 2.3 1.5 1.2 0.8
1976 14.19 9.25 11.86 7.75 33.61 25.26 2.4 1.6 1.2 0.8
1977 13.89 9.11 11.49 7.50 34.05 26.01 2.3 1.5 1.2 0.8
1978 13.74 9.12 11.38 7.47 33.51 25.51 2.5 1.7 1.3 0.9
1979 13.57 9.14 11.32 7.49 33.49 25.56 2.4 1.6 1.3 0.8
1980 13.44 9.15 11.28 7.46 33.42 25.56 2.5 1.7 1.3 0.9
1981 13.54 9.31 11.41 7.61 32.95 25.13 2.8 1.9 1.5 1.0
1982 13.84 9.59 11.74 7.88 3232 24.49 3.0 2.0 1.6 1.0
1983 14.16 9.87 12.05 8.11 32.23 24.43 2.9 1.9 1.6 1.0
1984 14.46 10.17 1236 8.40 31.99 24.16 2.9 1.9 1.6 1.0
1985 14.87 10.52 12.77 8.72 31.70 23.80 3.2 2.1 1.7 1.0
1986 15.22 10.80 13.09 8.97 31.78 23.77 3.1 1.9 1.6 1.0
1987 15.44 10.96 13.24 9.06 31.82 23.70 3.1 1.9 1.6 0.9
1988 15.69 11.19 13.43 9.27 31.67 23.47 3.2 2.0 1.7 1.0
1989 16.07 11.53 13.76 9.56 31.43 23.21 3.5 2.1 1.8 1.0
1990 16.55 11.95 14.17 9.93 31.38 23.11 3.5 2.1 1.8 1.0
1991 16.86 12.18 14.44 10.12 31.59 23.11 3.2 1.9 1.7 0.9
1992 17.03 12.22 14.60 10.14 31.87 23.16 3.0 1.7 1.5 0.8
1993 17.09 12.13 14.66 10.01 32.35 23.50 2.9 1.7 1.4 0.8
















































il 1. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital Stocks
’,t, 1950-94 (constant 1980 cruzeiros)
Gross stocks 
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
2,325 1,498 1.019 480 827
2,615 1,718 1.157 562 897
2,943 1,968 1.316 652 975
3,240 2,178 1.419 760 1.062
3,530 2,378 1.505 873 1.152
3,844 2,601 1.614 987 1.242
4,166 2,830 1.721 1.109 1.336
4,532 3,097 1.855 1.243 1.435
4,940 3,399 2.010 1.389 1.541
5,378 3,722 2.173 1.549 1.656
5,840 4,062 2.341 1.721 1.778
6,308 4,400 2.490 1.910 1.908
6,756 4,714 2.605 2.109 2.042
7,184 5,008 2.705 2.303 2.175
7,608 5,294 2.805 2.489 2.314
8,019 5,555 2.881 2.674 2.463
8,441 5,819 2.948 2.871 2.621
8,894 6,102 3.016 3.086 2.792
9,478 6,495 3.160 3.336 2.982
10,248 7,049 3.398 3.651 3.199
11,150 7,711 3.689 4.022 3.439
12,197 8,494 4.055 4.439 3.703
13,412 9,413 4.486 4.927 4.000
14,873 10,531 5.008 5.523 4.342
16,592 11,864 5.651 6.214 4.727
18,514 13,375 6.406 6.969 5.140
20,612 15,028 7.232 7.796 5.584
22,759 16,699 8.017 8.682 6.060
24,946 18,383 8.762 9.621 6.563
27,240 20,146 9.540 10.607 7.093
29,764 22,087 10.391 11.696 7.677
32,262 23,968 11.138 12.830 8.294
34,467 25,567 11.662 13.906 8.900
36,356 26,884 12.012 14.872 9.472
37,963 27,953 12.223 15.729 10.010
39,588 29,024 12.428 16.597 10.564
41,483 30,302 12.726 17.577 11.181
43,499 31,653 13.026 18.628 11.846
45,308 32,806 13.153 19.653 12.502
46,925 33,768 13.092 20.676 13.157
48,262 34,475 12.840 21.636 13.786
49,349 34,977 12.470 22.507 14.372
50,346 35,417 12.097 23.320 14.929
51,336 35,858 11.755 24.103 15.479















































The Economic Development of Latin America
Net stocks
Non-residential
Res.Total Total M&E Structures
1.560 983 659 325 577
1.809 1.177 775 402 632
2.095 1.401 913 488 694
2.348 1.584 993 591 764
2.574 1.738 1.043 695 836
2.793 1.886 1.093 792 908
3.004 2.022 1.128 894 982
3.242 2.180 1.177 1.003 1.062
3.503 2.357 1.236 1.121 1.147
3.792 2.554 1.303 1.250 1.238
4.103 2.767 1.374 1.392 1.336
4.421 2.979 1.434 1.546 1.441
4.744 3.194 1.492 1.702 1.550
5.052 3.393 1.544 1.849 1.658
5.344 3.578 1.590 1.988 1.766
5.622 3.747 1.624 2.122 1.876
5.937 3.947 1.683 2.264 1.990
6.303 4.189 1.769 2.419 2.114
6.736 4.485 1.881 2.604 2.251
7.313 4.899 2.052 2.847 2.414
7.998 5.401 2.267 3.134 2.596
8.782 5.984 2.530 3.454 2.798
9.720 6.690 2.854 3.835 3.030
10.876 7.572 3.260 4.313 3.303
12.253 8.640 3.770 4.870 3.612
13.782 9.838 4.364 5.474 3.944
15.414 11.110 4.979 6.131 4.303
17.026 12.339 5.505 6.834 4.686
18.596 13.509 5.942 7.566 5.087
20.189 14.683 6.362 8.321 5.505
21.917 15.956 6.799 9.157 5.961
23.547 17.114 7.104 10.010 6.433
24.818 17.939 7.168 10.771 6.879
25.731 18.447 7.053 11.394 7.284
26.386 18.735 6.846 11.889 7.651
27.080 19.055 6.677 12.378 8.025
28.065 19.611 6.655 12.956 8.454
29.222 20.299 6.701 13.598 8.922
30.235 20.866 6.665 14.201 9.369
31.151 21.349 6.571 14.778 9.802
31.907 21.709 6.417 15.292 10.198
32.482 21.946 6.233 15.713 10.537
32.932 22.100 6.038 16.062 10.833
33.353 22.242 5.860 16.381 11.111
















































il 2. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital Stocks
% 1950-94 (constant million 1980 international dollars)
Gross stocks 
Nan-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
65,995 40.163 21.676 18.488 25.832
74,271 46.254 24.609 21.645 28.016
83,587 53.123 28.001 25.122 30.464
92,651 59.462 30.185 29.277 33.189
101,680 65.671 32.015 33.655 36.009
111,213 72.389 34.336 38.053 38.824
121,111 79.369 36.611 42.758 41.742
132,183 87.343 39.458 47.885 44.841
144,459 96.293 42.759 53.534 48.167
157,672 105.934 46.245 59.689 51.739
171,697 116.135 49.817 66.318 55.562
186,199 126.572 52.980 73.591 59.628
200,530 136.703 55.417 81.285 63.828
214,290 146.316 57.562 88.754 67.974
227,913 155.597 59.674 95.923 72.316
241,337 164.357 61.305 103.052 76.980
255,293 173.376 62.721 110.655 81.917
270,354 183.105 64.168 118.937 87.249
288,973 195.779 67.232 128.547 93.194
312,984 213.006 72.301 140.705 99.978
340,950 233.492 78.484 155.008 107.458
373,056 257.339 86.271 171.067 115.717
410,310 285.320 95.443 189.877 124.991
455,092 319.396 106.557 212.839 135.696
507,425 359.694 120.230 239.463 147.731
565,474 404.865 136.299 268.566 160.610
628,809 454.305 153.874 300.430 174.504
694,548 505.173 170.568 334.604 189.376
762,310 557.202 186.418 370.783 205.109
833,404 611.738 202.977 408.761 221.666
911,727 671.827 221.089 450.738 239.900
990,619 731.437 236.973 494.464 259.182
1,062,143 784.028 248.120 535.908 278.115
1,124,721 828.731 255.583 573.148 295.990
1,179,087 866.265 260.072 606.192 312.823
1,234,147 904.033 264.422 639.611 330.114
1,297,529 948.136 270.756 677.380 349.393
1,365,223 995.034 277.138 717.896 370.189
1,427,938 1.037.239 279.857 757.382 390.698
1,486,534 1.075.373 278.554 796.819 411.162
1,537,815 1.106.989 273.181 833.808 430.826
1,581,847 1.132.716 265.313 867.403 449.131
1,622,614 1.156.096 257.390 898.706 466.518
1,662,694 1.178.991 250.113 928.877 483.703

















































The Economic Development of Latin America
Net stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
44,547 26.521 14.014 12.506 18.026
51,736 31.996 16.490 15.507 19.739
59,913 38.227 19.416 18.812 21.686
67,781 43.905 21.130 22.775 23.876
75,093 48.964 22.186 26.778 26.129
82,160 53.800 23.264 30.536 28.360
89,130 58.439 24.002 34.437 30.692
96,865 63.689 25.050 38.639 33.175
105,333 69.498 26.289 43.209 35.835
114,607 75.919 27.728 48.191 38.688
124,662 82.901 29.237 53.664 41.761
135,113 90.072 30.503 59.569 45.042
145,763 97.325 31.738 65.588 48.438
155,936 104.119 32.861 71.258 51.817
165,638 110.444 33.831 76.613 55.194
174,965 116.354 34.563 81.791 58.611
185,247 123.047 35.813 87.234 62.201
196,946 130.888 37.645 93.243 66.058
210,719 140.369 40.012 100.357 70.350
228,800 153.376 43.667 109.709 75.423
250,153 169.022 48.242 120.780 81.131
274,395 186.952 53.825 133.127 87.443
303,233 208.540 60.734 147.806 94.693
338,787 235.557 69.354 166.203 103.231
380,791 267.909 80.213 187.696 112.882
427,060 303.802 92.858 210.944 123.258
476,708 342.231 105.934 236.296 134.477
526,950 380.511 117.137 263.374 146.439
577,006 418.024 126.434 291.591 158.982
628,083 456.049 135.372 320.677 172.035
683,850 497.556 144.662 352.894 186.293
737,942 536.916 151.143 385.773 201.027
782,593 567.614 152.506 415.108 214.979
816,798 589.178 150.072 439.106 227.620
842,938 603.853 145.661 458.192 239.085
869,890 619.099 142.067 477.032 250.791
905,082 640.892 141.588 499.304 264.190
945,454 666.637 142.580 524.057 278.817
981,882 689.110 141.806 547.304 292.772
1,015,635 709.337 139.809 569.528 306.298
1,044,547 725.870 136.526 589.344 318.678
1,067,440 738.165 132.608 605.557 329.275
1,085,997 747.479 128.458 619.021 338.518
1,103,217 756.006 124.691 631.315 347.211
















































E.10 Brazil 3. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives and 
al-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of national currencies at constant 
prices)
Appendix E 221
Average age capital stock Average service life capital Capital-output ratios 
_______      stock
Total Non- Total Non- Total Non-
___________ residential re s id e n tia l_____________ residential
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
11.06 6.85 8.43 4.69 26.84 21.10 1.4 0.9 0.9 0.6
10.37 6.34 7.72 4.30 27.29 21.80 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.7
9.78 6.07 7.14 4.22 26.65 21.35 1.6 1.1 1.0 0.7
9.54 6.11 6.94 4.41 25.81 20.52 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.8
9.40 6.14 6.91 4.56 26.50 21.28 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.8
9.44 6.28 7.10 4.80 26.41 21.26 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.8
9.47 6.40 7.29 5.02 26.57 21.48 1.8 1.3 1.2 0.9
9.49 6.48 7.47 5.17 26.95 21.95 1.8 1.3 1.2 0.9
9.54 6.52 7.67 5.25 26.89 21.96 1.8 1.3 1.2 0.9
9.52 6.53 7.76 5.29 26.98 22.13 1.9 1.3 1.3 0.9
9.51 6.57 7.85 5.36 26.88 22.09 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.9
9.53 6.64 7.97 5.46 26.85 22.08 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.8
9.53 6.72 8.03 5.56 26.77 22.01 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.9
9.58 6.86 8.18 5.71 26.96 22.21 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9
9.68 7.01 8.28 5.87 27.07 22.26 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.9
9.85 7.21 8.45 6.08 27.18 22.30 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.9
9.88 7.31 8.43 6.18 27.57 22.62 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.0
9.95 7.43 8.45 6.31 27.87 22.84 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.0
9.99 7.44 8.48 6.32 28.84 23.81 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.9
9.90 7.36 8.39 6.25 29.09 24.10 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9
9.86 7.29 8.36 6.18 29.29 24.39 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.0
9.78 7.17 8.30 6.06 29.43 24.61 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.0
9.62 7.02 8.18 5.93 29.46 24.74 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.0
9.41 6.83 8.00 5.77 29.74 25.11 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.0
9.20 6.64 7.82 5.60 29.64 25.15 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.0
9.04 6.53 7.71 5.52 29.45 25.11 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.1
8.92 6.47 7.65 5.49 29.11 24.88 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.2
8.92 6.49 7.71 5.56 28.62 24.47 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.2
8.97 6.57 7.83 5.67 28.54 24.45 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.3
9.07 6.65 7.97 5.78 28.45 24.41 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.3
9.14 6.69 8.10 5.84 28.61 24.60 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.3
9.37 6.88 8.36 6.06 28.07 24.08 2.7 2.0 2.0 1.4
9.67 7.12 8.71 6.33 28.01 24.01 2.9 2.1 2.1 1.5
10.08 7.45 9.16 6.68 27.79 23.78 3.1 2.2 2.3 1.6
10.47 7.78 9.59 7.02 27.94 23.89 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.5
10.82 8.03 9.97 7.27 28.27 24.15 3.0 2.0 2.2 1.4
11.05 8.15 10.23 7.38 28.75 24.57 2.9 2.0 2.1 1.4
11.28 8.31 10.47 7.53 28.80 24.58 2.9 2.0 2.1 1.4
11.55 8.50 10.75 7.71 28.87 24.60 3.1 2.0 2.2 1.4
11.82 8.70 11.01 7.89 29.12 24.76 3.1 2.0 2.2 1.4
12.12 8.97 11.30 8.16 29.28 24.85 3.3 2.2 2.4 1.5
12.45 9.24 11.59 8.41 29.73 25.22 3.4 2.2 2.4 1.5
12.82 9.56 11.93 8.71 30.15 25.59 3.5 2.3 2.4 1.5
13.16 9.82 12.22 8.95 30.67 26.02 3.4 2.2 2.4 1.5




















































E.11 Brazil 4. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives and 
al-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of constant 1980 international
The Economic Development of Latin America
Average age capital stock Average service life capital Capital-output ratios
stock ___ ___  _____  ____
Total Non- Total Non- Total Non-
  residential residential  residential
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
11.93 7.37 9.41 5.22 30.42 23.87 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.5
11.18 6.80 8.57 4.74 30.73 24.48 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.6
10.50 6.48 7.86 4.58 30.17 24.14 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.6
10.13 6.41 7.50 4.68 29.47 23.48 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7
9.92 6.40 7.39 4.80 30.09 24.27 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7
9.89 6.50 7.52 5.02 30.02 24.31 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.7
9.86 6.60 7.65 5.22 30.21 24.60 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.8
9.84 6.68 7.78 5.39 30.56 25.09 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.8
9.85 6.71 7.94 5.47 30.53 25.16 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.8
9.80 6.74 8.00 5.54 30.62 25.35 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.8
9.74 6.78 8.04 5.63 30.55 25.36 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.8
9.75 6.86 8.15 5.75 30.55 25.43 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.8
9.74 6.95 8.24 5.88 30.50 25.42 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.8
9.79 7.10 8.40 6.05 30.65 25.63 1.8 1.3 1.2 0.9
9.90 7.27 8.52 6.24 30.77 25.71 1.8 1.3 1.2 0.9
10.08 7.48 8.72 6.49 30.89 25.80 1.9 1.3 1.3 0.9
10.14 7.60 8.76 6.62 31.31 26.19 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9
10.24 7.74 8.82 6.77 31.62 26.47 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9
10.30 7.76 8.87 6.81 32.57 27.47 1.8 1.3 1.2 0.9
10.22 7.70 8.81 6.76 32.87 27.84 1.8 1.3 1.2 0.9
10.20 7.64 8.81 6.70 33.06 28.13 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.0
10.14 7.53 8.78 6.59 33.19 28.35 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9
10.00 7.39 8.68 6.46 33.27 28.52 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9
9.80 7.20 8.51 6.29 33.57 28.93 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.9
9.61 7.01 8.35 6.11 33.45 28.95 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.0
9.46 6.90 8.26 6.02 33.24 28.87 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.1
9.36 6.83 8.21 5.98 32.91 28.63 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.1
9.34 6.83 8.25 6.01 32.44 28.24 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.1
9.38 6.89 8.35 6.10 32.36 28.22 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.2
9.46 6.96 8.48 6.20 32.24 28.16 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.2
9.52 6.98 8.58 6.25 32.44 28.39 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.2
9.72 7.16 8.82 6.45 31.89 27.87 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.4
10.01 7.38 9.15 6.70 31.81 27.81 2.7 2.0 2.0 1.4
10.41 7.70 9.60 7.04 31.55 27.55 2.9 2.1 2.2 1.5
10.79 8.03 10.03 7.40 31.68 27.67 2.9 2.1 2.1 1.5
11.14 8.28 10.41 7.66 32.00 27.96 2.8 2.0 2.1 1.4
11.39 8.42 10.69 7.81 32.50 28.43 2.8 1.9 2.0 1.4
11.62 8.59 10.94 7.98 32.54 28.45 2.8 2.0 2.1 1.4
11.90 8.79 11.25 8.18 32.61 28.50 2.9 2.0 2.1 1.4
12.18 9.00 11.53 8.38 32.86 28.71 3.0 2.0 2.2 1.4
12.50 9.28 11.84 8.66 32.97 28.81 3.2 2.2 2.3 1.5
12.84 9.56 12.17 8.93 33.38 29.19 3.3 2.2 2.4 1.5
13.22 9.88 12.53 9.24 33.73 29.53 3.4 2.3 2.4 1.6
13.57 10.15 12.85 9.49 34.19 29.97 3.4 2.2 2.4 1.5

















































e 1. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital Stocks
t, 1950-94 (constant 1980 pesos)
Gross stocks 
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
1,392,179 796.211 222.280 573.931 595,%8
1,445,139 826.915 237.432 589.483 618.225
1,499,782 860.777 254.005 606.772 639.005
1,555,279 893.475 268.429 625.046 661.804
1,611,331 923.533 280.461 643.072 687.798
1,677,570 959.063 294.371 664.692 718.507
1,746,609 1.001.865 313.030 688.835 744.744
1,814,558 1.055.288 341.237 714.051 759.270
1,888,813 1.119.429 376.219 743.209 769.384
1,958,525 1.174.888 404.924 769.964 783.637
2,038,889 1.232.288 430.703 801.586 806.601
2,132,486 1.303.575 461.416 842.159 828.912
2,227,117 1.374.919 488.923 885.9% 852.198
2,333,732 1.449.137 509.652 939.486 884.595
2,443,541 1.525.661 528.340 997.321 917.880
2,542,417 1.591.195 545.088 1.046.107 951.222
2,629,553 1.643.694 562.293 1.081.401 985.860
2,713,807 1.697.561 582.255 1.115.306 1.016.246
2,810,534 1.762.110 607.836 1.154.275 1.048.423
2,916,709 1.828.973 639.588 1.189.386 1.087.736
3,025,541 1.893.839 671.012 1.222.827 1.131.702
3,141,129 1.958.984 695.793 1.263.192 1.182.145
3,242,1% 2.009.606 703.426 1.306.180 1.232.590
3,317,676 2.045.289 701.503 1.343.786 1.272.387
3,401,420 2.092.382 707.386 1.384.997 1.309.038
3,474,659 2.134.993 714.979 1.420.014 1.339.665
3,504,%1 2.149.460 711.845 1.437.614 1.355.501
3,530,573 2.162.252 710.371 1.451.881 1.368.321
3,578,265 2.1%.427 726.163 1.470.264 1.381.838
3,647,251 2.250.555 753.406 1.497.149 1.396.696
3,751,815 2.328.523 794.092 1.534.432 1.423.292
3,8%,551 2.436.653 848.151 1.588.501 1.459.899
4,011,628 2.521.703 879.985 1.641.718 1.489.925
4,065,605 2.557.472 874.348 1.683.124 1.508.132
4,114,898 2.595.331 859.643 1.735.687 1.519.567
4,178,102 2.647.145 850.286 1.7%.859 1.530.957
4,251,052 2.701.587 844.758 1.856.829 1.549.465
4,349,276 2.776.346 856.587 1.919.759 1.572.929
4,481,386 2.879.370 888.548 1.990.823 1.602.016
4,651,716 3.012.989 939.559 2.073.430 1.638.727
4,849,398 3.171.707 1.004.641 2.167.066 1.677.691
5,047,772 3.328.320 1.068.528 2.259.792 1.719.453
5,272,394 3.499.562 1.144.320 2.355.241 1.772.832
5,550,702 3.711.493 1.242.238 2.469.254 1.839.210





















































Total Total M&E Structures Res.
862,635 472.214 134.211 338.004 390.421
899,232 495.001 145.459 349.542 404.231
940,961 523.355 158.587 364.768 417.605
983,167 549.916 169.627 380.289 433.251
1,022,549 569.997 176.631 393.366 452.552
1,065,442 589.818 184.247 405.570 475.624
1,110,586 616.739 196.346 420.393 493.847
1,157,798 655.921 215.316 440.605 501.877
1,208,126 702.129 238.123 464.006 505.997
1,247,053 734.316 251.774 482.542 512.737
1,289,243 763.076 260.745 502.331 526.167
1,342,642 802.501 276.405 526.095 540.142
1,400,593 844.181 293.047 551.135 556.411
1,472,314 891.183 303.799 587.384 581.131
1,546,163 941.385 312.260 629.125 604.778
1,607,914 983.126 318.537 664.589 624.788
1,664,478 1.018.572 325.470 693.102 645.906
1,722,005 1.056.214 336.903 719.310 665.792
1,785,021 1.098.254 351.640 746.614 686.767
1,855,445 1.142.517 367.769 774.748 712.928
1,931,361 1.190.626 382.867 807.759 740.734
2,006,749 1.235.769 394.637 841.131 770.980
2,059,226 1.259.742 395.724 864.018 799.485
2,087,779 1.269.446 392.462 876.984 818.334
2,117,504 1.282.391 390.310 892.081 835.113
2,136,667 1.288.356 386.710 901.645 848.311
2,130,376 1.278.367 380.285 898.082 852.009
2,124,671 1.272.409 378.756 893.653 852.262
2,137,530 1.287.113 390.537 896.576 850.417
2,168,314 1.317.730 411.808 905.923 850.584
2,226,745 1.365.357 443.766 921.591 861.387
2,319,492 1.442.312 488.158 954.154 877.180
2,377,543 1.494.157 512.368 981.789 883.386
2,373,276 1.494.504 501.620 992.885 878.771
2,371,483 1.500.421 485.276 1.015.145 871.063
2,392,784 1.526.083 476.346 1.049.737 866.701
2,423,777 1.555.083 470.637 1.084.446 868.693
2,473,149 1.597.622 473.621 1.124.000 875.527
2,551,847 1.663.699 492.109 1.171.591 888.147
2,667,628 1.758.516 528.499 1.230.017 909.111
2,807,128 1.872.294 574.503 1.297.791 934.834
2,938,631 1.974.881 612.654 1.362.226 963.750
3,096,391 2.094.284 663.139 1.431.144 1.002.108
3,314,028 2.260.875 743.908 1.516.967 1.053.153
3,559,852 2.448.317 837.534 1.610.782 1.111.535
PRESEN TA CIÓN  DE APP REVISTA CEPAL 




Table E.13 Chile 2. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital 




Mid-year Total Total M&E Structures Res.
1950 37,077 25,638 4.384«/ 2 1 .2 5 4 / 11.439
1951 38,379 26,513 4.683 21.829 11.866
1952 39,745 27,480 5.010 22.470 12.265
1953 41,143 28,441 5.294 23.146 12.703
1954 42,547 29,346 5.532 23.814 13.202
1955 44,212 30,421 5.806 24.615 13.791
1956 45,977 31,683 6.174 25.509 14.295
1957 47,746 33,173 6.731 26.442 14.573
1958 49,710 34,943 7.420 27.522 14.767
1959 51,541 36,500 7.987 28.513 15.041
1960 53,661 38,179 8.495 29.684 15.482
1961 56,197 40,287 9.101 31.186 15.910
1962 58,810 42,453 9.643 32.810 16.357
1963 61,822 44,843 10.052 34.791 16.979
1964 64,971 47,353 10.421 36.932 17.618
1965 67,748 49,490 10.751 38.739 18.258
1966 70,059 51,137 11.091 40.046 18.922
1967 72,292 52,786 11.484 41.302 19.506
1968 74,857 54,733 11.989 42.745 20.123
1969 77,538 56,660 12.615 44.045 20.878
1970 80,240 58,518 13.235 45.283 21.722
1971 83,192 60,502 13.724 46.778 22.690
1972 85,902 62,244 13.874 48.370 23.658
1973 88,021 63,599 13.836 49.762 24.422
1974 90,366 65,241 13.952 51.289 25.125
1975 92,401 66,687 14.102 52.585 25.713
1976 93,295 67,277 14.040 53.237 26.017
1977 94,040 67,777 14.011 53.765 26.263
1978 95,292 68,769 14.323 54.446 26.523
1979 97,110 70,302 14.860 55.442 26.808
1980 99,803 72,485 15.663 56.822 27.318
1981 103,575 75,553 16.729 58.825 28.021
1982 106,749 78,152 17.357 60.795 28.597
1983 108,521 79,574 17.246 62.329 28.947
1984 110,397 81,231 16.955 64.275 29.166
1985 112,696 83,311 16.771 66.540 29.385
1986 115,163 85,423 16.662 68.761 29.740
1987 118,177 87,987 16.895 71.092 30.191
1988 121,998 91,249 17.526 73.723 30.749
1989 126,768 95,314”"\ 18.532 76.782 31.453
1990 132,267 100,065 19.815 80.250 32.201
1991 137,762 104,759 21.076 83.684 33.003
1992 143,816 109,789 22.570 87.218 34.027
1993 151,244 115,942 \ 24.502 91.440 35.302







































































































































































































































































































































E.14 Chile 3. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives and
al-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis o f national currencies at
ant 1980 prices)









Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
16.10 10.24 14.47 9.13 35.28 28.42 3.6 2.3 2.1 1.2
15.90 10.11 14.09 8.87 35.07 28.28 3.6 2.3 2.1 1.2
15.68 9.91 13.73 8.49 34.80 28.05 3.6 2.2 2.0 1.2
15.51 9.87 13.50 8.44 34.51 27.63 3.5 2.2 2.0 1.2
15.42 9.98 13.50 8.67 34.42 27.48 3.6 2.3 2.1 1.3
15.38 9.87 13.56 8.58 34.71 27.68 3.8 2.4 2.2 1.3
15.28 9.82 13.38 8,35 34.32 27.61 3.9 2.5 2.2 1.4
15.05 9.69 12.95 7.97 34.18 27.80 3.7 2.3 2.1 1.3
14.92 9.80 12.72 7.98 33.55 27.36 3.7 2.4 2.2 1.4
15.00 9.99 12.77 8.20 32,80 26.49 3.9 2.5 2.3 1.5
15.00 9.97 12.80 8.15 33.05 26.80 3.8 2.4 2.3 1.4
15.00 9.96 12.85 8.08 32.69 26.68 3.8 2.4 2.3 1.4
14.95 9.89 12.90 8.02 32.44 26.40 3.8 2.4 2.3 1.4
14.78 9.75 12.80 7.90 32.57 26.54 3.7 2.3 2.3 1.4
14.75 9.66 12.76 7.75 32.46 26.56 3.8 2.4 2.4 1.5
14.77 9.67 12.70 7.75 32.31 26.35 3.9 2.5 2.5 1.5
14.67 9.81 12.53 7.97 32.21 26.26 3.7 2.3 2.3 1.4
14.63 9.87 12.47 8.03 32.22 26.36 3.7 2.3 2.3 1.4
14.58 9.80 12.40 7.92 32.37 26.48 3.7 2.3 2.3 1.4
14.44 9.79 12.20 7.94 32.20 26.25 3.7 2.3 2.3 1.4
14.32 9.80 11.90 7.97 32.09 26.09 3.7 2.4 2.3 1.5
14.40 9.81 11.94 8.04 32.06 25.94 3.5 2.3 2.2 1.4
14.71 10.02 12.25 8.30 31.76 25.61 3.7 2.4 2.3 1.4
15.02 10.28 12.54 8.60 31.91 25.81 3.9 2.4 2.4 1.5
15.30 10.42 12.85 8.74 32.38 26.26 3.9 2.4 2.4 1.5
15.61 10.76 13.19 9.10 32.00 25.95 4.6 2.8 2.8 1.7
15.91 11.07 13.52 9.35 31.76 25.74 4.5 2.7 2.8 1.6
16.17 11.36 13.73 9.61 32.14 26.12 4.2 2.5 2.6 1.5
16.32 11.49 13.75 9.60 32.32 26.39 4.0 2.4 2.4 1.4
16.43 11.51 13.82 9.53 32.35 26.45 3.8 2.2 2.3 1.4
16.41 11.38 13.75 9.34 32.57 26.67 3.6 2.1 2.2 1.3
16.34 11.15 13.52 9.05 32.50 26.70 3.5 2.1 2.2 1.3
16.69 11.38 13.79 9.25 31.47 25.72 4.2 2.5 2.6 1.5
17.12 11.66 14.17 9.48 31.31 25.58 4.4 2.6 2.7 1.6
17.37 11.79 14.36 9.55 31.74 26.14 4.2 2.4 2.6 1.5
17.52 11.83 14.45 9.54 32.01 26.44 4.1 2.3 2.6 1.5
17.67 11.91 14.57 9.64 32.29 26.74 3.9 2.2 2.5 1.4
17.64 11.72 14.50 9.41 32.75 27.31 3.8 2.2 2.4 1.4
17.57 11.53 14.40 9.24 32.88 27.48 3.6 2.1 2.3 1.3
17.28 11.13 14.10 8.87 33.08 27.79 3.4 2.0 2.2 1.3
17.05 10.76 13.90 8.52 32.80 27.63 3.5 2.0 2.3 1.3
16.86 10.55 13.78 8.39 32.47 27.32 3.4 2.0 2.2 1.3
16.52 10.19 13.48 8.13 32.58 27.47 3.2 1.9 2.1 1.3
16.07 9.78 13.09 7.83 32.49 27.45 3.1 1.9 2.1 1.3
15.67 9.45 12.79 7.60 32.11 27.15 3.2 1.9 2.1 1.3
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Table E.15 Chile 4. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives and
Capital-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of constant 1980 international
dollars)
Average age capital stock Average service life capital Capital-output ratios
______________________  stock______________________________
Total Non- Total Non- Total Non-
residential r e s id e n tia l_______________residential
Mid­
year
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
1950 16.44 10.49 15.62 9.95 36.55 32.26 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.1
1951 16.20 10.33 15.25 9.69 36.39 32.13 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.1
1952 15.95 10.05 14.90 9.27 36.19 31.94 2.7 1.7 1.9 1.1
1953 15.76 10.00 14.66 9.20 35.93 31.57 2.7 1.7 1.8 1.1
1954 15.69 10.15 14.65 9.44 35.84 31.43 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.2
1955 15.69 10.04 14.73 9.33 36.15 31.67 2.9 1.8 2.0 1.2
1956 15.58 9.92 14.56 9.08 35.79 31.54 3.0 1.9 2.0 1.3
1957 15.30 9.73 14.12 8.69 35.73 31.68 2.8 1.8 1.9 1.2
1958 15.16 9.84 13.89 8.74 35.24 31.30 2.8 1.8 2.0 1.2
1959 15.21 10.04 13.92 8.95 34.52 30.44 2.9 1.9 2.1 1.3
1960 15.22 10.00 13.94 8.90 34.89 30.87 2.9 1.8 2.0 1.3
1961 15.26 9.99 14.02 8.83 34.58 30.72 2.9 1.8 2.1 1.3
1962 15.24 9.91 14.08 8.75 34.43 30.53 2.9 1.8 2.1 1.3
1963 15.03 9.72 13.91 8.57 34.63 30.76 2.8 1.8 2.1 1.3
1964 14.98 9.57 13.83 8.36 34.51 30.74 2.9 1.8 2.1 1.3
1965 14.94 9.54 13.72 8.33 34.26 30.44 3.0 1.9 2.2 1.4
1966 14.80 9.73 13.52 8.58 34.08 30.25 2.8 1.8 2.1 1.3
1967 14.74 9.80 13.46 8.64 34.15 30.40 2.8 1.8 2.0 1.3
1968 14.69 9.72 13.38 8.54 34.26 30.47 2.8 1.8 2.1 1.3
1969 14.51 9.73 13.14 8.57 34.05 30.20 2.8 1.8 2.0 1.3
1970 14.30 9.75 12.79 8.61 33.96 30.07 2.8 1.8 2.1 1.3
1971 14.36 9.77 12.82 8.68 33.98 30.00 2.7 1.7 2.0 1.3
1972 14.68 10.00 13.15 8.95 33.71 29.72 2.8 1.8 2.0 1.3
1973 15.00 10.28 13.47 9.26 33.80 29.87 3.0 1.9 2.1 1.4
1974 15.29 10.41 13.78 9.40 34.27 30.35 3.0 1.9 2.2 1.4
1975 15.63 10.79 14.15 9.81 33.81 29.94 3.5 2.2 2.6 1.6
1976 15.96 11.09 14.52 10.07 33.58 29.74 3.5 2.1 2.5 1.5
1977 16.24 11.42 14.78 10.39 33.90 30.06 3.2 2.0 2.3 1.4
1978 16.38 11.55 14.83 10.44 34.08 30.31 3.0 1.8 2.2 1.3
1979 16.53 11.59 14.96 10.42 34.15 30.40 2.9 1.7 2.1 1.2
1980 16.54 11.50 14.95 10.29 34.37 30.59 2.8 1.6 2.0 1.2
1981 16.46 11.28 14.75 10.03 34.42 30.71 2.7 1.6 2.0 1.2
1982 16.80 11.49 15.04 10.22 33.46 29.76 3.2 1.9 2.3 1.4
1983 17.21 11.72 15.42 10.41 33.35 29.69 3.4 2.0 2.5 1.4
1984 17.41 11.78 15.58 10.41 33.82 30.30 3.2 1.9 2.4 1.4
1985 17.51 11.75 15.64 10.34 34.05 30.57 3.2 1.8 2.3 1.4
1986 17.63 11.81 15.74 10.41 34.31 30.85 3.1 1.8 2.3 1.3
1987 17.56 11.58 15.63 10.14 34.71 31.33 3.0 1.7 2.2 1.3
1988 17.48 11.39 15.54 9.98 34.86 31.52 2.8 1.6 2.1 1.2
1989 17.20 11.01 15.24 9.61 35.05 31.78 2.7 1.6 2.0 1.2
1990 16.98 10.64 15.05 9.25 34.86 31.66 2.7 1.6 2.1 1.2
1991 16.81 10.45 14.91 9.11 34.53 31.32 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.2
1992 16.50 10.15 14.62 8.87 34.66 31.46 2.5 1.5 1.9 1.1
1993 16.09 9.79 14.26 8.60 34.63 31.46 2.5 1.5 1.9 1.2















































Colombia 1. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital
oe o f Asset, 1950-94 (constant 1980pesos)
Gross stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
1,023,835 767.342 171.792 595.550 256.493
1,066,845 797.915 189.032 608.883 268.930
1,109,494 828.205 206.327 621.878 281.290
1,163,273 867.632 230.005 637.627 295.641
1,233,752 920.359 262.112 658.247 313.393
1,314,488 980.835 298.435 682.400 333.653
1,396,601 1.042.214 335.184 707.030 354.387
1,466,379 1.092.500 362.948 729.552 373.879
1,524,438 1.132.724 383.390 749.334 391.714
1,582,015 1.171.985 402.409 769.575 410.031
1,643,413 1.214.276 422.840 791.436 429.137
1,707,663 1.261.579 443.875 817.704 446.084
1,768,081 1.306.677 457.916 848.761 461.404
1,822,812 1.346.620 468.203 878.417 476.192
1,883,237 1.392.477 485.098 907.379 490.760
1,944,143 1.438.402 502.164 936.238 505.741
2,002,011 1.480.588 516.311 964.277 521.423
2,066,503 1.526.530 529.499 997.031 539.973
2,133,822 1.572.140 536.437 1.035.703 561.682
2,206,466 1.620.873 540.796 1.080.078 585.593
2,293,615 1.682.163 551.451 1.130.712 611.452
2,396,446 1.758.674 573.539 1.185.135 637.772
2,512,209 1.850.088 610.260 1.239.827 662.121
2,643,160 1.954.138 656.111 1.298.027 689.021
2,791,116 2.071.384 705.849 1.365.535 719.732
2,936,893 2.188.398 753.211 1.435.187 748.495
3,079,312 2.303.219 798.985 1.504.234 776.093
3,229,466 2.423.837 848.569 1.575.268 805.629
3,390,475 2.551.779 906.151 1.645.627 838.696
3,561,144 2.689.656 974.153 1.715.504 871.488
3,749,496 2.847.120 1.052.652 1.794.468 902.376
3,961,202 3.026.109 1.139.536 1.886.572 935.094
4,184,069 3.214.747 1.229.532 1.985.215 969.322
4,409,268 3.402.315 1.317.760 2.084.555 1.006.953
4,629,577 3.581.279 1.396.815 2.184.464 1.048.298
4,832,434 3.741.846 1.454.077 2.287.769 1.090.588
5,025,749 3.890.764 1.495.560 2.395.203 1.134.985
5,225,926 4.043.541 1.549.255 2.494.285 1.182.385
5,442,346 4.212.006 1.619.077 2.592.929 1.230.340
5,665,823 4.389.532 1.690.395 2.699.137 1.276.291
5,874,741 4.555.652 1.759.343 2.796.309 1.319.089
6,063,918 4.699.082 1.816.184 2.882.897 1.364.836
6,257,817 4.838.757 1.870.628 2.968.129 1.419.060
6,518,999 5.030.308 1.976.179 3.054.129 1.488.691

















































The Economic Development of Latin America 
continued) C.O I •>
Net stocks 
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
662,418 479.365 110.414 368.951 183.053
687,788 496.627 122.709 373.918 191.161
713,413 514.436 135.948 378.488 198.977
750,277 541.706 155.934 385.772 208.572
802,427 581.110 183.292 397.818 221.317
861,074 624.821 211.654 413.167 236.252
916,434 665.137 236.454 428.683 251.297
953,661 688.934 247.151 441.783 264.726
974,244 698.092 246.193 451.899 276.152
993,395 705.648 243.338 462.310 287.747
1,019,533 719.248 245.071 474.178 300.284
1,053,639 742.815 252.552 490.263 310.824
1,089,216 769.729 258.877 510.852 319.487
1,119,163 791.755 262.107 529.648 327.408
1,149,054 814.146 266.736 547.409 334.908
1,179,530 836.905 271.274 565.631 342.624
1,211,528 860.688 275.691 584.997 350.840
1,252,608 890.894 280.299 610.595 361.714
1,304,150 928.669 285.679 642.990 375.480
1,367,905 976.780 296.966 679.813 391.125
1,444,600 1.036.245 317.405 718.840 408.355
1,531,335 1.105.688 347.425 758.263 425.646
1,616,946 1.176.380 378.953 797.428 440.565
1,703,757 1.246.081 407.358 838.723 457.676
1,800,442 1.322.249 436.060 886.189 478.193
1,895,550 1.400.009 464.924 935.085 495.541
1,990,353 1.479.426 496.155 983.270 510.927
2,089,439 1.560.821 528.391 1.032.430 528.619
2,193,212 1.642.803 563.159 1.079.644 550.410
2,304,656 1.732.423 606.593 1.125.830 572.232
2,428,871 1.837.986 657.027 1.180.959 590.885
2,568,982 1.959.307 711.629 1.247.678 609.676
2,712,812 2.083.184 764.685 1.318.499 629.628
2,853,368 2.199.930 811.623 1.388.306 653.438
2,988,340 2.307.807 849.878 1.457.929 680.533
3,108,790 2.400.956 870.511 1.530.445 707.834
3,224,994 2.488.052 881.838 1.606.213 736.942
3,346,846 2.577.714 905.593 1.672.121 769.132
3,479,527 2.677.873 941.221 1.736.652 801.654
3,611,862 2.779.542 977.043 1.802.500 832.320
3,721,640 2.861.560 1.009.219 1.852.341 860.080
3,808,601 2.919.093 1.030.216 1.888.878 889.507
3,897,184 2.970.910 1.049.081 1.921.829 926.274
4,055,565 3.077.720 1.121.264 1.956.456 977.845
















































'olombia 2. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital
oe o f Asset, 1950-94 (constant million 1980 international
Gross stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
42,962 29,876 3.135 26.741 13.086
44,510 30,789 3.449 27.340 13.721
46,040 31,688 3.765 27.923 14.352
47,911 32,828 4.197 28.630 15.084
50,329 34,339 4.783 29.556 15.989
53,110 36,087 5.446 30.641 17.023
55,944 37,863 6.117 31.747 18.081
58,457 39,381 6.623 32.758 19.075
60,628 40,642 6.996 33.646 19.985
62,818 41,898 7.343 34.555 20.920
65,147 43,253 7.716 35.537 21.895
67,575 44,816 8.100 36.716 22.759
70,008 46,467 8.356 38.111 23.541
72,282 47,986 8.544 39.442 24.296
74,634 49,595 8.852 40.743 25.039
77,005 51,202 9.164 42.038 25.803
79,322 52,719 9.422 43.297 26.603
81,980 54,431 9.662 44.768 27.550
84,951 56,294 9.789 46.505 28.657
88,243 58,366 9.869 48.497 29.877
92,030 60,834 10.063 50.771 31.197
96,220 63,680 10.466 53.214 32.539
100,588 66,806 11.136 55.670 33.782
105,410 70,256 11.973 58.283 35.154
110,916 74,195 12.880 61.314 36.721
116,375 78,187 13.745 64.442 38.189
121,719 82,122 14.580 67.542 39.597
127,320 86,217 15.485 70.732 41.104
133,217 90,427 16.536 73.891 42.791
139,269 94,805 17.777 77.029 44.464
145,823 99,783 19.209 80.574 46.040
153,213 105,504 20.794 84.710 47.709
161,031 111,576 22.437 89.139 49.455
169,021 117,646 24.047 93.600 51.375
177,060 123,575 25.489 98.086 53.485
184,901 129,258 26.534 102.724 55.642
192,747 134,839 27.291 107.548 57.907
200,594 140,268 28.271 111.997 60.326
208,744 145,971 29.545 116.426 62.772
217,159 152,042 30.847 121.195 65.117
224,964 157,663 32.105 125.558 67.300
232,223 162,588 33.142 129.446 69.635
239,810 167,409 34.136 133.273 72.401
249,150 173,196 36.062 137.135 75.954

















































The Economic Development of Latin America
Net stocks
Non-residential
Res.Total Total M&E Structures
27.921 18.581 2.015 16.566 9.339
28.782 19.029 2.239 16.789 9.753
29.627 19.475 2.481 16.995 10.152
30.809 20.167 2.846 17.322 10.641
32.499 21.207 3.345 17.863 11.292
34.468 22.414 3.862 18.552 12.054
36.385 23.563 4.315 19.248 12.821
37.853 24.347 4.510 19.837 13.506
38.873 24.783 4.493 20.291 14.089
39.880 25.199 4.440 20.758 14.681
41.084 25.763 4.472 21.291 15.321
42.481 26.622 4.609 22.014 15.858
43.962 27.662 4.724 22.938 16.300
45.269 28.565 4.783 23.782 16.705
46.534 29.447 4.867 24.579 17.087
47.829 30.348 4.950 25.398 17.481
49.198 31.298 5.031 26.267 17.900
50.986 32.532 5.115 27.417 18.455
53.241 34.084 5.213 28.871 19.157
55.899 35.944 5.419 30.525 19.955
58.903 38.069 5.792 32.277 20.834
62.104 40.387 6.340 34.047 21.717
65.199 42.721 6.915 35.806 22.478
68.444 45.093 7.434 37.660 23.351
72.146 47.748 7.957 39.791 24.398
75.753 50.471 8.484 41.987 25.283
79.272 53.204 9.054 44.150 26.068
82.970 56.000 9.642 46.358 26.970
86.836 58.754 10.277 48.478 28.082
90.816 61.621 11.069 50.551 29.196
95.164 65.016 11.990 53.027 30.147
100.114 69.008 12.986 56.023 31.106
105.281 73.157 13.954 59.203 32.124
110.486 77.148 14.811 62.337 33.339
115.693 80.972 15.509 65.463 34.721
120.718 84.604 15.885 68.719 36.114
125.812 88.213 16.092 72.121 37.599
130.847 91.606 16.525 75.081 39.241
136.054 95.154 17.176 77.978 40.901
141.229 98.764 17.829 80.935 42.465
145.471 101.589 18.416 83.173 43.882
148.996 103.613 18.800 84.813 45.383
152.696 105.437 19.144 86.293 47.259
158.199 108.309 20.461 87.848 49.890

















































E.18 Colombia 3. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives 
"apital-Output Ratios, 1950—94 (on the basis of national currencies at 
mt 1980 prices)









Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
14.35 9.58 14.02 9.07 34.18 30.58 2.9 1.9 2.2 1.3
14.42 9.64 14.04 9.10 33.63 30.02 2.9 1.9 2.2 1.4
14.45 9.66 14.02 9.07 33.21 29.53 2.8 1.8 2.1 1.3
14.27 9.45 13.77 8.80 33.40 29.69 2.8 1.8 2.1 1.3
14.01 9.20 13.45 8.52 32.97 29.19 2.8 1.8 2.1 1.3
13.78 8.99 13.17 8.29 32.45 28.65 2.9 1.9 2.1 1.4
13.67 8.96 13.04 8.26 31.61 27.79 2.9 1.9 2.2 1.4
13.84 9.17 13.21 8.50 30.68 26.84 3.0 1.9 2.2 1.4
14.05 9.38 13.43 8.73 30.41 26.55 3.0 1.9 2.3 1.4
14.23 9.51 13.62 8.85 30.29 26.37 2.9 1.8 2.2 1.3
14.30 9.57 13.68 8.90 30.28 26.35 2.9 1.8 2.2 1.3
14.32 9.57 13.64 8.81 30.11 26.25 2.9 1.8 2.1 1.3
14.37 9.59 13.62 8.75 29.87 25.99 2.8 1.8 2.1 1.2
14.49 9.70 13.69 8.81 29.92 26.05 2.8 1.7 2.1 1.2
14.55 9.72 13.70 8.75 30.15 26.32 2.8 1.7 2.0 1.2
14.65 9.81 13.73 8.78 29.82 25.97 2.8 1.7 2.0 1.2
14.63 9.77 13.64 8.66 29.94 26.08 2.7 1.6 2.0 1.2
14.57 9.69 13.51 8.54 29.99 26.08 2.7 1.6 2.0 1.2
14.41 9.58 13.26 8.40 30.09 26.13 2.6 1.6 1.9 1.1
14.24 9.47 13.01 8.27 30.45 26.45 2.5 1.6 1.9 1.1
14.05 9.28 12.75 8.06 30.90 26.90 2.5 1.6 1.8 1.1
13.89 9.14 12.53 7.89 31.13 27.18 2.4 1.6 1.8 1.1
13.78 9.08 12.36 7.82 31.19 27.34 2.4 1.5 1.8 1.1
13.70 9.00 12.27 7.75 31.06 27.19 2.4 1.5 1.7 1.1
13.60 8.90 12.16 7.66 30.98 27.18 2.4 1.5 1.7 1.1
13.58 8.88 12.08 7.63 30.48 26.74 2.4 1.6 1.8 1.2
13.52 8.89 11.96 7.66 30.46 26.77 2.4 1.6 1.8 1.2
13.48 8.89 11.92 7.67 30.26 26.58 2.4 1.6 1.8 1.2
13.41 8.86 11.86 7.67 30.25 26.60 2.4 1.5 1.8 1.1
13.34 8.83 11.78 7.65 29.95 26.38 2.3 1.5 1.8 1.1
13.23 8.74 11.63 7.55 29.92 26.43 2.4 1.5 1.8 1.2
13.13 8.66 11.50 7.46 29.62 26.19 2.5 1.6 1.9 1.2
13.07 8.61 11.43 7.43 29.39 26.03 2.6 1.7 2.0 1.3
13.03 8.61 11.41 7.46 29.03 25.69 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.02 8.64 11.40 7.52 28.81 25.49 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.06 8.74 11.46 7.66 28.49 25.17 2.7 1.8 2.1 1.4
13.08 8.76 11.49 7.70 28.64 25.31 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.11 8.83 11.55 7.82 28.70 25.36 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.09 8.82 11.54 7.82 28.80 25.49 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.18 8.91 11.67 7.92 28.62 25.33 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.32 9.05 11.84 8.08 28.50 25.24 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.52 9.22 12.10 8.29 28.28 24.97 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.66 9.32 12.29 8.41 28.49 25.13 2.7 1.7 2.1 1.3
13.58 9.17 12.26 8.30 28.87 25.44 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.2
13.35 8.89 12.08 8.06 28.89 25.39 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.2
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Table E.19 Colombia 4. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives 
and Capital-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of constant 1980 
international dollars)
Average age capital stock Average service life capital Capital-output ratios
stock _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Total Non- Total Non- Total Non-
residential r e s id e n tia l______________ residential
Mid-
vear
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
1950 15.27 10.28 15.23 9.97 39.28 35,32 2,8 1,8 1,9 1,2
1951 15.42 10.41 15.36 10.08 38.87 34,86 2,8 1,8 1,9 1,2
1952 15.53 10.48 15.45 10.12 38.65 34,53 2,7 1,8 1,9 1,2
1953 15.47 10.36 15.35 9.95 38.86 34,65 2,7 1,7 1,8 1,1
1954 15.31 10.17 15.15 9.73 38.73 34,35 2,6 1,7 1,8 1,1
1955 15.16 9.99 14.97 9.52 38.39 33,90 2,7 1,7 1,8 1,1
1956 15.09 9.96 14.87 9.49 37.77 33,19 2,7 1,8 1,8 1,1
1957 15.21 10.10 14.99 9.67 37.05 32,39 2,8 1,8 1,9 1,1
1958 15.38 10.27 15.15 9.85 36.81 32,10 2,8 1,8 1,9 1,1
1959 15.51 10.34 15.27 9.90 36.78 31,98 2,7 1,7 1,8 1,1
1960 15.57 10.41 15.33 9.96 36.75 31,93 2,7 1,7 1,8 1,1
1961 15.60 10.43 15.26 9.85 36.67 31,96 2,6 1,7 1,8 1,0
1962 15.64 10.44 15.21 9.75 36.52 31,79 2,6 1,6 1,7 1,0
1963 15.76 10.56 15.25 9.79 36.47 31,78 2,6 1,6 1,7 1,0
1964 15.82 10.60 15.23 9.73 36.64 31,98 2,5 1,6 1,7 1,0
1965 15.91 10.69 15.23 9.75 36.37 31,68 2,5 1,6 1,7 1,0
1966 15.90 10.67 15.11 9.63 36.47 31,76 2,5 1,5 1,6 1,0
1967 15.80 10.57 14.90 9.46 36.64 31,87 2,4 1,5 1,6 1,0
1968 15.61 10.45 14.60 9.29 36.77 31,97 2,4 1,5 1,6 1,0
1969 15.44 10.34 14.33 9.16 37.12 32,33 2,3 1,5 1,6 1,0
1970 15.29 10.17 14.10 8.95 37.46 32,71 2,3 1,5 1,5 1,0
1971 15.18 10.05 13.92 8.80 37.59 32,93 2,3 1,5 1,5 1,0
1972 15.11 10.03 13.76 8.73 37.51 32,95 2,2 1,4 1,5 0,9
1973 15.03 9.94 13.66 8.66 37.52 32,89 2,2 1,4 1,4 0,9
1974 14.94 9.84 13.54 8.55 37.47 32,91 2,2 1,4 1,4 0,9
1975 14.94 9.82 13.46 8.51 37.00 32,49 2,2 1,4 1,5 1,0
1976 14.91 9.85 13.35 8.56 36.96 32,50 2,2 1,4 1,5 1,0
1977 14.88 9.84 13.30 8.56 36.80 32,32 2,2 1,4 1,5 1,0
1978 14.83 9.82 13.26 8.58 36.75 32,26 2,1 1,4 1,5 0,9
1979 14.79 9.83 13.20 8.59 36.45 32,03 2,1 1,4 1,4 0,9
1980 14.71 9.76 13.06 8.49 36.46 32,12 2,1 1,4 1,5 1,0
1981 14.64 9.68 12.92 8.40 36.23 31,93 2,2 1,4 1,5 1,0
1982 14.58 9.64 12.83 8.36 36.01 31,76 2,3 1,5 1,6 1,0
1983 14.53 9.63 12.79 8.39 35.72 31,43 2,4 1,5 1,6 1,1
1984 14.50 9.64 12.76 8.44 35.53 31,26 2,4 1,6 1,7 1,1
1985 14.50 9.70 12.76 8.54 35.30 31,02 2,4 1,6 1,7 1,1
1986 14.48 9.68 12.75 8.55 35.43 31,16 2,4 1,6 1,7 1,1
1987 14.51 9.76 12.82 8.69 35.37 31,07 2,4 1,5 1,6 1,1
1988 14.48 9.75 12.80 8.70 35.49 31,24 2,4 1,5 1,6 1,1
198 9 14.58 9.85 12.95 8.83 35.30 31,07 2,4 1,5 1,7 1,1
1990 14.73 10.01 13.16 9.03 35.13 30,93 2,4 1,5 1,6 1,1
1991 14.94 10.20 13.45 9.28 34.97 30,67 2,4 1,5 1,7 1,1
1992 15.09 10.30 13.69 9.45 35.16 30,81 2,4 1,5 1,7 1,0
1993 15.07 10.24 13.78 9.47 35.46 30,96 2,3 1,5 1,6 1,0
















































\exico 1. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital
>e o f Asset, 1950-94 (constant 1980 pesos)
Gross stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
1,161,610 937.095 145.880 791.215 224.514
1,268,525 1.027.481 161.671 865.810 241.043
1,390,508 1.131.796 179.234 952.562 258.712
1,513,255 1.235.054 198.128 1.036.926 278.201
1,636,803 1.337.211 218.484 1.118.728 299.592
1,770,065 1.446.993 239.366 1.207.627 323.072
1,922,487 1.573.605 262.773 1.310.832 348.882
2,094,984 1.717.690 290.594 1.427.096 377.293
2,270,575 1.862.028 320.044 1.541.984 408.547
2,440,620 1.997.672 347.513 1.650.160 442.948
2,611,295 2.130.511 372.630 1.757.881 480.784
2,782,818 2.257.830 417.289 1.840.541 524.988
2,958,803 2.382.598 484.317 1.898.281 576.205
3,151,240 2.518.665 557.230 1.961.435 632.575
3,382,527 2.687.910 646.452 2.041.458 694.617
3,647,325 2.884.423 750.527 2.133.896 762.902
3,932,193 3.094.136 860.843 2.233.293 838.057
4,255,611 3.334.836 983.586 2.351.250 920.775
4,622,027 3.610.212 1.122.677 2.487.535 1.011.815
5,020,632 3.908.616 1.274.963 2.633.653 1.112.016
5,452,064 4.231.240 1.439.565 2.791.675 1.220.824
5,899,136 4.551.764 1.606.170 2.945.594 1.347.371
6,374,235 4.883.600 1.779.878 3.103.722 1.490.635
6,919,585 5.281.155 1.984.494 3.296.660 1.638.431
7,526,375 5.739.992 2.222.361 3.517.631 1.786.383
8,182,943 6.236.968 2.487.919 3.749.049 1.945.975
8,846,168 6.718.111 2.739.228 3.978.883 2.128.057
9,456,498 7.141.114 2.941.283 4.199.831 2.315.384
10,090,874 7.598.454 3.142.044 4.456.410 2.492.419
10,850,056 8.178.748 3.399.613 4.779.135 2.671.308
11,741,821 8.879.384 3.727.202 5.152.182 2.862.437
12,778,178 9.712.797 4.128.556 5.584.241 3.065.381
13,779,896 10.502.372 4.476.686 6.025.686 3.277.524
14,507,288 11.022.728 4.645.728 6.376.999 3.484.560
15,091,096 11.401.141 4.738.662 6.662.479 3.689.955
15,707,995 11.799.198 4.854.819 6.944.379 3.908.797
16,283,479 12.149.478 4.963.156 7.186.322 4.134.001
16,782,455 12.420.584 5.031.118 7.389.466 4.361.871
17,271,368 12.678.575 5.088.368 7.590.207 4.592.793
17,779,894 12.951.715 5.156.742 7.794.973 4.828.179
18,337,334 13.250.678 5.248.563 8.002.115 5.086.656
18,979,876 13.602.698 5.406.338 8.196.360 5.377.178
19,746,221 14.046.770 5.669.903 8.376.868 5.699.450
20,551,995 14.518.501 5.943.365 8.575.137 6.033.494





















































Total Total M&E Structures Res,
837,728 672,753 99,149 573,604 164,974
917,855 738,870 110,451 628,419 178,986
1,010,569 816,754 123,228 693,526 193,815
1,099,558 889,413 135,338 754,075 210,145
1,184,824 956,712 146,758 809,954 228,113
1,277,148 1,029,276 158,390 870,885 247,872
1,385,858 1,116,267 172,367 943,900 269,591
1,509,139 1,215,688 188,295 1,027,393 293,451
1,628,809 1,309,158 202,554 1,106,604 319,651
1,738,697 1,390,288 214,059 1,176,229 348,409
1,857,908 1,477,946 226,123 1,251,823 379,962
1,986,207 1,570,363 261,152 1,309,211 415,844
2,115,039 1,658,478 318,394 1,340,084 456,561
2,255,129 1,753,722 378,428 1,375,294 501,407
2,425,071 1,874,273 448,532 1,425,741 550,798
2,621,441 2,016,251 526,902 1,489,349 605,190
2,831,949 2,166,862 608,211 1,558,651 665,087
3,068,589 2,337,546 697,119 1,640,427 731,044
3,334,676 2,531,008 794,696 1,736,311 803,669
3,620,755 2,737,122 896,766 1,840,357 883,633
3,925,825 2,954,149 1,002,569 1,951,580 971,675
4,228,568 3,152,163 1,103,137 2,049,026 1,076,405
4,539,469 3,344,300 1,203,213 2,141,087 1,195,169
4,902,308 3,586,452 1,322,803 2,263,649 1,315,857
5,309,029 3,875,040 1,461,211 2,413,829 1,433,989
5,747,732 4,186,815 1,613,843 2,572,971 1,560,917
6,192,879 4,485,856 1,759,161 2,726,694 1,707,024
6,588,529 4,733,601 1,863,662 2,869,939 1,854,927
6,989,165 5,000,279 1,960,660 3,039,619 1,988,886
7,500,284 5,379,317 2,116,013 3,263,305 2,120,966
8,135,577 5,873,774 2,338,428 3,535,347 2,261,803
8,897,611 6,486,681 2,622,645 3,864,037 2,410,930
9,599,834 7,034,313 2,841,835 4,192,478 2,565,520
10,004,214 7,293,099 2,875,582 4,417,517 2,711,115
10,257,720 7,406,403 2,835,715 4,570,688 2,851,317
10,550,531 7,549,248 2,826,762 4,722,486 3,001,283
10,804,270 7,650,571 2,807,984 4,842,588 3,153,698
10,987,777 7,682,992 2,752,222 4,930,770 3,304,784
11,179,076 7,724,153 2,712,313 5,011,840 3,454,923
11,402,865 7,797,090 2,712,170 5,084,920 3,605,775
11,692,600 7,917,525 2,760,998 5,156,527 3,775,075
12,076,453 8,105,362 2,880,048 5,225,314 3,971,091
12,551,759 8,357,972 3,070,306 5,287,665 4,193,787
13,042,359 8,619,734 3,258,858 5,360,876 4,422,626
13,537,383 8,882,789 3,430,287 5,452,502 4,654,594
Table E.21 Mexico 2. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital 







Total M&E Structures Res.
1950 61,878 48.020 6.881 41.138 13.859
1951 67,522 52.643 7.626 45.017 14.879
1952 73,952 57.982 8.454 49.527 15.970
1953 80,432 63.260 9.346 53.914 17.173
1954 86,966 68.473 10.306 58.167 18.493
1955 94,023 74.080 11.291 62.789 19.943
1956 102,086 80.550 12.395 68.155 21.536
1957 111,197 87.908 13.707 74.200 23.290
1958 120,489 95.270 15.096 80.174 25.219
1959 129,533 102.190 16.392 85.798 27.342
1960 138,654 108.976 17.577 91.399 29.678
1961 147,787 115.380 19.683 95.697 32.407
1962 157,113 121.544 22.845 98.699 35.568
1963 167,315 128.267 26.284 101.983 39.048
1964 179,514 136.637 30.493 106.144 42.878
1965 193,445 146.352 35.402 110.950 47.093
1966 208,456 156.724 40.606 116.118 51.732
1967 225,484 168.646 46.396 122.251 56.838
1968 244,751 182.293 52.956 129.337 62.458
1969 265,717 197.074 60.140 136.934 68.643
1970 288,414 213.054 67.904 145.150 75.359
1971 312,087 228.916 75.763 153.153 83.171
1972 337,346 245.331 83.956 161.375 92.015
1973 366,152 265.015 93.608 171.406 101.138
1974 397,994 287.724 104.828 182.896 110.271
1975 432,405 312.283 117.355 194.928 120.122
1976 467,448 336.087 129.209 206.878 131.362
1977 500,031 357.106 138.740 218.366 142.925
1978 533,769 379.916 148.210 231.706 153.853
1979 573,741 408.845 160.359 248.486 164.896
1980 620,387 443.694 175.811 267.882 176.694
1981 674,311 485.090 194.743 290.347 189.221
1982 726,780 524.464 211.164 313.299 202.316
1983 765,800 550.704 219.138 331.566 215.096
1984 797,706 569.931 223.522 346.409 227.775
1985 831,350 590.067 229.001 361.066 241.284
1986 862,942 607.757 234.111 373.645 255.185
1987 890,776 621.525 237.317 384.208 269.251
1988 918,168 634.662 240.017 394.645 283.506
1989 946,570 648.534 243.243 405.292 298.036
1990 977,627 663.635 247.574 416.062 313.991
1991 1,013,102 681.177 255.016 426.161 331.925
1992 1,054,813 702.995 267.448 435.547 351.818
1993 1,098,641 726.203 280.347 445.855 372.438




















































Total Total M&E Structures Res.
44,684 34.501 4.677 29.824 10.184
48,932, 37.884 5.210 32.674 11.049
53,836 41.872 5.813 36.059 11.964
58,563 45.591 6.384 39.207 12.972
63,116 49.035 6.923 42.113 14.081
68,053 52.752 7.471 45.281 15.301
73,849 57.208 8.131 49.077 16.641
80,414 62.300 8.882 53.418 18.114
86,823 67.091 9.554 57.537 19.732
92,761 71.254 10.097 61.157 21.507
99,208 75.753 10.666 65.087 23.454
106,059 80.390 12.318 68.071 25.669
112,878 84.695 15.019 69.676 28.183
120,308 89.357 17.850 71.507 30.951
129,287 95.287 21.157 74.130 34.000
139,648 102.291 24.854' 77.437 37.357
150,784 109.730 28.689 81.040 41.055
163,301 118.175 32.883 85.292 45.126
177,373 127.763 37.486 90.278 49.609
192,533 137.988 42.300 95.687 54.545
208,741 148.761 47.291 101.470 59.980
225,016 158.572 52.035 106.537 66.445
241,855 168.079 56.755 111.324 73.776
261,318 180.092 62.396 117.696 81.226
282,947 194.430 68.925 125.505 88.518
306,257 209.904 76.125 133.779 96.353
330,123 224.751 82.979 141.772 105.372
351,630 237.128 87.909 149.220 114.502
373,297 250.526 92.484 158.042 122.771
400,408 269.484 99.812 169.672 130.924
433,737 294.120 110.303 183.817 139.617
473,439 324.616 123.710 200.907 148.823
510,398 352.032 134.049 217.984 158.365
532,678 365.325 135.641 229.684 167.353
547,416 371.408 133.760 237.648 176.007
564,143 378.879 133.338 245.541 185.264
578,910 384.237 132.452 251.785 194.673
590,191 386.192 129.822 256.370 203.999
601,792 388.525 127.939 260.585 213.267
614,896 392.318 127.933 264.385 222.579
631,373 398.344 130.236 268.108 233.029
652,665 407.536 135.851 271.685 245.129
678,628 419.752 144.826 274.927 258.876
705,455 432.453 153.720 278.733 273.002
732,624 445.303 161.806 283.497 287.321
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Table E.22 Mexico 3. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives and 
Capital-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of national currencies at 
constant 1980prices)
Average age capital stock Average service life capital 
stock
Capital-output ratios
Total Non- Total Non- Total Non-
residential residential residential
Mid­ Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
year
1950 11.64 7.81 11.06 7.50 37,08 34,52 1,7 1,2 1,4 1,0
1951 11.45 7.65 10.93 7.33 37,53 35,10 1,7 1,3 1,4 1,0
1952 11.34 7.51 10.87 7.17 37,16 34,73 1,9 1,3 1,5 1,1
1953 11.36 7.57 10.97 7.25 36,79 34,36 1,9 1,4 1,6 1,1
1954 11.41 7.64 11.11 7.34 36,47 34,00 2,0 1,4 1,6 1,1
1955 11.43 7.63 11.19 7.34 36,49 34,03 2,0 1,4 1,6 1,1
1956 11.38 7.56 11.19 7.26 36,59 34,16 2,0 1,5 1,7 1,2
1957 11.35 7.64 11.21 7.36 36,57 34,15 2,1 1,5 1,7 1,2
1958 11.45 7.73 11.38 7.48 36,00 33,52 2,1 1,5 1,7 1,2
1959 11.59 7.84 11.60 7.61 35,73 33,21 2,2 1,6 1,8 1,2
1960 11.46 7.85 11.47 7.62 35,54 32,95 2,2 1,6 1,8 1,2
1961 11.42 7.90 11.43 7.69 35,45 32,71 2,2 1,6 1,8 1,3
1962 11.40 7.99 11.40 7.82 34,75 31,87 2,3 1,6 1,8 1,3
1963 11.35 8.02 11.34 7.87 34,32 31,32 2,2 1,6 1,8 1,2
1964 11.23 7.94 11.20 7.78 34,13 31,06 2,1 1,5 1,7 1,2
1965 11.08 7.97 11.01 7.82 33,43 30,26 2,2 1,6 1,7 1,2
1966 10.98 7.94 10.88 7.79 32,89 29,63 2,2 1,6 1,7 1,2
1967 10.87 7.84 10.75 7.67 32,61 29,29 2,2 1,6 1,7 1,2
1968 10.77 7.75 10.63 7.57 32,16 28,79 2,2 1,6 1,7 1,2
1969 10.68 7.70 10.52 7.52 31,71 28,28 2,3 1,6 1,8 1,2
1970 10.62 7.68 10.47 7.49 31,31 27,85 2,3 1,7 1,8 1,3
1971 10.69 7.72 10.60 7.58 30,75 27,11 2,4 1,7 1,9 1,3
1972 10.74 7.70 10.71 7.56 30,64 26,95 2,4 1,7 1,8 1,3
1973 10.73 7.61 10.70 7.43 30,58 26,88 2,4 1,7 1,8 1,2
1974 10.72 7.56 10.66 7.32 30,26 26,60 2,5 1,7 1,9 1,3
1975 10.69 7.49 10.63 7.21 29,96 26,25 2,5 1,8 1,9 1,3
1976 10.71 7.52 10.66 7.23 29,34 25,54 2,6 1,8 2,0 1,3
1977 10.82 7.62 10.76 7.33 28,93 25,10 2,7 1,9 2,0 1,4
1978 10.91 7.64 10.81 7.27 29,15 25,36 2,7 1,8 2,0 1,3
1979 10.89 7.56 10.72 7.10 29,37 25,60 2,6 1,8 2,0 1,3
1980 10.80 7.46 10.54 6.91 29,40 25,70 2,6 1,8 2,0 1,3
1981 10.64 7.31 10.29 6.67 29,41 25,78 2,6 1,8 2,0 1,3
1982 10.73 7.40 10.34 6.73 28,51 24,89 2,9 2,0 2,2 1,5
1983 11.06 7.71 10.69 7.05 27,88 24,22 3,1 2,2 2,4 1,6
1984 11.36 7.97 10.99 7.31 28,13 24,39 3,1 2,1 2,4 1,5
1985 11.60 8.19 11.23 7.52 28,35 24,52 3,2 2,1 2,4 1,5
1986 11.90 8.47 11.52 7.80 28,25 24,34 3,4 2,3 2,6 1,6
1987 12.19 8.73 11.81 8.07 28,33 24,31 3,5 2,3 2,6 1,6
1988 12.46 9.02 12.07 8.37 28,54 24,44 3,5 2,3 2,6 1,6
1989 12.73 9.21 12.32 8.54 28,74 24,53 3,5 2,2 2,5 1,5
1990 12.91 9.31 12.49 8.61 29,00 24,67 3,4 2,2 2,5 1,5
1991 13.01 9.34 12.56 8.60 29,25 24,80 3,4 2,2 2,4 1,5
1992 13.07 9.33 12.59 8.57 29,44 24,89 3,4 2,2 2,4 1,4
1993 13.19 9.38 12.67 8.58 29,17 24,55 3,5 2,2 2,5 1,5




















































E.23 Mexico 4. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives and 
al-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of constant 1980 international 
's)
The Economic Development of Latin America









Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
11.79 7.90 11.14 7.56 38.04 35.09 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.7
11.59 7.75 11.00 7.38 38.48 35.68 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.7
11.47 7.61 10.95 7.22 38.12 35.32 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.7
11.48 7.66 11.05 7.30 37.74 34.92 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.8
11.53 7.72 11.18 7.39 37.43 34.58 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.8
11.53 7.72 11.27 7.39 37.46 34.61 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.8
11.47 7.65 11.27 7.31 37.57 34.75 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.8
11.44 7.72 11.29 7.41 37.54 34.74 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8
11.52 7.81 11.46 7.53 36.98 34.11 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8
11.65 7.91 11.67 7.66 36.73 33.79 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.9
11.52 7.92 11.55 7.67 36.55 33.54 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.8
11.49 7.98 11.52 7.76 36.43 33.23 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.9
11.48 8.08 11.51 7.90 35.79 32.42 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.9
11.44 8.12 11.47 7.97 35.40 31.89 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.8
11.33 8.04 11.33 7.88 35.24 31.65 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8
11.20 8.07 11.16 7.94 34.57 30.85 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8
11.10 8.05 11.03 7.91 34.07 30.23 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8
11.01 7.95 10.91 7.80 33.81 29.90 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.8
10.91 7.86 10.79 7.69 33.39 29.41 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.8
10.83 7.82 10.68 7.64 32.95 28.89 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.8
10.77 7.80 10.63 7.61 32.57 28.46 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.8
10.82 7.83 10.77 7.70 32.05 27.71 1.7 1.2 1.2 0.9
10.87 7.81 10.88 7.69 31.95 27.55 1.7 1.2 1.2 0.8
10.86 7.72 10.87 7.56 31.89 27.48 1.7 1.2 1.2 0.8
10.85 7.68 10.83 7.45 31.56 27.20 1.7 1.2 1.3 0.8
10.82 7.62 10.80 7.34 31.27 26.84 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.9
10.84 7.64 10.83 7.36 30.67 26.13 1.9 1.3 1.3 0.9
10.95 7.75 10.93 7.45 30.27 25.69 1.9 1.3 1.4 0.9
11.04 7.77 10.98 7.38 30.49 25.96 1.9 1.3 1.3 0.9
11.03 7.71 10.89 7.22 30.70 26.20 1.9 1.3 1.3 0.9
10.95 7.62 10.71 7.02 30.72 26.30 1.9 1.3 1.3 0.9
10.81 7.49 10.45 6.78 30.72 26.38 1.9 1.3 1.3 0.9
10.91 7.57 10.50 6.83 29.83 25.49 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.0
11.24 7.88 10.84 7.15 29.20 24.80 2.2 1.5 1.6 1.1
11.53 8.14 11.14 7.41 29.45 24.97 2.2 1.5 1.6 1.0
11.77 8.36 11.38 7.62 29.68 25.11 2.3 1.5 1.6 1.0
12.07 8.64 11.68 7.91 29.59 24.93 2.4 1.6 1.7 1.1
12.36 8.90 11.96 8.18 29.69 24.90 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.1
12.63 9.19 12.23 8.48 29.91 25.02 2.5 1.7 1.7 1.1
12.90 9.38 12.48 8.66 30.12 25.12 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.0
13.09 9.49 12.65 8.73 30.40 25.25 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.0
13.20 9.53 12.74 8.75 30.66 25.38 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.0
13.28 9.54 12.77 8.72 30.86 25.46 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.0
13.40 9.59 12.87 8.75 30.60 25.12 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.0
















































enezuela 1. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital
ie o f  Asset, 1950-94 (constant 1980 bolívares)
Gross stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
128,678 112,340 50,564 61,776 16,338
142,283 124,192 55,403 68,789 18,090
157,815 137,135 60,709 76,426 20,680
175,771 151,782 67,732 84,051 23,989
195,894 168,408 75,919 92,489 27,486
216,918 186,285 84,296 101,989 30,632
238,672 204,481 92,175 112,306 34,191
262,628 224,761 101,279 123,483 37,867
287,513 245,494 111,752 133,742 42,019
312,265 266,372 122,495 143,877 45,893
333,325 284,677 130,439 154,238 48,648
348,609 297,584 134,592 162,992 51,025
361,003 307,457 137,301 170,156 53,546
371,894 315,225 138,346 176,880 56,669
384,093 323,595 139,129 184,466 60,499
399,491 334,192 141,539 192,653 65,299
416,621 345,912 145,331 200,581 70,709
433,210 356,998 147,893 209,106 76,211
450,128 368,323 148,561 219,763 81,804
468,521 380,937 149,061 231,875 87,584
487,600 393,940 149,953 243,987 93,660
509,952 409,210 152,483 256,727 100,742
536,703 427,396 156,070 271,326 109,307
566,795 447,587 160,344 287,243 119,208
597,296 468,033 165,104 302,929 129,264
634,674 495,286 174,875 320,411 139,387
687,762 536,684 193,783 342,901 151,078
757,953 593,453 221,401 372,051 164,501
839,186 660,021 254,056 405,964 179,166
912,155 717,208 280,211 436,998 194,947
969,938 759,418 298,010 461,407 210,520
1,023,751 799,675 315,583 484,092 224,076
1,077,832 843,244 334,989 508,255 234,588
1,121,769 879,592 349,234 530,358 242,177
1,150,897 903,202 356,761 546,441 247,695
1,175,328 923,228 365,435 557,793 252,100
1,200,945 944,620 376,805 567,815 256,325
1,225,619 965,059 387,481 577,578 260,560
1,249,739 985,123 397,592 587,531 264,617
1,267,440 999,395 404,364 595,031 268,045
1,274,380 1,004,002 401,679 602,323 270,379
1,279,644 1,007,455 393,154 614,301 272,189
1,287,588 1,013,062 381,576 631,485 274,526
1,294,572 1,017,323 365,421 651,902 277,249





















































Total Total M&E Structures Res.
94,446 82,822 35,519 47,302 11,625
104,166 91,036 38,117 52,919 13,130
115,783 100,343 41,352 58,991 15,440
129,723 111,299 46,423 64,876 18,424
145,399 123,866 52,482 71,384 21,533
161,081 136,862 58,128 78,733 24,219
176,189 148,937 62,277 86,660 27,252
192,191 161,864 66,666 95,197 30,327
207,903 174,096 71,546 102,550 33,807
222,843 185,911 76,396 109,515 36,932
234,134 195,247 78,809 116,438 38,887
240,034 199,595 78,056 121,539 40,438
244,215 202,120 77,272 124,848 42,095
248,626 204,310 76,739 127,571 44,316
254,919 207,735 76,521 131,213 47,184
263,672 212,736 76,917 135,819 50,936
273,072 217,872 77,242 140,631 55,199
282,599 223,144 77,043 146,101 59,456
293,921 230,216 76,969 153,247 63,705
307,825 239,803 78,140 161,663 68,022
322,133 249,630 79,802 169,828 72,503
337,591 259,732 82,104 177,628 77,859
356,986 272,424 86,059 186,365 84,562
380,159 287,720 91,561 196,159 92,440
403,810 303,519 97,931 205,589 100,291
431,559 323,527 107,275 216,252 108,033
471,331 354,164 122,467 231,697 117,168
526,935 399,107 145,355 253,752 127,828
591,630 452,126 171,871 280,255 139,504
645,399 493,352 190,093 303,259 152,048
681,484 517,387 198,882 318,504 164,097
710,979 537,179 206,349 330,830 173,800
738,193 558,039 214,206 343,833 180,155
753,689 570,307 215,904 354,403 183,382
754,736 570,331 211,224 359,107 184,405
751,593 567,356 207,713 359,642 184,238
750,588 566,715 207,020 359,696 183,823
750,298 566,937 206,696 360,241 183,361
751,097 568,420 206,881 361,539 182,677
746,706 565,394 204,207 361,188 181,312
734,378 555,578 194,915 360,663 178,800
726,927 551,206 186,462 364,744 175,721
731,945 558,844 184,481 374,363 173,100
741,753 570,951 184,163 386,787 170,802















































enemela 2. Gross and Net Fixed Tangible Reproducible Capital
ie o f  Asset, 1950-94 (constant million 1980 international dollars)
Gross stocks
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
26,144 23,195 11,162 12,033 2,949
28,894 25,629 12,230 13,399 3,265
32,021 28,288 13,402 14,886 3,733
35,653 31,323 14,952 16,371 4,330
39,736 34,774 16,759 18,015 4,961
44,003 38,474 18,608 19,865 5,529
48,394 42,223 20,348 21,875 6,172
53,244 46,409 22,357 24,052 6,835
58,304 50,720 24,669 26,050 7,585
63,349 55,065 27,041 28,024 8,284
67,618 58,837 28,795 30,042 8,781
70,669 61,459 29,711 31,748 9,210
73,118 63,452 30,309 33,143 9,665
75,222 64,993 30,540 34,453 10,229
77,563 66,643 30,713 35,930 10,920
80,557 68,770 31,245 37,525 11,787
83,914 71,151 32,082 39,069 12,763
87,134 73,377 32,647 40,730 13,757
90,366 75,600 32,795 42,805 14,766
93,879 78,070 32,905 45,165 15,809
97,532 80,626 33,102 47,524 16,906
101,850 83,666 33,661 50,005 18,184
107,032 87,301 34,452 52,849 19,731
112,863 91,345 35,396 55,949 21,518
118,784 95,451 36,447 59,004 23,333
126,174 101,013 38,604 62,410 25,160
136,838 109,568 42,778 66,790 27,270
151,036 121,343 48,874 72,468 29,693
167,497 135,157 56,083 79,074 32,340
182,164 146,975 61,857 85,118 35,189
193,659 155,659 65,786 89,873 38,000
204,404 163,957 69,665 94,291 40,447
215,291 172,947 73,949 98,998 42,344
224,111 180,397 77,094 103,303 43,714
229,901 185,191 78,755 106,436 44,710
234,822 189,317 80,670 108,647 45,505
240,047 193,779 83,180 110,599 46,268
245,070 198,037 85,537 112,501 47,032
249,973 202,208 87,769 114,439 47,765
253,547 205,164 89,264 115,900 48,384
254,796 205,991 88,671 117,320 48,805
255,574 206,442 86,789 119,653 49,132
256,787 207,234 84,233 123,001 49,553
257,689 207,644 80,667 126,977 50,045
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Net stocks 
Non-residential
Total Total M&E Structures Res.
19,153 17,054 7,841 9,214 2,098
21,092 18,722 8,414 10,308 2,370
23,406 20,619 9,129 11,490 2,787
26,210 22,884 10,248 12,636 3,326
29,376 25,490 11,585 13,904 3,887
32,539 28,168 12,832 15,336 4,372
35,546 30,627 13,748 16,880 4,919
38,733 33,259 14,717 18,543 5,474
41,871 35,768 15,794 19,975 6,102
44,862 38,196 16,864 21,331 6,666
47,096 40,077 17,397 22,680 7,019
48,204 40,904 17,231 23,673 7,299
48,974 41,376 17,058 24,318 7,598
49,788 41,788 16,940 24,848 7,999
50,967 42,450 16,892 25,558 8,517
52,628 43,434 16,979 26,455 9,194
54,407 44,443 17,051 27,392 9,964
56,197 45,465 17,007 28,458 10,732
58,339 46,840 16,991 29,849 11,499
61,017 48,738 17,250 31,489 12,278
63,783 50,695 17,616 33,079 13,087
66,777 52,723 18,124 34,598 14,054
70,562 55,298 18,998 36,300 15,264
75,106 58,420 20,212 38,208 16,686
79,766 61,663 21,618 40,045 18,103
85,303 65,803 23,681 42,122 19,500
93,314 72,165 27,035 45,130 21,149
104,587 81,513 32,087 49,426 23,074
117,710 92,529 37,941 54,588 25,181
128,477 101,032 41,963 59,069 27,445
135,562 105,942 43,903 62,038 29,620
141,363 109,991 45,552 64,439 31,372
146,777 114,258 47,286 66,972 32,519
149,793 116,692 47,661 69,031 33,101
149,861 116,575 46,628 69,947 33,286
149,160 115,904 45,853 70,051 33,256
148,942 115,761 45,700 70,061 33,181
148,894 115,796 45,628 70,168 33,098
149,064 116,090 45,669 70,421 32,974
148,159 115,431 45,079 70,352 32,728
145,552 113,278 43,028 70,250 32,274
143,925 112,206 41,161 71,045 31,719
144,888 113,643 40,724 72,918 31,246
146,823 115,993 40,654 75,338 30,831


















































E.26 Venezuela 3. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives 
'apital-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of national currencies at 
2nt 1980 prices)
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Average age capital stock Average service life capital Capital-output ratios
________________    stock
Total Non- Total Non- Total Non-
___________ residential re s id e n tia l_____________ residential
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
9.05 6.14 8.16 5.56 27.29 25.51 2.8 2.1 2.5 1.8
9.01 6.13 8.24 5.65 27.01 25.05 2.8 2.0 2.4 1.8
8.84 6.00 8.17 5.58 27.62 25.60 2.9 2.1 2.5 1.8
8.70 5.92 8.15 5.59 27.56 25.37 3.0 2.2 2.6 1.9
8.56 5.88 8.06 5.57 27.65 25.53 3.1 2.3 2.6 1.9
8.59 5.99 8.14 5.71 27.14 25.03 3.1 2.3 2.7 2.0
8.66 6.04 8.27 5.79 27.21 25.03 3.1 2.3 2.7 1.9
8.77 6.14 8.41 5.89 27.29 25.17 3.1 2.2 2.6 1.9
8.95 6.30 8.66 6.09 26.99 24.75 3.3 2.4 2.8 2.0
9.14 6.43 8.84 6.19 26.70 24.61 3.3 2.4 2.8 2.0
9.50 6.71 9.21 6.45 25.90 23.82 3.5 2.5 3.0 2.1
9.91 7.09 9.63 6.80 25.66 23.60 3.5 2.4 3.0 2.0
10.28 7.45 10.01 7.17 25.67 23.53 3.3 2.2 2.8 1.9
10.61 7.75 10.36 7.47 25.71 23.49 3.2 2.1 2.7 1.8
10.83 7.93 10.61 7.66 26.27 23.93 3.0 2.0 2.5 1.6
10.99 8.04 10.80 7.79 26.65 24.19 3.0 2.0 2.5 1.6
11.14 8.20 10.97 7.97 26.90 24.35 3.0 2.0 2.5 1.6
11.27 8.33 11.10 8.11 26.85 24.22 3.0 2.0 2.5 1.6
11.35 8.38 11.18 8.14 27.33 24.61 3.0 1.9 2.4 1.5
11.36 8.40 11.15 8.13 27.67 24.87 3.0 2.0 2.4 1.5
11.46 8.49 11.25 8.20 28.09 25.20 2.9 1.9 2.3 1.5
11.57 8.48 11.37 8.19 28.65 25.64 2.9 1.9 2.3 1.5
11.62 8.40 11.44 8.11 29.05 25.90 3.0 2.0 2.4 1.5
11.60 8.32 11.45 8.03 29.45 26.18 3.0 2.0 2.3 1.5
11.66 8.33 11.49 8.03 29.53 26.20 2.9 2.0 2.3 1.5
11.61 8.19 11.43 7.84 30.43 27.09 2.9 2.0 2.3 1.5
11.38 7.90 11.15 7.48 30.81 27.46 2.9 2.0 2.3 1.5
10.98 7.51 10.67 7.01 31.02 27.75 3.0 2.1 2.4 1.6
10.68 7.25 10.32 6.71 30.38 27.15 3.3 2.3 2.6 1.8
10.71 7.31 10.36 6.79 29.17 25.88 3.5 2.5 2.8 1.9
10.92 7.53 10.60 7.03 28.75 25.44 3.8 2.7 3.0 2.0
11.16 7.71 10.82 7.18 28.75 25.49 4.0 2.8 3.2 2.1
11.45 7.93 11.07 7.35 28.55 25.40 4.2 2.9 3.3 2.2
11.90 8.31 11.48 7.66 27.93 24.82 4.7 3.1 3.7 2.4
12.41 8.76 11.94 8.05 27.69 24.61 4.8 3.2 3.8 2.4
12.87 9.17 12.35 8.41 27.75 24.70 4.9 3.2 3.9 2.4
13.27 9.49 12.67 8.63 27.66 24.62 4.7 3.0 3.7 2.2
13.64 9.79 12.97 8.85 27.50 24.47 4.7 2.9 3.7 2.2
13.96 10.05 13.19 9.03 27.46 24.45 4.5 2.7 3.5 2.0
14.38 10.44 13.53 9.34 27.08 24.07 5.0 2.9 3.9 2.2
14.84 10.81 13.90 9.60 26.93 23.93 4.7 2.7 3.7 2.1
15.14 11.00 14.07 9.67 27.24 24.23 4.3 2.4 3.4 1.9
15.30 11.01 14.07 9.56 27.54 24.51 4.1 2.3 3.2 1.8
15.51 11.10 14.12 9.57 27.89 24.85 4.1 2.4 3.2 1.8
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E.27 Venezuela 4. Capital Stock: Average Ages, Average Service Lives 
'.apital-Output Ratios, 1950-94 (on the basis of constant 1980 
national dollars)









Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
8.82 5.97 8.01 5.44 26.35 24.78 2.1 1.5 1.8 1.3
8.80 5.99 8.10 5.54 26.02 24.30 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.3
8.65 5.87 8.04 5.48 26.64 24.86 2.1 1.5 1.9 1.4
8.52 5.80 8.01 5.49 26.57 24.65 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.4
8.38 5.76 7.92 5.48 26.66 24.81 2.3 1.7 2.0 1.4
8.42 5.88 8.00 5.62 26.16 24.31 2.3 1.7 2.0 1.5
8.51 5.93 8.14 5.70 26.22 24.30 2.3 1.7 2.0 1.4
8.62 6.03 8.28 5.80 26.32 24.46 2.2 1.6 2.0 1.4
8.81 6.19 8.54 5.99 26.02 24.06 2.4 1.7 2.1 1.5
9.00 6.32 8.72 6.09 25.75 23.92 2.4 1.7 2.1 1.5
9.36 6.60 9.09 6.35 24.95 23.12 2.6 1.8 2.2 1.5
9.77 6.97 9.50 6.69 24.71 22.91 2.6 1.7 2.2 1.5
10.14 7.32 9.88 7.05 24.71 22.84 2.4 1.6 2.1 1.4
10.46 7.62 10.21 7.35 24.73 22.79 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.3
10.68 7.79 10.46 7.53 25.27 23.21 2.2 1.4 1.9 1.2
10.84 7.91 10.64 7.65 25.64 23.47 2.2 1.4 1.8 1.2
11.00 8.06 10.82 7.83 25.89 23.63 2.2 1.4 1.9 1.2
11.12 8.20 10.95 7.97 25.81 23.48 2.2 1.4 1.8 1.1
11.21 8.24 11.03 7.99 26.27 23.85 2.2 1.4 1.8 1.1
11.21 8.26 11.00 7.98 26.59 24.10 2.2 1.4 1.8 1.1
11.31 8.34 11.09 8.05 27.01 24.43 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.1
11.42 8.33 11.21 8.03 27.55 24.86 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.1
11.46 8.25 11.27 7.95 27.93 25.11 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.1
11.44 8.17 11.26 7.87 28.32 25.38 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.1
11.48 8.18 11.29 7.87 28.40 25.41 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.1
11.42 8.03 11.21 7.67 29.31 26.31 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.1
11.18 7.73 10.93 7.31 29.69 26.69 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.1
10.77 7.33 10.44 6.85 29.91 26.97 2.2 1.5 1.7 1.2
10.47 7.07 10.10 6.55 29.27 26.38 2.4 1.7 1.9 1.3
10.50 7.14 10.14 6.64 28.06 25.12 2.5 1.8 2.0 1.4
10.71 7.36 10.38 6.88 27.64 24.69 2.8 1.9 2.2 1.5
10.95 7.54 10.60 7.03 27.66 24.75 2.9 2.0 2.3 1.6
11.23 7.76 10.84 7.20 27.48 24.66 3.0 2.1 2.4 1.6
11.68 8.14 11.25 7.52 26.86 24.08 3.4 2.2 2.7 1.7
12.18 8.58 11.71 7.91 26.63 23.88 3.5 2.3 2.8 1.8
12.63 8.98 12.11 8.25 26.70 23.97 3.6 2.3 2.9 1.8
13.01 9.28 12.42 8.47 26.62 23.91 3.4 2.1 2.8 1.6
13.38 9.57 12.72 8.68 26.45 23.76 3.4 2.0 2.7 1.6
13.68 9.81 12.94 8.84 26.42 23.74 3.2 1.9 2.6 1.5
14.09 10.19 13.28 9.14 26.04 23.36 3.6 2.1 2.9 1.6
14.55 10.54 13.65 9.40 25.88 23.20 3.4 1.9 2.7 1.5
14.84 10.72 13.82 9.47 26.17 23.49 3.1 1.8 2.5 1.4
14.98 10.72 13.81 9.36 26.45 23.73 2.9 1.7 2.4 1.3
15.17 10.81 13.86 9.37 26.79 24.05 3.0 1.7 2.4 1.3
15.49 11.05 14.06 9.54 27.22 24.48 3.1 1.8 2.5 1.4
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NOTES
1. Dollar with the same purchasing power parity over total GDP as the US dollar, but with a 
purchasing power over subaggregates and over detailed categories determined by average 
international prices rather than by US relative prices.
2. The exchange rates normally used are the (rf) series of the IMF, published in International 
Financial Statistics, various issues, which refer to period averages of market exchange rates for 
countries quoting in units of national currency per US dollar.

Appendix F. Foreign Trade*
Latin American involvement in the world economy and its role on economic 
development is a continuing theme in the debate on what development strategy 
should be chosen. In this appendix imports and exports series are presented, in 
current dollars and as indices representing volume movement only. For each 
country and each series I will give a detailed description of the sources used.
General sources
Imports and exports in current dollars for 1950-94 come from IMF (1995b). If not 
indicated otherwise current imports and exports for 1934-49 are from ECLAC 
(1976). ECLAC (1976) also provides the inport volume for the 1934-59 period 
(with the exception of Colombia) and the export volume for Argentina, Chile and 
Mexico for 1934-72 and for 1934-55 in the cases of Brazil and Venezuela.
Argentina
Current exports: 1900-1913, Lewis (1981); 1914-33, Wilkie (1974).
Export volume: 1900-1933, Di Telia and Zymelman (1973); 1973-94, ECLAC, 
Statistics and Projections Division.
Current imports: 1900-1914, Di Telia and Zymelman (1973, pp. 100-121);
1915-33, Wilkie (1974, p. 259).
Import volume: 1900-1933, United Nations (1959); 1960-86, IMF (1988), p. 
166; 1987-94, ECLAC, Statistics and Projections Division.
Brazil
Current exports: 1900-1913, Lewis (1981, p. 57). 1914-15, intrapolated;
1916-33, Wilkie (1974, p. 259).
Export volume: 1900-1933, ECLAC (1951).
Current imports: 1900-1915, APEC (1975); 1916-33, Wilkie (1974, p. 259).
* I am very grateful to John Hennelly who assisted me in the preparation of this appendix during his 
stay at ECLAC in Santiago de Chile
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Import volume: 1900-1912, Villela and Suzigan (1977, p. 366); 1913-33, 
ECLAC (1951, p. 221); 1961-85, IMF (1988, p. 166); 1986-94, ECLAC, 
Statistics and Projections Division.
Chile
Current exports: 1900-1915, INE (various issues) linked for 1916-29 with Wilkie 
(1974, p. 262); 1930-34 from ECLAC (1976).
Export volume: 1900-1930, ECLAC (1951, p. 284); 1973-93, ECLAC, Statistics 
and Projections Division.
Current imports: 1900-1915, INE (various issues) linked for 1916-29 with Wilkie 
(1974, p. 262); 1930-34 from ECLAC (1976).
Import volume: 1900-1930, ECLAC (1951, p. 284); 1960-86, IMF (1988, p. 
170); 1987-94, ECLAC, Statistics and Projections Division.
Colombia
Current exports: 1900-1904, Lewis (1981, p. 57). 1905-30, Colombia, 
Contraloria General de la República (1931), Anuario de Comercio Exterior. Año 
1930, vol. XXIX, p. 234; 1931-33, Wilkie (1974, p. 259).
Export volume: 1900-1904: 1900, Maddison (1989, p. 138); 1901-04 are 
intrapolated; 1905-55, Colombia, Contraloria General de la República, Anuario 
de Comercio Exterior, (1926, p. 213; 1950, p. 3 and 1966, p. LID); 1956-87, IMF 
(1988, p. 166); 1988-94, ECLAC, Statistics and Projections Division.
Current imports: 1905-30, Colombia, Contraloria General de la República (1931), 
Anuario de Comercio Exterior. Año 1930, vol. XXIX, p. 234; 1931-33, Wilkie 
(1974, p. 259).
Import volume: 1900-1904, not available; 1905-67, Colombia, Contraloria 
General de la República, Anuario de Comercio Exterior, (1937, p. 203; 1950, p. 2 
and 1967, p. LIE); 1968-87, IMF (1988, p. 170); 1988-94, ECLAC, Statistics 
and Projections Division.
Mexico
Current exports: 1900-1913, Lewis (1981, p. 57); 1914-17, intrapolated; 
1918-33, Wilkie (1974, p. 259).
Export volume: 1900-1933, ECLAC (1951, p. 424); 1973-94, ECLAC, Statistics 
and Projections Division.
Current imports: 1900-1917, INEGI (1990, vol. II, p. 679); 1918-33, Wilkie 
(1974, p. 259).
Import volume: 1900-1933, ECLAC (1951, p. 424); 1960-86, IMF (1988, p. 
170); 1987-94, ECLAC, Statistics and Projections Division.
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Venezuela
Current exports: 1900-1912, Lewis (1981, p. 57); 1913-49, Baptista (1991). 
Export volume: 1900-1949, Baptista (1991, pp. 35, 63); 1950-56, ECLAC 
(1976); 1956-83, IMF (1988, p. 166); 1984-94, ECLAC, Statistics and 
Projections Division.
Current imports: 1900-1915, Baptista (1991); 1916-33, Wilkie (1974, p. 259). 
Import volume: 1900-1933, Baptista (1991, pp. 61, 63); 1960-86, IMF (1988, p. 
166); 1987-94, ECLAC, Statistics and Projections Division.
252 The Economic Development of Latin America
Table F.l Latin American Exports, Six Countries, 1900-1994 (current dollars)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 149 182 61 11 75 9
1901 162 194 63 11 77 9
1902 173 175 68 9 76 8
1903 213 177 71 12 83 7
1904 255 189 79 19 95 16
1905 312 215 97 12 97 14
1906 282 255 208 15 135 16
1907 286 263 202 15 124 16
1908 356 215 233 15 120 15
1909 386 310 228 16 115 16
1910 362 307 243 18 129 17
1911 316 325 250 22 146 19
1912 467 363 282 32 148 26
1913 515 317 292 34 150 32
1914 566 223 215 33 154 23
1915 622 262 241 32 157 26
1916 556 267 188 36 161 25
1917 534 298 260 37 165 26
1918 777 288 292 37 168 51
1919 1,000 571 116 79 180 57
1920 1,013 368 289 71 383 33
1921 651 220 162 63 339 23
1922 656 301 124 53 289 27
1923 748 336 198 60 254 31
1924 790 423 221 86 267 45
1925 793 491 229 85 203 76
1926 730 461 201 112 299 93
1927 972 431 206 109 268 110
1928 1,017 475 236 134 255 141
1929 907 465 279 127 255 203
1930 895 736 277 113 329 193
1931 814 432 173 142 258 106
1932 569 312 58 98 147 113
1933 475 282 49 71 121 88
1934 475 291 95 78 149 143
1935 501 272 96 70 207 143
1936 537 322 113 78 188 167
1937 758 350 193 86 221 208
1938 438 296 139 81 161 201
1939 466 305 136 78 150 185
1940 428 263 140 71 142 177
1941 455 358 159 76 138 258
1942 503 400 178 98 168 181
1943 610 466 179 125 231 221
1944 682 575 195 130 216 303
1945 739 655 205 141 258 393
1946 1,168 972 217 201 320 555
1947 1,612 1,131 279 255 414 718




Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1949 1,011 1,089 296 321 381 1,164
1950 1,178 1,359 281 394 532 929
1951 1,169 1,771 370 463 644 1,187
1952 688 1,416 453 473 665 1,350
1953 1,125 1,539 408 596 591 1,463
1954 1,027 1,562 398 657 591 1,396
1955 929 1,423 472 584 785 1,819
1956 944 1,482 542 537 834 2,099
1957 975 1,392 455 511 735 2,542
1958 994 1,243 386 461 736 2,326
1959 1,009 1,282 495 473 753 2,214
1960 1,079 1,268 488 465 764 2,305
1961 964 1,403 506 435 826 2,225
1962 1,216 1,214 530 463 930 2,342
1963 1,365 1,406 522 446 985 2,343
1964 1,410 1,430 592 548 1,054 2,472
1965 1,493 1,596 637 539 1,145 2,455
1966 1,593 1,741 817 508 1,199 2,373
1967 1,465 1,654 847 510 1,145 3,077
1968 1,368 1,881 858 558 1,254 2,779
1969 1,612 2,311 1,075 708 1,430 3,083
1970 1,773 2,739 1,249 736 1,402 3,169
1971 1,740 2,904 997 690 1,504 3,124
1972 1,941 3,991 855 866 1,694 3,166
1973 3,266 6,199 1,231 1,177 2,250 3,298
1974 3,931 7,951 2,481 1,417 2,958 11,153
1975 2,961 8,670 1,552 1,465 2,904 8,800
1976 3,916 10,128 2,083 1,745 3,417 9,299
1977 5,652 12,120 2,190 2,663 4,167 9,551
1978 6,400 12,659 2,478 3,003 6,005 9,187
1979 7,810 15,244 3,894 3,300 8,982 14317
1980 8,021 20,132 4,705 3,945 15,570 19,221
1981 9,143 23,293 3,837 2,956 19,646 20,980
1982 7,625 20,175 3,706 3,095 21,214 16,590
1983 7,836 21,899 3,831 3,081 21,819 13,937
1984 8,107 27,005 3,651 3,462 24,407 15,997
1985 8,396 25,639 3,804 3,552 22,112 14,438
1986 6,852 22,349 4,191 5,102 16,347 8,660
1987 6,360 26,224 5,224 4,642 20,887 10,577
1988 9,135 33,494 7,052 5,037 20,765 10,244
1989 9,579 34,383 8,080 5,717 23,048 13,286
1990 12,353 31,414 8,373 6,766 27,131 17,497
1991 11,978 31,620 8,942 7,232 27,318 15,155
1992 12,235 35,793 10,007 6,917 27,722 14,185
1993 13,118 38,597 9,199 7,116 30,241 14,066
1994 15,659 43,558 11,539 8,399 34,530 15,480
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Table F.2 Latin American Imports, Six Countries, 1900-1994 (current dollars)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 156 135 48 0 56 11
1901 140 110 52 0 59 12
1902 119 115 50 0 71 5
1903 159 119 53 0 72 11
1904 252 126 59 0 79 9
1905 246 112 71 12 97 9
1906 300 122 88 11 103 10
1907 303 158 110 12 98 10
1908 260 139 101 14 69 9
1909 289 145 99 11 88 10
1910 363 175 112 17 91 15
1911 388 195 131 18 80 20
1912 429 233 125 24 83 19
1913 477 247 123 29 46 17
1914 377 138 98 21 23 11
1915 298 143 57 18 42 17
1916 310 191 82 30 31 21
1917 410 201 128 25 89 24
1918 425 251 161 22 135 15
1919 556 350 137 48 138 37
1920 793 439 123 101 194 62
1921 635 217 110 33 242 18
1922 585 214 81 42 152 20
1923 736 231 117 61 155 31
1924 565 305 128 56 153 43
1925 700 412 137 89 189 60
1926 662 391 164 111 180 81
1927 721 388 132 126 160 71
1928 705 442 151 149 168 82
1929 717 417 203 126 180 89
1930 911 445 175 63 275 119
1931 513 245 145 67 153 62
1932 322 182 44 49 95 41
1933 329 238 38 55 89 37
1934 291 210 44 53 92 38
1935 301 226 61 60 113 44
1936 308 247 72 68 128 56
1937 427 335 88 85 170 92
1938 392 295 89 79 109 99
1939 312 241 103 96 121 105
1940 284 250 85 75 124 99
1941 241 278 104 86 188 90
1942 237 238 108 53 155 66
1943 181 317 128 76 177 67
1944 201 415 131 87 278 114
1945 266 446 144 142 330 184
1946 519 674 156 204 543 300
1947 1,188 1,217 197 323 661 568




Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1949 1,036 1,115 304 234 440 724
1950 964 1,090 294 323 549 597
1951 1,480 1,987 391 371 822 765
1952 1,179 1,982 440 368 807 862
1953 795 1,319 398 484 808 961
1954 979 1,634 411 595 714 937
1955 1,173 1,307 448 592 874 1,098
1956 1,128 1,234 421 582 1,072 1,321
1957 1,310 1,489 525 483 1,155 1,869
1958 1,233 1,353 494 400 1,129 1,599
1959 993 1,374 491 415 1,007 1,578
1960 1,249 1,462 625 517 1,186 1,188
1961 1,460 1,460 711 557 1,139 1,197
1962 1,357 1,475 680 541 1,143 1,304
1963 981 1,487 663 508 1,240 1,238
1964 1,077 1,263 723 586 1,493 1,249
1965 1,199 1,096 718 454 1,560 1,421
1966 1,124 1,496 892 675 1,605 1,307
1967 1,096 1,667 819 497 1,748 1,445
1968 1,169 2,132 852 643 1,960 1,665
1969 1,576 2,265 1,028 685 2,080 1,720
1970 1,694 2,849 1,063 843 2,461 1,869
1971 1,868 3,701 1,109 929 2,407 2,103
1972 1,905 4,783 1,086 859 2,718 2,463
1973 2,230 6,999 1,290 1,062 3,814 2,812
1974 3,635 14,168 2,148 1,597 6,057 4,148
1975 3,947 13,592 1,525 1,495 6,580 6,000
1976 3,033 13,726 1,864 1,662 6,028 7,663
1977 4,162 13,257 2,539 1,880 5,489 10,938
1978 3,834 15,054 3,408 2,971 8,109 11,767
1979 6,700 19,804 4,808 3,364 12,086 10,670
1980 10,541 24,961 5,797 4,739 19,460 11,827
1981 9,430 24,079 7,181 5,201 24,068 13,106
1982 5,337 21,069 3,989 5,480 15,128 12,944
1983 4,504 16,801 3,085 4,963 8,023 6,419
1984 4,585 15,210 3,574 4,498 11,788 7,774
1985 3,814 14,332 3,072 4,141 13,993 8,106
1986 4,724 15,557 3,436 3,862 11,997 8,504
1987 5,818 16,581 4,396 4,322 12,731 9,659
1988 5,322 16,055 5,292 5,002 19,591 12,726
1989 4,203 19,875 7,144 5,004 24,438 7,803
1990 4,076 22,524 7,678 5,590 29,969 7,335
1991 8,275 22,950 8,094 4,906 38,124 11,147
1992 14,872 23,068 10,129 6,516 48,160 14,066
1993 16,784 27,740 11,125 9,832 50,147 12,200
1994 21,527 35,997 11,825 11,883 60,979 8,879
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Table F.3 Latin American Export Volume Indices, Six Countries, 1900—1994
(1980 = 100)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 16.3 0.0 23.6 0.8 8.3 4.3
1901 17.8 10.7 25.6 0.8 9.5 3.9
1902 19.0 10.2 24.3 0.7 9.8 3.1
1903 23.4 9.6 26.2 0.9 10.3 3.7
1904 27.6 7.7 28.9 1.4 10.3 4.6
1905 30.0 8.3 34.6 0.8 9.9 4.3
1906 26.3 10.6 87.2 1.0 10.3 4.0
1907 27.1 11.4 108.4 1.1 9.4 3.8
1908 33.0 9.3 99.6 1.0 9.8 3.9
1909 30.9 12.1 98.1 1.3 11.0 4.2
1910 29.6 7.9 110.6 1.5 12.6 4.2
1911 26.3 8.6 129.1 1.6 12.2 4.2
1912 38.9 9.2 123.4 1.6 12.5 4.4
1913 38.4 10.2 121.8 2.0 14.2 5.3
1914 41.7 9.1 97.0 1.9 15.8 5.5
1915 60.4 12.7 56.6 1.6 17.4 5.1
1916 52.6 10.8 81.0 1.6 19.0 5.1
1917 38.0 10.7 130.0 2.0 20.6 5.6
1918 54.6 9.1 159.0 2.0 22.2 6.5
1919 64.3 11.9 147.0 2.3 17.0 6.4
1920 62.3 10.9 166.0 2.4 36.8 6.3
1921 57.5 11.0 139.0 3.0 36.4 7.6
1922 73.0 11.6 87.0 2.6 39.9 7.6
1923 74.1 12.8 120.0 2.8 35.6 8.0
1924 91.5 11.5 133.0 3.2 32.4 9.1
1925 73.0 11.2 149.0 3.2 31.2 12.1
1926 81.8 10.9 157.0 9.0 32.4 13.7
1927 109.1 12.3 131.0 19.2 32.9 20.2
1928 101.3 11.6 146.0 25.6 31.3 29.1
1929 101.3 12.3 179.0 25.8 31.3 38.3
1930 70.1 13.5 288.0 26.6 25.2 38.2
1931 97.4 14.5 145.0 23.0 26.4 32.6
1932 89.6 9.9 44.0 21.9 18.6 32.2
1933 85.7 12.4 38.0 17.3 19.7 31.1
1934 72.5 13.6 44.0 23.2 26.2 35.7
1935- 76.5 15.7 61.0 23.2 26.8 38.1
1936 69.2 17.4 72.0 23.8 29.4 42.1
1937 80.5 15.7 88.0 25.6 34.6 45.8
1938 51.9 19.0 89.0 27.0 15.4 46.1
1939 66.5 19.5 103.0 27.7 14.6 47.7
1940 56.5 16.2 85.0 30.7 12.5 40.1
1941 50.5 17.6 104.0 29.2 13.7 56.0
1942 49.2 13.4 108.0 11.7 14.0 37.6
1943 50.5 13.6 128.0 16.5 16.3 44.8
1944 55.2 16.0 131.0 25.7 13.4 60.3
1945 56.5 17.4 144.0 26.9 15.7 77.2
1946 58.5 21.4 156.0 25.1 16.0 91.7
1947 63.8 20.2 197.0 27.2 16.3 101.9




Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1949 38.6 20.4 303.8 33.4 14.6 110.5
1950 47.9 16.5 31.7 38.8 16.6 124.7
1951 37.9 17.9 32.7 44.2 16.9 141.3
1952 25.9 15.0 34.0 42.8 17.5 152.4
1953 42.6 16.5 29.4 45.5 18.3 146.8
1954 45.9 14.6 33.6 42.8 18.6 157.9
1955 40.6 16.7 35.0 38.7 23.0 180.1
1956 45.2 21.3 38.2 37.0 23.6 208.2
1957 47.9 17.9 39.1 33.8 21.5 284.0
1958 51.9 19.0 37.3 39.5 23.3 251.4
1959 52.5 22.1 43.7 47.6 25.3 214.6
1960 53.2 22.3 40.0 45.8 25.0 213.0
1961 47.9 23.5 44.6 43.3 25.6 177.5
1962 58.5 23.3 45.1 50.3 28.8 187.1
1963 66.5 27.1 46.0 55.1 29.1 188.9
1964 64.5 23.1 50.6 56.7 29.4 192.7
1965 71.2 25.4 49.7 59.8 32.6 191.4
1966 73.8 29.0 52.9 69.4 34.0 185.0
1967 69.2 27.6 53.4 57.3 32.0 240.0
1968 66.5 31.7 53.8 61.6 33.5 217.4
1969 75.1 36.1 52.9 66.6 37.8 241.2
1970 81.0 45.4 49.2 69.9 38.0 182.1
1971 70.7 49.7 55.3 73.3 36.0 211.5
1972 65.2 58.8 49.3 81.6 40.5 209.4
1973 81.8 66.1 50.6 82.3 36.3 169.7
1974 78.5 62.3 61.0 75.9 38.2 145.8
1975 58.9 69.0 65.6 93.0 38.8 110.1
1976 84.7 69.4 84.7 86.0 46.9 111.4
1977 117.0 68.5 83.1 66.7 62.2 103.4
1978 123.7 75.5 79.2 88.9 66.0 100.6
1979 115.9 82.5 98.1 100.6 77.5 111.3
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 117.8 123.0 93.7 89.2 121.3 94.1
1982 105.4 114.5 100.7 84.9 152.9 74.2
1983 120.4 134.0 101.8 94.3 182.5 77.0
1984 119.7 160.1 107.6 103.1 198.7 88.0
1985 143.2 166.2 119.6 106.4 180.5 80.8
1986 125.1 143.2 122.7 125.2 185.4 92.0
1987 119.8 171.7 135.8 135.5 204.2 89.2
1988 150.0 193.3 150.5 130.4 219.7 99.9
1989 145.4 200.4 173.5 147.3 223.8 102.4
1990 198.1 186.9 191.1 180.1 233.2 117.1
1991 187.3 195.9 202.6 199.0 250.9 124.1
1992 188.1 230.1 238.7 214.9 258.4 119.6
1993 197.7 254.4 245.7 229.9 265.5 127.8
1994 232.6 268.4 266.8 226.7 291.5 140.9
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Table F.4 Latin American Import Volume Indices, Six Countries, 1900-1994 
(1980=100)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 17.2 0.0 11.0 0.0 5.8 3.5
1901 17.9 8.7 13.5 0.0 6.1 3.5
1902 15.4 9.1 13.1 0.0 5.7 3.6
1903 20.0 9.3 13.8 0.0 7.1 3.8
1904 31.9 9.4 15.5 0.0 6.7 3.7
1905 30.1 11.0 19.9 1.9 9.5 3.9
1906 34.7 11.6 24.5 1.5 9.4 4.1
1907 33.6 13.3 29.7 1.5 11.2 4.3
1908 31.2 11.8 28.5 1.8 10.6 4.1
1909 36.1 12.6 24.2 1.5 8.2 4.2
1910 41.3 15.7 25.9 2.2 9.5 4.6
1911 44.8 19.3 29.3 2.5 9.7 4.8
1912 43.8 20.6 30.7 2.9 9.1 5.0
1913 48.0 20.4 30.5 3.4 9.7 5.2
1914 29.7 10.6 24.3 2.8 8.5 4.7
1915 22.4 6.7 14.7 2.3 7.4 4.7
1916 27.0 7.2 20.4 2.5 6.2 5.5
1917 23.5 6.1 25.0 2.2 5.1 5.0
1918 21.7 6.2 24.6 1.2 3.9 4.2
1919 26.6 8.6 19.4 2.1 5.2 5.5
1920 36.1 11.7 17.4 3.6 7.6 5.9
1921 34.0 7.8 17.5 2.7 11.2 4.4
1922 34.3 8.9 17.5 3.1 7.1 5.4
1923 44.8 10.0 24.9 4.5 8.6 5.9
1924 46.6 14.2 27.6 5.1 8.6 6.1
1925 53.9 18.0 29.9 7.3 12.3 6.4
1926 56.4 15.6 40.5 9.3 11.3 6.8
1927 60.2 15.6 28.2 11.6 9.4 6.9
1928 63.4 18.1 30.0 14.6 10.0 6.7
1929 64.4 18.3 38.1 14.1 10.7 7.3
1930 53.6 11.1 35.2 8.9 8.7 6.5
1931 35.0 7.3 19.0 5.4 5.5 5.8
1932 27.3 6.6 6.7 4.0 4.2 4.7
1933 31.9 9.1 7.5 4.7 5.0 4.8
1934 33.3 10.1 9.9 5.8 6.1 4.8
1935 34.4 11.5 15.0 5.9 6.3 3.6
1936 36.3 11.7 17.0 8.0 7.3 5.0
1937 47.6 14.4 19.0 8.6 9.4 7.3
1938 45.0 13.4 17.4 8.9 7.8 7.8
1939 37.8 12.3 22.1 11.4 7.1 9.0
1940 32.5 10.9 16.6 8.7 6.7 8.1
1941 25.7 10.9 19.4 8.5 10.0 6.2
1942 21.2 8.0 16.2 4.3 7.3 3.9
1943 14.0 10.4 16.6 5.2 8.8 3.6
1944 14.0 12.8 16.6 8.0 13.1 8.1
1945 15.5 12.5 17.8 11.7 15.5 10.4
1946 30.6 16.0 17.8 14.3 20.8 14.6
1947 55.6 23.0 18.6 20.7 21.0 24.6
1948 62.0 20.6 24.5 18.1 14.1 32.8




Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1950 38.2 22.7 21.7 20.4 14.5 27.4
1951 43.5 35.2 24.5 23.0 18.8 28.3
1952 32.9 33.6 24.9 23.2 18.4 30.8
1953 25.7 23.0 24.1 32.8 17.7 33.3
1954 31.4 28.3 23.3 41.0 17.5 36.7
1955 36.7 21.4 25.3 37.2 19.0 38.6
1956 35.5 20.8 24.5 37.4 22.2 43.1
1957 40.8 26.4 32.0 31.8 23.1 60.2
1958 41.2 25.4 29.6 22.4 22.0 51.0
1959 35.2 27.2 28.0 21.5 20.4 50.1
1960 45.0 28.0 36.4 26.2 21.7 35.8
1961 51.0 25.0 41.8 31.2 20.8 36.1
1962 0.0 25.0 40.5 30.9 20.9 39.1
1963 33.0 24.5 38.7 24.9 22.4 36.4
1964 36.0 21.6 41.1 32.4 26.6 36.2
1965 40.0 18.6 40.7 23.3 27.3 40.3
1966 37.0 24.8 50.1 39.1 29.5 38.3
1967 36.0 26.8 49.0 26.6 29.7 40.5
1968 39.0 33.2 49.8 37.3 33.7 47.1
1969 50.0 24.6 58.7 39.1 34.5 46.9
1970 53.7 49.1 60.4 56.3 35.8 48.7
1971 57.9 58.7 59.1 60.3 34.6 51.6
1972 54.0 69.8 63.9 54.1 38.8 55.1
1973 55.0 86.3 71.1 51.2 46.5 52.5
1974 62.5 108.1 73.6 58.9 53.2 62.2
1975 59.0 101.5 47.3 49.6 51.8 81.1
1976 47.8 101.1 48.8 56.5 45.6 103.3
1977 60.9 92.6 59.7 67.6 41.6 135.5
1978 52.5 96.1 77.8 84.4 52.9 130.5
1979 77.0 103.8 89.7 84.8 68.3 102.5
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 89.6 87.0 120.1 105.8 122.2 115.7
1982 53.6 77.1 70.3 118.1 75.6 118.9
1983 47.9 64.5 61.2 108.5 54.9 82.8
1984 51.2 62.1 69.8 101.1 68.9 73.8
1985 41.7 61.3 65.3 89.5 84.8 81.4
1986 50.3 80.4 68.9 91.5 74.3 83.8
1987 54.8 78.3 82.3 97.0 77.4 92.3
1988 46.2 74.5 94.2 109.7 109.8 118.8
1989 34.4 81.6 119.2 104.8 133.7 71.6
1990 33.3 88.7 119.1 111.0 152.0 67.1
1991 61.6 99.3 126.3 105.6 176.8 99.6
1992 109.2 98.3 156.1 138.5 221.1 123.7
1993 125.9 127.7 176.0 211.1 214.9 109.9
1994 156.3 159.9 181.5 245.9 250.0 73.3

Appendix G. Prices
In this appendix the consumer prices evolution for the 1900-1994 period is 
presented. I have opted for a year-to-year inflation presentation because several 
countries present periods with very high or even hyperinflation, which makes an 
indices presentation quite difficult. If not mentioned otherwise I used IMF 1995c 
for the 1950-94 period. For the first half of the century sources were used as 
follows.
Argentina
1900-1913 not available, 1913-50, IEERAL (1986, Table 6, Consumer Price 
Index, pp. 122-3).
Brazil
1900-1957, Goldsmith (1986): Table IH-3, p. 91 (1900-1913); Table IV-7, p. 
158 (1913-45); Table V-9, p. 239 (1945-57).
Chile
1900-1950, Mamalakis (1983, vol.4, Table 4.6, p. 224).
Colombia
1900-1929, Ocampo (1981, Table 2, p. 134), representing nominal coffee prices 
which is a very rough approximation of the price level and 1929-50, Wilkie 
(1974, Table 1, p. 227).
Mexico
1900-1950, INEGI (1990, vol. II, Table 19.7, pp. 776-8) using the combined 
consumption and production price index, 1914-18 was interpolated.
Venezuela
1900-1950, Baptista (1991, Table VI-1, p. 287), which is an exports and imports 
price index.
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Table G. 1 Annual Change in Consumer Price Indices in Six Latin American 
Countries, 1900-1994 (annual % change)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1900 n.a. -6.0 18.5 -18.6 16.0 16.5
1901 n.a. -21.3 -16.4 11.4 22.8 -2.1
1902 n.a. -11.3 17.5 -29.5 2.8 -9.0
1903 n.a. 2.9 4.4 27.3 -0.5 -3.3
1904 n.a. 10.7 4.3 -1.4 -1.6 4.7
1905 n.a. -8.7 9.6 7.2 10.6 3.0
1906 n.a. 2.2 -3.7 12.2 -1.0 16.9
1907 n.a. -0.2 34.4 8.4 -1.0 -3.3
1908 n.a. 7.8 17.6 -8.9 3.6 -7.5
1909 n.a. -1.4 -0.5 -2.4 6.5 3.2
1910 n.a. 2.8 6.3 0.0 17.3 12.7
1911 n.a. 6.7 4.1 10.0 -5.2 9.8
1912 n.a. -0.2 -4.9 23.9 -0.8 4.7
1913 n.a. -4.7 4.2 20.2 -0.8 -6.9
1914 -0.5 -13.1 8.4 -3.8 17.5 0.3
1915 7.6 13.1 16.3 -2.4 17.5 6.1
1916 7.5 20.9 -5.1 0.8 17.5 8.8
1917 17.2 8.9 1.9 -4.0 17.5 13.1
1918 25.9 8.2 -1.5 4.2 17.5 3.4
1919 -5.8 8.8 22.7 62.9 -20.0 16.5
1920 17.1 19.1 14.6 5.4 5.0 15.1
1921 -11.1 -15.4 -1.7 -29.6 -8.8 -24.5
1922 -15.9 9.2 4.1 2.7 -16.2 -9.0
1923 -2.0 30.0 2.3 9.1 7.4 -0.2
1924 2.1 11.1 4.6 19.0 -4.4 5.6
1925 -2.7 18.3 7.7 29.5 5.2 4.0
1926 -3.1 -18.1 -0.5 5.4 -1.9 3.7
1927 -1.1 -2.2 1.2 -4.8 -2.5 -4.2
1928 1.1 11.5 0.4 1.2 -3.7 -1.2
1929 -1.1 -3.6 1.3 7.2 -0.6 -4.0
1930 1.1 -12.4 0.7 -19.2 0.6 -6.3
1931 -13.9 -10.8 -5.4 -23.8 -10.4 -4.8
1932 -10.4 1.5 10.1 -18.8 -9.0 -6.9
1933 13.0 -2.0 24.1 38.5 6.2 -13.2
1934 -11.5 6.3 0.1 16.7 3.4 -9.9
1935 6.0 4.7 2.1 -4.8 0.7 0.2
1936 8.7 1.6 8.4 20.0 6.0 6.1
1937 2.4 6.5 12.6 0.0 18.7 3.3
1938 -0.4 6.1 4.4 12.5 4.5 -4.6
1939 1.6 2.0 1.4 3.7 2.8 1.3
1940 1.9 6.7 12.7 -3.6 0.5 0.4
1941 2.7 10.2 15.2 0.0 6.1 4.2
1942 5.9 16.3 25.6 7.4 10.6 5.2
1943 1.0 15.6 16.3 17.2 20.0 7.1
1944 -0.3 21.7 11.7 20.6 28.2 7.4
1945 19.8 15.7 8.8 9.8 8.1 8.6
1946 -69.3 13.9 15.9 8.9 18.8 10.9
1947 334.9 7.8 33.6 18.4 2.1 10.5




Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1949 31.1 9.7 18.8 7.4 5.8 -5.0
1950 25.5 12.6 14.5 20.5 6.0 1.9
1951 36.7 20.8 22.5 9.0 12.6 7.1
1952 38.7 8.1 21.8 -2.4 14.3 1.2
1953 4.0 16.4 25.5 7.3 -1.5 -1.3
1954 3.8 22.2 72.2 8.7 4.9 0.1
1955 12.3 12.8 75.1 -0.8 16.0 -0.4
1956 13.4 33.6 56.1 6.5 4.8 0.9
1957 24.7 14.8 26.8 15.2 5.1 -2.1
1958 31.6 14.7 26.0 14.6 12.1 4.9
1959 113.7 39.3 38.7 7.2 2.6 5.0
1960 27.3 29.5 11.6 3.9 4.9 3.4
1961 13.4 33.4 7.7 8.7 1.6 -2.6
1962 28.3 51.8 14.0 2.5 1.2 -0.5
1963 23.9 70.1 44.1 32.0 0.6 1.1
1964 22.2 91.9 46.0 17.6 2.3 2.1
1965 28.6 65.7 28.8 3.5 3.6 1.7
1966 31.9 41.3 23.1 19.9 4.2 1.8
1967 29.2 30.5 18.8 8.2 3.0 -0.0
1968 16.2 22.0 26.3 5.8 2.3 1.3
1969 7.6 22.7 30.4 10.1 3.4 2.4
1970 13.6 22.4 32.5 6.8 5.2 2.5
1971 34.7 20.1 20.0 9.1 5.3 3.2
1972 58.4 16.6 74.8 13.4 5.0 2.8
1973 61.2 12.7 361.5 20.8 12.0 4.1
1974 23.5 27.6 504.7 24.3 23.8 8.3
1975 182.9 29.0 374.7 22.9 15.2 10.3
1976 444.0 42.0 211.8 20.2 15.8 7.6
1977 176.0 43.7 91.9 33.1 29.0 7.8
1978 175.5 38.7 40.1 17.8 17.5 7.1
1979 159.5 52.7 33.4 24.7 18.2 12.4
1980 100.8 82.8 35.1 26.5 26.4 21.5
1981 104.5 105.6 19.7 27.5 27.9 16.2
1982 164.8 97.8 9.9 24.5 58.9 9.6
1983 343.8 142.1 27.3 19.8 101.8 6.3
1984 626.7 197.0 19.9 16.1 65.5 12.2
1985 672.1 226.9 30.7 24.0 57.7 11.4
1986 90.1 145.2 19.5 18.9 86.2 11.5
1987 131.3 229.7 19.9 23.3 131.8 28.1
1988 343.0 682.3 14.7 28.1 114.2 29.5
1989 3079.8 1287.0 17.0 25.8 20.0 84.2
1990 2314.0 2937.8 26.0 29.1 26.7 40.8
1991 171.7 440.9 21.8 30.4 22.7 34.2
1992 24.9 1008.7 15.4 27.0 15.5 31.4
1993 10.6 2148.4 12.7 22.6 8.7 38.1
1994 4.2 2686.5 11.4 23.8 7.0 60.8

Appendix H. Previous Non-Standardised 
Capital Stock Estimates in 
Latin America
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this appendix is to examine in some detail the history of capital stock 
and national wealth estimation in Latin America in the twentieth century. The 
earliest estimates were made during the first half of the century. A second wave of 
estimates occurred early after World War n, influenced by the pioneering work of 
Goldsmith, Kuznets, Eisner, Fellner and Tinbergen. This appendix analyses all the 
major existing estimates. Chapter 5 presents new standardised estimates.
Reference will be made to earlier studies on capital and wealth estimates which 
are available in some countries such as Argentina and Chile. In Latin America no 
official time series of capital stock figures are prepared on a regular basis. The 
unofficial estimates were made by independent scholars and research institutes, 
and this explains why there are great differences in methodology and coverage.
Existing estimates can be useful for various types of analysis and comparisons 
within each country, but are difficult to use in international comparisons because of 
different underlying assumptions about the lives of assets, retirement patterns, and 
differences in the relative price of assets. Given the great difference in assumptions 
and methodology, this study concludes that the standardised estimates have the 
advantage of using the same methodology for all countries, and this facilitates 
comparisons between countries in terms of capital-output ratios, growth 
performance and the role of technical progress.
A first systematic approach to measuring capital stocks in Latin America was 
undertaken in the early 1950s in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico 
with support from ECLAC.1 Ganz (1959) provides an indication of the importance 
which ECLAC gave at the time to national wealth estimates:
Investment and capital accumulation are the main basis for economic development. . .  
and the study of capital formation, capital accumulation, investment needs, die role of 
foreign capital and the use of investment resources has been undoubtedly the most 
important economic theme of concern to government economic policy, academic study 
as well as the work of international organisations such as ECLA. (p.217)
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CAPITAL STOCK IN ARGENTINA
In the 1950s ECLAC made several efforts to estimate the Argentine capital stock. 
Before that time very few studies were available, with the exception of work 
carried out at the beginning of the century by Argentina’s director general of 
statistics, Alejandro Bunge, who studied Argentina’s wealth in comparative 
perspective, covering France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States 
(see Bunge, 1917). The first ECLAC study, ECLAC (1954), combined the gross 
investment estimates provided by an unofficial study of Belaunde2 with census 
benchmark estimates of the stock of capital.
Belaunde defined gross investment as; machinery and equipment, including 
both domestical and imported; construction and improvements, including public 
works, railways, private buildings and agricultural improvements; and changes in 
the stock of cattle. He felt that his estimates probably underestimated (a) some 
types of durable equipment; (b) some investment in public services, such as trolley 
lines and telephones, and (c) some types of construction and improvements, such 
as mines.
ECLAC (1954) concluded that its estimates of gross investment probably 
understated the level of investment in Argentina. The gross investment series, 
expressed in current prices, were deflated through the use of the gross product 
deflator for the years after 1935. A cost-of-living index was used for the 
1900-1935 period. The investment series were used to estimate the stock of 
capital defined as the depreciated replacement value (in 1950 prices) of 
reproducible tangible and durable capital goods. Land, consumer durable goods, 
inventories other than cattle, and monetary metal were excluded from the stock.
The main benchmark sources were the 1914 Census and the 1935 Census of 
Industry, direct estimates of producers’ durable equipment in industry and 
buildings, and the value of railways. Sectors for which no comprehensive measures 
were available included imported vehicles and public works. The value of the 
capital stock for these groups was estimated for a base year by cumulating gross 
investment, in 1950 prices, beginning with the year 1900, for a number of years 
equivalent to one-half of the estimated useful life of the capital good. This 
methodology was based upon Goldsmith (1952). The estimates of the capital stock 
for benchmark years were extended by means of net annual investment series. The 
net investment series were derived by subtracting the estimated real depreciation of 
the capital stock from the gross investment series in accordance with the estimated 
useful life of each type of capital good. Table H.1 shows net capital stock, output 
and the capital-output ratio.3
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Table H.l Argentina: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, ECLAC 
Estimate, 1945—52 (thousand millions of pesos at 1950prices)
Years Net capital stock GDP Capital-output ratio
1945 116.0 40.9 2.84
1946 119.9 49.7 2.41
1947 125.9 56.8 2.22
1948 134.9 57.9 2.33
1949 142.7 53.1 2.69
1950 150.7 53.7 2.81
1951 157.3 53.3 2.95
1952 161.3 48.5 3.33
Source: ECLAC (1954).
A second major effort to study the historical trends in capital formation was 
initiated in 1956 with the establishment of a joint Argentine Government/United 
Nations study group to study the economic development of Argentina, United 
Nations (1959).4 This group, which consisted of over 100 professionals, made 
sectoral evaluations in a historical perspective. The estimates generated by this 
project were relatively independent from those of the 1954 study and the 
differences are quite substantial (see Table H.2).
In the appendix to the study,5 gross investment and capital stock estimates were 
given for the 1900-1955 period. The methodological explanation of how the data 
were obtained is very general. Reference to the studies of Ganz (1959) and Balboa 
and Fracchia (1959). The somewhat confused way of referring to other 
publications obscures the exact methodology used. Ganz stated that the differences 
between his estimates and those by Balboa/Fracchia were due to differences in 
classification and the inclusion of cattle stocks. Additionally, in the calculation of 
the long-term series from 1900 onwards, there was a slight difference in the 
treatment of depreciation (see Ganz, 1959, p. 242). However, it is not completely 
clear how the 1900-1935 series were calculated, as reference was also made to 
ECLAC (1954) and to the estimates made by Belaunde, which were based, 
partially, on direct estimates.
United Nations (1959) concluded, after a critical analysis of all sources and 
available data, that it was not possible to obtain an estimate of fixed capital stock 
through direct estimation on the basis of census material. They used the perpetual 
inventory approach in which the estimates were based on accumulation of net 
annual investment. Reliable estimates were available for domestic production of 
investment goods.
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Table H.2 Argentina: Net Capital, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, ECLAC 













1900 39.989 8.865 4.51 1928 145.833 33.169 4.40
1901 42.862 9.615 4.46 1929 154.185 34.696 4.44
1902 44.709 9.425 4.74 1930 160.251 33.264 4.82
1903 46.758 10.773 4.34 1931 161.167 30.955 5.21
1904 49.711 11.919 4.17 1932 160.032 29.926 5.35
1905 54.908 13.499 4.07 1933 159.402 31.333 5.08
1906 61.064 14.108 4.31 1934 160.521 33.806 4.75
1907 68.769 14.481 4.75 1935 161.732 35.298 4.31
1908 74.941 15.898 4.71 1936 161.963 35.550 4.56
1909 81.689 16.686 4.89 1937 165.218 38.145 4.33
1910 89.969 17.898 5.03 1938 169.423 38.289 4.42
1911 97.683 18.220 5.36 1939 171.537 39.746 4.32
1912 103.261 19.707 5.24 1940 172.399 40.399 4.27
1913 108.592 19.914 5.45 1941 172.885 42.468 4.07
1914 111.150 17.849 6.23 1942 173.118 42.965 4.03
1915 111.414 17.945 6.21 1943 173.024 42.645 4.06
1916 111.227 17.429 6.38 1944 174.222 47.468 3.67
1917 110.355 16.014 6.89 1945 175.387 45.950 3.82
1918 109.232 18.952 5.76 1946 178.429 50.035 3.57
1919 108.528 19.651 5.52 1947 187.348 55.600 3.37
1920 110.022 21.079 5.22 1948 196.310 58.679 3.34
1922 114.330 23.346 4.90 1950 208.062 58.599 3.55
1923 120.087 25.919 4.63 1951 214.151 60.423 3.54
1924 124.925 27.942 4.47 1952 218.076 56.441 3.86
1925 129.266 27.824 4.65 1953 221.439 59.499 3.72
1926 133.325 29.164 4.57 1954 226.101 62.072 3.64
1927 138.790 31.233 4.44 1955 231.737 64.661 3.58
Note." At factor costs.
Source: United Nations (1959, Annex I, p. 4 and Annex 3, p. 91).
Depreciation was estimated following Balboa and Fracchia (1959, pp. 
280-83): (a) determination of the probable average life of groups of goods; (b) the 
assumption that goods would be completely worn out by the last year of their 
probable life (that is, they would have no scrap value); and (c) the assumption that 
annual depreciation would represent a constant proportion of the value when new 
(straight-line depreciation). In Table H.2, net capital stock, GNP and the 
capital-output ratio are shown for the period 1900-1955.
Recently several capital stock estimations have been published. One of these, 
prepared by TF.F.RAT, (1986), was based to a great extent on previous work, 
especially United Nations (1959). Again the methodological explanation is very 
general, and for details the reader is referred to other publications which are very
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hard to get, being, in some cases, mimeographed manuscripts at regional 
universities. It is somewhat surprising that the outcome, in terms of the 
capital-output ratio, is so different from the 1959 United Nations study. IEERAL 
(1986) presents total capital stock in australes at 1960 prices, equal to the sum of 
fixed capital in agriculture, non-agricultural activity (excluding government) and 
government. Table H.3 shows net capital stock, gross domestic product and the 
capital-output ratio for the 1950-84 period.
Table H.3 Argentina: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, 















1950 1,700 690 2.5 1970 3,168 1,412 2.2
1951 1,734 717 2.4 1971 3,349 1,480 2.3
1952 1,784 680 2.6 1972 3,538 1,526 2.3
1953 1,836 717 2.6 1973 3,739 1,620 2.3
1954 1,873 746 2.5 1974 3,926 1,724 2.3
1955 1,921 800 2.4 1975 4,134 1,709 2.4
1956 1,967 822 2.4 1976 4,348 1,705 2.5
1957 2,023 864 2.3 1977 4,570 1,808 2.5
1958 2,076 917 2.3 1978 4,849 1,729 2.8
1959 2,139 858 2.5 1979 5,055 1,852 2.7
1960 2,185 925 2.4 1980 5,292 1,878 2.8
1961 2,280 991 2.3 1981 5,428 1,761 3.1
1962 2,392 975 2.4 1982 5,504 1,662 3.3
1963 2,473 951 2.6 1983 5,549 1,713 3.2
1964 2,537 1,050 2.4 1984 5,543 1,748 3.2
1965 2,602 1,146 2.3
1966 2,692 1,153 2.4
1967 2,7% 1,184 2.4
1968 2,890 1,235 2.3
1969 3,009 1,340 2.2
Note: a At factor costs.
Source: IEERAL (1986).
Another study was the Goldberg and Ianehilovici (1986) estimation of the 
gross stock, derived on the basis of a perpetual inventory approach. This study has 
the advantage of a clear and transparent description of its methodology. They 
applied a rectangular retirement pattern in which all assets of the same vintage are 
scrapped simultaneously. Repairs and maintenance were deducted from total 
capital formation. The average service life of assets is rather high; fluctuating 
between 56-71 years for construction, 15-24 years for machinery and equipment, 
and 13-25 years for transport equipment; given the fact that the major part (75.2 
per cent) of capital stock consists of construction, this gives an estimated average
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life for capital assets of about 52 years. Estimates of the total and non-residential 
capital stocks were presented. Table H.4 shows the relevant ratios.
Table H.4 Argentina: Capital-Output Ratios, Goldberg and lanchilovici 






















Source: Goldberg and lanchilovici (1986).
Table H.5 compares the estimates presented in this chapter with the 
standardised estimates contained in Chapter 5.
The differences between the first three estimates are rather big in terms of 
levels and growth rates. The results of the Goldberg and lanchilovici study are 
broadly similar to my own; the differences can largely be attributed due to different 
assumptions about average service life of assets, which produced a higher level of 
stocks and lower growth rates in the case of the Goldberg and lanchilovici study.
Appendix H 271
Table H.5 Argentina: Capital-Output (C/0) Ratio, 1950-86, Comparison of







































1950 2.8 3.6 2.5 1.9 3.3 1.7
1951 3.0 3.5 2.4 1.9 3.2 1.7
1952 3.3 3.9 2.6 2.1 3.5 1.8
1953 3.7 2.6 2.0 3.4 1.8
1954 3.6 2.5 2.0 3.4 1.7
1955 3.6 2.4 1.9 3.2 1.7
1956 2.4 1.9 3.3 1.7
1957 2.3 1.9 3.2 1.7
1958 2.3 1.9 3.1 1.7
1959 2.5 2.1 3.4 1.9
1960 2.4 2.0 3.3 1.8
1961 2.3 2.0 3.2 1.8
1962 2.5 2.1 3.4 2.0
1963 2.6 2.3 3.6 2.1
1964 2.4 2.1 3.4 2.0
1965 2.3 2.0 3.2 1.9
1966 2.4 2.1 3.3 1.9
1967 2.4 2.1 3.4 2.0
1968 2.3 2.1 3.3 1.9
1969 2.3 2.0 3.2 1.9
1970 2.2 3.7 2.2 2.0 3.2 1.9
1971 2.3 3.7 2.2 2.1 3.3 1.9
1972 2.3 3.8 2.3 2.2 3.4 2.0
1973 2.3 3.8 2.4 2.2 3.4 2.0
1974 2.3 3.7 2.3 2.2 3.4 2.0
1975 2.4 3.9 2.5 2.3 3.5 2.1
1976 2.6 4.0 2.5 2.4 3.6 2.2
1977 2.5 3.9 2.5 2.3 3.6 2.1
1978 2.8 4.2 2.7 2.5 3.9 2.3
1979 2.7 4.1 2.7 2.5 3.7 2.3
1980 2.8 4.2 2.7 2.5 3.8 2.3
1981 3.1 4.6 3.1 2.8 4.3 2.6
1982 3.3 5.0 3.3 3.0 4.6 2.8
1983 3.2 5.0 3.3 2.9 4.6 2.8
1984 3.2 4.9 3.2 2.8 4.5 2.7
1985 5.2 3.4 2.9 4.8 2.9
1986 4.9 3.2 2.7 4.5 2.7
Source: Appendix E and sources indicated in headings.
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CAPITAL STOCK IN BRAZIL
ECLAC (1954) provided the first capital stock estimates for Brazil. The general 
methodology was the same as for Argentina. 1940 wealth was estimated from the 
1940 census. This benchmark, expressed in 1950 prices, was extended year by 
year, in combination with estimates of gross and net investment. For 1945 
onwards, ECLAC (1954) gave figures for gross and net fixed investment that were 
deflated by the implicit gross product deflator. The results are shown in Table H.6.
Table H.6 Brazil: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, ECLAC 
Estimate, 1945-52 (thousands millions of cruzeiros at 1950prices)
Years Net capital stock GDP Capital-output ratio
1945 520.1 173.4 3.00
1946 535.5 190.9 2.81
1947 557.7 197.4 2.83
1948 576.3 209.8 2.75
1949 599.0 227.1 2.64
1950 624.6 240.6 2.60
1951 655.0 252.9 2.59
1952 693.1 271.9 2.55
Source: ECLAC (1954).
A second estimate was prepared shortly afterwards in a study of Brazil’s 
economic development by ECLAC and the Brazilian National Bank for Economic 
Development (United Nations, 1956). An initial stock (for 1939) was updated on a 
yearly basis with net investment over the period 1939-53, giving a series of net 
fixed reproducible capital as shown in Table H.7. They were shown in 1952 rather 
than 1950 prices. There was a significant difference between the two estimates, as 
reflected in the capital-output ratio.
Carlos Geraldo Langoni undertook a third study to estimate the capital stock 
using different assumptions with respect to disaggregated growth and depreciation 
rates (Langoni, 1974). On the basis of an unpublished study by the Brazilian 
Economic Institute, Getulio Vargas Foundation (1970), he disaggregated the 
capital stock into machinery and equipment (E), urban construction (U), rural 
construction (R) and imported capital goods (M). Table H.8 shows Langoni’s 
capital-output ratios and a clearly downward trend can be observed.
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Table H.7 Brazil: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, United 
Nations Estimate, 1939-53 (billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices)
Years Net capital stock GDP Capital-output ratio
1939 410 200.3 2.05
1940 421 200.3 2.10
1941 432 210.0 2.06
1942 443 203.5 2.18
1943 451 209.0 2.16
1944 458 219.4 2.09
1945 470 234.6 2.00
1946 477 257.7 1.85
1947 492 278.3 1.77
1948 519 294.1 1.76
1949 561 302.1 1.86
1950 593 324.1 1.83
1951 627 346.5 1.81
1952 667 360.9 1.85
1953 713 376.1 1.90
Source: United Nations (1956).
Table H.8 Brazil: GDP and Capital-Output Estimates, Langoni Estimate, 
1948-69 (thousands of cruzeiros at 1953prices)























Note: n.a. = not available. The 1964 estimate was not included as it was impossible to reproduce GDP 
for that year.
Source: Langoni (1974).
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Raymond W. Goldsmith’s (1986) book about Brazil’s long-term development 
includes capital stock estimates for the 1913-80 period. These are based on 
Langoni’s initial 1948 estimate which was adjusted by Goldsmith, incorporating 
updated estimates for GDP and capital formation made by the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation. Goldsmith took Langoni’s estimate as far back as 1913, using a rather 
ingenious aggregation procedure in which gross fixed capital formation is assumed 
to be 10 per cent of GDP6 and net fixed capital formation 57 per cent of gross 
capital formation, the averages for the 1949-68 period. The 1972-80 estimates are 
by Goldsmith himself (see Table H.9).
Table H.9 Brazil: Capital Stock, Gross and Net Capital Formation and 
Capital-Output Ratio, Goldsmith Estimate, 1913-80 (millions of cruzeiros)









1920 402 63 36 2.55
1924 429 48 27 2.13
1928 488 104 59 2.00
1932 525 65 37 2.45
1936 565 70 40 2.25
1940 647 143 82 2.10
1944 740 163 93 2.28
1948 841 178 101 2.11
1952 996 271 155 1.85
1956 1,165 312 169 1.72
1960 1,437 467 272 1.86
1964 1,831 648 394 2.04
1968 2,386 829 555 1.98
1972 3,281 1,316 895 1.77
1976 4,814 2,190 1,533 1.60
1980 6,758 2,700 1,944 1.96
Source: Goldsmith (1986).
Table H.10 shows a comparison of the different results and it becomes clear 
that the differences are rather substantial. The large difference between the 
Goldsmith and Langoni series is somewhat surprising. Goldsmith used the Langoni 
base year estimates, but his adjustment to this base year seems to have been 
significant.7
The standardised estimates and those of Goldsmith show similar levels around 
1980, although his growth rate differs markedly. It is also difficult to compare the 
different performances as Goldsmith uses a four year moving average. My results 
are very different from those of Langoni and the earlier United Nations studies.
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Table H.10 Brazil: Capital-Output (C/0) Ratio, 1950-80, Comparison of 







































1950 2.6 1.8 2.6 0.9 1.4 0.9
1951 2.6 1.8 2.6 1.0 1.5 1.0
1952 2.5 1.8 2.5 1.8 1.1 1.6 1.0
1953 1.9 2.6 1.2 1.7 1.1
1954 2.5 1.2 1.6 1.1
1955 2.4 1.2 1.7 1.1
1956 2.4 1.7 1.3 1.8 1.2
1957 2.3 1.3 1.8 1.2
1958 2.3 1.3 1.8 1.2
1959 2.3 1.3 1.9 1.3
1960 2.2 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.3
1961 2.0 1.3 1.8 1.3
1962 2.0 1.3 1.8 1.3
1963 2.1 1.4 1.9 1.3
1964 2.0 1.4 2.0 1.4
1965 2.2 1.4 2.0 1.4
1966 2.2 1.4 2.0 1.4
1967 2.2 1.5 2.1 1.4
1968 2.2 2.0 1.4 2.0 1.4
1969 2.2 1.4 1.9 1.3
1970 1.5 2.1 1.4
1971 1.5 2.0 1.4
1972 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.4
1973 1.4 1.9 1.4
1974 1.5 2.0 1.4
1975 1.6 2.1 1.5
1976 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.6
1977 1.7 2.2 1.6
1978 1.7 2.3 1.7
1979 1.8 2.4 1.8
1980 2.0 1.8 2.4 1.8
Source'. Appendix E  and sources in headings.
CAPITAL STOCK IN CHILE
The first person to estimate capital stock in Chile was Raúl Simón (1935). He 
compared national income and wealth with the USA for 1929-34. His estimates of 
net capital stock cited in ECLAC (1954) were derived from a study by Hasche 
(1951). I only have at my disposal the aggregated values of the United Nations 
study, as the original Hasche study is no longer available (see Table H .ll).
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Apparently it estimated the depreciated replacement value of fixed capital, by 
activity for 1938-49, based on the 1938 census of industry and company balance 
sheets for that year. The benchmark estimate for 1938 took into account detailed 
information on the age composition of the capital stock by type of capital good. 
The estimate was extended year by year, by depreciating existing capital and 
adding new investment.
Table H .ll Chile: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, ECLAC 
Estimate, 1945-52 (billions o f1950pesos)
Years Net capital stock GDP Capital-output ratio
1945 241.2 125.6 1.92
1946 247.8 123.9 2.00
1947 253.9 117.2 2.17
1948 260.9 129.6 2.01
1949 270.7 123.4 2.19
1950 277.3 124.7 2.22
1951 284.7 131.3 2.17
1952 292.0 138.2 2.11
Source-. ECLAC (1954).
The ECLAC (1954) study made various adjustments to the Hasche estimates. 
For the stock of capital of the agricultural sector, an estimate by the Corporación 
de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) was used. Hasche’s estimates were 
reworked to introduce different assumptions on the average length of life of assets. 
Unfortunately ECLAC did not give detailed information on the numerical 
implications of the different assumptions. ECLAC’s stock of capital may be 
defined as the depreciated replacement value (in 1950 prices) of reproducible 
tangible and durable capital goods. Land, consumer durable goods, inventories and 
monetary metal were excluded from the stock of capital goods.
Recently, various estimates of net capital stock have been published (Gutiérrez, 
1983) (see Table 5.12) and Haindl and Fuentes (1986) (see Table 5.13). These 
used the methodology developed by Harberger in his study on the rate of return to 
capital in Colombia (Harberger, 1972).
This methodology involved estimation of the initial capital stock, as follows:
GI = (5 + y)K
Here GI refers to gross investment, y to the annual rate of growth of the capital 
stock, 6 to the annual rate of depreciation and K  to the capital stock at the 
beginning of the year. Harberger assumed the growth rate of capital stock to be 
equal to a normal growth rate of gross domestic product or national income, after
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allowing for depreciation. Based on this definition of the initial net capital stock, 
the stock in subsequent years consists of the initial stock minus depreciation plus 
gross investment during the year less one-half year’s depreciation of new gross 
investment.
TableH.12 Chile: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, Gutiérrez 
Estimóte, 1950-82 (billions o f1977pesos)
Years
Net fixed capital stock
Construction/ 
other works




1950 333.8 40.2 374.0 135.7 2.8
1951 342.1 43.5 385.7 141.6 2.7
1952 351.2 48.0 399.2 149.7 2.7
1953 361.1 52.3 413.5 157.3 2.6
1954 373.9 55.3 429.3 158.1 2.7
1955 387.7 57.0 444.8 157.9 2.8
1956 403.3 60.4 463.8 158.8 2.9
1957 411.2 65.0 476.3 175.5 2.7
1958 415.9 72.7 488.0 180.3 2.7
1959 419.5 79.0 499.1 178.4 2.8
1960 427.6 81.5 509.2 187.1 2.7
1961 442.2 85.8 528.1 196.0 2.7
1962 454.1 92.4 546.6 205.3 2.7
1963 471.4 97.5 568.9 218.3 2.6
1964 490.4 100.3 590.8 223.1 2.7
1965 516.7 104.1 620.8 224.9 2.8
1966 535.5 105.7 641.3 250.0 2.6
1967 552.3 110.0 662.3 258.1 2.6
1968 569.0 114.5 683.5 267.4 2.6
1969 587.8 120.8 708.7 277.3 2.6
1970 608.1 126.2 734.3 283.0 2.6
1971 630.8 132.0 762.8 308.4 2.5
1972 653.4 135.7 789.1 304.7 2.6
1973 668.3 134.9 803.2 287.7 2.8
1974 678.6 135.7 814.3 290.5 2.8
1975 697.7 135.3 833.1 253.0 3.3
1976 705.1 135.0 840.1 261.9 3.2
1977 707.9 133.4 841.3 287.7 2.9
1978 711.2 136.3 847.5 311.4 2.7
1979 717.2 142.5 859.8 337.2 2.6
1980 727.5 151.0 878.6 362.6 2.4
1981 744.2 163.5 907.8 381.8 2.4
1982 765.9 179.1 945.0 336.0 2.8
Source: Gutiérrez (1983).
Tables H.12 and H.13 give the estimates of capital stock, GNP and 
capital-output ratio for both studies. The initial stock in Table H.12 is based upon 
an assumed capital stock growth rate of 3 per cent, which is approximately the
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growth rate of GNP in 1940-60 (3.4 per cent). Estimates for depreciation were 2.5 
per cent in construction and 10 per cent for machinery and equipment. Gross 
investment was calculated using national accounts. Normal investment was 
estimated by regression analysis of the national accounts investment series over the 
period 1940-80, excluding the period 1971-73. Once the initial stock estimation 
was made, the stock in subsequent years was estimated by the perpetual inventory 
method, although use was made of net fixed capital formation series.8
The initial stock in Table H.13 was based on a growth rate of 3.7 per cent 
(average growth during 1957-63, that is, three years before and three years after 
the base year), depreciation rates were 2.5 per cent for construction (40 years of 
service life) and 6.7 per cent for machinery and equipment (15 years). Normal 
investment was also estimated using regression analysis for the period 1960-70. In 
contrast with Harberger and Gutiérrez, Haindl and Fuentes did not depreciate gross 
investment for the previous year, when constructing their series.
Table H.13 Chile: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, Haindl and 
Fuentes Estimate, 1960-84 (billions o f1977pesos)
Years
Net fixed capital stock
Construction/ M&E 
other works




1960 430,525 125,330 555,855 187,229 2.97
1961 445,374 130,050 575,424 196,039 2.94
1962 457,542 137,260 594,802 205,169 2.90
1963 475,044 143,163 618,207 218,351 2.83
1964 500,440 146,841 647,281 223,443 2.90
1965 521,086 151,506 672,592 225,030 2.99
1966 540,184 154,012 694,196 250,329 2.77
1967 557,237 159,357 716,594 258,598 2.77
1968 574,164 165,032 739,196 267,286 2.77
1969 592,787 172,672 765,459 277,157 2.76
1970 613,871 179,482 793,353 282,695 2.81
1971 636,906 186,860 823,766 308,799 2.67
1972 659,858 191,913 851,771 304,586 2.80
1973 674,969 192,551 867,520 287,793 3.01
1974 685,423 194,709 880,132 290,257 3.03
1975 704,892 195,549 900,441 252,793 3.56
1976 712,387 196,321 908,708 262,027 3.47
1977 715,261 195,700 910,961 287,651 3.17
1978 718,630 199,684 918,314 311,226 2.95
1979 724,775 207,203 931,978 337,168 2.76
1980 735,288 217,281 952,569 363,028 2.62
1981 751,910 231,824 983,734 383,804 2.56
1982 773,902 250,350 1,024,252 329,621 3.11
1983 785,365 252,213 1,037,578 327,169 3.17
1984 795,062 248,074 1,043,136 347,923 3.00
Source: Haindl and Fuentes (1986).
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Table H. 14 Chile: Capital-Output (C/0) Ratio, 1950-84, Comparison o f























1950 2.2 2.8 2.3 3.6 2.1
1951 2.2 2.7 2.3 3.6 2.1
1952 2.1 2.7 2.2 3.6 2.0
1953 2.6 2.2 3.5 2.0
1954 2.7 2.3 3.6 2.1
1955 2.8 2.4 3.8 2.2
1956 2.9 2.5 3.9 2.2
1957 2.7 2.3 3.7 2.1
1958 2.7 2.4 3.7 2.2
1959 2.8 2.5 3.9 2.3
1960 2.7 3.0 2.4 3.8 2.3
1961 2.7 2.9 2.4 3.8 2.3
1962 2.7 2.9 2.4 3.8 2.3
1963 2.6 2.8 2.3 3.7 2.3
1964 2.7 2.9 2.4 3.8 2.4
1965 2.8 3.0 2.5 3.9 2.5
1966 2.6 2.8 2.3 3.7 2.3
1967 2.6 2.8 2.3 3.7 2.3
1968 2.6 2.8 2.3 3.7 2.3
1969 2.6 2.8 2.3 3.7 2.3
1970 2.6 2.8 2.4 3.7 2.3
1971 2.5 2.7 2.3 3.5 2.2
1972 2.6 2.8 2.4 3.7 2.3
1973 2.8 3.0 2.4 3.9 2.4
1974 2.8 3.0 2.4 3.9 2.4
1975 3.3 3.6 2.8 4.6 2.8
1976 3.2 3.5 2.7 4.5 2.8
1977 2.9 3.2 2.5 4.2 2.6
1978 2.7 2.9 2.4 4.0 2.4
1979 2.6 2.8 2.2 3.8 2.3
1980 2.4 2.6 2.1 3.6 2.2
1981 2.4 2.6 2.1 3.5 2.2
1982 2.8 3.1 2.5 4.2 2.6
1983 3.2 2.6 4.4 2.7
1984 3.0 2.4 4.2 2.6
Source: Appendix E and sources in headings.
Table H.14 compares the different results. The estimates are quite close, 
especially when compared with the outcomes for most of the other countries. The 
estimate for 1950 included in the 1954 ECLAC estimate is very similar to mine. 
The Gutiérrez and Haindl and Fuentes estimates show somewhat higher levels. 
However, the performance with respect to growth rates and changes between years
280 The Economic Development o f  Latin America
is very similar. The differences in level are to a large extent attributable to the 
procedure followed to calculate the initial capital stock. These cannot be explained 
by the differences in average asset life, which are rather small.
CAPITAL STOCK IN COLOMBIA
ECLAC’s study of Colombia’s economic development included a long-term 
estimate of fixed capital stock (ECLAC, 1957). This was defined as the 
depreciated replacement value (at 1950 prices) of reproducible, tangible and 
durable capital goods, including construction, agricultural improvements and 
livestock. The total estimate was based partly on direct calculations for the 
different sectors performed by ECLAC, and partly on accumulated gross 
investment over a period that corresponds to the average life of the respective 
capital category. Table H.15 shows capital, output and capital-output ratio for 
1950-53 in millions of 1950 pesos.
Table H.15 Colombia: Capital, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, ECLAC 
Estimate, 1950-53 (millions o f1950pesos)
Years Capital stock GDP Capital-output ratio
1950 20,197 6,322 3.23
1951 20,725 6,702 3.13
1952 21,264 7,164 2.94
1953 22,262 7,751 2.80
Source: United Nations (1957a).
In an influential paper first published in 1969, Harberger developed a 
methodology to estimate the stock of fixed capital in Colombia, in view of the fact, 
as he stated, that there were no estimates of the total fixed capital stock of 
Colombia -  or even of major segments of it such as fixed reproducible capital -  
for any year (Harberger, 1972). He was obviously unaware of the studies made by 
ECLAC in the 1950s. His basic methodology was to estimate stock of capital 
through gross investment and, especially, assumptions about the growth of the 
capital stock and its depreciation rate (see also Harberger, 1972, p. 119). The 
growth rate of the capital stock was assumed to be the same as some other proxy 
growth rate.
For Colombia, Harberger used the growth rate of GDP of almost exactly 5 per 
cent per annum from 1950 to 1953. He assumed that the normal rate of growth of 
capital in the form of buildings and other construction works was also 5 per cent 
for that time. However, because of the likelihood that war-induced shortages of 
machinery and equipment had not been completely overcome, he assumed that
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stocks of those assets had a slightly higher normal growth rate of some 6 per cent 
per year during this period. Harberger used two sets of assumptions with regard to 
depreciation. He distinguished between asset lives of 40 to 50 years in construction 
and 12.5 to 20 years in machinery and equipment. The depreciation rates he chose, 
together with the abovementioned growth rates and gross investment data, 
generated the capital stocks shown in Table H.16.
Table H.16 Colombia: Alternative Capital Stock Estimates, GDP and 
Capital-Output Ratio, Harberger Estimate, 1952-67 (billions o f1958 pesos)
Years (1) (2) 







1952 31.64 36.59 16.1 1.97 2.27
1953 33.00 38.28 17.1 1.93 2.24
1954 35.30 40.91 18.3 1.93 2.24
1955 38.13 44.09 19.0 2.01 2.32
1956 41.05 47.42 19.7 2.08 2.41
1957 43.58 50.39 20.2 2.16 2.49
1958 45.83 53.08 20.7 2.21 2.56
1959 46.85 54.56 22.2 2.11 2.46
1960 48.09 56.24 23.1 2.09 2.43
1961 49.95 58.51 24.3 2.06 2.41
1962 52.08 61.04 25.6 2.03 2.38
1963 54.14 63.55 26.5 2.04 2.40
1964 55.77 65.61 28.1 1.98 2.33
1965 57.85 69.13 29.1 1.99 2.38
1966 59.58 71.30 30.7 1.94 2.32
1967 61.61 73.72 31.9 1.93 2.31
Notes:
a asset lives: construction, 40 years and machinery and equipment, 12.5 years 
b asset lives: construction, 50 years and machinery and equipment, 20 years
Source-. Harberger (1972).
In a recent study, Henao presented an alternative approach to Harberger’s initial 
capital stock estimation methodology (Henao, 1983). Equations (1) and (2) 
disaggregate the capital stock in machinery and equipment and equations (3)-(5) 
generate the total capital stock. Table H.17 shows Henao's estimates and the 
resulting capital-output ratio.
(1) KPTt = KMEt + KCt KPTt = total fixed private capital stock
in yeart
(2) Dt = SaKMEt + SbKCt KMEt = fixed private capital stock in
machinery and equipment in year t
(3) Dt = ScKPTt KCt = total fixed private capital in
construction in year t
(4) KPTt = KPTt-1 + Ibt -D t 5a, 8b, Sc = depreciation rates
(5) KPTt-1 = DT (1/dc + 1)- Ibt Ibt = gross investment in year t
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Table H.17 Colombia: Total Fixed Capital Stock, GNP and Capital-Output 
Ratio, Henao Estimate, 1950-81 (thousands o f1970pesos)
Years Fixed capital stock GNP Capital-output
ratio
1950 168,039
1951 172,831 51,325 3.38
1952 177,312 54,556 3.27
1953 182,378 57,853 3.25
1954 191,222 61,816 3.15
1955 202,122 64,288 3.09
1956 213,504 66,859 3.19
1957 223,375 63,395 3.27
1958 228,310 70,063 3.26
1959 232,421 75,147 3.09
1960 237,372 78,298 3.03
1961 244,572 82,352 2.97
1962 252,860 86,750 2.91
1963 260,871 89,614 2.91
1964 267,159 95,134 2.80
1965 275,227 98,569 2.79
1966 281,943 103,040 2.71
1967 289,777 108,180 2.68
1968 298,543 114,829 2.60
1969 309,680 122,128 2.53
1970 321,283 130,861 2.46
1971 335,592 137,889 2.43
1972 350,972 148,630 2.36
1973 365,461 159,195 2.20
1974 380,770 168,787 2.26
1975 398,098 175,226 2.27
1976 414,936 183,296 2.27
1977 432,058 192,187 2.25
1978 450,094 209,369 2.15
1979 468,573 220,006 2.13
1980 493,511 228,805 2.15
1981 520,081 235,054 2.21
Source: Henao (1983).
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Table H.18 Colombia: Capital-Output (C/0) Ratio, 1950-81, Comparison of
Standardised and Existing Estimates (on the basis of national currencies)
ECLAC Harberger Henao (1983) Standarised estimates of tins
(1957) (1972) study
Years Total Total Total Total Total Gross
net net net net gross non-res.
C/O C/O C/O C/O C/O C/O
ratio ratio ratio ratio ratio ratio
1950 3.2 1.9 2.9 2.2
1951 3.1 3.4 1.9 2.9 2.2
1952 2.9 2.0 3.3 1.8 2.8 2.1
1953 1.9 3.2 1.8 2.8 2.1
1954 1.9 3.1 1.8 2.8 2.1
1955 2.0 3.1 1.9 2.9 2.1
1956 2.1 3.2 1.9 2.9 2.2
1957 2.2 3.3 1.9 3.0 2.2
1958 2.2 3.3 1.9 3.0 2.3
1959 2.1 3.1 1.8 2.9 2.2
1960 2.1 3.0 1.8 2.9 2.2
1961 2.1 3.0 1.8 2.9 2.1
1962 2.0 2.9 1.8 2.8 2.1
1963 2.0 2.9 1.7 2.8 2.1
1964 2.0 2.8 1.7 2.8 2.0
1965 2.0 2.8 1.7 2.8 2.0
1966 1.9 2.7 1.6 2.7 2.0
1967 1.9 2.7 1.6 2.7 2.0
1968 2.6 1.6 2.6 1.9
1969 2.5 1.6 2.5 1.9
1970 2.5 1.6 2.5 1.8
1971 2.4 1.6 2.4 1.8
1972 2.4 1.5 2.4 1.8
1973 2.2 1.5 2.4 1.7
1974 2.3 1.5 2.4 1.7
1975 2.3 1.6 2.4 1.8
1976 2.3 1.6 2.4 1.8
1977 2.2 1.6 2.4 1.8
1978 2.1 1.5 2.4 1.8
1979 2.1 1.5 2.3 1.8
1980 2.1 1.5 2.4 1.8
1981 2.2 1.6 2.5 1.9
Source: Appendix E and sources in headings.
Formula (5) gives capital stock and the only dependent variables are 
depreciation, the depreciation rate and gross investment. Thus, the main difference 
with the Harberger methodology is that no assumption is necessary regarding 
growth of the capital stock. An initial estimate was made with the depreciation 
rates of ECLAC (1957) (Sc = 0.0346, Sa = 0.05733 and 8b = 0.02862), resulting 
in a total stock of $141,305,9 million for 1950. Given this stock, Henao estimated 
the depreciation rates which ‘minimized’ the differences between depreciation in
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this estimated capital stock and the depreciation estimates in the national accounts. 
The result was Sc = 0.036, da - 0.0659 and Sb = 0.0269.
For public capital, a long series from 1925-81 of public investment was 
available. Henao first estimated the initial capital stock in 1925 and this initial 
capital stock was then updated. From the 1950s onwards the original error in the 
1925 estimate does not affect the total series to any great extent.
Table H.18 compares the different results. The capital stock levels are rather 
different. The results of the Harberger study and my results coincide, but they 
differ by a constant factor as both capital-output ratios remain almost the same, 
while the Henao estimate shows a clear downward trend.
CAPITAL STOCK IN MEXICO
In the early 1950s ECLAC published some estimates of the capital stock in 
Mexico which were based upon the accumulation of gross investment data for a 
number of years equivalent to one-half of the estimated useful life of the stock of 
capital (ECLAC, 1954). The methodology was based upon the perpetual inventory 
method described in Goldsmith (1952). Investment data for the period 1925-38 
was obtained from ECLAC (1951) and for 1939-50 from the Combined Mexican 
Working Party (1953) (see Table H.19).
In 1957, ECLAC published another study which contained rather different 
figures, especially with regard to capital stock (see Table H.20). It consisted of a 
preliminary estimate of Mexico’s geographical assets in 1950, defined narrowly as 
‘tangible reproducible wealth’ (United Nations, 1957b). In 1969, the Banco de 
México published a comprehensive system of national accounts which included 
capital stock (Banco de México, 1969). The information was based upon national 
censuses and data obtained from the Statistics Division of the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade. Additional information was obtained through surveys or directly from 
public and private enterprises. However, the methodological explanation given for 
this study is very vague. It remains quite unclear how the initial stock was 
measured. Table H.21 shows the basic information at constant 1960 prices.
Table H.19 Mexico: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, ECLAC 
Estimate, 1950-52 (billions o f1950pesos)
Net capital stock GDP Capital-output ratio
1950 77.3 43.2 1.79
1951 83.8 45.1 1.86
1952 89.6 45.8 1.96
Source: ECLAC (1954).
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Table H.20 Mexico: Net Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, ECLAC 
Estimate, 1950-55 (billions o f1950 pesos)
Years Net capital stock GDP Capital-output ratio
1950 93.5 43.3 2.16
1951 96.4 47.8 2.02
1952 100.9 47.4 2.13
1953 105.5 49.3 2.14
1954 109.1 53.4 2.04
1955 112.9 57.7 1.96
Source: United Nations (1957b).
Table H.21 Mexico: Total Fixed Net Capital Stock, Banco de Mexico Estimate, 
1950-67 (millions o f1960pesos)









1950 235,857 140,246 79,936 15,675 85,319 2.76
1951 248,873 147,395 85,456 16,022 91,732 2.71
1952 262,323 155,444 90,312 16,567 94,480 2.78
1953 273,413 161,365 94,922 17,126 99,587 2.75
1954 285,427 168,332 99,408 17,687 105,012 2.72
1955 298,637 175,756 104,502 18,379 113,315 2.64
1956 314,871 185,128 110,858 18,885 119,372 2.64
1957 331,885 194,767 117,407 19,711 128,335 2.59
1958 347,297 203,919 123,098 20,280 134,225 2.59
1959 362,825 212,902 129,000 20,923 140,058 2.59
1960 380,692 223,696 135,359 21,637 150,511 2.53
1961 399,480 234,354 142,455 22,671 156,664 2.55
1962 417,907 245,570 149,110 23,227 165,518 2.52
1963 439,482 258,672 156,977 23,833 179,920 2.44
1964 467,245 274,479 168,173 24,593 199,609 2.34
1965 495,964 289,765 181,051 25,148 212,139 2.34
1966 528,508 307,654 195,060 25,794 229,151 2.31
1967 565,805 328,082 211,245 26,478 245,499 2.30
Source: Banco de México (1969).
For the period 1960-85,1 obtained six diskettes from the Banco de México 
containing very detailed information, in current and constant prices, on capital 
formation. Table H.22 gives a summary of the information on capital stock and 
depreciation. These diskettes do not give any methodological explanation, and 
analysis of the period covered by both, 1960 and 1970 base-year Banco de México 
series, brings one to the conclusion that there are great discrepancies between the 
two series. It is probable that the Banco de México diskettes contain some kind of 
error, as the capital stock is very low compared, for example, with the stock in
1960 prices presented in Table H.21 and, therefore, the results are not presented in 
the summary Table H.23.
286 The Economic Development o f  Latin America
Table H. 22 Mexico: Gross and Net Capital Stock, Banco de Mexico Estimate, 
1960-85 (millions ofl970 pesos)
Total Stock Construction M&E
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
1960 97,304 60,304 57,586 36,469 39,718 23,835
1961 105,061 65,634 62,167 39,671 42,894 25,963
1962 112,154 69,010 64,817 40,572 47,337 28,438
1963 123,036 75,834 69,649 43,445 53,381 32,389
1964 135,387 83,286 74,377 46,058 61,010 37,228
1965 145,893 88,860 78,108 47,738 67,785 41,122
1966 156,874 95,715 81,039 48,467 75,835 47,248
1967 171,387 104,526 85,972 51,242 85,415 53,284
1968 181,674 109,109 89,474 53,326 92,200 55,783
1969 195,532 116,433 93,426 54,959 102,106 61,474
1970 222,241 134,742 104,720 63,658 117,521 71,084
1971 242,038 145,916 111,489 67,740 130,549 78,176
1972 260,358 156,690 118,128 71,572 142,230 85,118
1973 283,092 170,166 124,995 75,750 158,097 94,416
1974 300,485 177,349 130,177 77,801 170,308 99,548
1975 323,956 190,802 133,617 79,356 190,339 111,446
1976 355,915 209,363 143,441 85,270 212,474 124,092
1977 378,471 218,481 150,324 88,709 228,147 129,772
1978 399,354 227,553 152,704 87,732 246,649 139,821
1979 419,416 237,844 155,845 87,686 263,571 150,158
1980 444,374 250,815 162,857 90,982 281,517 159,832
1981 478,776 276,886 170,082 95,343 308,694 181,543
1982 527,167 306,424 177,438 98,022 349,730 208,402
1983 536,173 297,402 180,617 96,588 355,557 200,814
1984 538,302 284,509 182,176 93,632 356,126 190,877
1985 543,941 276,046 182,175 89,994 361,767 186,053
Source: Banco de México (1986a).
Table H.23 compares the results of the different studies. It is clear that growth 
rates as well as levels of capital stock differ substantially according to the study 
used.
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Table H.23 Mexico: Capital-Output (C/0) Ratio, 1950-67, Comparison of





Banco de Mexico 
(1969)
Standarised estimates of this 
study
Years Total Total Total Total Total gross Total
Net net net net non-res. net
C/O C/O C/O C/O C/O C/O
Ratio ratio ratio ratio ratio ratio
1950 1.8 2.2 2.8 1.2 1.7 1.4
1951 1.9 2.0 2.7 1.3 1.7 1.4
1952 2.0 2.1 2.8 1.3 1.9 1.5
1953 2.1 2.7 1.4 1.9 1.6
1954 2.0 2.7 1.4 2.0 1.6
1955 2.0 2.6 1.4 2.0 1.6
1956 2.6 1.5 2.0 1.7
1957 2.6 1.5 2.1 1.7
1958 2.6 1.5 2.1 1.7
1959 2.6 1.6 2.2 1.8
1960 2.5 1.6 2.2 1.8
1961 2.5 1.6 2.2 1.8
1962 2.5 1.6 2.3 1.8
1963 2.4 1.6 2.2 1.8
1964 2.3 1.5 2.1 1.7
1965 2.3 1.6 2.2 1.7
1966 2.3 1.6 2.2 1.7
1967 2.3 1.6 2.2 1.7
Source: Appendix E and sources in headings.
CAPITAL STOCK IN VENEZUELA
Information regarding Venezuela’s capital stock is scarce. The only available 
sources are the reports by the Central Bank of Venezuela (Banco Central de 
Venezuela, 1958, 1968 and 1991) and the interesting work by Asdrubal Baptista 
(1991). The Central Bank of Venezuela gives net fixed capital stock estimates for 
the period 1950-65. The methodology used for the estimation of depreciated 
renewable fixed capital was based on a measure of gross investment, depreciation 
and inventories of machinery and equipment, infrastructure, construction works, 
buildings and livestock in each of twelve different sectors. The base year of the 
series was 1957 for which the best data on prices were available. To obtain a 
capital stock estimate for 1950, the Central Bank extended several series 
retroactively (see Table H.24). Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain these 
series, which might facilitate estimation of a gross fixed capital stock for the period 
1950-85.
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Table H.24 Venezuela: Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, Banco 
Central Estimate, 1950-65 (millions o f1957 bolívares)




1950 26,523 12,728 2.08
1951 28,484 14,212 2.00
1952 31,326 15,248 2.05
1953 34,342 16,190 2.12
1954 37,840 17,749 2.13
1955 40,821 19,325 2.11
1956 44,033 21,366 2.06
1957 47,485 23,848 1.99
1958 50,032 24,164 2.07
1959 53,442 26,065 2.05
1960 55,250 26,433 2.09
1961 56,370 26,881 2.10
1962 57,499 28,585 2.01
1963 58,800 29,765 1.98
1964 60,769 32,326 1.88
1965 63,512 33,966 1.87
Source: Banco Central de Venezuela (1958,1968 and 1991).
A very complete source of information is the study by Asdrubal Baptista (1991) 
who gives net and gross capital stock estimates based upon the perpetual inventory 
method (see Table H.25). He also presents his basic investment series, making it 
possible to reproduce his results using different assumptions on service life, 
depreciation and mortality. His assumptions about service life are somewhat lower 
than those of the standardised method: 15 years for machinery and equipment in 
general; 12 years for machinery and equipment in the oil sector; 10 years for 
transport equipment; and 35 years for railroad equipment.
Non-residential structures have a service life of 35 years (with the exception of 
non-residential structures in the oil sector whose service life is 25 years). Finally, 
residential structures have a service life of 50 years. Baptista presents a brief but 
careful description of methodology and limitations of capital stock estimation. He 
obtained estimates of net fixed capital stock by using straight-line depreciation. In 
Table H.26 the summary information on Venezuela is presented.
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Table H.25 Venezuela: Total Capital Stock, GDP and Capital-Output Ratio, 
Baptista Estimate, 1950-89 (millions o f1984 bolívares)
Years
Total fixed capital stock GDP Capital-output ratio
Gross Net Gross Net
1950 204,484 151,885 118,302 1.73 1.28
1951 223,583 166,212 131,064 1.71 1.27
1952 245,283 182,771 141,209 1.74 1.29
1953 268,080 197,327 145,476 1.84 1.36
1954 291,738 214,292 159,396 1.83 1.34
1955 315,967 230,748 176,458 1.79 1.31
1956 341,693 249,444 195,804 1.75 1.27
1957 374,083 277,869 223,881 1.67 1.24
1958 409,104 302,504 221,948 1.84 1.36
1959 440,611 323,005 236,235 1.87 1.37
1960 466,434 332,950 236,538 1.97 1.41
1961 486,443 336,272 234,296 2.08 1.44
1962 502,735 339,685 250,428 2.01 1.36
1963 516,716 343,271 259,343 1.99 1.32
1964 531,818 350,269 278,625 1.91 1.26
1965 550,662 358,814 293,438 1.88 1.22
1966 568,546 366,443 295,567 1.92 1.24
1967 585,913 375,994 309,508 1.89 1.21
1968 607,822 391,681 326,847 1.86 1.20
1969 634,611 409,621 333,407 1.90 1.23
1970 663,990 428,450 356,089 1.86 1.20
1971 697,217 451,744 359,015 1.94 1.26
1972 734,131 481,329 357,839 2.05 1.35
1973 775,080 512,125 378,642 2.05 1.35
1974 819,734 541,515 377,397 2.17 1.43
1975 871,163 585,101 374,377 2.33 1.56
1976 934,716 642,443 403,266 2.32 1.59
1977 1,019,109 722,758 427,309 2.38 1.69
1978 1,121,236 805,062 439,127 2.55 1.83
1979 1,222,748 865,201 440,823 2.77 1.96
1980 1,313,760 909,513 418,811 3.14 2.17
1981 1,393,171 949,957 419,643 3.32 2.26
1982 1,459,407 979,308 423,378 3.45 2.31
1983 1,502,188 983,066 408,989 3.67 2.40
1984 1,528,847 969,200 391,765 3.90 2.47
1985 1,546,119 958,178 396,319 3.90 2.42
1986 1,562,588 955,273 419,977 3.72 2.27
1987 1,577,165 950,411 431,714 3.65 2.20
1988 1,601,080 961,136 463,540 3.45 2.07
1989 1,615,436 940,778 427,011 3.78 2.20
Source'. Baptista (1991).
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Table H.26 Venezuela: Capital-Output (C/O) Ratio, 1950-89, Comparison of 
Standardised and Existing Estimates (on the basis of national currencies)




( 7 0  ratio
Baptista (1991) Standarised estimâtes of this study
Total 
gross 
D O  ratio
Total 
net 
D O  ratio
Total 
net 
D O  ratio
Total 
gross 
D O  ratio
Gross 
non-res. 
D O  ratio
1950 2.1 1.7 1.3 2.1 2.9 2.5
1951 2.0 1.7 1.3 2.1 2.9 2.5
1952 2.0 1.7 1.3 2.2 3.0 2.6
1953 2.1 1.8 1.4 2.3 3.1 2.7
1954 2.1 1.8 1.3 2.3 3.2 2.7
1955 2.1 1.8 1.3 2.4 3.2 2.8
1956 2.1 1.7 1.3 2.4 3.2 2.7
1957 2.0 1.7 1.2 2.3 3.1 2.7
1958 2.1 1.8 1.4 2.5 3.4 2.9
1959 2.1 1.9 1.4 2.4 3.4 2.9
1960 2.1 2.0 1.4 2.5 3.6 3.1
1961 2.1 2.1 1.4 2.4 3.5 3.0
1962 2.0 2.0 1.4 2.2 3.3 2.8
1963 2.0 2.0 1.3 2.1 3.2 2.7
1964 1.9 1.9 1.3 2.0 3.0 2.5
1965 1.9 1.9 1.2 2.0 3.0 2.5
1966 1.9 1.2 2.0 3.0 2.5
1967 1.9 1.2 2.0 3.0 2.5
1968 1.9 1.2 1.9 3.0 2.4
1969 1.9 1.2 2.0 3.0 2.4
1970 1.9 1.2 1.9 2.9 2.3
1971 1.9 1.3 1.9 2.9 2.3
1972 2.0 1.3 2.0 3.0 2.4
1973 2.0 1.3 2.0 3.0 2.3
1974 2.2 1.4 2.0 2.9 2.3
1975 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.9 2.3
1976 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.9 2.3
1977 2.4 1.7 2.1 3.0 2.4
1978 2.5 1.8 2.3 3.3 2.6
1979 2.8 2.0 2.5 3.5 2.8
1980 3.1 2.2 2.7 3.8 3.0
1981 3.3 2.3 2.8 4.0 3.2
1982 3.4 2.3 2.9 4.2 3.3
1983 3.7 2.4 3.1 4.7 3.7
1984 3.9 2.5 3.2 4.8 3.8
1985 3.9 2.4 3.2 4.9 3.9
1986 3.7 2.3 3.0 4.7 3.7
1987 3.6 2.2 2.9 4.7 3.7
1988 3.4 2.1 2.7 4.5 3.5
1989 3.8 2.2 2.9 5.0 3.9
Source: Appendix E and sources in headings.
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NOTES
1. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean undertook a 
series of studies on economic development and capital stock estimation which included four of 
our countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico), in ECLAC (1954) some estimates 
were also given for Chile.
2. Apparently this study by Belaúnde, who formed part of the Alejandro Bunge group which 
studied Argentina’s wealth at the beginning of the twentieth century (see Bunge, 1917), was 
never published.
3. The length-of-service-life assumptions used for estimating depreciation were as follows: 
agricultural improvements, 50 years; agricultural machinery, 20 years; producers durable 
equipment (non-agricultural), 20 years; vehicles, 20 years; buildings, 50 years; railroad 
equipment and construction and improvements, 33 years; public works, 50 years.
4. The study was carried out in Argentina and at the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, under the direction of Raúl Prebisch.
5. Anexo m, ‘Inversión Bruta y Capital Existente en la Argentina, por Sectores Económicos y por 
Tipo de Inversión y Capital, 1900-1955’, pp. 77-105.
6. Goldsmith used the GDP estimates of Haddad (1980).
7. See Goldsmith (1986, p. 154).
8. See Gutiérrez (1983, pp. 205-10).
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